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Title: Gavin Andresen's idea of neutralizing a 51% attack: has it been implemented yet? Post by: BusyBeaverHP on January 21, 2015, 12:27:05 AM http://gavintech.blogspot.com/2012/05/neutralizing-51-attack.html
From Gavin's blog: Quote Something like "ignore a longer chain orphaning the current best chain if the sum(priorities of transactions included in new chain) is much less than sum(priorities of transactions in the part of the current best chain that would be orphaned)" would mean a 51% attacker would have to have both lots of hashing power AND lots of old, high-priority bitcoins to keep up a transaction-denial-of-service attack. And they'd pretty quickly run out of old, high-priority bitcoins and would be forced to either include other people's transactions or have their chain rejected. It sounds like a simple thing to do, but has it been implemented yet? Title: Re: Gavin Andresen's idea of neutralizing a 51% attack: has it been implemented yet? Post by: Hazir on January 21, 2015, 12:52:09 AM To be honest I never heard of it. I need to read some more about it. And as far as I know this is not implemented...
Title: Re: Gavin Andresen's idea of neutralizing a 51% attack: has it been implemented yet? Post by: Salmon1989 on January 21, 2015, 07:12:17 AM No it hasn't.
You can find some discussion on Gavin's idea in https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=78403.msg874553#msg874553. He was having more important things to work on, so may be he forgot about that idea. Or may be there was disagreement within the developers. Title: Re: Gavin Andresen's idea of neutralizing a 51% attack: has it been implemented yet? Post by: chronicsky on January 21, 2015, 04:31:03 PM http://gavintech.blogspot.com/2012/05/neutralizing-51-attack.html From Gavin's blog: Quote Something like "ignore a longer chain orphaning the current best chain if the sum(priorities of transactions included in new chain) is much less than sum(priorities of transactions in the part of the current best chain that would be orphaned)" would mean a 51% attacker would have to have both lots of hashing power AND lots of old, high-priority bitcoins to keep up a transaction-denial-of-service attack. And they'd pretty quickly run out of old, high-priority bitcoins and would be forced to either include other people's transactions or have their chain rejected. It sounds like a simple thing to do, but has it been implemented yet? It might sound simple to do , but it really isn't that simple . As i know , it is not implemented yet .. |