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21  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [POT]PotCoin - Banking for the Legal Cannabis Industry ✦ ✦ ✦Grow With Us ✦ ✦ ✦ on: March 06, 2017, 12:05:18 AM
How does the halfing work in potcoin? I understand the mining reward is 420 coins per block, but does that value half every 210000 blocks?
22  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Service Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [VTC] [VERT] ThisIsVtc.com Announcing the Vert Community Alliance on: August 30, 2016, 08:40:43 PM
is thisisvtc.com down? I rely on it's bitpay insight API for a project I'm using that supports VTC.
23  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] bip32.org: JavaScript BIP32 - Now available for Dogecoin! on: June 25, 2016, 06:58:53 PM
Personally, I think altcoins should not define a new version byte for extended private/public keys. BIP44 defines a way to derive altcoin addresses from a bitcoin extended private key, which all altcoins should support instead of making their own specification.
24  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Service Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: ** BE FLY !!** QUALITY BLOCK EXPLORERS AT A LOW PRICE FROM TEAM FLY!! on: April 10, 2016, 08:43:17 PM
Nice block explorer. I hope you don't mind, but I've added your service to my blockchain API project: https://github.com/priestc/moneywagon

I have some requests: First, could you please add a "transaction for address" API endpoint? Also an "unspent outputs" endpoint would be great too.

The single transaction endpoint does not return the "value" parameter. The value parameter is there for outputs, though.

Also, the "getaddress" endpoint is erroneously calls the txid the address. It would be nice to have "value" in that endpoint as well.
25  Bitcoin / Bitcoin Discussion / Re: ToominCoin aka "Bitcoin_Classic" #R3KT on: March 30, 2016, 11:58:11 PM
Why is it that everyone who supports segwit has to be a condescending asshole all the time?
26  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Signature aggregation for improved scalablity. on: March 16, 2016, 02:12:55 AM
However if you reuse your address it would make it quite evident to external people that _your_ address is with a very high probability not the change and likely the other address used is my change.

One for that one single transaction. If you wallet is generating new addresses for each change output, nobody is even going to know it's you making the transaction to my re-used address in the first place.

When doing blockchain analysis to link addresses together, there are two types of links: Links that are 100% guaranteed to be the identified person, and links that are only thought to be an identified person according to a probability. Each time you move coins to a newly generated change address, you're decreasing the probability that those funds belong to you from the perspective of someone trying to do analysis.

If you buy BTC from Coinbase, and then send those coins directly to the Silk Road, Coinbase is going to know with 100% certainty that you made that transaction, and they could report you to the police. If you instead sent that coin to a separate address, then send them to the Silk Road, then there is plausible deniability. That intermediate address could be another person, it also could be your own address. Coinbase can't do anything about it because they can't be 100% sure. The court system works under the premise of reasonable doubt. The intermediate address creates enough reasonable doubt to make this not be a privacy leak.

To use the naked picture analogy, moving your coins to a new address is like blurring a naked picture of yourself. Each time your funds moves addresses, a stronger blur is applied. If somebody publishes a naked picture of you that is blurred, is that a violation of privacy? This is sort of a philosophical question.

Sending coin to an address that is being re-used is technically decreasing the probability that its you since the change address is not ambiguous, but it doesn't destroy your privacy, it merely decreases it slightly. Its like somebody taking a blurry naked picture and making it slightly less blurry. Its still blurry so you're still private.
27  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Signature aggregation for improved scalablity. on: March 15, 2016, 07:36:05 PM
I wasn't aware of 131 when I wrote that text, but aggregating public key reuse is a perennial proposal which reoccurs every 6 to 9 months and is shot down each time.
Do you have a link to any of these proposals? I wrote BIP131, so I'm curious to see other people's (failed) take on it.

Quote
 Inserting a huge incentive to compromise fungibility and privacy into the system to get a modest capacity boost is a non-starter, even more than it was a non-starter in 2011 when I first recall seeing it proposed. And yes, some people currently use Bitcoin in ways that damage the system-- it can take that-- but in no way makes it acceptable to reward that harmful behavior.

I keep seeing this posted over an over again by multiple people, but it makes no sense to me. I'm referring to the notion that me using the system a certain way has any effect your privacy. Like me re-using addresses has any effect on you. Could you explain how this is so? Its not a self-evident claim at all.

Lets say my shower is bugged with a hidden camera. This will cause my privacy to be lost, not anyone else's. The only way this bugged shower will effect your privacy is if I were to paste a naked picture of you over the camera hole. In order for me to do this, I need a naked picture of you in the first place. I can't violate someone's privacy unless I have their private information in the first place. If you're sending me bitcoin from a wallet that generates a new change address every transaction, and I'm using the same address over and over again, what is the proverbial naked picture I have of you that I'm leaking to the world?

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(As an aside, the example you give is pretty broken-- if every customer pays to the same address you cannot distinguish which of multiple concurrent payments has actually gone through; so that only works so long as your hotdog stand is a failure, as soon as you had multiple customers paying close together in time it turns into a mass of confusion.)

Oh come on, you're being pedantic. If you want to accept concurrent payments, you print out multiple QR codes, one for each register.

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No kind of aggregation can be just done by "flipping a bit in the version field", as that is utterly incompatible with the design of the system; violates all the layering, and would be rejected as coin-theft by all the existing nodes.

You're the only person who thinks this.

Quote
In fact, the way you're describing it here would result in _immediate_ funds loss, even absent an attacker. Imagine an additional payment shows up that you weren't expecting when you signed but happens to arrive first at miners, and the total value of that additional payment get converted into fees! As you described it here, it would also be replay vulnerable... where someone sends the same transaction to the chain a second time to move new payments that have shown up since.

Only UTXOs confirmed in a block previous to the signed input get included in the coalesce. Lets say you have three UTXOs to the same address:

#1 value 4 BTC in block 1000
#2 value 2 BTC in block 2000
#3 value 1 BTC in block 3000

and you included input #2 into your coalescing transaction, only output #1 and #2 will be included in the coalesc. Output #3 is left off because it's included in a block after the output that was included in the TX. The total input amount in this case would be 6 BTC.

Quote
That kind of design also results in a substantial scalablity loss as every node would need an additional search index for the utxo set (or perform a linear scan of it, which takes tens of seconds currently) in order to gather all the inputs with the same scriptpubkey.

You just invoked a pet peeve of mine. You can't throw out numbers like that without mentioning the hardware. Currently the UTXO database has 35 million rows. On my 3 year old laptop I can query a 35 million table database and have it finish in a few hundred milliseconds. I guess if you're running this on an Apple II it would take "tens of seconds"...

Even if it does take a long time to query the UTXO database, it shouldn't matter because the purpose is to spend those outputs. This results in a smaller UTXO database, which makes subsequent queries faster.
28  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Signature aggregation for improved scalablity. on: March 13, 2016, 11:42:21 PM
Quote
Unlike other past shared signature proposals based on exploiting pubkey reuse, there is no advantage in this design in reusing public keys; so it also doesn't create a new privacy moral hazard for the network.

Could you please clarify this paragraph? I assume by "other proposals" you mean BIP131.

It seems to me that BIP131 pretty much solves zipping inputs into a single input in a very simple manner. Your proposal sounds like there are only 3 people in the world with enough phDs to understand whats going on. I feel like I can explain BIP131 to a group of kindergartners and they'll pretty much know what I'm talking about.

Lets say you run a hot dog stand. At the beginning of the day you generate an address, and print off a QR code. Each time someone buys a hot dog, they send you $1.50 worth of bitcoin to that address in the QR code. At the end of the day, your wallet generates a single 233 byte transaction which moves all transactions for that day into your coinbase account (or wherever). Then you throw away that QR code, and generate a new one for the next day. A lot of people use bitcoin this way already. There is no moral hazard because no private key is being re-used. BIP131 solves the moral hazard.

All you have to do to enable the "wildcard" feature is to flip a bit in the version field. Now all inputs that have the same scriptPubKey and are confirmed in a block lesser than the block of the input you did sign, then those inputs gets spent by the transaction as well. The work to implement this can be done by someone with 0 ph.Ds. I could probably implement it myself if I knew C++...
29  Other / Bitcoin Wiki / Re: Request edit privileges here on: January 31, 2016, 07:07:16 PM
Chris12345
30  Bitcoin / Project Development / Working on python Bip38 implementation, 80% complete, need help with remaining on: October 04, 2015, 02:16:31 AM
As far as I know, there aren't any full Bip38 implementations in python. I have decided I want to write one so that python developers can build applications using encrypted private keys.

My code is here: https://github.com/priestc/moneywagon/blob/master/moneywagon/bip38.py

What I have working:
* Non-ec multiply encrypt and decryt. (with tests)
* Generating Confirm Code.
* Generating Intermediate Point.
* Generating encrypted private key from Intermediate Point.

What I do not have working:
* Decrypting ec-mutiply encrypted private key
** Working examples:
** https://github.com/mannkind/bit2factor.org/blob/master/js/bitcoin.bip38.js#L84
** https://github.com/casascius/Bitcoin-Address-Utility/blob/master/Model/Bip38KeyPair.cs#L125

* Generating address from confirm code
** Working exampes:
** https://github.com/mannkind/bit2factor.org/blob/master/js/bitcoin.bip38.js#L298
** https://github.com/casascius/Bitcoin-Address-Utility/blob/master/Model/Bip38Confirmation.cs#L102


The white paper does a very good job of explaining how to do everything, but when it comes to decrypting ec-multiply and generating address from confirm code (the two things I haven't done yet), the BIP is very sparse of details:

https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0038.mediawiki



I don't really know that much about cryptography so someone else will have to finish this. I have done as much as I can do.
31  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: Looking for one more service developer on: June 04, 2015, 10:23:58 PM
is this for a paid position?
32  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: [ANN] Bitcoin Payment Channels - community reference repository on: June 03, 2015, 05:02:12 PM
Facebook in 2004 didn't have the ability to handle the amount of load it gets today.

Back in 2004, Facebook's software didn't need the scale, so their software couldn't handle it.

The came condition occurs now with bitcoin micro-transactions.

The network can't handle large amounts of them, because no one has yet found an application that needs large scale bitcoin micro-transactions.

In my opinion, every single one of these "payment channels" projects are approaching the problem from the wrong perspective.

Lightning Network and Strawpay and the like are putting the cart before the horse. Even if the lightning network were to actually get built, it would just site there unused much like straw pay is just sitting there, unused today.

My attempt to bring micro-transactions to bitcoin is called autotip. Its a chrome extension that sends bitcoin to a participating website. Its kind of like a "reverse adblock" if you will. As of right now, 5 people have it installed, despite my every effort to get people to use it. Only 5 people felt it was something they'd be interested in. Part of the reason why Autotip works now is because not many people use it. If its usage were to explode, it would need to change the way it works under the hood.

Autotip takes a "usage first" approach rather than a "technical solution approach first". Its true that once Autotip gets a lot of traffic (if ever), then it will probably have to switch to using some other approach. I feel like Autotip is a square peg, and "payment channels" are all turning out to be round holes. Autotip will probably never implement payment channels.

The only project that I know of that uses payment channels is streamium. But anyone could build a live streaming site like streamium without payment channels and it would work just as well as streamium. A future version of Autotip will have a Video API (much like the current Audio API) so you can monetize videos, much like how streamium monetizes live video.
33  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: BitcoinMessages : Send free anonymous public/private bitcoin messages on: May 26, 2015, 03:33:09 PM
the domain doesn't resolve for me
34  Bitcoin / Project Development / [ANN] MusicStation.Tips - Online radio, tip artists with Autotip on: May 25, 2015, 08:04:53 PM
http://musicstation.tips

It is a radio station, sort of like Pandora, but it is "synchronized" lik an old school FM radio station. All users are hearing the same playlist playing at the same time.

The software that runs musicstation.tips is open source, available here: https://github.com/priestc/TheStation

You can install TheStation on a server of your own, and you can make your own station just like musicstation.tips (you have to upload your own music and provide your own S3 credentials).

All tipping is done through the Autotip extension. Search for Autotip in the chrome web store. Autotip is a decentralized microtipping platform. The person who developed Autotip is the developer of MusicStation.Tips. This project is the reference implementation of the Autotip Audio API. More about the Autotip Audio API go here: http://autotip.io/docs/html5-audio-api

All bitcoin tipped through musicstation.tips is held by musicstation.tips until the artist comes forward to claim the private key to their funds.

None of the music on musicstation.tips is streamed with permission from the owning rights holders. My experience is hat the record companies only care to go after you when you're really big. MusicStation.Tips is not really big, so in the mean time enjoy the music while it lasts.
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