Cheap will be $0.30 cents.

Yes, users want their transactions to appear in the longest chain. They don't need to trust each other. They trust that Nash equilibrium.

Following up on that bolded commitment quoted above, cross-partition transactions even with asset transfers (e.g. a crypto currency, not scriptable block chains) seems to destroy the Nash equilibrium also, because the cascade of derivative transactions infects across partitions, yet the validators did not validate all partitions (i.e. not all transactions). Thus later if it is discovered that a partition lied about a transaction being valid, then downstream transactions in other partitions would invalidated (i.e. reverted). Which would of course cause the coin to be considered a failure and market price plummet. So it is the same as the case of strict partitioning with scripting.

Thus I have no idea what Fuserleer is doing for eMunie that might possibly work soundly. I will have to wait for his white paper.

In my design, I have cross-partition transactions, but the way I accomplish this and maintain the Nash equilibrium is I entirely centralized verification, i.e. all transactions are validated by all centralized validators. This eliminates the problem that full nodes have unequal incomes but equal verification costs, thus ameliorates the economics that drives full nodes to become centralized. The centralized validators would still have the potential incentive to lie and short the coin. So the users in the system (hopefully millions of them) are constantly verifying a subsample of the transactions so that statistically a centralized validator is going to get caught fairly quickly, banned, and their hard won reputation entirely blown. Since these validations are done in a non-organized manner (i.e. they are randomly chosen by each node), then there is no viable concept of colluding to maintain a lie.

In case anyone has forgotten, I believe I have convincingly shown that it is impossible to design a consensus algorithm that will not centralize verification (if not also mining control in Satoshi's PoW and in PoS). So at least my design maintains decentralized control, while centralizing verification while also statistically decentralized checking the verification for lies.

There won't be any miners in the traditional sense. Only payers of transactions, who must include a PoW share else their transaction will not be accepted on the block chain. They mine at a loss. Consider it a transaction fee. They have a Nash equilibrium incentive to make sure they mine on the longest chain so their transactions get included on the chain and also possibly a less than profitable block reward.

So yes this requires a good volume of transactions.

Yeah I want to kill mining. Sorry if any with mining equipment hate me for that. I'd be quite pleased if I could turn Bitcoin mining farms into warehouses of expensive doorstops.


Yeah expect ETH to be pumped again with hype on the next upgrade. I tried my best to make it more difficult for them to hype the PoS(hit). But I assume they will invent some new technobabble (if they don't actually invent a true solution).

I tried to my best to force the price lower (by explaining the technological flaws) so they couldn't raise more funding, but perhaps I didn't succeed although I see the price plummeted to 0.01 BTC since I started posting today. When I called the double-top at 0.016, I was preparing to unleash this onslaught on their coin and marketcap. If you attribute the decline to me, then I guess I erased about $200+ million from their market cap. So that makes me feel like it wasn't a complete waste of my time.

But I didn't stretch the truth nor did I short ETH. I earned nothing on this except some satisfaction and perhaps some reputation (some haters too I am sure).

I am sorry but his response demonstrates that he ostensibly didn't understand the point about modularity versus dependent typing, i.e. when programmability is also the objective. I feel no desire whatsoever to try to teach him and other readers who couldn't possibly understand some stuff about computer science that is I guess not comprehensible to mere mortals. I already tried to explain it a few times. I guess he can learn about the effects of I/O, modularity, dependent typing, Turing completeness, and the Halting Problem from other sources if he is so inclined.

His vision of having scripts do dependent typing means he didn't pay attention to what I wrote about dependent typing. Or he somehow thinks what he wrote doesn't mean dependent typing.

These issues have been worked on already by academics. He is apparently unaware of their findings. I don't know of just one single canonical comprehensive resource I could cite for him.

Any way, just forsake the partitioning and the issue is "resolved". Well read below...


My time isn't free and I have expended years foruming. So that is the extent of my rebuttal.


I said:

* partitioning (of scriptable block chains) is flawed and is unsolvable.
* verification must be (or will be regardless) centralized in order to scale

I have not changed my position on that. Call that failure or not, depending on your expectations. In other words in the real world, I don't think it is that scalable unless they forsake decentralization. I have a idea about how to keep decentralization in face of those realities I allege.

If they wanted to expend some of their $millions on me, I might find it difficult to decline if the amount offered was high enough (given it would be guaranteed income). But I really have something more exciting to work on which if I am successful could generate potentially $billions not $millions, so not only do I not expect them to be interested in my assistance, but I doubt I would really be interested as well. Because for one reason is I think their company culture is too much on hype and that turns me off. The mcap is already $400m so I am surely not interested in holding ETH for appreciation (although they may be able to hype it to $billion or more on next upgrade regardless of whether the tech works in the real world or not). I mean I don't really believe in the project. I have no idea if programmable block chains will even be useful for anything real. Perhaps I could become convinced, but then I might just decide to make own programmable block chain instead starting from a $10,000 mcap is much more attractive than starting from a $400m marketcap. They seem to be highly disorganized and do they really produce a lot of code? I don't know. I would need to dig in and any way I am already working on something which I find interesting.

So I guess I just wrote a paragraph which basically says, "don't hire me".


Thanks. Well I really am laid back but I guess I have a limited patience because a forum can consume all of my time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 356 days a year for 3 fucking years. I am trying to quit and it just goes on and on an on. I have programming I need to be doing. Not this.

In addition to my posts upthread, I also explained in my video why proof-of-storage/retrievability can't work.

Snowden is not that stupid. Surely he realizes some basic facts.

Yeah it is absolutely great that China's mining bloc controls 65% of Bitcoin's hashrate and has vetoed any block size increase, including Classic's proposed mere doubling of the block size to 2MB only. Ostensibly they want to force transaction fees higher to fatten their profits. This is called an oligarchy and it is great for individuals like us, so we can pay through the nose to the oligarchy.

Thanks again for your incredible wisdom and including your sage proclamation that Szabo is a crypto god and was/is Satoshi.

Peachy has joined you in my very exclusive Ignore list, which I reserve for the wisest soothsayer salesmen.

I have already explained it. I was also cordial in hinting to you that you needed re-read my post and learn. Then you pushed it by saying my cordial hint was not civil. So I tried to explain it to you again. Now you've gone one step further by calling your Professor childish.

I think perhaps what you are proposing (yet you did not articulate it) is that you want every transaction to require that the input data is annotated to specify where that data appears on the block chain (i.e. which script output it is). But that means you are proposing to exclude "external I/O"; and I had already written upthread that yes if a design excludes external I/O then the problem is solved, but this means the programmability is mostly useless, e.g. no new accounts, etc..

Please monsterer think about what I have written. Please learn about type systems and what "dependently typed" means. Take some quiet time.

Sorry this is evidence that is not the case that we are not peers.

And the sooner you respect that, then the sooner I can respect you.


monsterer you are babbling nonsense. Sorry I am not going to unravel for you the entangled myopia you are weaving. The more I try to explain, the more deeply you will nest your misunderstanding. This is simply ridiculous that you are incapable of understanding freshmen level Computer Science.

Did you study at the university?

What did I write that wasn't civil and factual?

If a student was babbling nonsense in front of the entire classroom and the Professor tried to amicably ask the student to please go study a bit more because he doesn't seem to understand some basic issues, and the student continued to ramble on filling up the entire 2 hour class session with his misunderstanding, would the Professor be uncivil to finally put his foot down and demand "please stop".

I don't know why you can't comprehend what I have already written. The "transaction" which contains the input data for a script, can be set by any external entity. How do you propose to require that the bits & bytes of that input data declares its dependencies when it is impossible to force the external entity to declare where the data came from? You seem to not understand some basic facts about modularity and type systems in programming. Even if you could force the external entity to declare the full lineage of the input data (i.e. 100% dependently typed), that would require that the scripting can't be programmable, i.e. the external I/O capability would be eliminated. If you don't understand why, please go learn about the typing systems Coq and Epigram.

Please review a post about typing Modularity from Philip Wadler on Gilad Bracha's blog (hope you realize who those two guys are) and note his post immediately followed my post. My post was even deeper than Wadler's and in fact what I wrote there in 2011 is exactly what I am writing here about Ethereum. If anyone wants to identify a god in computer science, Philip Wadler would rank orders-of-magnitude higher than Szabo. Even the Lex Spoon who comments after Wadler wrote the book on Scala. Gilad only wrote the specification for Java.

You should know that Wadler invented the Expression Problem, which is precisely about how to produce statically typed extensible programmability without needing to refactor and recompile. I did a lot of research on this Expression Problem and even Stackoverflow deleted some of my earlier research.

---

You are so ignorant of Computer Science that you don't even know the difference between horse shit and a textbook.

How can anyone expect me to be nice to you, when you belittle academics.

I suppose it is good you are so stupid that you don't realize how stupid you are, as it can be considered a defense mechanism against depression. Ignorant bliss.

Re-read my prior post. You seem to not understand basic facts of computer science and thermodynamics, i.e. you can't prevent the external entity from lying.

If you are talking about scripting, then I think you've failed to entirely understand the point. That is that the data specified as input to any script can't be prevented from being taken from another script (in another partition) by the external entity that provided that "transaction" as you call it. The data can't be dependently typed such that it totally orders the universe external to the block chain. That is a fundamentally known fact of computer science and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This is for example why Haskell has the IOMonad and the Control.Monad.ST.Unsafe. A 100% dependently typed program is 100% deterministic and thus can't be programmed to do anything new, i.e. it is an entirely closed system and can't accept any external entropy.

If you want to talk about total eventual ordering of transactions for directed acyclic graphs, I think we should do so in your thread.

See my edit. No you got me, because I failed to explain that clearly.

Good you pointed that out, so I can clarify.

The distinction for Side Chains is one block chain is subject to the 51% attack of the other block chain. So the security is only as strong as the weakest block chain.

You are referring to asset exchange (not Ethereum's scripting). As you have stated, only the consensus mechanism can choose between the plurality of partial orderings because the partial orderings are arbitrary (and in the presence of competing double-spends, the partial orderings are conflicting). Thus Nash equilibrium depends on the consensus mechanism not being gameable which is the point I was making in my Edit#2 of my prior post.

I am interpreting your posts as you continue wishing for some sort of absolute, structural synchrony which can't exist in distributed systems. Did I misunderstand your question?

For readers, what monsterer is pointing out here is that the design of decentralized cross-chain (meaning two coins' block chains, not two candidate chains for the same longest-chain-rule block chain) exchange suffers from if either block chain orphans the block that the other block chain depended on, i.e. that a chain reorganization on one block chain of one coin isn't enforced on the other coin's block chain, thus one of the parties in the exchange steals from the other (because the one keeps the coins on both chains).

So monsterer is offering this as an example where even for only asset exchange block chains (i.e. no scripting), there is the case that external factors can cause the "system" to fail from the perspective of the user.

And this is the main problem with Blockstream's proposed Side Chains, in that chain reorganizations could cause a cascade of failure, which thus seem to make Side Chains totally insecure and unworthy of adoption. Some people have argued that exchanges could be delayed by sufficient confirmations, but remember that with proof-of-work a lie-in-wait 51% attacker can rewrite the entire block chain. Then again others point out that we are screwed any way with a 51% attacker and that the community will organize. Note I rebutted this in my video, by explaining that community can't organize. Please watch my video to get the full explanation. Note that the Chinese mining cartel already controls 65% of Bitcoin's hashrate and has vetoed any block size increase, not even allowing the doubling of block size for Bitcoin Classic, thus this has shown the community can't overcome a 51% attack.


For monsterer's example (not Side Chains), I argue that the user is capable of associating that failure with incorrect use of the system and localized to use of a decentralized exchange. Whereas the distinction from the partitioned scripting case is that users wouldn't even be able to know what service they used had caused the failure, because the failure could occur derivatively due to intertwined cascade from other scripts. In short, the users (or programmers) of violating scripts may be aware that the assumption of cross-partition has been violated, but the rest of the users would be incapable of making this determination!


Even the script can't stop a user from copying data from one partition to another. So even if Ethereum only runs authorized and vetted scripts, this afaics wouldn't totally ameliorate the issue.

Edit: Of course (external) I/O from scripts can input to other scripts in a myriad of cascade and permuted entanglement.

When I write 'external I/O', I mean differentiated from referencing some data on the block chain as an input, e.g. UXTO. You see that for asset exchange, the data is deterministic because all I/O must sum to 0 and the directed acyclic graph assures us there is no recursion of the state.

Edit#2: It appears to me that for asset exchange all I/O is deterministic. For scripting, this is not the case due to external I/O, not even without partitions! But at least without partitions, then scripting apparently doesn't violate the Nash equilibrium in the sense that all scripts are validated by all validators (thus there is no way for the validators for a partition to lie to the other validators). Whereas in partitioning, sufficient (w.r.t. to the consensus-by-betting resolution) validators might lie about their partition (i.e. pursue another strategy) since that is another game theory strategy that is introduced by the partitioning given that the partitions can't be enforced externally. The distinction is about Nash equilibrium. Per the definition of Nash equilibrium, then validators pursing another strategy (i.e. lying) destroys the Nash equilibrium.

Note edit I made to a post on the prior page:


Speculators who think Szabo and Vitalik are gods deserve what the Bible says in the Ten Commandments:


These guys took $18 million to go work on vaporware and didn't even produce a scalable prototype.

The first sin was taking ICO money when all they had to offer was their reputations and no actual product or even completed research.

Why do humans base so much on perceived reputation. Reputation is overrated. Completed production talks, all the other BS walks.

There are so many smart people in this world. Smartness isn't enough.

You all have destroyed this young man. You spoiled him. I had to cut lawns and I developed my first commercial software success by sleeping under my desk and programming from my room. Sacrifice.

You got it with the edit. You must have re-read my prior post and the edits I had done on my prior post.

The issue is the system thinks it has strict partitioning, but the external users can violate that partitioning of state (at least with scripts, not sure yet about only asset transfers). The system thinks that the state of one partition can't impact the state of another partition, but the external users can violate this assumption if there exists the ability to apply external input to the block chain (which obviously must exist otherwise the scripting is mostly useless, i.e. no new accounts, etc).

For asset transfers, I need to think about the harm that can be done and whether the same problem applies. For scripting (with external I/O) it is clearly impossible to assume/enforce strict partitioning of state.


No script fails from the perspective of the block chain. The external users see failure, because only the external users are aware they violated the strict partitioning of state. And thus the spaghetti of external failure becomes as intertwined as inputs and outputs from many partitions cross-pollute cascades and intertangled scripts.

Edit: the block chain thinks it is validating the block chain because it erroneously thinks strict partitioning is enforced. External users see that validation is failing, because they violated the assumption of strict partitioning by cross-polluting the state via the external I/O of the block chain. Thus holistically and systemically there is failure (from the perspective of the external users and thus the coin's market value plummets as users abandon the system due to failures).

More completely stated, the Nash equilibrium is that there is no other strategy other than the strategy of mining on the longest chain which is visible to all nodes, i.e. that there is no superior strategy other than the one that nodes are already doing and which is known to all nodes. Whereas, as I pointed out in my video, when a node (or colluding nodes) have > 33% of the hashrate, then for Satoshi' PoW design they can apply the selfish mining attack by withholding block solutions until the rest of the network catches up, thus the Nash equilibrium is destroyed by selfish mining in that case.

Also I have pointed out in my video and the follow up posts in this thread about a meta issue that destroys the Nash equilibrirum, that for the case where there are external failures (external to the block chain's perspective of itself) due to external actuation of cross-partition state (even if the block chain thinks it is enforcing a strict partitioning with no cross partition state), the Nash equilibrium fails because the entire coin fails, thus the validators of partitions can't trust the validators of other partitions (because although they get their block reward, the external market value of the reward fails). It remains under study whether this applies to asset transfers too (or just to partitioning of scripts) and whether it applies for asset transfers in the strict partitioning block chain (which I argued in my video is immune to the problem) and/or in the cross-partitioning block chain (which I did not address in my video and Fuserleer raised this point hence).

I hope readers don't get confused that I am making a distinction between when cross partitioned state is occurring by-design on the block chain and when it occurs externally because it can. For scripting it is impossible to enforce a strict partitioning because it is very clear that the external actuation can inject state from one partition into another partition (and even though the block chain can't determine this, the external users can and the external users can experience failure that the block chain is entirely unaware of due to this external Turing completeness, which is a very deep, meta, high IQ concept that apparently most people wouldn't think of ... note smooth indicated to me in a PM that he had thought of this issue of external Turing completeness before too). For asset transfers (no scripting), it is not yet 100% clear to me. I need to think about it more.


Yes as long as the state from the two partitions did not leak into each other by any means (including the external meta case mentioned again above).