Bitcoin Forum

Ce service est vraiment sous-coté sur le forum, et je trouve ça assez étonnant.

 . . .

  :o

 Maintenant que tu en parle c'est vrai qu'ils sont étonnamment anciens !

 Je suppose c'est le marketing "agressif" qui peut faire toute la différence ou pas peut-être! ???

Our domain exch.cx was suspended by Lyubomir Gyundzhiev from Key-Systems who misread our abuse report resulting into suspension of the victim's domain instead of attacker's.

Welcome to 2024 where incompetence is an important skill for being employed by domain registrar companies. The inability to read simple texts is awarded.

Accidently suspending something like a multi-million company's (https://platform.arkhamintelligence.com/explorer/entity/exch) domain must be some kind of trend nowadays.  

Temporarily new domain till these guys resolve it: exch.PW

https://exch.pw

https://talkimg.com/images/2024/03/13/JaPlH.png


We will be moving to some new domain zone soon that is not managed by CentralNic or Key-Systems, since these companies demonstrated inability to handle simple issues and even making negligent harm during issue resolution.

 Par ailleurs qu'en est-il des taux de conversion? C'est généralement le point noir des services de swaps.

Ben leurs taux sont visibles, affichés.. et comme pour tout échange tu n'as qu'à regarder et comprer, non ?!! ???

Ou dis-nous au moins quels outils tu utilises pour pouvoir les comparer rapidement, par exemple pour vendre ou acheter des LTC contre des XMR.

classique je n'ai pas besoin de comparer, car je place mon ordre au prix où j'ai envie d'acheter ou de vendre,
 (PS : j'adore les oneliners de surdoués sur les forums "taka chercher sur google" ok bro, tyvm very helpful comment...)  ; )    ,  ok bo!

Ok d'accord,


mais dis moi moi d'abord :


Si je comprends, pour là maintenant si tu as envie d'acheter BTC à 59k il te suffit de placer un ordre sur un échange conventionnel ! ??  ???
 ( cours à l'heure: https://i.postimg.cc/sgK5csg6/Screenshot-20240821-234517-Chrome.jpg )

--snip--
Je ne sais pas si il existe un concours pour cela mais j'ai des ordres qui datent de plusieurs années sur des exchanges et qui sont toujours en cours. J'en ai même qui datent depuis 2018 pour des shitcoins LOL

Avec ce post, je lance un appel à tous ceux d'entre vous qui voudraient signaler ces deux sites web. Cela ne prend que 2 minutes. Si vous avez la gentillesse de faire ces signalements, veuillez utiliser ce lien : https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/?hl=en.

Et meeeerde :


Y'a des coups de projecteurs que certain(e)s plateformes/produits voudraient éviter.
Prochaine news d'ici quelque semaines/mois : fermeture d'exch.cx ou arrestation des créateurs...

[April 2025] We are aware that there is an ongoing operation targeting our service by some law enforcement agencies with the goal of adding us to the OFAC sanctions list and possibly seizing our infrastructure (good luck to them, nevertheless). Since it's primarily coming from U.S.-based agencies, we will update our ToS to inform our users in the U.S. not to use our service and warn them about the risks of being prosecuted in their country for using a service like ours. Since we have no logs or any IP-detecting capabilities, we won't be able to enforce this policy; thus, we can't be held responsible for any regulatory violations. We have already developed a legal framework to ensure that the responsibility for regulatory violations is applied to our customers and not to us, which will also be outlined in the ToS. This might also apply to some countries in EU with the worst recent regulatory updates that target privacy services, however, it's not confirmed yet.

J'espère qu'ils éviteront les balles, mais ça va être compliqué.
Mais ça a suffit pour que Theymos "recadre" les membres du Staff qui particpaient à la campagne de signature :) (Je comprends sa position)

Prohibited jurisdictions: None (we are unable to detect customers country anyway because we have IP-logging disabled and none of our software pieces process such information)

Eligibility: Any person can create and perform exchange operations on our service. We do not discriminate or have any rejection criteria.

Almost all of you know that eXch started as a project aimed at demonstrating to the community that alternatives can exist during times when there were none. We have never had any financial goals with this project and rather, we conducted an experiment that was unexpectedly successful.

Recently, we received confirmation of information we had previously, thanks to some friends we have even in the state intelligence sector, that our project is the subject of an active transatlantic operation aimed at forcibly shutting our project down and prosecuting us for "money laundering and terrorism."

Even though we have been able to operate despite some failed attempts to shutdown our infrastructure (attempts that have also been confirmed to be part of this operation), we don't see any point in operating in a hostile environment where we are the target of SIGINT simply because some people misinterpret our goals. Starting from the date of the merger with a new management team this month, and as a result of some urgent meetings, the majority of us voted to cease and retreat instead of going against strong winds, because none of us want to cause any harm to innocent people or this forum.

The goals we certainly never had in mind were to enable illicit activities such as money laundering or terrorism, as we are being accused of now. We also have absolutely no motivation to operate a project where we are viewed as criminals. This doesn't make any sense to us.

Originally, we were just a team of privacy enthusiasts with main areas of interest quite distant from cryptocurrency, where we saw the absolutely unfair happenings. This project was an attempt to restore balance in this industry.

Our project has demonstrated that an instant exchange done properly can be more effective than any centralized mixer in terms of privacy, which is why it has been referred to as "a mixer" many times by third parties, even though we have continuously rejected this label.

Our project has shown that it's possible to operate without abusing customers with nonsensical policies, unlike projects that will accept this announcement as a "weight lifted off their shoulders" that pretend to believe the false idea that confiscating crypto from customers somehow prevents "money laundering", who rely on random and unreliable scoring systems created and operated by companies that are parasites aiming to extract money from their governments by providing consulting based on the segregation of the crypto space and blockchain data. If we were to look at these projects from the perspective of "preventing money laundering and terrorism financing", any instant exchangers that screen their customer deposits using third-party APIs and appeal to nonsensical AML/KYC terms are far from preventing money laundering and terrorism. If they were serious about this, they would need to stop hiding behind shelf offshore companies and start conducting strict due diligence on every customer, which none of them do in reality. The absurdity is compounded by the absolute uselessness of the address score reporting APIs they use, as any of these screening mechanisms can be easily bypassed.

Our project will also demonstrate that even without it, this space will continue to have ways and instruments for those engaging in illicit activities to effectively "launder" their funds. Thus, the goal of stopping eXch under the belief that it may stop all money laundering in the world is ridiculous.

Meanwhile, our project effectively provided privacy to all our customers and even anonymity to most. However, there are still far more effective ways to achieve it, thanks to these flagship projects that exist nowadays:

- Monero, with its total privacy, although not without some recently discovered issues that are serious and should be fixed with the Full-Chain Membership Proofs implementation
- Litecoin, with its optional privacy (MWEB)
- Dash, with its optional privacy
- Tornado Cash
- Bitcoin CoinJoin protocols

Another distinctive project that does not betray its mission is Thorchain. Even under the immense pressure that the whole industry had to deal with due to the irresponsible actions of those at ByBit, Thorchain was the only decentralized protocol that resisted the pressure to implement screening mechanisms at the protocol level, proving itself to be absolutely reliable. Even though all Thorchain trades are transparent on-chain, privacy and even total untraceability can be easily achieved when combined with some of the privacy-enabling projects mentioned above, when used correctly. However, the Thorchain network currently has a very limited choice of good interfaces, aside from Asgardex and MMGen wallets, and none of them are privacy-preserving, but we hope this can change.

Bitcoin privacy remains, however, in the midst of a notable crisis given the collapse of all important projects and protocols that had significant liquid CoinJoin-like pools. The most interesting and convenient of them in terms of usability remains WabiSabi; however, it needs some lightweight implementations to achieve greater popularity in order to effectively prevent serious risks associated with Sybil attacks. We certainly know that most people in this space prefer lightweight solutions to heavy software solutions, and this factor can significantly affect the popularity and usage of any good project.

Given this, we are announcing a 50 BTC open-source fund to support any FOSS projects aiming to enhance the availability of privacy solutions. We hope we can still make a difference. Here are examples of the projects we will support:

- Bitcoin wallets and protocols aiming to preserve user privacy
- Thorchain wallets aiming to preserve user privacy
- Bisq Light Client
- Ethereum wallets and smart contracts aiming to preserve user privacy (an example of such might be a "non-rigged" fork of Railgun smart contracts and wallets allowing users to operate in Tor)

Unfortunately, we will not support projects that are written in Java, JavaScript, Go, or C#, especially developers who don't take module chain supply attacks seriously and believe they're some kind of "conspiracy theory".

There will be other projects that will hopefully take our place as the industry leader in privacy-oriented centralized exchanges, and we wish them success.

Our partners will still have access to our API for a limited time, but what happens after May 1st will depend on our new management team, who will be in possession of all access to our infrastructure. Thus, we recommend launching their own liquidity pools to guarantee seamless operation. We will provide consulting and recommendations to them.

Privacy is not a crime.

[thread locked for a few days for propagation]

Ouch, je m'attendais à des jours compliqués pour eXch, ils avaient l'air confiants, mais ça été plus rapide que je ne l'aurais pensé. Au moins j'espère pour eux que ce sera une happy end et que la pression va se relacher.

@paid2 Tu conseilles quel service maintenant pour acheter du Monero?

Here is the press release in German: https://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/7/6029813

Le service d'échange "eXch" de crypto s'est éteint Les monnaies cryptographiques évaluées à environ 34 millions d'euros

Le Bureau du Procureur Général à Francfort-sur-le-Main - Bureau Central pour la Lutte contre le Crime Internet (ZIT) - et le Bureau Fédéral de Police Criminelle (BKA) ont confisqué l'infrastructure serveur du service de crypto-échange "eXch" situé en Allemagne le 30 avril 2025 et ont désactivé la plateforme. Le service était accessible sous le domaine eXch.cx et diverses autres adresses Internet. En plus de données étendues de plus de huit téraoctets, les valeurs cryptographiques Bitcoin, Ether, Litecoin et Dash ont été saisis. 34 Millions d'euros garantis. C'est la troisième plus haute saisie de valeurs cryptographiques de l'histoire de la BKA.

eXch était un service qui existait depuis 2014 et permettait aux utilisateurs d'échanger différentes crypto-monnaies contre d'autres crypto-monnaies (appelées "swap"). La plateforme était accessible à la fois dans le Clearnet et dans le Darknet et spécifiquement annoncée sur les plateformes de l'économie clandestine criminelle pour ne mettre en œuvre aucune mesure de lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent. Les utilisateurs n'ont pas eu à s'identifier au service, ni les données des utilisateurs y ont été stockées. À cet égard, le cryptoswapping via eXch était particulièrement adapté pour masquer les flux financiers. On estime que 1,9 milliard $ en actifs cryptographiques ont été transférés depuis la création du service. On soupçonne qu'eXch en particulier a reçu Bitcoin d'origine criminelle. Entre autres choses, une partie de la somme volée de 1,5 milliard $ de l'échange cryptographique Bybit piraté le 21 février 2025 aurait été échangée via eXch.

Les opérateurs d'eXch sont donc soupçonnés de blanchiment d'argent commercial et d'exploitation d'une plateforme de trading criminelle sur Internet.

Les opérateurs ont initialement annoncé à bref délai qu'ils cesseraient leur service le 1er mai 2025. Les autorités ont anticipé cela et ont obtenu de nombreuses preuves et traces. Malgré le temps de préparation court, la base de données de la plate-forme et les valeurs cryptographiques associées ont été assurées. Au cours de l'enquête, ZIT et BKA ont coopéré étroitement avec l'enquête fiscale néerlandaise (FIOD). ZIT et BKA supposent que les connaissances acquises dans le processus aideront également à élucider un grand nombre d'autres cybercrimes.

Carsten Meywirth, directeur du Federal Criminal Police Office et chef du département de la cybercriminalité, a déclaré: "Nous avons de nouveau obtenu un nombre record de crypto-monnaies incriminées et avons pu débrancher une plate-forme de blanchiment d'argent numérique. Les dimensions montrent de manière impressionnante que des cybercrimes à l'échelle industrielle sont commis. Nous allons continuer à augmenter le risque de perte pour l'économie souterraine avec tous les moyens à notre disposition. Notre objectif reste de tenir les responsables responsablent."

Le Dr Benjamin Krause, procureur principal de la ZIT, a ajouté: "L'échange cryptographique est un élément essentiel de l'économie souterraine afin de dissimuler les fonds incriminés d'activités illégales telles que le piratage ou le commerce de données de cartes de paiement volées et de les rendre ainsi utilisables pour les auteurs. Il est d'autant plus important que les organismes d'application de la loi agissent de manière cohérente contre ces options de blanchiment d'argent rapides et anonymes et privent les auteurs du crime