!!!  this is unacceptable, you will not get anybody to mine at your pool if you 'take' their shares.  what if my miners crash? i lose my shares?

I had bitarena blocked at my router 

So that's a "No", then? You're confident enough to go online with your reward method but not confident enough to see if someone can break it?


Full time miners please take note.


edit: because I misplaced the damn quotes!

edit2: You do know slush's reward method is exploitable, and he wants to change to a non-exploitable reward method? You know this, right?

I don't mine. I don't need to mine in order to find a way to exploit a reward method. I'm asking if you're willing to pay me to find out if your reward method is exploitable and report any exploits I find. I'm also asking you to offer sum of btc payable if I do find an exploit.

How much you offer me to do this will be a indication of how confident you are in your reward method, and how confident full time miners should be that they are being paid fairly.

How confident are you? Are you willing to pay btc if someone can find a way to hop your method and report it to you? Let me know and I'll start warming my keyboard.

grabs popcorn

Btw from your description it looks like you tried to invent a wheel, but you actualy invented square.

I believe slush's pool uses point system:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1976.msg50002#msg50002

sounds similar to the point system... without the points.

Please, don't. If it's not provably fair anyone will be able to write an exploit for it within a day, and your pool hoppers will still profit only a little less so. There's no reason to create a new reward method.

Sounds....intriguing.

Nope. It can't be profitable after 43.45%, it's just impossible. Mostly the share value expectation is 1.0 at 23.6% or so, but as the pool hashrate increases to a larger proportion of D, the hop window stretches to a maximum of 0.4345xD - sort of like what happens with Slush, only more so.

Run a few simulations and you'll see I'm right. I'll get around to posting a derivation some day, and calculate how much fulltimers there lose (especially since only half of the hopper tax is returned to fulltimers). From what I see most hoppers are leaving a 23.6% regardless of hashrate and not profiting as much as they could.

...

@ Greee I know certain forum members will hate me for repeating what Dr Haribo has said but there is no future in using a payout method which unfairly penalises fulltime miners.

First, read https://bitcoil.co.il/pool_summary.pdf and https://bitcoil.co.il/pool_analysis.pdf. From the first, you can pick and choose a reward method that suits you. From the second, you get more details on each reward method.

PPS: You'll see that you can calculate exactly how much risk you want to take with PPS. In Meni's example, the bitcoin block reward is 50 btc, the risk of bankruptcy you'll will to accept is 1/1000, and the fee is 5%, then you'll need to have a bankroll of 3454btc to start the pool - although if you wait until the block reward is halved, then the required bankroll to start is 1727 btc.

PPLNS: It's a little trickier than you might think to implement in a completely pool hopper invulnerable way. Just ask Dr. Haribo. It's intuitively easier to grasp than DGM, but variance and maturity time can't be controlled to the same extent.

DGM: Tricky, and you might want to ask Inaba or Graet (if Inaba doesn't want to lose a hoppable pool ) for some help. But you can control a great deal about your miners' experience by varying it's variables.

That's it, Greee. There are no other options if you want to retain fulltime miners.

Good luck!

Whatever you do you need to make sure you make it very clear in advance.
What you're describing sounds remarkably similar to slush's score-proportional system, but you need to make it clear in advance.