Ten years ago, Satoshi and Craig created a website where just like that from donations distributed 5 bitcoins to all those in need,and now some 0.5 bitcoins would solve my almost all problems.
I join my friend and say if God in the world let him drip on my purse incentive prize for the promotion of cryptocurrency to the masses!!! 1HqqeH1VWDY9vJq8nF4C7BHQ3Yvzxak48V
Just so you know: begging is not allowed on this forum and you can actually be banned for begging. Not sure if this is begging but be careful. |
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What if you add your own personal coding to the obvious phrase?
Lets say, replace all the letters A with B.
For example "cbptbining finbncial conservbtism mbyonnbise" instead of "captaining financial conservatism mayonnaise"
Will it more difficult to get the key?
I think the point of this entire thread can be summed up as follows: Give up and use a secure random number generator based on a qualified true random number source of entropy unless you want to lose your Bitcoins. |
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I decided to drive the statistics. Calculate the partial repetition of a part of a public address, starting from the end or from the beginning. Bit repetitions. I.e 10101010111......0101010101 1101010101001011010100......0101010010 11010101010Match the end to 11 bits. 1101011011011010101010111......010101010110101010101 1101011011011001011010100......010101001010010101010 Match from the beginning to 14 bits. Private keys get over in a row. And looking for repetition in a public address. When repetition is found, the difference in the private key is calculated. At the moment, found such a minimum range. 24 bits: 2970 * 128 = 380160 (+-128) pkeys
23 bits: 330 * 128 = 42240 (+-128) pkeys
22 bits: 33 * 128 = 4244 (+-128) pkeys
21 bits: 11 * 128 = 1408 (+-128) pkeys
20 bits: 10 * 128 = 1280 (+-128) pkeys
Matching 19 or less bits are found with ranges of less than 128 keys. Of course, a jump (pass) to 380k keys, at a search speed of 1M per second, is nothing. But finding large ranges, you can make big jumps. Sometimes, when I look at clouds, I see that they look kind of like animals. I have seen a cloud that looks like a rabbit. One time I saw this cloud that looked very much like an elephant. I have seen many various animals in clouds. I believe that if you look hard enough at any cloud you will see that it looks like some sort of animal. |
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any tip how i can make raw public key like on this table ?
unsigned char rawpubkeys[NUMPUBKEYS][33] = {
{ 0x03,0x29,0xc4,0x57,0x4a,0x4f,0xd8,0xc8,0x10,0xb7,0xe4,0x2a,0x4b,0x39,0x88,0x82,0xb3,0x81,0xbc,0xd8,0x5e,0x40,0xc6,0x88,0x37,0x12,0x91,0x2d,0x16,0x7c,0x83,0xe7,0x3a },//== 1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr#85
};
unsigned char rawpubkeys[NUMPUBKEYS][33] = { { .. add all strings here... "1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr", // #85 }; |
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Hi, folks! Great topic!
Need some of your guru's help. As far as I understood, if we have i.e.
61. 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000013C96A3742F64906 - 1AVJKwzs9AskraJLGHAZPiaZcrpDr1U6AB
62. - 1Me6EfpwZK5kQziBwBfvLiHjaPGxCKLoJi
63. - 1NpYjtLira16LfGbGwZJ5JbDPh3ai9bjf4
64. - 16jY7qLJnxb7CHZyqBP8qca9d51gAjyXQN
65. 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a838b13505b26867 - 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe
means that privat keys for #62, 63 & 64 will be somewhere between 13C96A3742F64906:1a838b13505b26867. Am I right?
If yes, how can I narrow the keyspace for #62 only? Even approximate range I believe will be ok fo try. Can a simple hex math be used in this case?
Sorry if its a noob question.
And who prevents you to narrow a range of search? For search the private keys for address 62 is selected keyspace 2000000000000000 - 3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF In this space it is possible to find about 2305843009213693952 variants. The project has started for a long time, therefore it is possible to assume, that about three quarters of addresses is checked up and among them no required. I.e. it is necessary to you to check up 2305843009213693952:4 = 576460752303423488 variants Can try to begin with 3800000000000001 - keyspace 3800000000000001:3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF If this quantity of variants 576460752303423488 you divide into speed of generation of keys of your computer that receive a rough operating time Good luck! Since the entire search space for #62 is 2000000000000000 to 3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF If you search the last 1/4 of the space from 3800000000000001 to 3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF you will have exactly a 25% chance of finding the key assuming nobody else with much faster hardware finds it first. Good luck! You are going to need it. |
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I think, that after addresses #61 presumably factor will be even more in a range from K*4 up to K*6
It is possible, that the organizer specially has arranged addresses with balance with such different steps.
My idea has appeared " complete delirium "!
We already know exactly how the author of the puzzle generated the private keys because he told us exactly how he did it right here in this thread. The private keys were made by taking a random number and then masking it to the desired bit length: #1 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 1 - 1) #2 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 2 - 1) #3 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 3 - 1) ... #60 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 60 - 1) #61 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 61 - 1) #65 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 65 - 1) #70 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 70 - 1) #75 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 75 - 1) ... #160 = 256 bit random number bit wise ANDed with (2 160 - 1) So, there is no pattern to be discovered. |
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If someone will please solve this puzzle for me then I will give you some of the profits I make. Please let me know when you have a solution for me. I am willing to pay up to 10% of all profits to you just for solving the puzzle for me. Thanks.  |
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Meanwhile, maybe there is some reason why somebody is sending fractions of 0.00001 BTC to addresses #62, 63, 64 and 66 (and #01 too  ) I do not see why. Sending BTC to an address does not expose any useful information. Spending from an address obviously does expose useful information as we have seen. |
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PS: I thought that everything called Federal.... was part of the Government over the US  It was named "The Federal Reserve" on purpose to fool people into thinking it was part of the government and it has "reserves" of some sort. Both of which are lies. |
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Fiat money does at least come from democratically elected governments (public institutions) so even if it's not perfect, it can be controlled, and is meant to be "for the people".
You obviously don't know that in the United States at least "fiat money" (the USD) is created by a conglomerate of private institutions: the Federal Reserve (a private institution owned by very large private banks and other private investors) and all the private banks in the private banking system. The United States government (originally "for the people" but now, due to the citizens united decision is, is "for the Corporations") then uses the money created by this privately held corporate conglomerate of privately held corporate banks and the Federal Reserve central bank. RESEARCH it. Here is a list of the stockholders/owners of the Federal Reserve system. Unfortunately, since is it a privately held congolmerate, we do not know the amount of stock each of the stockholders owns. But hey, at least we do know who owns and profits from our central banking sytem: http://philosophyofmetrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/List-of-Federal-Reserve-Member-Banks-2015.pdf |
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Maybe, but only if I can buy Bitcoins with it.
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How is calculated the keyspace for each address? Thanks!
The sequence number tells you exactly how many bits are in the private key: #1 has 1 bit in the private key #2 has 2 bits in the private key #3 has 3 bits in the private key ... #60 has 60 bits in the private key #61 has 61 bits in the private key #65 has 65 bits in the private key #70 has 70 bits in the private key #75 has 75 bits in the private key ... #160 will have 160 bits in the private key Do you understand now? |
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Well, what is the sacramental meaning of the step through 5? And he just brute force? because, it seems, it is necessary that the address be translated to its public key lit up. Arulbero could not until there is no output, find the number or could?)).
The author of the puzzle did that transaction to spend from every fifth address. My guess is that it is an experiment to see how far people can get when there is an available spend transaction versus addresses with no available spend transaction. He has been known to visit this thread. Perhaps he will explain it. Obviously it is much easier to get the private key when there is a spend transaction on the address. #1 through #61 took a long time whereas #65, #70, #75 and #80 were snatched up pretty soon after the author added the spend transaction to those addresses. I expect #85 will also be snatched up in due time. As discussed #85, #90, #95, #100, #105, #110 are all within the realm of possibility given enough time and resources. It looks as if #115 would be a new world record so someone with enough equipment and motivation can probably get that one. Beyond that it is very iffy. Note that since there is a spend transaction on these addresses we will probably see more of them before we ever see the next address without a spend transaction, #62. This is a HUGE difference in effort. I think one of the take home messages here might be that due to this difference in effort and other factors having to do with privacy and the fungiblity of Bitcoin in general: do not reuse Bitcoin addresses. Bitcoin addresses should be used exactly twice: once to fund them and once to spend them - then never used again. |
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01 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 1BgGZ9tcN4rm9KBzDn7KprQz87SZ26SAMH
02 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 1CUNEBjYrCn2y1SdiUMohaKUi4wpP326Lb
03 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007 19ZewH8Kk1PDbSNdJ97FP4EiCjTRaZMZQA
04 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008 1EhqbyUMvvs7BfL8goY6qcPbD6YKfPqb7e
05 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000015 1E6NuFjCi27W5zoXg8TRdcSRq84zJeBW3k
06 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000031 1PitScNLyp2HCygzadCh7FveTnfmpPbfp8
07 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004c 1McVt1vMtCC7yn5b9wgX1833yCcLXzueeC
08 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0 1M92tSqNmQLYw33fuBvjmeadirh1ysMBxK
09 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001d3 1CQFwcjw1dwhtkVWBttNLDtqL7ivBonGPV
10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000202 1LeBZP5QCwwgXRtmVUvTVrraqPUokyLHqe
11 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000483 1PgQVLmst3Z314JrQn5TNiys8Hc38TcXJu
12 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a7b 1DBaumZxUkM4qMQRt2LVWyFJq5kDtSZQot
13 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001460 1Pie8JkxBT6MGPz9Nvi3fsPkr2D8q3GBc1
14 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002930 1ErZWg5cFCe4Vw5BzgfzB74VNLaXEiEkhk
15 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000068f3 1QCbW9HWnwQWiQqVo5exhAnmfqKRrCRsvW
16 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c936 1BDyrQ6WoF8VN3g9SAS1iKZcPzFfnDVieY
17 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001764f 1HduPEXZRdG26SUT5Yk83mLkPyjnZuJ7Bm
18 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003080d 1GnNTmTVLZiqQfLbAdp9DVdicEnB5GoERE
19 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005749f 1NWmZRpHH4XSPwsW6dsS3nrNWfL1yrJj4w
20 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d2c55 1HsMJxNiV7TLxmoF6uJNkydxPFDog4NQum
21 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001ba534 14oFNXucftsHiUMY8uctg6N487riuyXs4h
22 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002de40f 1CfZWK1QTQE3eS9qn61dQjV89KDjZzfNcv
23 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000556e52 1L2GM8eE7mJWLdo3HZS6su1832NX2txaac
24 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000dc2a04 1rSnXMr63jdCuegJFuidJqWxUPV7AtUf7
25 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001fa5ee5 15JhYXn6Mx3oF4Y7PcTAv2wVVAuCFFQNiP
26 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000340326e 1JVnST957hGztonaWK6FougdtjxzHzRMMg
27 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006ac3875 128z5d7nN7PkCuX5qoA4Ys6pmxUYnEy86k
28 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d916ce8 12jbtzBb54r97TCwW3G1gCFoumpckRAPdY
29 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000017e2551e 19EEC52krRUK1RkUAEZmQdjTyHT7Gp1TYT
30 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003d94cd64 1LHtnpd8nU5VHEMkG2TMYYNUjjLc992bps
31 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d4fe747 1LhE6sCTuGae42Axu1L1ZB7L96yi9irEBE
32 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b862a62e 1FRoHA9xewq7DjrZ1psWJVeTer8gHRqEvR
33 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a96ca8d8 187swFMjz1G54ycVU56B7jZFHFTNVQFDiu
34 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000034a65911d 1PWABE7oUahG2AFFQhhvViQovnCr4rEv7Q
35 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004aed21170 1PWCx5fovoEaoBowAvF5k91m2Xat9bMgwb
36 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009de820a7c 1Be2UF9NLfyLFbtm3TCbmuocc9N1Kduci1
37 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001757756a93 14iXhn8bGajVWegZHJ18vJLHhntcpL4dex
38 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022382facd0 1HBtApAFA9B2YZw3G2YKSMCtb3dVnjuNe2
39 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004b5f8303e9 122AJhKLEfkFBaGAd84pLp1kfE7xK3GdT8
40 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e9ae4933d6 1EeAxcprB2PpCnr34VfZdFrkUWuxyiNEFv
41 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000153869acc5b 1L5sU9qvJeuwQUdt4y1eiLmquFxKjtHr3E
42 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002a221c58d8f 1E32GPWgDyeyQac4aJxm9HVoLrrEYPnM4N
43 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006bd3b27c591 1PiFuqGpG8yGM5v6rNHWS3TjsG6awgEGA1
44 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e02b35a358f 1CkR2uS7LmFwc3T2jV8C1BhWb5mQaoxedF
45 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000122fca143c05 1NtiLNGegHWE3Mp9g2JPkgx6wUg4TW7bbk
46 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002ec18388d544 1F3JRMWudBaj48EhwcHDdpeuy2jwACNxjP
47 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cd610b53cba 1Pd8VvT49sHKsmqrQiP61RsVwmXCZ6ay7Z
48 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ade6d7ce3b9b 1DFYhaB2J9q1LLZJWKTnscPWos9VBqDHzv
49 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000174176b015f4d 12CiUhYVTTH33w3SPUBqcpMoqnApAV4WCF
50 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022bd43c2e9354 1MEzite4ReNuWaL5Ds17ePKt2dCxWEofwk
51 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000075070a1a009d4 1NpnQyZ7x24ud82b7WiRNvPm6N8bqGQnaS
52 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000efae164cb9e3c 15z9c9sVpu6fwNiK7dMAFgMYSK4GqsGZim
53 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000180788e47e326c 15K1YKJMiJ4fpesTVUcByoz334rHmknxmT
54 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000236fb6d5ad1f43 1KYUv7nSvXx4642TKeuC2SNdTk326uUpFy
55 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006abe1f9b67e114 1LzhS3k3e9Ub8i2W1V8xQFdB8n2MYCHPCa
56 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009d18b63ac4ffdf 17aPYR1m6pVAacXg1PTDDU7XafvK1dxvhi
57 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001eb25c90795d61c 15c9mPGLku1HuW9LRtBf4jcHVpBUt8txKz
58 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002c675b852189a21 1Dn8NF8qDyyfHMktmuoQLGyjWmZXgvosXf
59 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007496cbb87cab44f 1HAX2n9Uruu9YDt4cqRgYcvtGvZj1rbUyt
60 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fc07a1825367bbe 1Kn5h2qpgw9mWE5jKpk8PP4qvvJ1QVy8su
61 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000013C96A3742F64906 1AVJKwzs9AskraJLGHAZPiaZcrpDr1U6AB
65 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001A838B13505B26867 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe 70 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000349B84B6431A6C4EF1 19YZECXj3SxEZMoUeJ1yiPsw8xANe7M7QR 75 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004C5CE114686A1336E07 1J36UjUByGroXcCvmj13U6uwaVv9caEeAt 80 FOUND 85 FOUND 90 (next one to be found) |
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By the way, and you know why their puzzle addresses were removed from the 161st?
My thought is that this is the limit of public addresses. That is the further search in the theory goes on a circle.
Because all the funds from 161 through 255 were redundant (Bitcoin addresses only use 160 bits) the author of the puzzle moved all the funds from the 160-255 ranged down into the 1-160 range. It is explained up thread. |
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In (coming?) the world wide adoption path all other Banks (except Carlton) will prefere the more transparent blockchains - so all tainted and on purpose more ano chains will be dismissed from that path.
You obviously do not know your audience. |
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Finding an active wallet is hard, but not impossible. Every time you open a random page, you have a chance of finding someone else's fortune. BTC
Yes, everyone that believes this should spend all their time opening random pages and checking them. That will keep the mathematically challenged busy and off this forum. |
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Here is some information for your research project: It is easy to calculate the public key from the private key. The formula is PublicKey = PrivateKey * G where G is a specific point on the specified elliptic curve and * is the scalar multiplication defined over the finite group of the elliptic curve. For all practical purposes it is impossible to calculate or even estimate the private key from the public key because there is no "division operation" defined for the group. That is what makes Bitcoin work. If you could calculate or even estimate the private key from the public key then anyone could calculate anyone's private key from their public key and anyone could steal anyone's Bitcoins. If anyone ever figures out how to calculate or estimate the private key from the public key then Bitcoin and a plethora of other system worldwide would all be catastrophically broken. In other words it is impossible to do what you ask even when you give us 10,000,000 Bitcoin addresses. |
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My comment about you stealing my Bitcoins was a joke. You can't steal them for the mathematical reasons I gave.
The only way to get the next prize is to brute force search the range of the prize.
You are correct that other people with much faster hardware will probably beat you to the prize.
There has been a lot of effort on this thread where people try to "calculate" (in other words guess) the expected sub-range withing the next prize range.
You could search their guess at the expected sub-range but again without faster hardware you will probably not win the next prize.
You could try to search randomly in the next range (or their guess at the expected sub-range). You will probably still lose but hey, you just might get lucky.
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