Please note that just "running a node" is not the same as "forging" in terms of "protecting the network".

Although it can help with things like DDoS and for those that are blocked from accessing IP addresses the most important work is that done by "forging nodes" as only those nodes are "confirming transactions".

The situation is that under the proposed TF changes you will "try" to announce your "forged block" and end up being rejected (due to a "better" block) and then be ignored by those nodes that saw this for 24 hours.

This is possible (and what James is working on) but securing the Nxt network needs to be done in Nxt not in a layer above it.

We need as many nodes as we can get in order to make sure that the network doesn't "fail" (if there are too few nodes then our TPS would drop dramatically and in fact the whole network could be at risk).

Whether these nodes are "pool operators" or "individual forgers" is what we are discussing in regards to the "penalty" situation.

I don't think this adds much to the discussion but thanks for the input.

I think you've got it correctly - the reason that 1 can't continue this behavior successfully depends upon his control of the future blocks (which he can't actually *control by himself* due the random nature of crypto hashes).

So the *evil block forger* actually needs *evil friends* to help him. If he has enough friends then he can win but the actual probability of this is why we need a math guy.

This doesn't parse - care to explain it again?

That is not useful - please provide reasoning for your statement.

Yes they are blocks not nodes.



Now you lose me with the math (as I said that is not my field) - but let's try and move forwards.

There is "no official" branch.

Each node makes it's own decision about its current chain according to what it sees. So one node can end up on a "fork" and if it goes too far down that fork it may never be able to get back onto the "main chain".

So the "main chain" is the "best chain" in terms of the "weight" of every block in it.

It really is a penalty as they now have no chance to forge a block for 24 hours (I wouldn't be surprised if people ended up modifying the software to "go to sleep" for 24 hours in that situation).

Also it doesn't really matter being "the best" as we are building "chains" (the weight of the entire chain is what is best rather than each specific block in it).

I will try my best (math is not my strength - logic is).

Basically the way that TF works is that there is a crypto hash for each block which was calculated from the previous' block hash and the "forgers" account.

This hash then determines who's account is the "best" to forge the next block so in a perfect situation if we consider that the max. "weight" of a block is 100 then you would see a blockchain like this:

A(100) B(100) C(100) D(100)

but things aren't perfect as some people won't forge (or pass on their forging right) so the network allows other "less perfect" blocks to be announced and each node will accept the best one that they see to try and keep building on the chain.

A(80) B(90) C(50)

The problem of "forking" is because each node can't see everything in the network (due to latency) so you could also end up with:

A(80) B(95) C(10)

with these "forks" ending up becoming "ignored" because a longer "better" chain has been noticed by the node.

So the problem we are dealing with is that B(95) could "hide" their block and then announce it *after* B(90) which would at least for 1 block make it a "better chain".

But as others will build upon what they see then it won't necessarily *matter* that B(95) was better than B(90) because C(50) is better than C(10) and so B's attempt to "create a fork" will fail.

If though someone has the ability to produce a better B, C, D, E, etc. then they could replace a large number of blocks. This is known in Bitcoin as the >50% attack.

We need to work out the probabilities of all this including how "penalising" a node for "not forging" changes this.

I only speak for myself but I think it would better not to try tying the Nxt community itself to such causes (whether they be noble or otherwise) as you are always going to "turn off some potential users".

Wouldn't it be better for interested Nxt users to just form their own groups for that?

You need to become familiar with how Bitcoin works at a lower level to understand the problem.

For simplicity think of it like this:

You wallet could either contain one $100 bill or it could contain 10,000 1 cent coins (the latter situation very likely if you are using faucets or getting tiny amounts of bitcoins from some websites "paying" you).

If you are wanting to send 10,000 1 cent coins it is a bit like the merchant going "sorry - you need to pay me in notes".

So assuming this is your "real problem" you will have to perhaps get some help to "clean out the dust" in your wallet (and maybe not continue doing the same thing).

Not possible as no reasonable person is likely to "spend their very last NXT" on a transaction fee.

I am not so sure my first idea was a good one but my concern is that if most people become uninterested in forging it could make the network less resilient in the (hopefully unlikely) case of pool servers being shut down by authorities in particular.

So I am quite happy to drop that idea but I still think the problem of "penalty" needs to be considered as well as the problem of having "too much forging power" amongst a small number of pools.

We really need the math - so if we have any math guys in our community there is an opportunity for you to earn some NXT or BTC for helping out with this and some other analysis.

A DAC is a "digital autonomous corporation" which indeed could be one application for an AT although there are many others.

For a start I don't think we have seen any math to "prove" that the penalty system will give us >90% protection (does anyone have that information?).

The health of the network is dependent upon people forging (for whatever reason they do it) so my concern is that penalising smaller stake holders for "not forging" could reduce the number of forging nodes and therefore potentially "weaken" the network (by making it more vulnerable to governments who might decide to order the shutdown of servers).

I think you mean 1000 TPS but the penalty wouldn't be much of a problem for pools as they effectively have as many accounts as the # of people who have leased forging rights to them (so it just means that they can't use certain "tickets").

Actually you don't but the AT will be more designed as a "term deposit" (i.e. the funds are *locked* until a certain time then released).

It will be helpful for those that "don't trust themselves" and also could function for passing on "an inheritance" of NXT (by having it tie into the Dormant Funds Transfer AT I've built).