snA**************
Great job posting your secret key...enjoy getting your funds stolen when and if you do get them... |
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Cheers for the answer.
Does that best share rate seem low for 24 hours mining though? I just restarted CGMiner - 1 hr ago - and the best share is only 131.
All screenshots I see of other users CGMiner output has best shares waaay above mine, so yeah just wondering if I have messed up somewhere.
It's really just luck. For instance, when I mined Bitcoin in 2011 with just 260mh/s my avg time was 20 weeks to find a block, I found it just 6 hours when I started soloing, then 10 days later I got another block. But I have not had one since. Though my best difficulty so far has been one million.  |
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I am mining (well attempting to) solo mine PPC, with a hash rate of 680 - 690 mh/s.
If I understand it correctly, PPC's current difficulty is 307k, so for me to submit a winning block my best share (using CGMiner) would have to be over 307k.
My issue is after a day of mining, my best share is 1.84k.
So my questions are : Is there anyway to get my GPU to attempt higher shares? Does my best share increase the longer I mine? (e.g mining for 1 day will get 1.4, 2 days 2.8 etc etc)
Any help would be greatly appreciated.
A share is basically a block, it's difficulty is random. You can only get an avg amount of time before you find a block with a high enough difficulty, but in no way can you control the difficulty of shares. Your avg time to find a block with 690mh/s at difficulty of 307k is 3 weeks or so. |
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If there are any to spare, please do rNbZWTQfxaSAHaxFgRDdqw7cWcNRdtd6nW
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These patches do nothing, as soon as difficulty drops a miner with a lot of GH/s exploits this difficulty bug to mine at low diff, then when the difficulty increases by a factor of 3, he stops and waits. Just look at the blocks at diff 5k  |
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This will require a client that is capable of running every chain at the same time. Multiple wallets for a single network, yes, but for different chains, not easily done.
I get that, hence the bounty fund. If there is enough interest in this, I will set up a fund for this, and anyone who wants can donate to it. It must be a very huge bounty since you are requesting a drastic change of the standard client, a new client altogether, or an extended version of say Armory. |
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I have to agree that pure unabashed clones are a waste of time even when created without any malicious intent. If you have some technical improvement try to convince an existing coin to implement it first before spinning off a new coin.
Technical in what way? For instance I wanted to improve the UI a bit with more features, if I can of course, but anything more important as changing part of the protocol to do something in a different way, like PPC does proof of stake blocks, is beyond me. Though I did want to go for increased precision, i.e less than 0.00000001. |
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This will require a client that is capable of running every chain at the same time. Multiple wallets for a single network, yes, but for different chains, not easily done.
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I believe the client uses openssl to generate random bytes
On Windows it creates random bits from a "screenshot" of the screen if I understood it correctly, additionally it also calls CryptGenRandom API for even more random bits. |
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Makes sense. Any other drawbacks?
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In a nutshell, what does this mean?
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I checked sources: https://github.com/litecoin-project/litecoin/blob/master/src/main.cppI found function to check it. It is exacly same as in bitcoin so hashes should be similiar unless ... binary clients are from different source and LTC users are in BIG trouble or I am just missing something here. bool CheckProofOfWork(uint256 hash, unsigned int nBits)
{
CBigNum bnTarget;
bnTarget.SetCompact(nBits);
// Check range
if (bnTarget <= 0 || bnTarget > bnProofOfWorkLimit)
return error("CheckProofOfWork() : nBits below minimum work");
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (hash > bnTarget.getuint256())
return error("CheckProofOfWork() : hash doesn't match nBits");
return true;
}
That sentence doesn't even make sense. |
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When I do the required packages installation I get this error
Package libdb4.8++-dev is not available, but is referred to by another package.
This may mean that the package is missing, has been obsoleted, or
is only available from another source
When I do the make I then get this error
src/net.cpp:18:32: fatal error: miniupnpc/miniwget.h: No such file or directory
compilation terminated.
I'm running Ubuntu Narwhal. Any ideas, please?
Well duh, "fatal error: miniupnpc/miniwget.h: No such file or directory" was pretty self-explanatory, you apparently did not read after the first paragraph. |
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We really need such a website. |
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+1, I'd like to know how and why too.
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I really do not think CloudFlare is the solution for Bitfinex.  Offline viewing? This is not the product for you!! CloudFlare is not designed to keep a realtime site up! Bitfinex team, using them is not a good choice, and the option to view a offline version of site is embarrassing. You are not a forum or blog! Not very impressed at all. Really gives a bad impression, like you have no idea what CloudFlare does, I think they are designed for static blogs and stuff. Can't you load balance the site across multiple AWS instances? I double facepalmed at your post. Offline viewing = unprofessional?? |
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If this only queries a website and displays popups, why not just code it as an HTML5 Windows widget?
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Attack wars, further jamming stuff up, seem counter productive.
It's perfect. |
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I'm starting this thread to ask about the lessons we've learned from Bitcoin thefts regarding security. We've seen exchanges, pools, online wallets get hacked despite the fact that they were maintained by people who knew what they were doing and despite every theft/hack we still end up with security holes.
If I wanted to start a Bitcoin service, how would I proceed to design my service as to avoid the attacks used on other websites and exchanges?
So far I've made a list of things that can go wrong:
CSRF Attacks and XSS. CSRF can, at least on paper, be mitigated by having some unique identifier every time you reload a page and every time a form is submitted, it's compared to the one in the database and later re-generated. In case AJAX-like features are implemented, a different approach is required. XSS is a matter of escaping html, but I believe straight out disallowing '<' and '>' from being entered in a field is also possible as well as avoiding printing dynamic data from a GET request.
SQL Injection. This is possibly the most common vector of attack. From all I've read about it, using prepared statements where it's claimed that data is escaped for you should be more than sufficient. And avoiding concatenation of parameters when doing it. Avoiding any use of addslashes is encouraged as it has a quirk that allows it to mutate a byte to a different one thereby allowing you to bypass it.
Plaintext password. This is probably the first thing that one should fix, by hashing the password a few times with salt. Personally I would use double SHA-512 with salt OR even scrypt if need be. I would store the password as a BLOB conserving space as a 512 bit hash is 128 bytes in ASCII Hex, so you conserve 64 bytes per password by storing it in binary. I was also thinking of the use of reversible scrambling algorithm on the data in the database in case the attacker obtained a SQL dump. This way an attacker would need access to the actual source code of your service to see the algorithm.
You are free to fill in the blanks. I am by no means a security expert, this is just what I think should solve a few of the problems.
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You know, I have a feeling he is reading this thread as we speak.
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