@dinofelis, for as long as physical violence is effective, we will continue to have government (per Max Weber's canonical definition of government as a " monopoly on the use of violence"), because the primary reason government formed was to enable civilization to progress from warlords to investment in commerce via sea transport (Athenian Empire) and roads (Roman Empire) for the Agricultural (first and second) revolutions. Government was necessary to aggregate the capital and protection for large economy-of-scale fixed capital investments continuing into the First and Second Industrial Ages. We are now entering the Second Computer Revolution which my thesis posits is spawning the Knowledge Age due to network effects from the First Computer Revolution. I don't fully agree with this analysis. I think cause and consequence are inverted here, although you do have a point. I don't think that government *was needed* ; rather that it was *unavoidably created*. To me, the "warlords" ARE the governments, and they arise BECAUSE there is wealth to steal ; not the other way around. It is not because one created governments, that wealth occured ; it is because there was wealth, that warlords became governments. Incorrect. Warlords (feudalism) is what you get when there is a power vacuum and thus nothing can be organized on any sufficient economies-of-scale. It is what the Western Roman Empire collapsed back to for a Dark Age, because we didn't have the Roman military guarding the road construction and commerce. That said, it is true that the monopoly of violence (the ultimate winner of the law of the strongest) DID have a positive side-effect: as there was no competition on the violence side any more (there was no incentive to do so, as the monopolist was so terribly strong that it was a waste of effort, and would lead to one's demise), it DID allow for the investment in violence to be left to the government, which, through economies of scale, could reduce the total expenditure for violence (and limit the total amount of capital destruction by violence).
Not only that, but it enabled protection for large scale infrastructure and commerce. Competing Dark Age warlords means interstate commerce dies. I do not agree that the government permitted less violence: what was local small scale violence, was replaced by inter-governmental wars on large scale.
Agreed, but it did enable massive progress for mankind. You can't deny the Agricultural, Industrial, and now Computer revolutions of which the first two at least could not have happened without the nation-state as I explained above. So to get rid of the natural demand for government, then we need to transition the economy away from fixed capital investments to non-fungible, decentralized creativity.
There is no natural demand for government in my opinion. There is a demand for a mutual agreement for non-violence but that doesn't need to go through the concentration of violence in the hands of warlords (states) that use this to fight each other in wars. It requires a nation-state and it is a natural demand when the economies-of-scale of humans was in physically threatened work in the agricultural and industrial ages. However, there is a way to empower individuals with weapons of mass destruction. As such, the economies of scale on the level of warlords/states will lose its significance.
That is a non-sequitor. Chaos of physical security on the large scale would only send us back into a Dark Age with warlords. Rather if human activity becomes sufficiently decentralized, then we no longer are threatened by physical attack. For example, it is impossible to attack the heartland of the USA with an army because there is a citizen's gun under every blade of grass. (the heartland can be attacked by isolating it from commerce and trade though, because we aren't 100% in the decentralized Knowledge Age yet) But the second, much more attractive weapon of mass destruction I see evolving, is what I'd call "DNA printers". If you have a DNA (or RNA) synthesizer - which will most probably be developed in the near future and will be of the size of less than table-top - you can synthesize about any known or artificial virus, and its antidote. Give it 20 or 30 years and I think this kind of technology will be available. The spread of a virus (eventually a triggerable virus, that you first let propagate without symptoms to get sufficient people contaminated, and that you can activate afterwards by a second infection that can be much more targetted) can then be done very very easily by just any individual who created or downloaded the right virus file and "printed" it, while giving himself and his kin the anti-dote.
When individuals can whipe out entire cities or continents, I don't see how the governments can keep their monopoly on violence based upon their economies of scale on warfare and killing.
In the decentralized Knowledge Age, the important people won't live in any concentrated area. Sorry we can't move (within the next decade or two) to Monero's absolute anonymity. Sorry. We need a more pragmatic approach for Stage #5 of the global economic collapse because the State will still be strong in Asia and destructive in the West. I propose anonymity that is compatible with taxation, because Asia will have strong States not total collapse. I sure hope you aren't throwing all caution to the wind and deciding to hell with it and you will break the law and hope the State collapses without consequences. If that is the Monero community's attitude, then the project will be doomed. |
|
|
|
Poloniex and Kraken are both in the USA.
Where do you think people trade these days?
Another big problem is the private keys for the tokens are held by these exchanges (note I have a solution to this which will be revealed in my white paper).
I think people trade in China. If Poloniex and Kraken stop trading some tokens then trading will move to other exchanges. They can't move the tokens: Another big problem is the private keys for the tokens are held by these exchanges (note I have a solution to this which will be revealed in my white paper).
And China is I bet very intent on regulating exchanges: China is also showing a willingness to regulate what it can and recently they stated this was to protect investors from excesses. Ditto Singapore, Japan, etc..
The global elite are all in the same club. And we ain't in that club. |
|
|
|
So now that I properly understand your design, I can more easily identify the flaws.
I think were are on the same page now, maybe with the exception of one very important aspect: Interests on coins are credited to every account every time a block is built (by anybody). So, interest alone cannot be an incentive factor to buy more than one account since you get the very same interests (at the same pace), no matter how you split up your coins between your accounts. But those with more stake can afford to buy more mining accounts, even though they don't have to. And thus if denying others interest is relatively more profitable for them... ______________ (fill in the blank yourself) Thanks also.  |
|
|
|
And why can't these tokens like Maisafe for example become the Bitcoin 2.0 ?
Because afaik they didn't solve the major problem of decentralization and scaling of blockchain consensus for general uses of a blockchain. Their focus is on storage, not general use blockchain technology. Please feel free to correct me if I am mistaken on that assumption. Also IMO, the Bitcoin 2.0 blockchain is not only going to be a token. It will be for consensus on all forms of data. I am not sure whether they solved this issues as well but even if not, they might be able in future ? Everyone has tried and no one has provably succeeded yet. Afaik, that has not been the focus of the proof-of-storage projects (correct me if my assumption is incorrect). They are trying to sell and develop proof-of-storage concepts. Afaics we are drawn to where our expertise and interests lie. Unless they just happen to stumble on to it because it dovetails with their R&D for the proof-of-storage. (MaidSafe has claimed solving everything but my impression is it is mostly BS, yet that is not an exhaustive review, just an impression from some review of it a couple of years ago) I think I have (but I could be mistaken) a little insight into what is required to solve it. I don't think it is going to be something random others will realize easily. The people wired the right way to solve it, have the relevant knowledge, awareness, and availability are probably few (but I might be wrong because I don't know what everyone is doing in obscurity right now all over the world). Apart from that, do you think there will be just one blockchain where all decentral apps and transaction features are placed on or several ones like a bitcoin chain + ethereum like chain etc. ?
Well once someone produces a technology that scales well decentralized, then others will likely clone it. Whether there is one project that wins or many clones and offshoots, remains to be seen. Note BitShares' Graphene (also used in Steem and other projects) scales well but centralized by whales and even centralized running only one core of the CPU. I don't think the world will rally around a blockchain controlled by some whales. If Bitcoin is instructive, then one leader (usually the first mover) will emerge. Because the world prefers not to have the risk/cost/confusion of competing standards. We see in every case on the Internet, that the world rallies around a clear winner in standards wars. That is if one standard can fit all major needs. Otherwise factions/forks emerge for niche markets. |
|
|
|
Your token's investors (owners) will care if the G20 crashes the price of your project's token on the exchanges in Western markets.
Since when Western markets are relevant? I can't recall even a single pump or dump starting on a Western exchange. Poloniex and Kraken are both in the USA. Where do you think people trade these days? Another big problem is the private keys for the tokens are held by these exchanges (note I have a solution to this which will be revealed in my white paper). |
|
|
|
I hope you won't imply again that your backwater country is relevant to what the major axis powers of the world could do the exchange price of an altcoin project if they ruled it was in violation of common sense investment securities regulation and investor protections.
My "backwater country" is a part of Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus union. As long as ICOs are allowed in Russia, I don't care about SEC opinion on the matter. Also, in civilized countries the laws are not retrospective. Your token's investors (owners) will care if the G20 crashes the price of your project's token on the exchanges in Western markets. I don't know how likely that is to happen or not. But normally governments let new paradigms run amok, then crack down later as they catch up to the new paradigms. But all the past history is not gone. They can go back and attack any history that was illegal. |
|
|
|
Ok, I'll wait for it. I hope it won't imply again that Americans is the superrace and 90% of the world should care about the laws set by the remaining 10%...
China is also showing a willingness to regulate what it can and recently they stated this was to protect investors from excesses. Ditto Singapore, Japan, etc.. The G20 is becoming ever more coordinated on harmonizing regulation with each other. This year they start sharing information on financial crimes and illegal taxation shelters activity. I hope you won't imply again that your backwater country is relevant to what the major axis powers of the world could do to the exchange price of an altcoin project if they ruled it was in violation of common sense investment securities regulation and investor protections. So the more relevant question is what type funding and organizational arrangements are truly decentralized and which are just obfuscations of a company share structure with escrow agents, board of directors, and expectations from ICO investors reliant on the actions of those centralized parties. The argument that the token holder is the owner of a software token and copy of the software blockchain which he is free to manage as he pleases (in the words of the Supreme court) must not fail the test of economic reality and common sense. My post is still forthcoming... |
|
|
|
Last time I checked the political map of the world it had more than 1 jurisdiction. If you think that the USA is able to export democracy on global scale then google for North Korea, China and Russia.
I am talking about the impact on the market price (given most exchanges are within the G20's jurisdictional reach). Not whether the SEC can put you personally in jail since I heard you live in Belarus. Please wait for my next post which will reiterate which types of projects I think are not subject to the Howey test. I will reiterate my revelation where I became less worried about regulation. |
|
|
|
Which crypto-tokens are ILLEGAL, unregistered "investment securities" as defined by USA securities regulation law?
I don't think I need to bother about your question once I'm not a US citizen.
Crypto is a new type of asset that is even given the regulators problem to regulate. If you read some of the terms and conditions of some of these ICO, they classified ICO token as a software of the company or a license to use the application in future
The buyer of the token is apparently not legally culpable (or not greatly so). The SEC investment securities regulation seems to be most onerous for the developers and promoters of the ICO. I will explain this is more detail in my next post which is forthcoming. It affects you as an investor only in that if for example the SEC decided to take action against ANY PROJECT which might cause all ICO projects' valuations to collapse on the markets.In other words, all those who are currently invested in any project that had a history that could be suspect, might see their coins collapse in value if the SEC took any action against any project for the similar type of violation. Note the SEC action against Ripple (which is covered in greater detail upthread) was related to Ripple being an exchanger, i.e. both selling and repurchasing its own tokens. So that is why it did not cause a selloff in projects which weren't acting as their own exchanger. But I posit that if the SEC attacked a coin for a violation of the Howey test of the investment securities law, we would see a collapse of the price of many ICO projects and other projects which had a centralized structure that violates the Howey test. I will explain more in the next post. Disclaimer: I am not a professional adviser on this topic. Consult your own professional adviser. |
|
|
|
And what happens when the escrow people have different judgement than some or many of the ICO investors?
Discord? "Oh well"? Suckers!
That is why the escrow has to be trusted. You need to have faith that the escrow will take the right decision in case of a dispute. Obviously, it there is a dispute between the investors and the coin developers, the escrow's judgment will make one of the parties unhappy. What if the investors disagree with each other and the developers? Who does the escrow agent follow? So the escrow agent becomes entrusted as the "controlling" owner of the project (which may make him culpable to the SEC regarding investment securities law). |
|
|
|
Please try to wrap up this discussion between you and I (which I'm feel was worthwhile for me). Because I don't have free time to expend on this. But you aren't addressing the reason I mentioned that. Refer back to the prior discussion.
I don't expect everybody to become an investor and take part in mining. The majority of users will probably only use free accounts. But given the fact that the number of accounts will correspond to the number of blocks, there will be a considerable supply of new accounts at all times. (I'm not sure if I got your point though.) The point remains that accounts will become power-law or exponentially distributed (if not relative to themselves then at least relative to free accounts) and thus be much fewer to attack to steal private keys than the number of freemium users. Whereas, in my design, you also need plenty of time (years, even decades) or the necessary power/creditibility to control 50% of the active miners without buying accounts. Now you are telling me new accounts can be sold? So why do you think these won't be power-law distributed? They always are.
New accounts can be sold on the market just like the currency itself. They won't get centralized because it simply doesn't make sense for an investor to have more than one account since he gets the same interests on his stake, while the profits from selling child accounts will get neglibile over time. Ultimately, the attacker would have to keep paying the market price for at least 50% of the ongoing production of blocks/accounts as long as he wants to maintain his attack.
If mining is profitable why wouldn't the "attacker" (or natural power-law effect) do this? If mining is not profitable, why would anyone buy new accounts?
Investors will buy the accounts because they get regular interests on their stake with every block attached to the blockchain, even if they never mine a single block. However, everybody who owns an account has an incentive to mine since mining is profitable and the costs are very low without PoW. The profitability of mining will decrease over time due to the growing competition. If you buy your first account 10 years after the genesis block, you will have to wait another 10 years on average to get your first child account (provided that every investor is actually mining). Now, you can decide if you want to sell your child account or keep it and retain your relative mining power. If you opt for the latter, you will have to you wait another 10 years to get your first grand child account. If you sell it, you can cash out with the current account price and will only have half the minting power as of now, which means that you would have to wait 20 more years for your first grand child account. Accounts that haven't been sold at their birth, will be practically unsalable for the future due to the buyer's risk I already mentioned. That's a fundamendal difference to traditional PoS where you can grow your stake just by keeping it mining and sell it any time you want. In my design, the price you pay for an account will be sunk costs. So, it's only profitable to mine once you own an account (which you have bought in order to get interest on your coins). Whenever you get the chance to build a block, it will be more profitable to sell the child account and invest the price back into the underlying currency, rather than keeping the account in the hope of selling grand-child accounts later on. You've clarified a key detail just now highlighted in bold above. So you are saying that users need one mining account to enable earning interest on their non-mining tokens (your prior descriptions led me to assume interest was per mining account and had nothing to do with tokens owned)? So you are saying that there is no reason to own more than one mining account, because mining does not return enough to recoup the cost of buying an account. So you are implying mining is not profitable in the sense of total ROI, but it does produce profitable operating income. You did not make that distinction clear in your description and terminology before. That was not at all clear to me from your original summary of your system. I suggest you improve your abstract. So you are claiming that as long as the starting distribution of mining accounts is nearly uniformly distributed (i.e. one person, one account), then it would be too costly to buy new accounts to maintain a 50% control on total supply of mining accounts, because the cost of buying them can never be recouped from mining alone (only from interests on tokens). So now that I properly understand your design, I can more easily identify the flaws. The flaw should be obvious to you! If the supply of new mining accounts is insufficient to match the number of new users who are buying tokens (which you state decline exponentially in order to make the mining account a sunk cost relative to mining profits), then it means competition in pricing for mining accounts means that only some tokens owners earn interest. So in order to earn interest, there will be competition to consolidate token ownership ever and ever more concentrated. So that the price of new accounts keep rising until the supply of tokens is owned by a very individuals. This will also drive the price of the token down and down, because eventually only a very few large token holders can justify buying new accounts. Even they can justify buying more than one new account, because their interest earned per mining account purchased is higher than their competition. So you can see mining becomes centralized. Really there is no way to stop nature from routing around your Coasian barrier applied to a fungible resource. Your attempt to make it not fungible plays right into why the concentration still wins the economy-of-scale as I explained. I had stated before that if mining income is very small relative to interests earned, then no one will bother to do it. Thus that is another reason the mining will become centralized. I am intuitively confident we will discover numerous ways this fails. But I don't have time to think about this too much. |
|
|
|
wait wait wait, you are not talking about Zcash here.. are you ?  Neither Zcash nor Monero ( nor Zcoin or any coin that current exists, except maybe Steem but I think it is probably doomed by its whale heavy distribution). I'll let this be my last reply unless some new issue of discussion is raised. P.S. Afair I don't know anything about Zcoin, unless it was that coin I had looked at long ago that was based on the original Zerocoin accumulator. |
|
|
|
And why can't these tokens like Maisafe for example become the Bitcoin 2.0 ?
Because afaik they didn't solve the major problem of decentralization and scaling of blockchain consensus for general uses of a blockchain. Their focus is on storage, not general use blockchain technology. Please feel free to correct me if I am mistaken on that assumption. Also IMO, the Bitcoin 2.0 blockchain is not only going to be a token. It will be for consensus on all forms of data. |
|
|
|
* Dash has a decentralized budget system that is funded directly from the blockchain. Budget proposals are voted on by masternodes. Independance of budget and governance enables Dash
to create its own ecosystem and expand drastically from there.
You can't prove it is decentralized, because you can't prove there isn't a Sybil attack on the ownership of masternodes. Given the skewed distribution of tokens at the start due to the sneaky "bug" instamine, it is sensible to expect that most (let's guessestimate a majority or supermajority) of the masternodes are owned by "Evan Inc.". Why would the insiders give up control of such a marvelous alleged "scam", especially given that speculators apparently keep feeding Evan Inc. more money ( unless the market liquidity is Evan, Inc buying tokens from himself to fake the liquidity and manipulate the price upwards)? Decentralized is not the same as distributed or replicated. Please consult the dictionary if you disagree. I've been thinking more about what Evan Inc. could in theory do to the market place if the float was only a tiny fraction of the insider controlled money supply. It means that any selloff by any person who owns Dash will only cause a short-term drop in the price, because the insiders can buy tokens from themselves and raise the price back up again. This gives the illusion that there is liquidity for those Dash holders who want to sell. If anyone with large holdings (e.g. $100,000 of it) wanted to sell Dash, they would crash the price. If 10 guys with $10,000 each of Dash tried to sell, they would probably crash the price. I VERY MUCH DOUBT YOU CAN SELL DASH WHEN YOU NEED TO. It is possible the Evan Inc. might try to absorb your selling if he felt it was just a test. But sustained selling of only very tiny amounts of the marketcap would I bet crash the price. And this is why I think you are crazy to sell Bitcoin and buy Dash. Bitcoin has liquidity. Dash I bet doesn't (but I can't prove it without doing a test).
If there is a way to short Dash, someone may want to do this test and make a lot of money if the hypothesis is correct.  You could force the insiders to buy at lower prices to stop you from covering your shorts, which they might do so that you lose and they lose also. So you might need very deep pockets to win this war. You'd probably also want to make sure you are anonymous, because it is not beyond the realm of plausibility to ponder if this group could possibly have ties to mafia and retaliate bodily. You could talk to iCEBREAKER, he is known to have shorted Dash in the past .. this could totally be his thing. Let's assume for the sake of argument that the liquidity is real, with sufficient speculators being enamored with Dash's marketing to provide an aggregate market. Maybe ICEBREAKER needs to wait and short when the Dash "reality distortion field" has been busted by a project that is actually gaining the real world adoption that Dash only talks about. |
|
|
|
Spoetnik are you proud of me now? Who scam the once - will scam again..... Don't trust in such team for real.... Just fire the Dai and all will be Glad
He is a co-founder, I'm not sure whether they(the foundation members) have right to fire him, many other co-founders can. There is no board there, fire a co-founder could be very difficult. And 1 million USD has invested on him already. One of the most interesting questions in my opinion is, if the rest of the team knew about Dai's past or not. Any infos?
As if they would tell you the truth. When there is a corruption at the very top, you can safely assume that many people were also involved in a planned corruption. They've already scammed $1 million out of the community. You'll never be able to determine who of those remaining are not scammers. Safer to assume they all are complicit and move on. Blacklist all their names from future projects, so there are consequences to working with scammers. Sorry for the bag holders. Let it be a lesson to you to stop investing in bullshit. Any one can write up a whitepaper and make a fancy website with a lot of rehashed bullshit. |
|
|
|
Who scam the once - will scam again..... Don't trust in such team for real.... Just fire the Dai and all will be Glad
He is a co-founder, I'm not sure whether they(the foundation members) have right to fire him, many other co-founders can. There is no board there, fire a co-founder could be very difficult. And 1 million USD has invested on him already. In my opinion: Not enough evidence to say Qtum is a scam.
One of the most interesting questions in my opinion is, if the rest of the team knew about Dai's past or not. Any infos?
As if they would tell you the truth. When there is a corruption at the very top, you can safely assume that many people were also involved in a planned corruption. They've already scammed $1 million out of the community. You'll never be able to determine who of those remaining are not scammers. Safer to assume they all are complicit and move on. Blacklist all their names from future projects, so there are consequences to working with scammers. Sorry for the bag holders. Let it be a lesson to you to stop investing in bullshit. Any one can write up a whitepaper and make a fancy website with a lot of rehashed bullshit. |
|
|
|
* Dash has a decentralized budget system that is funded directly from the blockchain. Budget proposals are voted on by masternodes. Independance of budget and governance enables Dash
to create its own ecosystem and expand drastically from there.
You can't prove it is decentralized, because you can't prove there isn't a Sybil attack on the ownership of masternodes. Given the skewed distribution of tokens at the start due to the sneaky "bug" instamine, it is sensible to expect that most (let's guessestimate a majority or supermajority) of the masternodes are owned by "Evan Inc.". Why would the insiders give up control of such a marvelous alleged "scam", especially given that speculators apparently keep feeding Evan Inc. more money ( unless the market liquidity is Evan, Inc buying tokens from himself to fake the liquidity and manipulate the price upwards)? Decentralized is not the same as distributed or replicated. Please consult the dictionary if you disagree. I've been thinking more about what Evan Inc. could in theory do to the market place if the float was only a tiny fraction of the insider controlled money supply. It means that any selloff by any person who owns Dash will only cause a short-term drop in the price, because the insiders can buy tokens from themselves and raise the price back up again. This gives the illusion that there is liquidity for those Dash holders who want to sell. If anyone with large holdings (e.g. $100,000 of it) wanted to sell Dash, they would crash the price. If 10 guys with $10,000 each of Dash tried to sell, they would probably crash the price. I VERY MUCH DOUBT YOU CAN SELL DASH WHEN YOU NEED TO. It is possible the Evan Inc. might try to absorb your selling if he felt it was just a test. But sustained selling of only very tiny amounts of the marketcap would I bet crash the price. And this is why I think you are crazy to sell Bitcoin and buy Dash. Bitcoin has liquidity. Dash I bet doesn't (but I can't prove it without doing a test). If there is a way to short Dash, someone may want to do this test and make a lot of money if the hypothesis is correct. You could force the insiders to buy at lower prices to stop you from covering your shorts, which they might do so that you lose and they lose also. So you might need very deep pockets to win this war. You'd probably also want to make sure you are anonymous, because it is not beyond the realm of plausibility to ponder if this group could possibly have ties to mafia and retaliate bodily. |
|
|
|
Why the "proof-of-storage" tokens will not have value: And my main point is I don't see the point of the tokens. I don't see any investment value of investing in the tokens long-term. They may get pumped by hype but in the long-run we will be using "Bitcoin 2.0" (what ever that ends up being) to pay for these services, not Sia, Storj, MaidSafe tokens.
|
|
|
|
In addition to my prior critique of "proof-of-storage", I see some additional flaws in the idea expressed as quoted below: Coins are issued by the network based on the following formula:
-1 coin = 1gb hosted for 1 month.
-Any downtime (detected by pinging) reduces profit 10x (ie, if your mining machine is down for 1 day, you lose 10 days worth of profit for that uptime month)
-100% of your "storage" has to be downloadable by the network within 1 hour, tested by the network randomly 4 times per month (uptime month of 30 days, not calendar). If you fail this test your profits over this period are reduced by double the amount of failed download, eg, you are hosting (mining with) 4gb of space, a random download attempt occurs and only 90% of the 4gb is downloaded, then your profits are reduced by 20% untill the next random download test.
-When you start mining you do not receive profit for the first uptime week of 7 days (this is to stop people that had some downtime simply creating a new miner on a new wallet straight away)
- Ping checks are performed every 15 minutes, you need to fail 2 to be considered "down". Thus you can install an update and restart without "down time".
- Miners are also rewarded the transaction fees of the network, spread evenly to the miners based on earning.
None of these quoted are objectively provable to the public-at-large, i.e. on a blockchain. For example, proof-of-storage can work from the perspective of the owner of the data to be stored, but not from a public perspective. Network performance can't be proven. This is one of the fundamental reasons we have to deal with Byzantine fault tolerance on networks. How do you prove to a blockchain that the ping time you measured was accurate. You can't. How do you prove downtime. You can't. If you say voting, then you have Sybil attacks on voting. Byzantine agreement can't remain unstuck without a hardfork or whales. Etc.. Sorry this is entirely impossible. It violates the basic research and fundamentals. Much more detail is in my unpublished white paper wherein I start from first principles and try to explain these fundamentals (but ends up being far too much to summarize to laymen, so I don't know if that version of the whitepaper will be the one I end up publishing). So this is what I mean with my criticism that proof-of-storage can't even really work well even for file storage in the Storj model where each user encrypts the data to be stored (in multiple variants), because it is impossible to insure fungible performance for the data retrievability. The idea of the coin is just the same as an other cryptocurrency, just using proof of storage instead of proof of work or proof of stake, to get some real world use out of the "security". Unlike "Burst" the storage could be used for usefull things.
Burst is a flawed shitcoin and I had long ago explained precisely why. But nobody listens to me, so I often don't bother to explain any more. Everyone ends up hating me, because almost every project in our ecosystem is a flawed shitcoin. So much better I will STFU. Now this is the important (and I think clever) bit:
Fees paid by purchasers of storage are NOT given to the miners, but are BURNED.
This should, theoretically, stabilize the price of the coin. If the value of the coin is low, more coins are spent to buy storage, thus more coins are burned, thus total supply shrinks.
If the value of the coin is high few coins will be spent on purchasing the storage, thus the coins given to the miners will far outweigh the amount burned and the supply will increase.
Increased adoption of the coin should not increase the value of each coin substantially, but will increase the total supply of them.
It is an interesting idea conceptually, but afaics the economic and mathematical relationship is not sound. For example, in order to bring the token supply down considerably via burning fees, we may need more supply of storage to accommodate enough spending. Yet supply would leave if the price is too cheap. So the system diverges instead of converging as you assumed. |
|
|
|
...does this mysterious bitcoin killer of yours have privacy included as standard?
Wasn't my first priority, but you've prompted a rekindling of my interest in anonymity. Frankly I have nothing but vaporware and a lot of work to do, so let's not talk about it. I will post about it when it is time to talk about it. You need to deal with what is real and mine isn't real. Yes please I've found some flaws in your idea, and I replied on that thread. |
|
|
|
|
Show Posts
