Actually it doesn't matter whether you first uninstall the outdated version and install the updated afterwards or simply just install the latest version 'on top of' the old one.
In both cases your wallet file (usually named default_wallet) inside the AppData directory will not be deleted.

To be on the safe side, you might simply want to make a backup of (1) your 12/24 word seed mnemonic (inevitable) and/or
(2) the wallet file (located in \Users\YourUserName\AppData\Roaming\Electrum\wallets), accessable through pressing WIN-key + R (to open run-command) then enter: %APPDATA%\Electrum\wallets

Glad you got it sorted out.

Everytime a service marks a transactions as successful, you need to check the transaction on a block explorer.
If the TX can't be found (either TXID invalid or no TX id at all) - it is a mistake on the service providers site (in this case: bitbay).
If you can't find a TX when searching for your address on a block explorer, it means that no transaction has been broadcasted into the network yet.

You might consider using a more 'trusted' exchange. There are quite a few with better liquidity, fees and more coins to be tradable.
Usually, bigger exchanges are more secured (even tho this can't be said for sure).

So.. your wallet basically is a brainwallet.

This is the WORST form of creating a private key. Zero entroy, zero randomness.
Only fully predictable inputs from user.

A lot of people have already lost money through using some phrases of a book as a brainwallet.
Now, this wallet expects people to only choose a username and a password to derive a private key..


Security-wise, this is a horrible approach.




Again, security-wise.. this is horrible.


I'd recommend everyone to NOT USE this wallet.
You can't be sure what code is running. And even if the code is not malicious, the whole concept is extremely bad and unsecure.

For pocket money and just to try it out - sure.
But for more than a few bucks - never. The chances of losing money (either through bugs, exploits, backdoors or simply the worst mechanism ever to generate private keys) is too high.

I can't imagine your reasons are somewhat halfway good enough to justify such a behavior.
Updating your hardware wallet is mandatory to stay fully secured against known attack vectors.

You are running the risk of losing your portfolio by not using the latest security updates.
Ledger won't be responsible in any way if you lose coins on an outdated device.




I heavily doubt this is a bug from their side.
You did skip multiple updates. You can't expect everything to work flawlessly if you don't invest some time to keep it running on the latest update.

Anyway.. good that you have worked it out now. You might consider keeping your nano s up-to-date. For security AND usability reasons.

Is the switch from the chrome applications to ledger live the only update you didn't do yet ?

I'd heavily recommend to perform EVERY firmware update proposed by ledger.
This is mandatory if you want to keep your coins secured on your hardware device.


Regarding ledger live, currently it is the way to access all of your coins which have been previously accessible through chrome apps.
It is the recommended way due to the fact that 1) chrome applications aren't going to be supported for too long anymore and 2) chrome does collect TONS of data.


The process of updating itself is pretty straight forward and is explained very well on their FAQ.

I'd agree with OmegaStarScream here. This looks like a Google 2FA code.
They use 'secret codes' with capital letters + numbers and a length of less than 16 symbols.

This definitely isn't a private key. You need way more characters to encode a private key (256 bit).


Do you remember anything at all regarding the wallet you have used ?
Did you use an online wallet ? Or did you maybe use a desktop wallet ?

This GA code could be from anywhere.

Isn't the whole purpose of the xpub key to be used as a sort of watch-only wallet ?

I don't see any practical reason to have a xpub key, without using it on an online machine as a watch-only wallet.
There is no use for the xpub key on an offline machine (IMO).


The thing is, that there should never be a private key which will be compromised from your seed.
Actually, there is no way to get your private key compromised (except for you exporting it + sharing it with other people/devices).

As long as this rubbish is not done, the xpub can safely be used on not-that-trustworthy devices (as long as you don't care about losing your privacy).

What do you mean by "didn't download the entire chain" ?

You can either sync the (full) blockchain or not sync it. You can't just partially sync it on your device.

Did you properly start core and started the syncing process ? If so, it doesn't matter when you paste your wallet.dat file into the data directory.
Simply just download + sync the blockchain, shutdown core, replace the wallet file (never delete a wallet file, always just rename them), start up core again with a rescan.

That's the fastest and most convenient way to check whether you still have funds sitting inside of your wallet. But your local copy of the blockchain has to be fully synced to be able to check different wallet.dat's for their BTC's.

This does definitely help.. There is only one bitcoin (traded with ticker BTC or XBT).
Anything else is just a fork of bitcoin, which took the same code base and took the name to attract new money.




That's never a good idea. Especially not if you are dealing with money.




An app can't be 'defective'.
An app can be compromised or buggy. But not 'defective'.

If you have downloaded the correct app AND the app is trustworthy AND you have the backup of your seed, your money is safe.

I would discourage you from accepting any 'offers' via email. The majority will be scam.

1.000.000 combinations is very easy to bruteforce. You don't need specialized hardware or knowledge to do so.

The safest (and cheapest) way would be to bruteforce it yourself. As already mentioned, btcrecover is what you are looking for.
You will be able to check all combinations locally on your PC, without revealing any private information. You can find a tutorial on how to use btcrecover/tokenfile here.

If you have trouble using this tool correctly, feel free to post your questions.

All you need to backup to be able to access your coins again, are your private keys.

The private keys (and additional information) are stored inside the wallet.dat. That's all you need to backup.


But a proper backup isn't only determined by what to backup, but also by how.

Make sure to never store your backup on a PC connected to the internet (less risk of it getting compromised).
Don't store your backup on the same machine running your wallet (risk of getting destroyed through ransomware or lightning strike, HD failure, etc..)
Keep multiple copies of your backup (especially if you only store them digitally) spread across different devices NOT attached to the internet.

While you are right with the heavily decreased privacy on an SPV client, the sercurity should be completely independent from the type of the wallet (full node / SPV).

All a wallet needs to do in order to be secure, is to keep all private information secured.
This is not depending on whether the wallet gets the information through an SPV server or through other nodes on the network.

The proper process of gathering entropy, generating private keys, storing/encrypting private keys is what makes a wallet secure / not secure. Not the source of information.

For proper (advanced) blockchain analyzing, you either have to hire a company (there are quite a few which offer such a service for a relatively high price),
or you'll need to build it yourself (which probably is the less expensive way).

Especially regarding altcoins there isn't much available. So creating it from scratch (or hiring someone to do this) is probably the best way to get a software which fulfills all of your requirements.

---

Edit:
Basic data (generation date, coin circulation) can easily be pulled from livecoinwatch or coinmarketcap. Are you referring to such information with blockchain analysis ?

You can configure your system to only route the bitcoin traffic through the VPN, leaving each other traffic untouched.
Unfortunately this isn't that trivial, but you can use different interfaces for different ports (i.e. 1 interface only for bitcoin port -> VPN).

Changing ports, of course, is the easier way. If only ports are blocked, thats perfectly fine.
But if the firewall does inspect the packets, the only possibility is to obscure the payload (through VPN, SSH tunneling, etc..).

Actually, ledger does support all of these coins. All of them stored on the nano s can be accessed using the official wallets.

Ledger live has been introduced to replace the chrome applications (because all of them are going to be removed from chrome).
So each coin which is supported on ledger live currently, was supported through a chrome application.

They are going to add additional coins to ledger live. But this might take some time since they have other priorities.

The nano s isn't simply an USB stick. The private keys are not lying around on a flash memory.
They are stored inside a secure element.

So, no. That's not possible. You need to enter the correct pin (within 3 tries) to access the private keys.

You can read more about the ST31 secure element and the architecture of the nano s here: https://ledger.readthedocs.io/en/0/bolos/hardware_architecture.html

Are you talking about a normal transaction or about the change of a transaction?

The change of a transaction simply just is an additional output. So an usual transaction has at least 1 Input and 2 Output (Receiver / Change).

Each transaction requires a fee (based on the size) to be included into a block. It doesn't matter whether you are sending the coins to an address owned by you, or someone else.
Noone except you knows that you are owning the receiving and sending address. A transaction between 2 of your addresses is a normal transaction for everyone in the network.

You will be able to choose the fee, just like with each other transaction inside mycelium.

Did you read the OP ? It is not about privacy here. It is about BEING ABLE to connect to the bitcoin network.
OP never mentioned he wants enhanced privacy.

Additionally, anyone can see traffic to/from the bitcoin network. With a VPN, noone except you and the VPN provider knows that YOU are connecting to the BTC network.
So.. it does increase privacy. Even if that wasn't the intention of OP.




Why should he use TOR? It is WAY slower. It is just not worth the hassle if you don't insist on hiding the traffic from the VPN provider (which OP isn't).
TOR might be helpful in some situations, but it is NOT a panacea for everything.

No. You are 100% wrong.

You NEVER access your nano s with your seed. You only initialize it ONCE.
Each time afterwards, you are accessing it with your pin. Your seed is stored inside your ledger.

Without having any clue, at least listen to us. You are repeating yourself. Your coins are gone. You have used the wrong seed.
Take it as a lesson and move forward.

To be honestly, i am not aware of a single router without a WPS button.
The whole purpose of WPS is to physically press a button to circumvent entering the PSK.

Having WPS enabled by default WITHOUT a button, is plain stupid, i agree. But any router which isn't lowest low-class shouldn't be that shitty.




Hiding the SSID doesn't give you any benefit regarding security. Random people just won't see it on their mobile phone.
But anyone still can connect to it and anyone still can sniff all probe requests / handshakes. You are gaining nothing.




No. Neither the privacy nor the security of your network is enhanced when hiding the SSID.
And especially keylogger have nothing to do with your Wifi. Keylogger are purely application level. How do you come to that statement