Bitcoin Forum

I just paid for lifetime service with bitcoins over at http://DeadMansSwitch.net and convinced them to accept bitcoin as a payment option.

This type of service (combined with encryption and a few other tools/steps) is a good way to notify your loved ones how to access your "secret bitcoin stash" once you die. Not to mention, it's a great way to allow your heirs or the executor of your estate to access your digital life after you've passed on to Satoshi Heaven.

Cheers!
TraderSteve

Yes, don't forget the encryption part.   Or if not encryption, a method that remains secure assuming these messages (on DeadMansSwitch.net) will end up in the hands of a hacker.

What would be a strategy that is still safe with this assumption?

I can envision an approach like this:

I printed two copies of the same paper bitcoin wallet, and then cut each paper in half -- Part A and Part B.

One copy of Part A is in my drawer at work in an envelope labeled "Personal receipts 2012".
The other copy of Part A is in the inside cover of my End The Fed book on my bookshelf at home.

One copy of Part B was handed to [friend / family member / attorney / etc.]
The other copy of Part B was handed to [other friend / different family member / etc. ]


This way there is nobody that has both Part A and Part B, and there is redundancy if one copy is destroyed or otherwise unavailable.

[Edit: See below.  This approach is not a very good one.]

Thoughts?

Yes, that would work. Here's another way:

1. Decide who is going to be the Executor of your estate (obviously this should be someone you trust to carry out your wishes - and not kill you :().

2. Create a list of all of your passwords/passphrases with instructions. This can double as your "Digital Last Will and Testament". It can state your last wishes and how you want your estate divided up. Encrypt this file using TrueCrypt.

3. Send the encrypted file to the person you wish to be your Executor (with TrueCrypt instructions) and let them know that they will receive the passphrase from one or more sources sometime after your death. Have them "white-list" the email addresses from DeadMansSwitch.net and your other "reporter" (see below).

4. Put this passphrase in the email notification system at www.DeadMansSwitch.net. DeadMansSwitch.net acts as a "reporter" - reporting your death or incapacitation. The passphrase will be in plaintext but it doesn't matter because an interceptor will not have access to the encrypted file therefore the passphrase is useless to them.

5. Arrange for another close friend or family member to be a "back-up reporter" and give them the passphrase as well with these instructions: "In the event of my death, or you do not hear from me for x days, send this passphrase to [Executor's email]". This gives you redundancy in the event that DeadMansSwitch.net fails. You could even add a third "reporter" for added redundancy.

6. Check-in with your "reporters" (including DeadMansSwitch.net) as scheduled to keep re-setting the switch. Update the encrypted file and send the updated version to your Executor as needed.

Thoughts on how one can improve upon this?

easywallet.org already have a deadman's switch mechanism implemented that will forward bitcoins to another address after a certain spell of inactivity.
This way you can create a will with explicit private keys that will only contain funds once you have vanished/died/forgot your password etc.
It should be relatively easy to implement in any wallet.
Can this be done directly within the bitcoin protocol (ie without a 3rd party)?

It seems to me that your bitcoin client would have to be connected to the internet in order for this to work. Otherwise, you would need to use a web-based wallet like EasyWallet.org which has its own set of risks - not to mention the 12% annual fees for balances over 12 BTC.

Just saw this comment on YC:

StavrosK 55 minutes ago

 :) BTW, Yankee, what is "YC"?

YC= Y-Combinator

Link: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4773526

I just realized that my suggested approach above is not secure.  Revealing the locations in the message is not ideal.  In my example, should a hacker gain access to the message I used as an example, I think I would simply end up with two break-ins, or broken windows on my vehicles.  Or if someone were to discover half a paper bitcoin in one glove compartment, that person might just go check the other vehicle for the other half.    That just wasn't a very good suggestion.

After reading their FAQ, I can now see there are better ways:
- http://www.deadmansswitch.net/help/

Instead encryption is probably the best.  

And GPG works well for that.

So to spend the funds there are three components,

 1.) An encrypted file containing the wallet's private key for the Bitcoin address holding the funds.  This can be ASCII (armored), and will be about 600 characters long.
 2.) An export of the GPG secret key as ASCII (armored)
 3.) The GPG passphrase for decrypting

So to the executor I give #3 (paper/text) and #1 (paper/ASCII - armored).

For the message on DeadMansSwitch.net I have #2 (file/ASCII - armored) and #1 (file/ASCII - armored), and that goes to both the executor and the reporter.

To a trusted party / family member, I give a thumb drive with #2 (file/ASCII - armored) and #3 (paper/text) with instruction to store securely and give to executor after I pass.

Default condition: The executor already has #1 (file/ASCII - armored) and #3 (paper/text).  Trusted party / family member hands over to executor #2 (file/ASCII - armored).
If trusted family member fails: The executor already has #1 (file/ASCII - armored) and #3 (paper/text) and after 60 days of my last checkin gets from DeadMansSwitch.net #2 (file/ascii - armored).
If Executor fails: The reporter gets from DeadMansSwitch.net #1 (file/ASCII - armored) and #2 (file/ASCII - armored) and trusted party/family member hands over to reporter #3 (paper/text).

This pretty much eliminates the risk from a hacker as the executor only has paper copies of #1 and #2, and hacker doesn't know there is a trusted family member with #3 (and even if somehow did discover this, the thumb drive would be stored securely, offline.)

Getting closer here I think.

One half of private key on DMS. Second half tattooed on the scalp.

DMS has instructions that the head is to be shaved before burial/cremation to retrieve the second half.

Can also be tattooed elsewhere that normally wouldn't be visible.

Real close.

So the encrypted paper wallet(s) go to family members.  DeadMansSwitch gets the decryption key, as does the trustee.  From another thread:


This solution (encrypted paper wallets) robably isn't ready for prime time, but give it a few weeks and that will probably become a very good method for offline / long term savings that is secure.

I like the idea of this - but how do we know that DeadMansSwitch will be around in 5 or 10 years time even? It doesn't even say who they are!

You should never have a single point of failure. DMS should be one of several persons who are instructed to deliver the message upon your passing.

"Three is two, two is one, and one is none" when it comes to back ups. That way you're covered if one or two of the backups fail.

Incidentally, the main URL site cannot be accessed securely but there is an alternate URL that is secure:
 - https://deadmansapp.appspot.com