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Is there a way to export a wallet that has 1000's of different addresses as a "watch only" wallet? Perhaps it would be a good idea to have a new file format, like wallet.wol (watch only wallet), and this would be all your public keys that can then be imported as watch only on your online laptop. Similar to how .psbt file makes things easier, this would be the same. The goal is to minimize command line usage and automate these things because you can screw up by accident specially if dealing with tons of addresses.
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This is a little bit off-topic, but I feel I have to clear up some misconceptions here. In this case, I only see a solution, and that is a sort of a pnemonic mnemonic seed similar to the 12 word seed with Electrum which you can memorize, but Bitcoin Core does not support this (and I don't trust non-full node software). You could convert the hd wallet string of characters into something readable and memorize this perhaps?
This to me implies you use Bitcoin Core only to store all your BTC funds? Be aware, that while this is excellent software and running a node is an integral part of Bitcoin, which also helps your privacy, it's not the best for security. Bitcoin Core is a hot wallet. I would highly suggest instead using that node via Tor from one or multiple SPV wallets, which e.g. support mnemonics and HSMs / hardware wallets. Here is how to install and access electrs remotely via Tor from any wallet. It can run on a mobile phone for example, which is great security wise due to sandboxing and secure boot (compared to traditional desktop OS). Especially if that phone application you use is open source, possibly compiled by you yourself and accesses keys that are stored on a Bluetooth-enabled HW wallet or (imo much better) an airgapped wallet that supports QR code communication. You must understand, that while using Core is great for privacy, you're at risk due to using a hot wallet. Any airgapped / cold wallet or even HW wallet setup would be safer security wise. By configuring the 'light client' software to use your own BTC node to query balances and transactions, you retain the same privacy as if using Core directly. I use Bitcoin Core for cold wallet too. Bitcoin Core on laptop 1, fully synced with watch only addresses. Bitcoin Core on laptop 2, airgapped with no wifi card and pkeys for signing. And now with PSBT you just have to save the PSBT in an sdcard and put it on the online laptop to broadcast. Back then it was a pain in the ass with getrawtransaction etc. But still, Bitcoin Core is very primitive when it comes to cold wallet features but I can trust it above other software. Also the more software and different stuff you use the bigger chance that there is a bug somewhere. I assume Bitcoin Core is the most peer reviewed software on the planet at this point, so while I miss features for cold storage by other wallets, I just use the same software for both hot and cold. Hopefully in the future they work on better cold storage support. I think people like Luke Dash Jr also use either Core or Knots as wallet, or at least back then I think he was recommending it, but now im not sure if they moved to coldcard. I know someone that has been using Bitcoin Core in a linux laptop that he only uses for this, uses it both for storage and broadcasting but deletes the wallet.dat once he has broadcasted what he wants. Also, what he does is he syncs the blockchain, once fully synced, turns off internet, then decrypts an aes file with wallet.dat on it which he has saved somewhere else, loads the wallet file on Core, clicks send to send a transaction so it becomes pending until you have network, turns on internet, transaction is broadcasted, quickly turns off internet and monitors the transaction on his regular computer on some blockchain explorer, once its all confirmed and well he saves the wallet.dat back on the encrypted file, saves it somewhere else, shreds the file. Considering he only transacts a few times a year I would say it's almost impossible that he gets hacked. He can't be bothered with learning how to use anything else and works for him. |
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Wouldn't you simply be better to access that encypted data remotely?
On a rented server, or, in you aren't homeless, access your home remotely?
Have nothing that matters stored on any hardware you carry into regions where that could matter ...
Well, which company would you trust when it comes to renting a server? And aren't you in the same dilemma? you are trusting someone else to store the data for you. As far as accessing your own server at home, suppose that the country you left (where you have your running machines) becomes very anti-Bitcoin, and finds out you are dealing with cryptocurrencies, they could raid your house and steal your machines where everything is hosted. I think 5 to 10 years (or sooner) from now, all these scenarios are very possible. Look at the covid insanity where you no longer have autonomy over your own body when it comes to vaccines, why is it so hard to imagine a world in which they raid you if you are dealing with "unregulated money"? This is where you have to ask yourself: Where can I host my bitcoins where I could recover them in case they took everything from me? In this case, I only see a solution, and that is a sort of a pnemonic seed similar to the 12 word seed with Electrum which you can memorize, but Bitcoin Core does not support this (and I don't trust non-full node software). You could convert the hd wallet string of characters into something readable and memorize this perhaps? |
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I want to make a study of latency in transaction relay and I would like to know a way to see where the transaction jumps exactly from node to node step by step since you send it and get a ms of how much time it takes on each step until it becomes inserted into a block. Is there a way to monitor this?
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Coinbase (and thus the IRS) already knows you have X amount of bitcoins. Even if you move them away from the exchange you are a target for them if you try to hides these coins from them in the future. So assume no privacy of the money you buy through centralized websites.
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There is a lot of shilling lately (again) with "the flippening" event happening. Ethereum has created a new market which is basically 99% scam tokens, rugpulls, pump and dumps and NFTs which are probably used for money laundering. Anyway, the thing is, there is definitely if a demand for all of that, even if it's all based on a platform that's not decentralized.
So to the point: Would you quit if a centralized shitcoin managed to surpass Bitcoin in marketcap? At that point it would be clear that entire space is a joke. Bitcoin would still march on as usual, but it would be just sad to see people putting their money on shitcoins rather than on the only actually decentralized blockchain worth anything.
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As someone that saw all the iterations of hard fork attempts back then I would personally have it fixed to 1MB forever. Most people don't even want to transact, they hold it, and whenever you start with the next hard fork attempt crisis prices plummets, which is against the agenda of any hodler. Also, by looking at actual demand, the mempool is pretty empty: https://mempool.space/As of right now you can get a transaction going in 10 minutes for 9sats/byte. There is no demand for hard fork and time has proven that the blockchain was getting spammed by Roger Ver and Jihan Wu et al back then. And even if there were high fees it would still be debatable that this means a hard fork is urgent. At this point it's probably not even possible to ever reach supermajority for a hard fork increase thus proving Bitcoin is in fact decentralized. Perhaps the only thing that would get everyone on board was a global ban on physical cash, then the only way out for financial privacy would be Bitcoin, at this point it would be an organic demand for a block space and maybe there would be supermajority reached. |
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Slightly off-topic, but there are ways to create gmail accounts anonymously. It's a bit harder and well, gmail is owned by Google. But it can be done and then forever accessed through Tor so gmail never has your ip address, except maybe the first time (so the first time, when it is created, you have to do it from some public wifi hotspot or coffee shop or mall.)
You can then use those gmail accounts to maybe sign up for protonmail, maybe? I've only had to make one protonmail account and I don't even use it.
I find it's much easier to hide as a normal looking sheep with the other 1 billion users of gmail.
Crossing international borders is always a risk. I find that the officers don't normally take too much interest in phones or cameras, and sometimes even laptops. As long as you keep all of those devices off and encrypted, they're usually not going to bother. You can also just tape a microsd card to your device without actually inserting it? That way you can "smuggle" up to 1 terabyte of data without anyone knowing.
But, like implied, that might be a hassle for the OP to do.
I wouldn't use anything Google to store anything of value. In this particular case, using gmail throught Tor the way I see it is a recipe for disaster. Google can lock you out at a random time because the IP that you are trying to connect from doesn't match the last device used, which will be the case because Tor always cycles IP's. In fact you can find people with their accounts locked because they tried to log in from an VPN, so I wouldn't even use any proxy to access anything Google, specially if you have an Adsense account. The only way to unlock it would be via doxing yourself (phone) so in this scenario it wouldn't work. Protonmail is known for handing info when requested, but I guess it's safer when it comes to accessing it thought Tor, even tho I have had Protonmail accounts locked because the IP of the Tor node was tagged by them as "spam", so not even Protonmail is safe from getting locked but at least is less probable than Google. You could also try to get it unlocked via support and pointing to the fact that they even have an onion site so they should support Tor users. No way to do this with Google. I understand the philosophy of hiding between a lot of other users but I don't think Google and Tor get along. If they decide to ask email or SMS as verification, your only option is either perform the verification or upgrade to paid plan using Bitcoin. Then I could buy a pre-paid SIM card for a dollar anonymously using cash for the sole purpose of receiving this SMS verification. Or try various disposable email address for verification. Or I could email them and directly request an invite, since the only reason they require verification is to prevent spammers, and it's highly unlikely a spammer is going to email them directly for the purpose of opening a single account. Or I just pay the $5 to open a Plus account for a month, not a big deal. Although if you are going to encrypt the PSBT before uploading it, you don't even need to use ProtonMail - just host it somewhere you can access via Tor and it won't get deleted. Open a GitHub account and stick it on there. You could probably open a topic on the Archival board here and stick it there. Message it to yourself using an encrypted communication app like Signal. There are multiple possibilities. Github has banned Tor, or at least the last time I tried you couldn't get past the captcha. Not aware of the Archival method. The main problem would be that you don't control the servers, so even after you delete the file, the file is recoverable. With a strong 128 char random password, it should be safe to say it wouldn't be cracked even if they obtained a physical copy, but you never know. I was thinking about methods to store a wallet.dat in the cloud too since you can't have the "spawn seed" method like on Electrum, and I just don't feel safe uploading it anywhere even with 128 char sha-512 encryption. |
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Interesting question, OP. Such a program would indeed be useful but I am not aware of any programs that will brute force a wallet password by regex. You will essentially want to create a tokens file specifying the various strings which could be a part of the password and what combination of said strings to try, and then run it against your wallet.dat file. The instructions for how to do this are here: https://btcrecover.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tokenlist_file/Are you sure that BTCrecover will work with Bitcoin Core wallet.dats? I thought it could only recover Electrum seeds. Your best hope is probably hashcat: https://hashcat.net/hashcat/But you'll have to spend big bucks in a decent computer with a top tier gaming GPU by nvidia if you want any realistic chances of bruteforcing it. If the money lost is relevant then I would pick an 3080 RTX card or 3090 RTX if you can afford it. If you have no success bruteforcing at least you'll be able to play games at the highest settings. |
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Carrying the PSBT file throught a border and then getting the laptop checked in customs for instance. Then don't carry it through customs. As achow has said, it is going to be publicly viewable to the entire world once you broadcast it, so you can store it on the cloud, email it to someone else or yourself, post it on a blog, any method of digital storage which you can access later once you arrive at your destination. If you do all this with a brand new and otherwise anonymous cloud/email/whatever account, then there is minimal additional risk to your privacy. I've heard stories of people getting their laptops confiscated if they had full disk encryption and refuse to deliver a password. If border agents are interested enough in you to force you to decrypt your entire disk, then they are going to be interested enough in individual encrypted files or containers to force you to decrypt them too. If you really want to hide something from border agents, then don't take it across the border with you. If you must, then a hidden volume with some "decoy" encrypted data is probably the way to do it, which is far outside the scope of Bitcoin Core. I can't agree with this logic of "the entire world will know". The entire world will know X transaction happened but not that it's tied to you. The problem is linking this data to you. It's the basic pseudonymous principle of making transactions in Bitcoin. So if for instance you save a .psbt file in an usb pendrive and you forget to delete it, and someone gets access to the USB physically and manages to tie this USB pendrive to you, then they would know you are an owner of bitcoins. So you have now become a target. But assuming this will remain as it is then you'll just have to guarantee that the file is put inside a Veracrypt container or something before it leaves your airgapped laptop. As far as cloud storage. All of these "anonymous email" services aren't really anonymous. And "anonymous cloud services" require that you dox yourself via paying a subscription usually. You would to find one that accepts BTC and mix the coins and hope it all goes well. There's also the problem that you never know what happens with this data if you don't control the servers physically. I haven't found any reasonable way to store stuff in the cloud and call it "safe". Carrying the PSBT file throught a border and then getting the laptop checked in customs for instance.
Wallet software is way more obvious than a PSBT. And wallet software will contain far more private information than a PSBT. PSBTs are just base64 strings, you wouldn't know that it is Bitcoin related unless you are looking for it specifically. And again, you can just encrypt the PSBT with a third party tool. Then it will look like an encrypted file, instead of specifically an encrypted PSBT as adding an encryption standard would make. I have always wondered why the wallet.dat is not fully encrypted, but in any case you wouldn't move the wallet.dat file around to sign between computers as you would with the PSBT ones. Of course it's the same thing: never move the wallet.dat file around if it's not fully encrypted with a third party software. |
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Almost all of the information contained in the PSBT is (or will be) public information. UTXOs are public, signatures are public, txids and vouts are public. The only thing that is not public are the BIP 32 derivation paths, and those aren't particularly useful to an attacker.
What "personal information" are you concerned about? What is the attack you are concerned about? If you are transmitting PSBTs over the internet, then you can employ third party tools for encryption, such as PGP. If you are concerned about a man in the middle between local machines, then you are concerned about an attacker who has gained remote access to your machines, in which case you have much bigger problems.
Carrying the PSBT file throught a border and then getting the laptop checked in customs for instance. I've heard stories of people getting their laptops confiscated if they had full disk encryption and refuse to deliver a password. In general you don't want governments or just anyone to know you are transacting in Bitcoin and PSBT shows you are in. I guess you can always put the file inside an encrypted container. I just would like a minimalistic setup where the entire process is done with Bitcoin Core and you don't need to install anything else to store encrypted data. |
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The "This is experimental software" line is probably a disclaimer in order to protect from people suing the developers in case something went wrong and loss of funds happened due a glitch in the code.
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I was testing offline transactions via PSBT and realized that the PSBT file can be decoded using this program: https://github.com/achow101/psbt-decoderThen it's plaintext that contains personal information about the transaction. % psbt_dump data/worked-7.psbt
976 bytes in PSBT: data/worked-7.psbt
-- HEADER --
psbt 0xff
-- GLOBALS --
key: 00 (GLOBAL_UNSIGNED_TX)
value:
020000000258e87a21b56daf0c23be8e7070456c336f7cbaa5c8757924f545887bb2abdd750000000000ffffffff838d0427d0ec650a68aa46bb0b098aea4422c071b2ca78352a077959d07cea1d0100000000ffffffff0270aaf00800000000160014d85c2b71d0060b09c9886aeb815e50991dda124d00e1f5050000000016001400aea9a2e5f0f876a588df5546e8742d1d87008f00000000 (154 bytes)
Transaction: (2 inputs, 2 outputs, 0 witness)
: txid 82efd652d7ab1197f01a5f4d9a30cb4c68bb79ab6fec58dfa1bf112291d1617b
[in #0 ] (not signed)
from 75ddabb27b8845f5247975c8a5ba7c6f336c4570708ebe230caf6db5217ae858 : 0
[in #1 ] (not signed)
from 1dea7cd05979072a3578cab271c02244ea8a090bbb46aa680a65ecd027048d83 : 1
[out #0 ] tb1qmpwzkuwsqc9snjvgdt4czhjsnywa5yjdzglap9
[out #1 ] tb1qqzh2ngh97ru8dfvgma25d6r595wcwqy06sqc03
-- INPUT #0 --
key: 00 (IN_NON_WITNESS_UTXO)
value:
0200000001aad73931018bd25f84ae400b68848be09db706eac2ac18298babee71ab656f8b0000000048473044022058f6fc7c6a33e1b31548d481c826c015bd30135aad42cd67790dab66d2ad243b02204a1ced2604c6735b6393e5b41691dd78b00f0c5942fb9f751856faa938157dba01feffffff0280f0fa020000000017a9140fb9463421696b82c833af241c78c17ddbde493487d0f20a270100000017a91429ca74f8a08f81999428185c97b5d852e4063f618765000000 (187 bytes)
Transaction: (1 inputs, 2 outputs, 0 witness)
: txid 75ddabb27b8845f5247975c8a5ba7c6f336c4570708ebe230caf6db5217ae858
[in #0 ] (unknown)
[out #0 ] 2MtgN5EvHUm2kNVvqKgqsZ9v2fGH3jCpXVF
[out #1 ] 2Mw4CE6tUQ7Ak9Zf9TKujgzbVjDZqgRbUVP
key: 07 (IN_FINAL_SCRIPTSIG)
value:
00473044022074018ad4180097b873323c0015720b3684cc8123891048e7dbcd9b55ad679c99022073d369b740e3eb53dcefa33823c8070514ca55a7dd9544f157c167913261118c01483045022100f61038b308dc1da865a34852746f015772934208c6d24454393cd99bdf2217770220056e675a675a6d0a02b85b14e5e29074d8a25a9b5760bea2816f661910a006ea01475221029583bf39ae0a609747ad199addd634fa6108559d6c5cd39b4c2183f1ab96e07f2102dab61ff49a14db6a7d02b0cd1fbb78fc4b18312b5b4e54dae4dba2fbfef536d752ae (218 bytes)
-- INPUT #1 --
key: 01 (IN_WITNESS_UTXO)
value:
00c2eb0b0000000017a914b7f5faf40e3d40a5a459b1db3535f2b72fa921e887 (32 bytes)
key: 07 (IN_FINAL_SCRIPTSIG)
value:
2200208c2353173743b595dfb4a07b72ba8e42e3797da74e87fe7d9d7497e3b2028903 (35 bytes)
key: 08 (IN_FINAL_SCRIPTWITNESS)
value:
0400473044022062eb7a556107a7c73f45ac4ab5a1dddf6f7075fb1275969a7f383efff784bcb202200c05dbb7470dbf2f08557dd356c7325c1ed30913e996cd3840945db12228da5f01473044022065f45ba5998b59a27ffe1a7bed016af1f1f90d54b3aa8f7450aa5f56a25103bd02207f724703ad1edb96680b284b56d4ffcb88f7fb759eabbe08aa30f29b851383d20147522103089dc10c7ac6db54f91329af617333db388cead0c231f723379d1b99030b02dc21023add904f3d6dcf59ddb906b0dee23529b7ffb9ed50e5e86151926860221f0e7352ae (218 bytes)
-- OUTPUT #0 --
key: 02 03a9a4c37f5996d3aa25dbac6b570af0650394492942460b354753ed9eeca58771 (OUT_BIP32_DERIVATION, 34 bytes)
value:
d90c6a4f000000800000008004000080 (16 bytes)
Address: 03a9a4c37f5996d3aa25dbac6b570af0650394492942460b354753ed9eeca58771 (33 bytes)
= n1ExfZ1rECtYdzfBHoeYtAWzTURXsdSVkb
HD Path: (m=0x4f6a0cd9)/0'/0'/4'
-- OUTPUT #1 --
key: 02 027f6399757d2eff55a136ad02c684b1838b6556e5f1b6b34282a94b6b50051096 (OUT_BIP32_DERIVATION, 34 bytes)
value:
d90c6a4f000000800000008005000080 (16 bytes)
Address: 027f6399757d2eff55a136ad02c684b1838b6556e5f1b6b34282a94b6b50051096 (33 bytes)
= mfaZXpvjGrisYP1rW2wL2YBHJt22sCoX53
HD Path: (m=0x4f6a0cd9)/0'/0'/5'
-- EXPECT EOF --
-- ACTUAL EOF -- If an attacker gets this, it wouldn't be nice. In order to maintain privacy, I suggest that the PSBT files can optionally be encrypted. It would prompt for a password, once entered the PSBT file is saved encrypted. As you load it on the other computer, it asks for the password. This way you wouldn't be paranoid that a man in the middle attack can be performed to steal the contents of the PSBT. |
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Can someone trusted confirm if these checksums are correct?
9547fa03574f8bde296f707c7d9f7d89827c75c5a28f84402578a4fa92a787ec bitcoin-22.0-aarch64-linux-gnu-debug.tar.gz
ac718fed08570a81b3587587872ad85a25173afa5f9fbbd0c03ba4d1714cfa3e bitcoin-22.0-aarch64-linux-gnu.tar.gz
80071e0ecd24edfec8a1972b495b9822c79a5d33c7123bff51688638aac97cab bitcoin-22.0-arm-linux-gnueabihf-debug.tar.gz
b8713c6c5f03f5258b54e9f436e2ed6d85449aa24c2c9972f91963d413e86311 bitcoin-22.0-arm-linux-gnueabihf.tar.gz
8f70852feb39078e02182563517d17bdfc4a12904cf1bdabbae95594d9a1e473 bitcoin-22.0-codesignatures-22.0.tar.gz
d0e9d089b57048b1555efa7cd5a63a7ed042482045f6f33402b1df425bf9613b bitcoin-22.0.tar.gz
bfc04a3c4e8b613bfd9359e54da6cc60f027860e9723f9a6bfd6f13873eb811f bitcoin-22.0-powerpc64-linux-gnu-debug.tar.gz
2cca5f99007d060aca9d8c7cbd035dfe2f040dd8200b210ce32cdf858479f70d bitcoin-22.0-powerpc64-linux-gnu.tar.gz
5f0bf1491bc8825ca1506f7cf586030f06bb17a563ccde92e8c75720022704e6 bitcoin-22.0-powerpc64le-linux-gnu-debug.tar.gz
91b1e012975c5a363b5b5fcc81b5b7495e86ff703ec8262d4b9afcfec633c30d bitcoin-22.0-powerpc64le-linux-gnu.tar.gz
59b16e63aa935f50fd2813efe7f137187fcf0fff84e3205a9c6cb462a8bb160c bitcoin-22.0-riscv64-linux-gnu-debug.tar.gz
9cc3a62c469fe57e11485fdd32c916f10ce7a2899299855a2e479256ff49ff3c bitcoin-22.0-riscv64-linux-gnu.tar.gz
3b3e2680f7d9304c13bfebaf6445ada40d72324b4b3e0a07de9db807389a6c5b bitcoin-22.0-osx-signed.dmg
52449aa894a6ce5653315e1260d0ce87c1d9f490afe3c92b44285710804b11ae bitcoin-22.0-osx-unsigned.dmg
f51156774c24c0ac5cc30237fa08aa17ed04a180dfd72c3e7d20fdc3f45806dc bitcoin-22.0-osx-unsigned.tar.gz
2744d199c3343b2d94faffdfb2c94d75a630ba27301a70e47b0ad30a7e0155e9 bitcoin-22.0-osx64.tar.gz
3a4f05657c048d3e9505bdb9c4fb3658e5e3d4233b0b93c1853e080620589765 bitcoin-22.0-x86_64-linux-gnu-debug.tar.gz
59ebd25dd82a51638b7a6bb914586201e67db67b919b2a1ff08925a7936d1b16 bitcoin-22.0-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz
9169989d649937c0f9ebccd3ab088501328aa319fe9e91fc7ea8e8cf0fcccede bitcoin-22.0-win64-setup.exe
f890473d6d910d478f8ff08f9356d0305d19b46cf06e4fc3b5a49b0b684fd2a7 bitcoin-22.0-win-unsigned.tar.gz
0a97ebc8ae44913e3ef9c5b1ddd2af3a4ffb0ba25b6ab1ee8173e40e60499402 bitcoin-22.0-win64-debug.zip
ecc579d006230d6ffc5a5b7b53ce8c76477d37c1c7bad69694e9c2d69f00331d bitcoin-22.0-win64-setup-unsigned.exe
9485e4b52ed6cebfe474ab4d7d0c1be6d0bb879ba7246a8239326b2230a77eb1 bitcoin-22.0-win64.zip
I've just read recently that the bitcoin.org domain was hacked. I wanted to compile 22.0 but now im worried that the hacker listed some dodgy files in there. I assume by now it has been sorted but I want to double check. You never know with these scammers.
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I slightly dislike(I know, I can be petty) those Twitter people who seems to think that Bitcoin is the answer to literally whatever news-trending problem there is. But "wasted" renewable energy is one good use-case of Bitcoin mining. They contribute to the network, and at the same time they get value in exchange for the supposedly wasted energy. Win-win!
Michael Saylor is overleveraged and continuously doubles down on massive Bitcoin long positions every time it dips. His entire otherwise stagnant business depends on his BTC holdings now. Buying MicroStrategy stock basically means buying BTC under the fiat system. Don't get me wrong I like guy as a fellow Bitcoin, however people so invested on it financially usually become and start seeing Bitcoin as a key that fits on every lock. I think these guys are going to get rekt bigly the moment expected long term bullish models fail. |
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I was testing with this option to see what happened if I unchecked this box, I expected that by disabling it no one would be able to reach the node and thus request to download from me wouldn't happen resulting in a flat 0 kb/s line for upload rate, however after a while I saw uploading was still going on. Now im wondering what this option is doing exactly.
Also, in a country where it was dangerous to run a node, which would be ideal setting beside running through Tor? I know that for the network to work you need to contribute yourself, but in a situation where you would want your node to be invisible basically im not sure where the middle ground is. Tor is relatively safe but who knows.
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51% attack is not happening any time soon for Bitcoin but I see that Faketoshi is having big headache after his fork suffered one more 51% attack, after four happened in month of July. Listen to this now, cost of performing this attack for one hour was only $5,001  Looking at bitinfocharts bsv hashrate chart looks like a slow and painful death to me...  I am not sure if this data is up to date and correct but it would take $1,509,919 to perform just one hour of 51% attack on Bitcoin network with 109,616 PH/s! https://www.crypto51.app/Another website claims that cheapest hardware cost for performing 51% attack on Bitcoin would be $19,158,042,714, and the attack would consume 263,423,087 kWh or $13,171,154 per day! https://gobitcoin.io/tools/cost-51-attack/The interesting part is that Craig Wright will probably threat people with legal cease and desist letters for those using mining power for the 51% attack. This is the epitome of a failed project in terms of decentralization. When you can't achieve it technologically you attack legally. It's almost as bad as Ethereum. |
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You can turn off all network connectivity by clicking on the connections icon in the bottom righthand corner and that will instruct Bitcoin Core to not try to make any network connections. Then it isn't constantly "trying to sync". The out of sync modal will remain since it is unrelated to the network connection status, but that does not mean it is actually doing anything in the background.
Right then I will click the icon. But I have another question: During the install of Bitcoin Core it says you must have 450 GB at least (or whatever size at the time for a full download). Since I have never attempted to install it on a drive with less size than that and the size I want to use is just a small 100 GB HDD for this: will Bitcoin Core let me install anyway? Basically I only need the space required for the OS, a few extras and Bitcoin Core (the software not the blockchain) so im not even bothering with SSD. |
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Yes. It makes no difference whether it is trying to synchronize or not. Your offline Core node's primarily purpose is to only sign transactions with the information given using the PSBT files.
We'll have descriptors soon so it should be easier to import descriptors within the online Core instance.
Is there nothing planed to refine this "airgapped state"? The software constantly trying to do something to no end when it's not needed wastes resources. It's like having an offline computer you will never plug constantly running ping. In this sense there is some optimization that could be done. Any work in this direction is good imo. Most computers that don't have NSA chips on them are old, so considering you would want to use one of these to create and sign transactions, having a "lightweight offline Core" mode of sorts would be cool. Like a HW wallet with the Core interface and knowing it's proper peer reviewed and running on a librebooted laptop. |
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