A bit desperate this one is it not ? Blockchain daemons can be run by anyone, anywhere, anytime. For that matter, half of them can be run in the foyer at Langley HQ for all the difference it makes to the network's behavioural logic. Thats the whole point of a decentralised network. Don't worry, if TPTB truly feel the need to de-anonymise one of your addresses, they'll have easier ways of doing it than waiting for one of your transactions to be handled by some random masternode, attempting to find out where in the world it and its participating partners for that transaction are, commandeering those virtual servers only to discover that they can't detect your transaction originating address anyway. They'll probably just knock on your door instead. (On the other hand, since they "own" cryptonote tech and all known jiggery pokery, scam logic, corrupt transactional behaviour and heists are totally hidden from public view and therefore void of public accountability, I'm sure they won’t mistake which one has the “low hanging fruit”). P.S. Masternodes are secured by a collateral populated coin address, not hosted servers. P.P.S. Mind your definitions. Centralised:CJSR Russia: 1 Decentralised:Accelerated IT servers: Frankfurt Germany: 95 Amazon USA: 44 Asmunda Frankfurt Germany: 150 Bhost ltd: England/Amsterdam: 3 Choopa, NJ, USA: 162 City Network Hosting Stockholm Sweden: 4 CJSR Russia: 1 ColoCrossing NY USA: 14 Comcast PA USA: 3 Crisis Solutions LLC USA: 7 Deutsche Telekom Germany: 1 Digital Ocean NY USA: 75 DNA Oy Finland: 4 Earthnet CO USA: 1 Evanzo ECom Germany: 1 Fevvo Inc CT USA: 11 Hetzner Online Germany: 2 Hostinger Intl. Cyprus: 1 HostUs USA: 1 IDC*China or MA USA: 10 Internet Assigned Numbers: 3 Microsoft USA: 3 MyLoc Managed Dusseldorf Germany: 104 Neterra Bulgaria: 1 NodeServ LLC FL USA: 32 Online SAS France: 213 PP KOM i TEX Ukraine: 1 Private Layer Inc Zurich Switzerland: 110 QHoster Ltd Bulgaria: 96 QuadraNet CA USA: 4 QuickPacket Llc GA USA: 4 RackSpace Hosting TX USA: 2 Rogers Cable Com Canada: 3 Serverius Netherlands: 1 TDC A/S Denmark: 1 Telecom3Sverige AB Sweden: 1 Time Warner USA: 1 UAB Technoloigu Lithuania: 4 VideoTron Telecom Lte Canada: 1 So you believe LEAs won't subpoena, coerce, or just ask hosting companies to provide billing information? How many instamine recipients own the nodes in Germany, or France, or the USA? If you had only those three countries supplying node intel, you'd have over 80% of all masternode traffic. They wouldn't even need to ask for the operator's permission; they just need to hack nicely. but I'm sure people who spend so much time covering their tracks by using hosting companies follow best practices with their personal computers also. Dashers learn to make private nodes and how to obfuscate your IPs--too hard? Then give up the anonymity game--you already lost.
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A constructive post by YOU? Maybe our love for Monero is finally defrosting his heart... "You're a mean one Mr. Grinch Primer...."
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(1) As long as people host their masternodes properlywith encrypted wallets with backups, I can't see anything that could cause any issues. (2) If a hosting company were to refuse hosting masternodes for whatever magical reason, nobody would lose anything and there are plenty of them around so I wouldn't call it centralized. I mean there are much fewer pools than masternode hosting services so for the time being I think we're fine.
1. My point is that hosting companies are privacy breaches waiting to happen for masternodes, and most people don't follow best practices in this regard, so why would they in other ways? Are you in the "they got this wrong, but they'll get that right--because it validates my opinion" business? 2. My stated concern (listed at the beginning an end of the post) is not that peoples funds are at risk, but their privacy and security. For most coins, nodes being hosted on a corporate server isn't a big deal, but when their advertised anonymity depends on those nodes, it's a massive security breach waiting to happen.
(Facts and figures)
--Over 95% of the masternodes are on servers owned by companies located in 5 countries. If this coin ever reached the market cap levels of Bitcoin or threatened global monetary supply, it would certainly gain the inquisitiveness of LEA worldwide who would likely share data in order to prosecute criminals or those that threatened their monopoly of wealth. This shouldn't be made this easy. This is further proof that cryptosystems that rely on users to follow best practices are relying on failure.
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For most coins, nodes being hosted on a corporate server isn't a big deal, but when their advertised anonymity depends on those nodes, it's a massive security breach waiting to happen. Here's a list of active Dash masternodes, the hosting company (or privately held node), and their address: Accelerated IT servers: Frankfurt Germany: 95 Amazon USA: 44 Asmunda Frankfurt Germany: 150 Bhost ltd: England/Amsterdam: 3 Choopa, NJ, USA: 162 City Network Hosting Stockholm Sweden: 4 CJSR Russia: 1 ColoCrossing NY USA: 14 Comcast PA USA: 3 Crisis Solutions LLC USA: 7 Deutsche Telekom Germany: 1 Digital Ocean NY USA: 75 DNA Oy Finland: 4 Earthnet CO USA: 1 Evanzo ECom Germany: 1 Fevvo Inc CT USA: 11 Hetzner Online Germany: 2 Hostinger Intl. Cyprus: 1 HostUs USA: 1 IDC*China or MA USA: 10 Internet Assigned Numbers: 3 Microsoft USA: 3 MyLoc Managed Dusseldorf Germany: 104 Neterra Bulgaria: 1 NodeServ LLC FL USA: 32 Online SAS France: 213 PP KOM i TEX Ukraine: 1 Private Layer Inc Zurich Switzerland: 110 QHoster Ltd Bulgaria: 96 QuadraNet CA USA: 4 QuickPacket Llc GA USA: 4 RackSpace Hosting TX USA: 2 Rogers Cable Com Canada: 3 Serverius Netherlands: 1 TDC A/S Denmark: 1 Telecom3Sverige AB Sweden: 1 Time Warner USA: 1 UAB Technoloigu Lithuania: 4 VideoTron Telecom Lte Canada: 1 --Of the 1175 active nodes I only found 4 that could be considered run on privately held nodes (3 Internet Assigned Numbers and 1 PP KOM i TEX). The other 1171 were listed under hosting companies. By country: Germany: 352 (29.95%) Accelerated IT servers: Frankfurt Germany: 95 Asmunda Frankfurt Germany: 150 Deutsche Telekom Germany: 1 Hetzner Online Germany: 2 MyLoc Managed Dusseldorf Germany: 104 USA: 364 (30.97%) Amazon USA: 44 Choopa, NJ, USA: 162 ColoCrossing NY USA: 14 Comcast PA USA: 3 Crisis Solutions LLC USA: 7 Digital Ocean NY USA: 75 Earthnet CO USA: 1 Fevvo Inc CT USA: 11 HostUs USA: 1 Microsoft USA: 3 NodeServ LLC FL USA: 32 QuadraNet CA USA: 4 QuickPacket Llc GA USA: 4 RackSpace Hosting TX USA: 2 Time Warner USA: 1 France: 213 (18.12%) Online SAS France: 213 Switzerland: 110 (9.36%) Private Layer Inc Zurich Switzerland: 110 Bulgaria: 97 (8.25%) Neterra Bulgaria: 1 QHoster Ltd Bulgaria: 96 Other: 38 (3.23%) Bhost ltd: Englad/Amsterdam: 3 City Network Hosting Stockholm Sweden: 4 CJSR Russia: 1 DNA Oy Finland: 4 Hostinger Intl. Cyprus: 1 IDC*China: 10 Internet Assigned Numbers: 3 PP KOM i TEX Ukraine: 1 Rogers Cable Com Canada: 3 Serverius Netherlands: 1 TDC A/S Denmark: 1 Telecom3Sverige AB Sweden: 1 UAB Technoloigu Lithuania: 4 VideoTron Telecom Lte Canada: 1 --Over 95% of the masternodes are on servers owned by companies located in 5 countries. If this coin ever reached the market cap levels of Bitcoin or threatened global monetary supply, it would certainly gain the inquisitiveness of LEA worldwide who would likely share data in order to prosecute criminals or those that threatened their monopoly of wealth. This shouldn't be made this easy. This is further proof that cryptosystems that rely on users to follow best practices are relying on failure. *IDC China telecommunications (subsidiary of US company or a Chinese company) listed and counted as China/Other. Figures gathered 6/1/15 https://www.dashnodes.com/index/masternodes/?sorts%5Bisp%5D=1&perPage=100
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What a nice research! And now, please, you can talk about this: Attacking The Consensus System via Sybil attackhttps://www.dashpay.io/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/InstantTX.pdfAnd this: That probability depends on every transaction using 4 rounds of mixing (not likely), as well as assembling a 100% complete transaction, which isn't necessary for an attacker to draw hasty conclusions.
yep, but if you do the calculation using just one round it's still a huge number of days. As for complete transactions, I agree that's not included....but I was answering your 'gun in the crowd' point, which has a probabilty of near 1, which is astronomically different to the proabilities we're talking about here. It would be nice to know what are the average or most comonly used mixing rounds in a darksend, and calculate probability based on that. Or, even better, calculate attacker probability based on the minimum allowable amount of mixing, to establish a "worst case scenario" or baseline probability.
ok i'll do it then with 15% of the network compromised and just one round of darksend per transaction the probability is 3.32526E-17 or .0000000000000000332526 mutiply by 1,000,000 for transactions per day (which is a really big number of darksend transactions, by the way): .0000000000332526 and divide into 1 for number of days to get a complete transaction: 30072836410 thank you, Here's one to hold you over, Still searching for Fluffy's domination post. G2M is correct. If you're able to do two-way mapping of hash functions, then everybody is collectively screwed independent of XMR v. DRK or on-chain v.
off-chain.
OK gotcha. I wonder why people go on about the off-chain benefits....doesn't sound like any benefit at all in this case. G2M is not correct, as he's probably not aware that Darksend doesn't reuse addresses. Yet, the DRK I drksent to someone else is still forever recorded in my wallet with that person's public address. Even after importing it on a different computer. Imagine if they got my wallet dump? Regardless of the inbetween, the end points are what we're talking about here. But that's okay anyways: If my private key was capable of being compromised by TLA's, here's the transaction they would select, simply for no other reason other than that it 'looks' like a darksend transation, because it's creating darksend denominations: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?4fbe96210f828f5fbfd1c4859217d8fd76b2d3344325ec0ceae3d0cf1efd5ffd.htmThen, when parsing the blockchain for those output addresses, they'd deftly reveal the private key to reveal if they've been spent, or just look for it on the blockchain. Because they're a TLA, they're interested in larger amounts first. Let's pick one of the 10 drk denominations: Here's the first denomination of 10 that's gonna be my 10 drk to drksent. I know it's mine because it's an address that was in the last transaction: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?7c7cde0076f0169f42b7a6ee863d4a24929d33c4558e5123a8a9cd415cc8d607.htm 6 4fbe96210f828f5f...:26 XfeJKzKEJUtVDYvuv7vF9jJKkF3Dx23ft6 10.0001 DASH Anyways, let's say that out of those 9, XcRHvNsezZzKB6U7sejx2EPUKjkFkrSEm3 is the address that correlates to me. It goes to this tx: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1655733.htmBecause we're dealing with a situation where rsa/ecc are compromisable in the first place, I'd simply just go ahead and plug into all of the masternodes because encryption is bunk. Seeing as how their IP's are easily discoverable and public knowledge, I'd simply go ahead and sign into it as a remote user, because again cryptography/encryption just doesn't hold up anymore and then I'd go ahead and reveal all of their private keys to myself. Next, I'd take the second transaction above, that was sent to a masternode and dump the private keys for all of those transactions (for luls). We have 9 transactions, being sent off on some time interval to some other masternode So, when I'd like to discover when a masternode has sent someone some return DRK, I can just say "OH well I received this guy's 10 DRK, then sent it off to the next node". So I'd go ahead and see where that 10 DRK got sent to, because, you know, more cryptography. Basically I'd set up a table of masternode keys and just simply walk myself through the transactions one by one, until ... it leaves the masternode addresses (it would be insanely profitable, so how could I not?). Anyways, from there it's pretty safe to say that the output address would be the same user as the three addresses above. Finally here, I sent 29.0 of the mixed darksend: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?8ce9862e053bce9272f023a4c2654a30edaf6118dd430b6391e611e26ceb84b9.htmFor which, we will pick both of the 10 drk denominations which are from this transaction (also, this absolutely confirms that these inputs are from one person, which means 20 of the transactions in this are the same person): https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?8ce9862e053bce9272f023a4c2654a30edaf6118dd430b6391e611e26ceb84b9.htmSo going to the input side of that tx, just look for the only other tx that's capable of having >20 inputs, which is this transaction: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1655916.htm, (c7a33d66547c65fa39b9a10511c5827c0353f6507c107118adae5bbc0d65da98) EDIT: Wow, copying and pasting is balls, sorry for what I'm sure is the flame trail after this post that I didnt even read up to yet): (Follow those 20 inputs to the next tx - https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1655874.htm ( Then once more - https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1655733.htm) (and bam linkStealth addressing - you'd have an absolutely miserable time doing what I just did if you used stealth addresses as well. Then they'd really need to get those private keys to make the work much less harder. Of course, this is mostly useless. Likely compromised keys would be used to just spend unspent output, and steal. Because crypto's not going anywhere fast. Nobody cares much about the private financial history of something like a DRK or and XMR user. I'm really just compromising private keys for luls, because the lack of stealth addressing and knowing that change goes to the miners makes identification of the actual money trivial to identify. Now that I've spent this godawful amount of time doing this, can someone please return the favor and walk me through the same thing for XMR? Preferrably someone that favors DRK, yet is curious about XMR. If not that's fine. Also, Because it took me much less time to actually trace my tx, than it actually took to complete the tx (I spent a lot of time waiting), this means real-time monitoring is a possibility, therefore not fungible if private keys are compromisable. Oh, god, 60 replies since I started writing this. I haven't read any of them since I quoted illodin
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--Over 95% of the masternodes are on servers owned by companies located in 5 countries. If dash ever surpassed the market cap levels of Bitcoin it would threaten global monetary supply and certainly gain the inquisitiveness of LEA worldwide who would gladly share data in order to prosecute criminals or those that threatened their monopoly of wealth. This shouldn't be made this easy. This is further proof that cryptosystems that rely on users to follow best practices are relying on failure.
Currently people run their masternodes on Amazon et al. because it's just so easy and cheap to do so as the reward of running one ($40/month or so) isn't big enough to put in more effort. But let's analyze the scenario you described where LEA's might start getting interested, and consider how the numbers might change. Let's assume using round numbers DASH has market cap of current Bitcoin $3,000,000,000, has 6,000,000 coins, and that there are 3000 masternodes, and that the block reward is 5 DASH of which 45% goes the masternodes. One masternode would then collect 13 DASH / month on average, which would equal to $6,500 earned each month. Now we are starting to talk about the kind of money which would allow people to purchase DDOS protection and private dedicated servers, and hiring professionals to secure them. And someone running 10+ nodes could easily set up their own datacenter and retire. Also, who's to say DASH mixing stays exactly the same as it is now, it's been improved during the last year and I don't see why it would stop being improved. An example of an improvement would be that masternodes couldn't see which inputs and ouputs belong to the same user, so even if you owned 100% of the nodes that wouldn't help you to find out whose coins went where in any of the mixing rounds. These are dangerous assumptions based on code that doesn't exist and best practices that aren't being followed. You may be right, but you can risk it with your money and your privacy.
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So here's a list of active masternodes, the hosting company (or privately held node) and their address:
Accelerated IT servers: Franfurt Germany: 95 Amazon USA: 44 Asmunda Frankfurt Germany: 150 Bhost ltd: Englad/Amsterdam: 3 Choopa, NJ, USA: 162 City Network Hosting Stockhom Sweden: 4 CJSR Russia: 1 ColoCrossing NY USA: 14 Comcast PA USA: 3 Crisis Solutions LLC USA: 7 Deutsche Telekom Germany: 1 Digital Ocean NY USA: 75 DNA Oy Finland: 4 Earthnet CO USA: 1 Evanzo ECom Germay: 1 Fevvo Inc CT USA: 11 Hetzner Online Germany: 2 Hostinger Intl. Cyprus: 1 HostUs USA: 1 IDC*China or MA USA: 10 Internet Assigned Numbers: 3 Microsoft USA: 3 MyLoc Managed Dusseldorf Germany: 104 Neterra Bulgaria: 1 NodeServ LLC FL USA: 32 Online SAS France: 213 PP KOM i TEX Ukraine: 1 Private Layer Inc Zurich Swisserland: 110 QHoster Ltd Bulgaria: 96 QuadraNet CA USA: 4 QuickPacket Llc GA USA: 4 RackSpace Hosting TX USA: 2 Rogers Cable Com Canada: 3 Serverius Netherlands: 1 TDC A/S Denmark: 1 Telecom3Sverige AB Sweden: 1 Time Warner USA: 1 UAB Technoloigu Lithuania: 4 VideoTron Telecom Lte Canada: 1
Of the 1175 active nodes I only found 4 that could be considered run on privately held nodes (3 Internet Assigned Numbers and 1 PP KOM i TEX). The other 1171 were listed under hosting companies.
By country:
Germany: 352 (29.95%)
Accelerated IT servers: Franfurt Germany: 95 Asmunda Frankfurt Germany: 150 Deutsche Telekom Germany: 1 Hetzner Online Germany: 2 MyLoc Managed Dusseldorf Germany: 104
USA: 364 (30.97%)
Amazon USA: 44 Choopa, NJ, USA: 162 ColoCrossing NY USA: 14 Comcast PA USA: 3 Crisis Solutions LLC USA: 7 Digital Ocean NY USA: 75 Earthnet CO USA: 1 Fevvo Inc CT USA: 11 HostUs USA: 1 Microsoft USA: 3 NodeServ LLC FL USA: 32 QuadraNet CA USA: 4 QuickPacket Llc GA USA: 4 RackSpace Hosting TX USA: 2 Time Warner USA: 1
France: 213 (18.12%)
Online SAS France: 213
Switzerland: 110 (9.36%)
Private Layer Inc Zurich Swisserland: 110
Bulgaria: 97 (8.25%)
Neterra Bulgaria: 1 QHoster Ltd Bulgaria: 96
Other: 38 (3.23%)
Bhost ltd: Englad/Amsterdam: 3 City Network Hosting Stockhom Sweden: 4 CJSR Russia: 1 DNA Oy Finland: 4 Hostinger Intl. Cyprus: 1 IDC*China: 10 Internet Assigned Numbers: 3 PP KOM i TEX Ukraine: 1 Rogers Cable Com Canada: 3 Serverius Netherlands: 1 TDC A/S Denmark: 1 Telecom3Sverige AB Sweden: 1 UAB Technoloigu Lithuania: 4 VideoTron Telecom Lte Canada: 1
--Over 95% of the masternodes are on servers owned by companies located in 5 countries. If dash ever surpassed the market cap levels of Bitcoin it would threaten global monetary supply and certainly gain the inquisitiveness of LEA worldwide who would gladly share data in order to prosecute criminals or those that threatened their monopoly of wealth. This shouldn't be made this easy. This is further proof that cryptosystems that rely on users to follow best practices are relying on failure.
*IDC China telecommunications--subsidiary of US company or a Chinese company--still researching. Listed and counted as China/other.
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There are other methods of attacks, so addressing one attack does not address them all. I did comment on this above, but i think you responded as I was revising it, so you missed it. [1]
I'm researching the masternode list you linked me to earlier; it's more telling than you think. Thanks for providing it.[2]
[1] "There are other methods of attacks, so addressing one attack does not address them all" is like saying nothing. Please be specific, then maybe I can help you or guide you to someone who can help (or maybe you are adressing a new vector attack that we need to cover, that would be very welcomed!) [2] Masternodes are public (for now), you are welcome! 1. start here you lazy dasher--I joke, at least you're trying https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1001642.6602. A little too public as i'm finding out.
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This doesn't prove that they aren't being run on amazon servers--check the wiki on amazon server locations. Also, why are so many nodes not receiving transactions and others receiving so many? Are they being attacked already? (citation needed) Citation? Look at the list you linked me to--there are a lot of nodes with 0 transaction and lot more being run off of corporate servers that are most likely working with their local spying agency. Europe and America share spy data last time i checked. This is what i mean about trusting people to follow best practices--they don't. ok, I really enjoyed our conversation. If you want to spread FUD (without understanding the basics of the masternode system and assuming some paranoic statements without any proof) i'm out. btw. I still waiting a comment about this: Attacking The Consensus System via Sybil attackhttps://www.dashpay.io/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/InstantTX.pdfThere are other methods of attacks, so addressing one attack does not address them all. I did comment on this above, but i think you responded as I was revising it, so you missed it. I'm researching the masternode list you linked me to earlier; it's more telling than you think. Thanks for providing it.
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This doesn't prove that they aren't being run on amazon servers--check the wiki on amazon server locations. Also, why are so many nodes not receiving transactions and others receiving so many? Are they being attacked already? (citation needed) Citation? Look at the list you linked me to--there are a lot of nodes with 0 transaction and lot more being run off of corporate servers that are most likely working with their local spying agency. Europe and America share spy data last time i checked. This is what i mean about trusting people to follow best practices--they don't.
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This doesn't prove that they aren't being run on amazon servers (or american or compromised server companies). Also, why are so many nodes not receiving transactions and others receiving so many? Are they being attacked already?
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Monero's success depends on its usefulness, the community's ability to articulate that usefulness to those currently unaware of Monero and the community's ability to build an ecosystem of products and services designed to maximize Monero's usefulness.
It has to be noted that before MiG (which is in design still), there is not a single website that is coherently promoting Monero as an investment, a currency, a store of value, or anything that is material to its success marketcapwise. Or please link if you know of one This is how i found out: https://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinSerious/comments/2eg0r0/whats_the_best_path_for_privacy/Having an addictive game doesn't hurt either.
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Decide on the features you value in a cryptosystem and then research the coins that fit those parameters. How you want to divvy the investment holdings depends more on you than the coin(s) you are investing or trading.
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If you could argue me point for point the way i did you without reflecting evasively back to arguments a few posts back You did not. You quoted me point for point and then promoted your usual random nonsense at each one about the strength of cryptography and the importance of privacy as if anyone's challenging it. I'm sorry to tell you that what you're bagholding is a cryptographic bookkeeping system that isn't money, though it doesn't surprise me since you don't appear to have much appreciation as to the significant differences between fiat and crypto as far as privacy is concerned. As far as your equally inaccurate statements about "centralisation" goes, be advised that any function that's redundantly reproducible cannot be described as 'centralised' despite the best efforts of a little band of jaundiced propagandists rattling around in their self indulgent threads. If you really feel so comfortable in dismissing the challenges that Dash's approaches are addressing so successfully then maybe you should take a look at the latest litany of squabble threads in the Bitcoin Core vs Bitcoin XT saga and the spectacle of "celebrity devs" warring over the relative merits of a rock and a hard place. Then again, that might distract you from your hobby of recycling stale agendas and have little relevance to endorsing your delusions about the relationship between "privacy" and "value" in crypto."It's better to have intelligent enemies than stupid friends." --Anonymous. Good luck Otoh and Evan.
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I am always a little terrified when I hear that in order to succeed, Monero needs also btc to be succeeded. By investing into XMR the investor is taking a risk on both Monero's success and Bitcoin's success.
Is it really so that Monero cannot stand on her own feet and merit but need the bitcoin for its success?
No. Monero's success depends on its usefulness, the community's ability to articulate that usefulness to those currently unaware of Monero and the community's ability to build an ecosystem of products and services designed to maximize Monero's usefulness. The text books leave this out, but there was a gold strike in California before Sutter's Mill.
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Sorry to tell you that that cryptographers and mathematicians define whether a cryptosystem is strong or weak Don't be sorry because that's a very different thing from defining what is and isn't "money" which - I reiterate - is a much more nebulous process in the absence of trusted counterparties and one that is ultimately arbitrated on by public consensus. If you measure everything in terms of degree of cryptographic obfuscation of the public blockchain then all you'll get is the best "obfuscated blockchain". Good luck with that because monetary media derive both their consensual existence and value from a whole lot of properties, none of which is obscurity. Fungibility is, however, an integral property of monetary media and you don't improve fungibility by implementing "strong cryptographic obfuscation" between one address and another on the blockchain. All you do is frustrate people who regard that as an essential element of public accountability, prepare the ground for scams and heists and generally kill confidence. Dash has improved Bitcoin's fungibility in the most optimal way any approach could have while preserving transparency and confidence. It does it in exactly the way that traditional cash does. Somebody earlier in this thread said they were surprised at how long Dash had lasted in the "top 10" and noted that despite their preference and the subject line of this thread, Dash was doing "insanely well". In fact there was no need to be surprised - Dash is the only public blockchain which improves on Bitcoin's fungibility by orders of magnitude. Privacy in crypto calls for different cryptographic priorities from what privacy in fiat does. Some things are necessarily more public, others are more private. Cryptonote simply sends up back to the dark ages with the old fiat model again which is why it's seen zero adoption and next to zero development in more than a year other than its bare existence. Get real and stop harping on about garbage non-arguments that are well past their sell by date such as instamines, centralisation that isn't, amazon servers and the faux innovation that is invisible blockchains. If you could argue me point for point the way i did you without reflecting evasively back to arguments a few posts back or from posts from entirely different threads that would be a debate--this is just you hoping no one notices your flimsy argumentation. Good luck selling a clear blockchain as good privacy technology--I'm sure there are some idiots who will buy in and give that market cap a few more pumps.
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Why don't you send GMaxwell your poster so he can hang it on his wall as a token of your unheralded genius after he takes his XMR address off his profile page. 1.Because cryptographers don't define money. Users and markets do and the only reason they need to worry about privacy is because they have something of value. 2. If there's no value proposition in the first place then nobody gives a f* about privacy, no matter how much you scream about cryptographic proofs and mathematical certainty. Contrary to what you allude to in your posts it doesn't work the other way around unfortunately. Listen up! Use a clear blockchain to buy drugs, sex, gambling, evade your taxes, send donations to political dissidents..... 3."clear blockchain" is money - and yes, they're going to need money to pay for those things. As far as their anonymity goes, they'll be slightly more worried about divulging a delivery address than an anonymous cryptocurrency address. ....because Toknormal amateur economist said that opaque blockchains will never work because people are too stupid to trust math 4. Well I don't have any problem agreeing on the first of those points. As far as people "not trusting math", we can probably even agree on that as well. Unless they see results that mean something to them * most people wouldn't trust math as far as they could "notionally" throw it 5.* (In modern electronic 'money' with no trusted third party, that means "where did my money come from and where did it go") 1.Sorry to tell you that that cryptographers and mathematicians define whether a cryptosystem is strong or weak and a system that depends on masternodes is more insecure than a system that doesn't, so implying that the market won't take their opinions into account is like saying investors won't take the opinions of software developers into account when evaluating a software company's stock. 2.As far as no one giving a fuck about privacy, it will be good for dash if they don't. But I'm only worried about my privacy, so i don't and won't use it. Also, you might want to ask governments, corporations, husbands, dissidents, libertarians, arms dealers, drug dealers, human traffickers, tax evaders, teenagers, wives, ect. if they're willing to use inferior privacy just so dash's marketcap gets pushed up. For these few examples, privacy actually is a major part of an opaque blockchain's value proposition. 3.Again, this is a false choice. The experts (cryptogapher and mathematicians) have validated ring signatures time and time again, so unless you can prove otherwise with math, you're going to sound like ice salesman trying to tell people to not use refrigerators because you can't see electricity--again, I already pointed out that if ring signatures didn't work that there would be evidence of inflationary or deflationary amounts of coins in the wallets of exchanges of users. So the evidence and the experts are only countered with, "but you can't see it." This is why i think you are stupid. 4. Again, people trust math with their money (and their lives--try flying without math building or guiding your plane) every day and a ring signature coin's transactions aren't any more hidden than Bitcoin's are--you just can't link them to a single wallet without the user's permission, which is the point. And this is really big when you have companies taking in billions of dollars a year and do not want a competitor monitoring their every transaction or pinpointing their payroll. 5. You are partly right for once. In any age, you want to see where money goes and you can see where your money went by checking the account screen in front of you. You have no right to know where my money went though--unless you are governmental agency--and this is the cash effect that clear blockchain's miss. As far as knowing where your money came from--next time you go into a mom and pop restaurant or a convenience store dump out the tip/donation jar and tell them it's only money if they can tell where every cent came from. And please record it and uplpoad it to youtube.
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If a governmental agency can afford to buy enough nodes to break TOR's anonymity (they did and can), why couldn't they afford to buy enough masternodes to break dash's anonymity
In case you're referring to Operation Onymous, I thought it wasn't known how they found the hidden services' real IP's? I'm not following news regarding TOR very closely though so maybe they have disclosed their methods since. Is there proof somewhere that they have been "buying TOR nodes" and how does that help to break its anonymity? Many are assuming, I'm one of them, that Onymous was carried out by one of these exploits--no evidence that's been outed yet, so i'm guilty of being intuitively biased. Guess we'll have to wait for next Snowden before we can bet money on it. https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-tor-anonymity-can-busted-2500-month/https://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-the-nsa-or-anyone-else-can-crack-tors-anonymity
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