+1 no need to reinvent the wheel. Shamir's secret 2 of 4 on the seed and you're done. |
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Could you add an image based password?
What is that? |
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んー。。。 https://github.com/hivewallet/hive-jsこれにモナーのサポートをPull Requestしてみれば？ すでにビットコイン・ライトコインを同じBIP32のシードから生成するようにできてるから、ライトコインとビットコインの扱い方の違いをみて、数日でモナーコイン追加できそうな、できなそうな。。。 実際あまり詳しくは見ていないし、モナーがどこまでSPVが進んでるかもわかりません。 ご参考までにー ちなみに東京周辺ならば週1回のミーティングがあるので是非参加してください。 |
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What's your browser & version?
iPhone 5 iOS 7.1.1, Chrome App, latest version as of now. PC, Chrome. Latest version as of now. Both of them did not update, even though there were 6 confs (confirmed in separate tab on PC in Chrome via blockchain.info) The Circle spinny icon in the upper right did not update the balance when tapped/clicked. I have to hit the refresh button on chrome and type in my PIN. |
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Ok, so I had 0.01 BTC in my balance, I go to send 0.01 BTC expecting an explanation about mining fees etc. or maybe a screen where I can select my mining fee?
Nope, big red X that says "You do not have enough funds in your wallet." that's it.
A new user will definitely be confused if they just to happen to want to spend the whole balance.
AT LEAST have the not enough funds message include "If you are trying to send your whole balance, please subtract 0.0001 BTC from your total as a mining fee." etc.
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Ok, so I think this is a bug.
I sent bitcoins to my hive web wallet, and it wasn't showing up in the history at all...
check blockchain, it got confirmed! check hive web....... it finally shows up in history!!!
As "pending"... and my balance did not increase.
I now have 6 confirms.... and then it finally says a date... but my balance isn't updated?
I click the refresh circle icon... no balance. I close the browser, re-open it... now the balance shows.
Zero-conf should be "pending" and 1 conf should be a timestamp and balance update, imo.
idk, this kinda turned me off to it... and it's not something I'd push to newcomers either. (Hey guys! there's a new payment method and it's super cool! check it out!... *1 hour later*... AND here's your bitcoins! *friend has confused look on his face at this "revolutionary" 1 hour wait for $2...)
Brand spanking new wallet, so there's time to improve, but initial first impresson = yeeeahhhh, I'm gonna wait til you guys get kinks worked out here, I guess...
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Questions:
1. Is this up on github?
2. I assume the wait after pin entry is key stretching... 15 seconds is a while to wait... and I have an iPhone 5...
3. Not showing unconfirmed received transactions at all? :-/ I understand zeroconf security is low, but really?... If I want to send bitcoin to a friend, they have to wait 10 minutes to get any sort of visual feedback, at all? (even if they can't spend it, having quick visual feedback is important imo)
...
Will continue with more questions once I can actually use my coins and look into it further.
Looks promising, but is very beginner-geared with no advanced options available. Hopefully those will come down the pipeline someday soon... maybe do like Wallet32 and have us tap a walrus 10 times to enter advanced mode or something...
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I did the coding myself. Very simple.
In bitadress.org's HTML, lines 9086-9088, replace original code with this:
var pattern = "77";
var j = pattern.length + 1;
var i = 0;
var bytes;
var btcKey;
do {
i = i + 1;
bytes = Crypto.SHA256(key + i, { asBytes: true });
btcKey = new Bitcoin.ECKey(bytes);
} while (btcKey.getBitcoinAddress().substring(1, j) != pattern);
var bitcoinAddress = btcKey.getBitcoinAddress();
You must replace "77" with whatever you please.
Note that the javascript will loop for a while. The browser may freeze.
Shouldn't you also change the javascript to display the nonce that must be added to the brainwallet to get the address? Otherwise it's not really a brainwallet... |
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However, this does not solve the compatibility issue:
The real problem is wallet structure, and there is no agreement on that between wallets developers.
What are your thoughts on BIP-0044? Do you think that a standardization of HD wallets in this fashion will be a good way of structuring? https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki |
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Thank you for your response. I am trying to restore an existing wallet whose password was written down incorrectly and whose seed I hope is written down correctly. How does choosing a new name restore a wallet of a different name? I suppose I could delete Electrum and and reinstall it in order to change the password on the wallet in question. I imagined it could be done without deleting and reinstalling. I have never used a word processor, I don't even have one on my new computer.  Kinda makes it difficult to read the occasional word document sent to me. An idea I just had is to install Electrum on somebody else's computer to make sure the seed is correct before I delete it from my computer or even try to restore it. 1. your seed has nothing to do with the name of the wallet or your password. As long as the seed is correct, you can name the file whatever and you can make the password whatever and the seed will always create the same addresses. 2. You can only change the password on a wallet by inputting the password and then setting a new password. So the only way you can retrieve your wallet is to make a new file (the name doesn't matter) and restore from your seed. 3. Don't put your seed into someone else's computer. Your bitcoins will be stolen. 4. I recommend you use Coinbase. If want to check your seed, just click "New/restore" type in a random name. Any name is fine. Click Save. Then when it asks, click restore from seed, then type in your seed. If your seed is correct, you should see your addresses appear in the newly created wallet. |
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File>New/Restore select wallet from list and then select "Save". Is that correct, and if so what happens next?
NONONONONONONO THIS WILL OVERWRITE THE WALLET FILE! File>New/Restore, then TYPE IN A NEW NAME THAT IS NOT THE SAME AS ANY ONE IN THE LIST. This is like the "Save As..." feature of any word processor. If you choose the same name as an existing file, it will DELETE the old file, and REPLACE it with the new wallet you create/restore. |
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Yeah but the main reason I am going to do this is because I don't have to worry about so many things with them, I don't have to worry about master public key and where to input them or not. I would make a bunch of them, keep them offline and also print them offline as well and still continue doing what I do, which is keep my keys secure and when I perform a transaction, transfer my rest of the funds to the next one and not worry about my other keys being revealed because someone was able to find out my Master Private Key by getting hold of my Master public key and a Private key.
OK, as long as you actually PRINT your paper wallets and are using secure printing procedures you're fine. Paper wallets are a very powerful tool. Your Master Private Key will never be found out if you do one thing: 1. Don't ever export a single private key from your Electrum wallet. It's not hard to be safe with Electrum. Just don't export private keys, and don't let your seed online. Paper Wallets are better for individual key management, physical security, and long term storage. Electrum is better for frequent re-use. Aka, I have a cold wallet, but I want to use it to top up my hot wallet occasionally, etc. Stay calm, and learn about each method, and how to use it safely. If you are paranoid and scared about everything you hear, you will get nervous and make a big mistake that loses all your bitcoins. So stay calm, learn about your options, and remember to BACK UP EVERYTHING. If it doesn't exist in two or more physical locations, one fire in your house can wipe out all your bitcoin holdings. |
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Yes, 100% sure. If I type a wrong password I get this Error: This password does not decode this wallet. but if I type the right one the daemon starts and then goes idle... weird.
Did you try mktx and see if the signed tx comes back alright? If it does, then that means the problem is in the network interface. |
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I'm talking about terminal/bash, not the Electrum console. If I navigate to the Electrum executable file on Mac (/Applications/Electrum.app/Contents/MacOS) and type: I get a perfectly good response with a list of my addresses. But if I want to send some Bitcoins to some address using the "payto" command: ./electrum payto 1CM6v8N9ZST5koc8g7W2So6hKyADQYvi8B 0.001 It first asks me for my password (so it recognised my command) and when I input my password it starts a deamon (Starting deamon [some node]) and then... nothing. It doesn't send the coins neither does anything else. It's just... idle. It's the same if I include the fee into transaction: ./electrum payto 1CM6v8N9ZST5koc8g7W2So6hKyADQYvi8B 0.001 --fee=0.0002 Has anyone tried to send bitcoins through the unix terminal? Am I doing something wrong? Are you 100% sure about your password being correct? You might want to check that. |
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Thanks, I guess I am just going to opt for paper wallets from now on-wards, print them offline, keep them offline and only bring them to light when and if to perform a transaction and send the reaming to the next one.
Paper wallets have their uses... but their main usefulness is that you can physically protect them and they don't rely on hardware (like hard disks and computer operating systems) that can fail. If you are going to keep the paper wallets only on your offline computer, you are no more safe than using Electrum offline. And Electrum offline wallet is easier to use. |
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I was referring to the quote from Vitalik. I don't see the point to implement a complex scheme like that just to allow an auditor to search the blockchain when you could set up a watch only wallet. Doesn't make sense, maybe I'm missing something.
The idea is that if you give the auditor the watch only wallet, he could conspire with one of the holders of the private keys below it to create the master private key and run away with all the money. M = master public key m = master private key m/ = CEO holds it M/ = Auditor holds it. With it, they can view all company funds, but not spend. m/m 1 = Department A head holds it, and can generate further chains with it. m/m 2 = Department B head holds it, and can generate further chains with it. m/m 3 = Department C head holds it, and can generate further chains with it. combining M/ with m/m x would give me m/ ... so an auditor would have to conspire with one corrupt department head to run away with the company's entire finances. With the solution provided says that the CEO would make m 1/ m 2/ m 3/ Then Dept A: m 1/m 1m 2/m 1m 3/m 1Dept B: m 1/m 2m 2/m 2m 3/m 2Dept C: m 1/m 3m 2/m 3m 3/m 3Each dept using the three public keys generated by those chains to generate deterministic 2of3 chains. The Auditor would ONLY receive: M 1/ Then they could check the blockchain for redeemscripts that included M 1/M 1M 1/M 2M 1/M 3Then they would know how much money each department SPENT without being able to collude to get 2 private keys. Downside: They could only find SPENT funds, as the redeemscript is only revealed on the blockchain when funds are spent from the multi-sig address. imo, the best way to do an audit for business would be to use a dual-key Stealth Address, and give the scan_privkey to the auditor... but this is a topic slightly unrelated to BIP32. You could set up so your company's stealth addresses are generate on a per-department basis, but that all scan_keypairs are generated by a separate BIP32 chain. Give that master private key to the auditor, as that keypair is only used to generate shared secrets to discover funds, not to spend it. |
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A little off-topic but what are your views on paper wallets like one you get from offlineaddress.com, if a user creates a paper wallet offline using the html they provide, do they use some sort of Master Private/Public key, can the people who created this offline paper wallet creation tool know what addresses and private keys were generated by users?
I have not personally verified offlineaddress.com so I can't speak for them. However, I assume it is similar to bitaddress.org. With bitaddress.org, all calculations are performed on your computer, on the browser. When you generate the paper wallets, you are generating a new private key from a random number generator every time you generate them, so nothing is deterministic. If you save the html file of the website on to an offline computer and then open the html file in a browser, generate a paper wallet and print it up, there is no way that anyone can know your private key. If your printer is super smart and connects to the internet and caches everything ever printed on it for some reason, you might be slightly vulnerable, but if you're super paranoid, disconnect the printer from the internet, connect to the offline computer via USB, and after printing up, look up a way to clear the printer's spool. Google "secure home printing" for tips. |
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The solution to a more secure internal control structure, so you can leverage the utility of the master public key.
There's nothing wrong with how electrum does it. He's talking about some convoluted scenario that doesn't have any real life application as far as I'm concerned. Actually, the "solution" that JonCD was talking about was more geared towards BIP32. Electrum (in its current 1.9.8 version) would not be able to generate the 3 separate key chains for a deterministic 2of3 P2SH chain wallet. However, the method JonCD describes is actually what ThomasV is implementing into Electrum 2.0 right as we speak. (in fact current git HEAD already has 2 of 3 and 2 of 2 BIP32 deterministic chains already.) The idea is that since your bitcoins are not attributed to any 1 specific master public key and master private key, even if you exported one of the private keys and someone calculated your master private key, they would still need one more master private key, AND they would need all three master public keys (so that they could create the redeemscripts)... It adds a level of obfuscation that protects the user. Not to mention that if your wallet is 2 of 3, you probably won't be exporting keys anyways. In general, if you want to have exportable private keys in BIP32, you must use hardened keys. The downside to this is that you will not be able to generate those public keys from a Master Public Key. (hardened keys do not have a master public key, which is how they are hardened) But they will still be attached to your chain, so recoverable from seed. |
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I noticed you were sending two outputs of 583952 and 359215 satoshis to the same address.
Add together your 156000 satoshi fee, and I assume your total balance to be 1099167 satoshis. That wasn't my intention, as my balance on the 2 imported addresses is 5.15215 mBTC, and after modifying my client as you described, the fee asked for to send it was 1.56 MBTC. I intended to send 3.59215 mBTC, and I don't know where the 5.83952 mBTC came from. I will take your advice, and attempt sending smaller amounts. I'm not very keen on trying to send with no fee at all, as there is always the risk that the transaction won't get relayed and get stuck in limbo. @zetaray. Maybe your solution to wait is the best after all, because as micro transactions become more common in the future, fees will inevitably need to be reduced in line with this. At the moment, the Bitcoin system doesn't seem to handle bitdust very well. As an aside, my Electrum 1.9.8 doesn't seem very stable, and quite often when I start it up it seems to need to re-download all 25MB of the blockchain headers again, then spend over half an hour resynchronizing, with the hard drive thrashing away furiously and using 1GB of RAM before the GUI will display any output! I see what happened. You need to subtract the fee from your address balance that you are trying to consolidate. ... hmm, this might be difficult. Here, I just sent you the amount you want from your address. Proof: tx: https://blockchain.info/tx/0d973022967893495b4e64832d7e8b994cf9ca1dc9462208c38a71d2c63f48df-----Message-----
I dabura667 of bitcointalk.org forum just sent you the money you're trying to consolidate on June 19th.
-----Address-----
1PoUvdwUpQ9hohVPFiFoX1SAmrrBZcKc1a
-----Signature-----
HHNpLvZCiHVfCeYcwiQTKdGupHVtoUNZfD3gVnmZFivkRy5csCXBALMjB4bJbPmjMWxQXf46sOHZTiV2M4UHB6k=
------------------ Just PM me your private key and I'll consolidate it and send it to myself. Thanks. |
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