What version of electrum are you using ? The latest is 3.2.3.
If you are using an older version, get the latest from the official site (https://electrum.org/#download).

You might also try to change the server you are connected to (Click on the red circle at the bottom right and choose a different server).


Can you verify that you have restored your wallet correctly ?
Do you see the same type of addresses (e.g. starting with either 1.., 3.. or bc1..) ?

Yes, of course.

ElectrumX is an electrum server (Clients (standard electrum) contacts electrum servers to get the block header and all necessary information).
You don't need to (and according to your post: don't want to) run an electrum server.

Note that running electrum on a server is NOT the same as running an electrum server.

Simply install electrum on your server.




The official electrum only supports BTC. All other versions for other coins are forks.

IF they support the same commands, then yes.. they can do the same as the original electrum. But you'll have to check that first.

Your aim shouldn't be to try to get your coins back (which won't work), but to find out HOW this happened.

Since you always received an email when logging in, the attacker obviously didn't have to login (or had access to your email account and deleted the mail).
The easiest way to circumvent a login is to steal the cookie stored in your browser after you login.


I'd gladly help you to find out (or at least limit the possibilities) of what happened.

In order to find this out, we need as much information as possible. If you are interested, start off with answering these questions:

• What OS / browser are you using?
  
  
• Do you have any shady browser extensions installed ? Can you name all ?
  
  
• Did you check your computer for malware (i highly recommend doing this!) ?
  
  
• Did you use the password for your email account anywhere else ?
  
  
• Also, what kind of 2FA did you use ? Google authenticator, email, SMS ?

A bitcoin transaction basically just assigns coins(BTC) to a specific public key.
In order to access/spend these coins, you'll need to have the corresponding private key.

So, if the transaction has been completed successfully (send to the correct address and TX is confirmed; can be checked on a block explorer), you indeed received your BTC.
You don't need your wallet to be online to receive transaction. You don't have to actively do anything to receive a transaction.


The short answer is: No, you didn't lose them.

Who holds the 3rd private key? I assume some kind of an escrow ?

You need 2 out of 3 keys signing the transaction. So if the seller refuses to sign the transaction, you need the 3rd key holder to sign it (escrow?).



A lot of tools can do that.

But this won't help you at all since you'd need the private keys to sign the transaction (which you don't have).

You have 2 options. Either (1) get the seller to sign the transaction or (2) get the 3rd keyholder to sign the transaction.

Yes, you can do this with electrum.

There is no automatic 'redirection' of funds available. You'll need to program that logic yourself.

You can use RPCs to generate new addresses, check whether funds have been received and to send funds.
There isn't much more necessary to implement your concept.


Further information can be found in the documentation (http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/). Especially under 'How to accept Bitcoin on a website using Electrum'

Such a dongle can (theoretically) compromise the communication between the host computer and the device attached.
It could also function as a virtual keyboard and compromise your computer by executing commands / downloading malware.

The probability of one of these happening is very low. It is not the most common way of infecting a PC / stealing crypto.


And as Heretik has mentioned, a hardware wallet is safe to be used on a compromised machine (as long as you verify every information on the trezor itself).
So, as long there is no vulnerability in the trezor, you are fine.

This means that the input you are using to participate in the coinjoin features has to be more than 0.1 BTC.

So, owning more than 0.1 BTC is not enough, you need to use/spend more than 0.1 BTC in such a transaction.

Did you even read this thread ?

What you are trying is NOT POSSIBLE. You won't be able to achieve what you are trying.

I don't know how often you need to hear it until you finally accept it. It already has been mentioned in your thread.


Your only option would be to try out every single possible private key (2^256) and check whether it resolves to your address.
But since the number is way too high to just test a fraction of the keyspace, you should just give up.

Your 'scientific work' is crap.

Not necessarily.

While the TOR traffic won't be investigated in such a less-severe-crime, an IP address from the VPN provider would be a good first step.

The law enforcement agencies could easily contact the VPN provider to get the real IP address (depending on the location of course).
The majority of VPN provider (even those who claim to not store logs) do store logs. They have to store logs to not be legally liable for the customers actions.

Mocacinno (unfortunately) is right.

There is no way for you to get the IP address of the scammer. Facebook is using the XMPP protocol which does not create a direct connection between the chat participants.

However, if you could seduce him into sending you an email, then you would have his IP address which you could hand over to the law enforcement agency.
Another option to get the IP address would be to setup a webserver (which logs everything) and send him a link. If he clicks on it, you'll have his IP address.

Those are the 2 easiest methods to get his IP address. If those aren't an option, you are mostly out of luck.

That's basically a brain wallet. A brain wallet with slowed down bruteforce.

The entropy used to create this seed is less than the entropy an individual private key could have.
This method basically reduces the randomness of the seed by a lot.

While this MIGHT(!) be safe from bruteforce (for now, until better hardware is available OR a shortcut has been found in the function), it is less secure than the established methods to generate a seed.

Whats more severe (in my opinion) is the fact that the wallet is closed-source. You don't know how they build the code, whether it contains malware, vulnerabilities, mistakes in the seed generation etc.. Definitely NOT recommended.

IMO, you shouldn't risk more BTC than you would carry with you in a mobile wallet. And only install it inside of a VM or a machine without sensitive information stored.

Storing sensitive information on an online server is always a bad idea. There are too much attack vectors for it to be considered a secure storage.

There is a simple suggestion for your case: Use encryption.

You can simply use VeraCrypt (https://www.veracrypt.fr) to create an encrypted container. Each data stored inside of this container can only be accessed after decrypting it with the correct key/password.

In case of your laptop getting stolen, the thief won't be able to access your data (assuming you have chosen a password which is strong enough).
You should make sure to have a few copies of the container (on a different drive, USB-stick, etc..). This will allow you to gain access after your laptop got stolen or after a failure of your hard drive.


Note, that you also should NEVER use (unencrypted) emails to transmit/store sensitive information. Each mail server between you and your recipient can read and modify your email (since they are transmitted in plain text without authentication/verification).

Since ledger has revamped all of their nano s applications (to save space so that more apps can be installed on the nano s), i guess that you were trying to use/install a fork of BTC.
In this case it makes sense that you need the BTC app to be installed (since any forked coins use the same libary included into the BTC application).

The same probably also applies to ETH, especially when trying to use a fork (not sure if there is any supported by the nano s at all).


At least you have fixed the problem, that's the most important thing 

The best protection is granted when all sensitive information are stored in an isolated environment.

Each communication to the 'outside' can be seen as a potential vulnerability. Without any communication channel, there is no surface for an attacker to gain access to the private key.

However, the less communicating channels your storage device has, the less convenient the usage is.


The most secured option is to have your coins stored on a dedicated offline machine without any connection to the outside (no bluetooth, wifi, LAN, etc..).
At the same time it is the least convenient one to spend coins from.

On the other side - the least secured option - is to have your coins stored on a web wallet. It is accessible by anyone from everywhere, making it very convenient to access your coins.
But the downside is that it is the least secured option (and should always be avoided if possible!).

IMO, the best trade-off between security and convenience is a hardware wallet. It stores the private keys in an isolated offline environment, while still allowing you to easily access your coins anytime and everywhere (assuming you got your hardware wallet with you).


It might be worth to note that 'hacking' isn't the only way to lose coins. A LOT of people are simply being scammed. The best and most secured wallet doesn't help you, if you don't use your common sense.

cudart32_80.dll is part of the CUDA toolkit. Do you have it installed?

If not, get it from nvidia.com (https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-downloads?target_os=Windows)

I don't really understand your problem.

Where do you get the error message ? From ledger live ? And what does the error message say ? "BTC and ETH app required" 

And what are you trying with the chrome app ?


Are you struggling getting ledger live to work ? If so, what OS are you on ?

As others already have mentioned, this is the 'new' segwit format (bech32). This is the 'true' segwit format.
Nested segwit (P2PKH nested into P2SH; address starting with 3..) is 'kind of segwit'. To be more precise, it is legacy data fetched into segwit format.


I guess you might be irritated and refering to it as camouflaged because you can't click on the address ?
If so, this has nothing to do with the address format itself, but with blockchain.com. They simply haven't updated their explorer since months.

Therefore you can't click on the addresses, they simply didn't invest a few hours to index them yet.
If you want to view the transaction of such an address, use another explorer. Most of them already support searching/viewing bech32 addresses.

You might consider to change your wallet.

I heavily discourage from using this wallet.

ZelCore is a brainwallet with a nice-looking UI. The randomness of your private keys is heavily(!) decreased compared to using a normal wallet.
Additionally it is closed-source. You don't know what this software does. You can't be sure of anything with a closed-source wallet without any security audits.

Even an online wallet would be more secure than this one.

1. Nothing is 'perfectly secure' period.

2. A front-end should NEVER create security flaws. When interacting with a 'blockchain backend', anyone can create their own 'front end'.
Anyone can decide for himself when and how to communicate with the network. 'A frontend' is never the only access to the 'blockchain backend'.

3. In your scenario everyone should(!) be able to create a front-end. But anything has to be built with security in mind, or you will(!) have bugs/vulnerabilities.