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4181  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice on: November 16, 2015, 12:22:37 PM
Afaics this just mucks up capturing the true metric of inertia. PoW forces giving control to the longest chain or no objectivity, but the longest chain may deviate (centralize due to its economics) from some other more permissionless durable measure of inertia.

What is the definition of inertia in the context of consensus, though? We have POW because of the sybil problem... I guess, in idealised terms, inertia in cryptocurrencies would be directly proportional to the number of unique individuals in the voting process?

Inertia is an interpretation of the (history of the) UTXO. It it is the context in which it is interpreted that gives rise to my design. Sure anyone can make transactions to themselves and even avoid TX fees if they are also the confirmation delegate to Sybil attack the UTXO, but...
4182  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 16, 2015, 12:08:46 PM
More hints about what is unique in my design for block chain consensus...

A non-PoW algorithm could in the short-term use an objective metric of the long-term historical consensus to limit the rate of deviation of the short-term consensus. Think of rolling checkpoints, but applying this inertia to the future as well, analogous to anti-aliasing. There is your strong hint as to what I am doing differently than other attempts to overhaul the block chain consensus algorithm.

Interesting. I'm not sure what you're describing here, although it reminds me of an old idea I had about DPOS: throw away the stake elected delegates and replace them with POW elected delegates. That way, delegates become permissionless, you still get to keep the fast block times and it kind of adopts a checkpoint-alike system since the POW frequency would be lower than the block generation frequency.

Note afaics (?) PoS isn't inherently lacking the permissionless attribute, but rather it is ill-defined as to what threshold of adversarial strategy does it break, because the "something to stake" isn't consumed because for example there are a myriad of strategies such as shorting against your own stake so you have "nothing at stake". Perhaps someone can quantify the breakage thresholds of all the myriad of adversarial strategies precisely, but I doubt it. For example, I started to read the 40 page Neucoin white paper, but there is so much verbiage to wade through as compared to Satoshi's concise elucidation.

PoW election of delegates (i.e. Bitcoin-NG except with multiple simultaneous leaders) still retains the Satoshi weaknesses that 51% can destroy the permission-less quality and the centralization directed economics of the longest chain (refer to my up thread post). The permissionless breakage point is more well-defined than PoS, nevertheless Satoshi's PoW doesn't appear to have a decentralized future. I originally also contemplated this method, as superior to stake deposits but dissatisfied that the permissionless attribute would not be durable as the network becomes more centralized. I did have one idea for battling centralization of PoW by not offering any rewards for PoW and making it required, but this still meant that the inertia of popular delegates with 51% could form an censorship clique which I wasn't totally satisfied with (although willing to attempt as an improvement over what we have now with Bitcoin and more well-defined than PoS).

My idea for "inertia" is how I think the permissionless attribute can be impossible to break unless the adversary has near to 100% of the inertia. The relevant form of inertia should have the property of a virus in that if you can't block all of it, it eventually infiltrates the other 99.9% of the inertia as kryptonite against the power of the censorship. DAG (Iota) and similar explorations (e.g. RaiBlocks block lattice) have been essentially trying to capture permissionless "inertia" but I believe they missed some key insights.

One of the key insights comes from the entropic force and the fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics insures us that nature is always trying to route around inefficient Coasian barriers. Conceptually PoW is a Coasian barrier attempt to control inertia rather than recognize that inertia is an emergent phenomenon of the entropic force and structures itself. So I believe Iota and RaiBlocks are attempting to force non-emergent structure because they haven't identified that which is emergent and removed all the other unnecessary controlling structure which afaics renders their designs unable to provide the objective reality within the CAP theorem (interpreted with a higher level ontology as I have described in my discussions with the devs of those two coins).

Another insight derives from the fact that the world must be relative, because if everyone was forced to hold the same perspective, then no entropy could emerge. Nothing would exist. In other words, if everything is the same, then nothing exists (nothing is distinguishable). So I was searching for a way that there could simultaneously be virtual Partitions of consensus (allowing different relative perspectives), yet impossible to have multiple or ambiguous objective realities about validity (i.e. not losing global Consistency, except by absolute physical network partitioning, which is very unlikely since we do have permissionless global communication with for example shortwave radio and degrading functionality more precisely in that physical partitioning scenario). Accessibility could be forsaked on some virtual partitions for as long as it is not lost on every partition, because on the internet every partition is reached (unless there is no physical connectivity or perhaps if the anti-DoS is flawed). So essentially I think Satoshi's PoW is inflexible on gradations of tradeoffs between C, A, and P (in my ontology of that CAP theorem), thus it loses centralization (permissionless) durability because it can't model the actual inertia.

In my abstract conceptualization, Iota is essentially trying to capture the same conceptual direction, but I think they missed the insight of what the key emergent phenomenon that is the inertia, thus afaics their design suffers from conflating some other structure which I am currently thinking makes it weaker (but more precise analysis awaits after they've released a product and finalized their design and ditto me as well). For example, afaics I believe their first fundamental mistake was to introduce longest tangles of PoW as the metric of objectivity. Afaics this just mucks up capturing the true metric of inertia. PoW forces giving control to the longest chain or no objectivity, but the longest chain may deviate (centralize due to its economics) from some other more permissionless durable measure of inertia.

Another key insight is that afaik all PoS penalization mechanisms are based on the concept that it is "more expensive to attempt to cheat", which unfortunately are theoretically broken by strategies such as shorting the coin. Whereas, the inverted concept that "it is too expensive to not check for cheating" transforms the onus from the one with stake to the one who needs inertia. This is an example of the powers of discernment that recognize that "nothing at stake" is distinct from "something to stake". We should consider all the possibilities of abstraction in order to broaden our ability to discern.

Referring to the prior two paragraphs and the following self-quote, note that the incentive to be on the longest chain in PoW conflates the incentive to not be on a invalid chain with the requirement to have only one virtual partition.


with a sufficient penalty for not joining the longest chain to motivate convergence on one chain


You are (perhaps unconsciously?) identifying a more significant economic fact: there is no way to secure a block chain without centralization due to power law distribution of wealth coupled with the Iron Law of Political Economics when any resource is involved in the objectivity of the consensus. With inertia as the objectivity, I think it will be much more difficult to centralize the block chain.

I look forward to reading your whitepaper Smiley

Thanks. I am trying my best to rush, and hopefully cutting corners in implementation won't end up blowing up in my face.

The white paper will be less abstractly opaque. I have to be somewhat opaque at this point, otherwise I simply spill the beans entirely.

Afaics this just mucks up capturing the true metric of inertia. PoW forces giving control to the longest chain or no objectivity, but the longest chain may deviate (centralize due to its economics) from some other more permissionless durable measure of inertia.

What is the definition of inertia in the context of consensus, though? We have POW because of the sybil problem... I guess, in idealised terms, inertia in cryptocurrencies would be directly proportional to the number of unique individuals in the voting process?

Inertia is an interpretation of the (history of the) UTXO. It it is the context in which it is interpreted that gives rise to my design. Sure anyone can make transactions to themselves and even avoid TX fees if they are also the confirmation delegate to Sybil attack the UTXO, but...

Inertia is an interpretation of the (history of the) UTXO. It it is the context in which it is interpreted that gives rise to my design. Sure anyone can make transactions to themselves and even avoid TX fees if they are also the confirmation delegate to Sybil attack the UTXO, but...

I don't have enough info to reason about this Smiley I'll have to wait for your doc

I was purposeful too vague and abstract Embarrassed.

Just because someone can Sybil attack the UTXO, doesn't necessarily follow they can Sybil attack the "inertia" which an interpretation (a chronological, partitioned structuring) of the UTXO. Someone could send a zillion transactions to their Sybil addresses (if they can recoup the TX fees by running their own full node), but if the rest of the inertia doesn't consume those UTXO, then it isn't inertia and it is a private, virtual "subnetwork" of the attacker.

I have mentioned the long-term inertia limits the rate of change in the near-term (a form of anti-aliasing) so that objective reality in the near-term moves into the long-term history before the rate of change could enable a double-spend by "replacing the 51% of delegated authority".

It is not possible for collusion of delegates to prevent even very small percentages of the inertia from being confirmed by an ever spreading percentage of the inertia, thus the colluding delegates implicitly remove themselves from the system by censoring the growing inertia. Unlike with PoW, there is no way to stomp out all permission-less activity as it acts more like a virus that spreads. The only way to be congruent with the virus-like quality of the inertia is to not censor any portion of the inertia. During battles over perspective, there can be partial orders (partitions) in terms of consensus, but there can't be invalidity because of the anti-aliasing. The payee only has to fear that a particular partition will complete die, but due to the way inertia infects itself, this is extremely unlikely. I think I read that all of us are connected by on average only 5 degrees-of-acquaintances. Again consensus systems are probabilistic. Just like with Bitcoin, the probability of an orphaned virtual partition declines over time. One difference from Bitcoin is there isn't the requirement of not more than one virtual partition (just one longest chain), yet convergence is probabilistically inevitable. If you conceptually combined DPOS and Iota, you'd be closer to my design.

The inertia is in control. It is a force of the users. It is what we idealistically thought PoW was supposed to be as a decentralized vote. The incentive of the user to be able to transaction freely (with any human at any time, not just some portion of the UTXO) is the inertia.

One of the important aspects of making this work correctly is going entirely against the concept that Bitcoin should be only for a reserve currency for the large stake holders. To make my design work, the users of currency must be the determinants of the inertia. Micro-transactions and the need to transact widely with any one at any time without any Lightning Network corporate servers building "harvestwalls" (or however data harvesting is employed to extract profit) or other means of the rich continuing to parasite on and interfere/throttle/limit the individuals (the entropic force) that is the real economy.

I think that will be enough hints for now.

Edit: one more point is that if there are multiple long-term histories, the most objective one is the one which has all the (valid) transactions, i.e. combine the multiple histories if no one else has yet. In my analysis thus far, I have not found an ambiguity in the objectivity. The key design insight was employing anti-aliasing to make validity unambiguous.
4183  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice on: November 16, 2015, 11:12:03 AM
A non-PoW algorithm could in the short-term use an objective metric of the long-term historical consensus to limit the rate of deviation of the short-term consensus. Think of rolling checkpoints, but applying this inertia to the future as well, analogous to anti-aliasing. There is your strong hint as to what I am doing differently than other attempts to overhaul the block chain consensus algorithm.

Interesting. I'm not sure what you're describing here, although it reminds me of an old idea I had about DPOS: throw away the stake elected delegates and replace them with POW elected delegates. That way, delegates become permissionless, you still get to keep the fast block times and it kind of adopts a checkpoint-alike system since the POW frequency would be lower than the block generation frequency.

Note afaics (?) PoS isn't inherently lacking the permissionless attribute, but rather it is ill-defined as to what threshold of adversarial strategy does it break, because the "something to stake" isn't consumed because for example there are a myriad of strategies such as shorting against your own stake so you have "nothing at stake". Perhaps someone can quantify the breakage thresholds of all the myriad of adversarial strategies precisely, but I doubt it. For example, I started to read the 40 page Neucoin white paper, but there is so much verbiage to wade through as compared to Satoshi's concise elucidation.

PoW election of delegates (i.e. Bitcoin-NG except with multiple simultaneous leaders) still retains the Satoshi weaknesses that 51% can destroy the permission-less quality and the centralization directed economics of the longest chain (refer to my up thread post). The permissionless breakage point is more well-defined than PoS, nevertheless Satoshi's PoW doesn't appear to have a decentralized future. I originally also contemplated this method, as superior to stake deposits but dissatisfied that the permissionless attribute would not be durable as the network becomes more centralized. I did have one idea for battling centralization of PoW by not offering any rewards for PoW and making it required, but this still meant that the inertia of popular delegates with 51% could form an censorship clique which I wasn't totally satisfied with (although willing to attempt as an improvement over what we have now with Bitcoin and more well-defined than PoS).

My idea for "inertia" is how I think the permissionless attribute can be impossible to break unless the adversary has near to 100% of the inertia. The relevant form of inertia should have the property of a virus in that if you can't block all of it, it eventually infiltrates the other 99.9% of the inertia as kryptonite against the power of the censorship. DAG (Iota) and similar explorations (e.g. RaiBlocks block lattice) have been essentially trying to capture permissionless "inertia" but I believe they missed some key insights.

One of the key insights comes from the entropic force and the fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics insures us that nature is always trying to route around inefficient Coasian barriers. Conceptually PoW is a Coasian barrier attempt to control inertia rather than recognize that inertia is an emergent phenomenon of the entropic force and structures itself. So I believe Iota and RaiBlocks are attempting to force non-emergent structure because they haven't identified that which is emergent and removed all the other unnecessary controlling structure which afaics renders their designs unable to provide the objective reality within the CAP theorem (interpreted with a higher level ontology as I have described in my discussions with the devs of those two coins).

Another insight derives from the fact that the world must be relative, because if everyone was forced to hold the same perspective, then no entropy could emerge. Nothing would exist. In other words, if everything is the same, then nothing exists (nothing is distinguishable). So I was searching for a way that there could simultaneously be virtual Partitions of consensus (allowing different relative perspectives), yet impossible to have multiple or ambiguous objective realities about validity (i.e. not losing global Consistency, except by absolute physical network partitioning, which is very unlikely since we do have permissionless global communication with for example shortwave radio and degrading functionality more precisely in that physical partitioning scenario). Accessibility could be forsaked on some virtual partitions for as long as it is not lost on every partition, because on the internet every partition is reached (unless there is no physical connectivity or perhaps if the anti-DoS is flawed). So essentially I think Satoshi's PoW is inflexible on gradations of tradeoffs between C, A, and P (in my ontology of that CAP theorem), thus it loses centralization (permissionless) durability because it can't model the actual inertia.

In my abstract conceptualization, Iota is essentially trying to capture the same conceptual direction, but I think they missed the insight of what the key emergent phenomenon that is the inertia, thus afaics their design suffers from conflating some other structure which I am currently thinking makes it weaker (but more precise analysis awaits after they've released a product and finalized their design and ditto me as well). For example, afaics I believe their first fundamental mistake was to introduce longest tangles of PoW as the metric of objectivity. Afaics this just mucks up capturing the true metric of inertia. PoW forces giving control to the longest chain or no objectivity, but the longest chain may deviate (centralize due to its economics) from some other more permissionless durable measure of inertia.

Another key insight is that afaik all PoS penalization mechanisms are based on the concept that it is "more expensive to attempt to cheat", which unfortunately are theoretically broken by strategies such as shorting the coin. Whereas, the inverted concept that "it is too expensive to not check for cheating" transforms the onus from the one with stake to the one who needs inertia. This is an example of the powers of discernment that recognize that "nothing at stake" is distinct from "something to stake". We should consider all the possibilities of abstraction in order to broaden our ability to discern.

Referring to the prior two paragraphs and the following self-quote, note that the incentive to be on the longest chain in PoW conflates the incentive to not be on a invalid chain with the requirement to have only one virtual partition.


with a sufficient penalty for not joining the longest chain to motivate convergence on one chain


You are (perhaps unconsciously?) identifying a more significant economic fact: there is no way to secure a block chain without centralization due to power law distribution of wealth coupled with the Iron Law of Political Economics when any resource is involved in the objectivity of the consensus. With inertia as the objectivity, I think it will be much more difficult to centralize the block chain.

I look forward to reading your whitepaper Smiley

Thanks. I am trying my best to rush, and hopefully cutting corners in implementation won't end up blowing up in my face.

The white paper will be less abstractly opaque. I have to be somewhat opaque at this point, otherwise I simply spill the beans entirely.
4184  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 16, 2015, 10:18:16 AM
I registered:

inertia.social ($12)
inertias.net   ($9)
inerti.us      (only $4)
4185  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Nothing-at-Stake & Long Range Attack on Proof-of-Stake (Consensus Research) on: November 16, 2015, 09:08:36 AM
Tangentially please note even though you didn't make this error, it is a semantic conflation error to equate "nothing at stake" with "nothing to stake" as others have (and James apparently wasn't considering that attackers with large value to stake, can short the coin as a way to make sure they have nothing at stake ... will make sure I bring this to his attention next time we exchange messages):


And if it requires actual stake to do a N@S attack, then there is definitely something at stake!

...If there is no attack without anything at stake, then it seems that something is at stake...

4186  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice on: November 16, 2015, 08:31:06 AM

That may be true or not. Even with currencies like the Euro there is a certain risk of losing at least some value (about 30% in the past 3 years or so compared to the US dollar), so even in a pretty stable cryptocurrency the risk would be always significant.

If your unit-of-account is in Euros, then normal fluctuations in the currency are irrelevant.

Capital is fleeing Euro because EU is imploding (because they separated the unit-of-exchange from the unit-of-account for fiscal debt). Thus an example of what I said, then that the security is low.

That wasn't euro-specific. Every currency has fluctuations, even the larger ones. It's even true for the US dollar and obviously for assets like gold and silver. So the risk never is zero, but, obviously, the more mature the market, the less the risk of a long term deposit.

I don't know why I am failing to communicate my point in two prior attempts.

My point is that unless the currency fluctuation is extreme to the point of causing general economic malaise, then the users of that currency as a unit-of-account have no appreciable individualized risk risk w.r.t. to the international exchange fluctuations.

Thus if a crypto-currency is intended to become a currency (e.g. a unit-of-account), then the "nothing at risk" will apply and my point is the "rich get richer" applies.

Note the Euro's extreme fluctuation right now is a result of the suicidal decision to merge the unit-of-exchange of Europe without also merging the unit-of-account for (national fiscal) sovereign debts (e.g. thus Greece borrowed in devalued Euros when there was a mad rush to chase investment into southern Europe over a decade ago, but now has to pay back overvalued Euros as north Europe's higher productivity and the reversion of the trend, and Greece can't devalue its sovereign debt relatively due to the fact that it is not denominated in Drachmas). If a crypto-currency makes suicidal design decisions, then it will also likely have a loss of CONFIDENCE and thus a loss of security as well.

In short, I don't see how adding risk to stake or burn deposits improves the issues with "nothing at stake" and advantage to those with the most to stake.

Tangentially please note even though you didn't make this error, it is a semantic conflation error to equate "nothing at stake" with "nothing to stake" as others have (and James apparently wasn't considering that attackers with large value to stake, can short the coin as a way to make sure they have nothing at stake ... will make sure I bring this to his attention next time we exchange messages):


And if it requires actual stake to do a N@S attack, then there is definitely something at stake!

...If there is no attack without anything at stake, then it seems that something is at stake...


I was speaking about short-term double-spend risk where "weak subjectivity" doesn't apply. If the currency's exchange rate (to normally used units-of-account) is too volatile, then the PoB variant you described will have low security because it will be too risky to participate in the long-range PoB commitment risk.

That should be subject of investigation Wink. The nascent stage is not only the most volatile but also the stage where the opportunity to win with a low investment is the highest. In Slimcoin, for example, in the nascent stage, a large part of the mined and minted coins were burnt in the first three months (it has a hybrid model, PoW/PoS/PoB) to maximize chance of income. At this moment, there was even a "burn bubble" where there were more coins burnt than there were rewards for the next months, and many people then complained about low profits.

It is a simple fact that volatility declines with increased liquidity (participation) and thus price. So by definition a more volatile and risky investment will have a smaller market cap and thus less security (relatively speaking). Even in my proposal to use "inertia" at the objective metric of consensus, the larger the participation, then the stronger the security of more inertia (at least the "inertia" I have in mind scales by n2 though). Whereas, your described a design where risk declines as value increases, thus your security that depends on risk declines as the value increases which could provide more security. So you have two things working against each other in that design. Seems flawed.

The problem are periods where most participants think the currency is overvalued and a bear market is about to begin, and, of course, large bear markets with sinking expectations. But if the value of the coins that you burnt increase your probability to find blocks for a large time interval (in Slimcoin, it's 1 year with linearly decreasing probability), then these fluctuations in "burn participation" should not be very large.

The problem with the Slimcoin's PoB algorithm (as I understand it from your brief descriptions only) isn't due to volatility of risk, but rather as I explained above due to depending on risk to provide an objective metric of consensus yet risk declining as coin value increases, and overall objectivity of consensus (i.e. security) being dependent also on stability provided by larger market cap (actually participation, since some/most of these altcoin market caps are total illusions).

So my point is that requiring risk does not fix the problem that rich get richer (and centralization results). When there is risk, the coin loses viability. When there is insignificant risk, the rich get richer (as they do in all block chain consensus algorithms thus far invented).

You are right, some degree of centralization is inherent to all currently known designs. But pure PoS (without locked deposits) is the most benefitting for the rich.

The underlined is not a logical statement, if only those who can lock their coins instead of transact them will receive the mining rewards.

I don't mean to be condescending, but I really don't have time for this. I prefer to have discussions with those who I rarely have to correct their logic or repeat the same logic several times. Simply because I should be programming and not here in the forum losing time writing. I prefer it when those such as perhaps monsterer nearly always have some logical statement and then we are simply trying to add to each other's knowledge and perspectives. No one can be perfect (including myself), but the quality of the discussion determines whether I will just have to throw my hands up in the air and bow out (not for any personal animosity reason but just as a matter of prioritization of scarce time and effort). Hope I've expressed amicably and not condescendingly, my frustration with not having infinite time and wanting to interact with everyone but recognizing the reality of a finite lifespan.

All they must do is not move their coins. In PoW and PoB, at least, it makes sense for them to analyze the market situation; so there will not only the "most rich" group burning large amounts of currency but also a "entrepreneur" group (comparable to the Bitcoin miners) seeking opportunities. It's a rich-get-richer game, but not that simple like in PoS.

That simply isn't true that those with the most to stake won't benefit disproportionately just because you think you've forced them choose between more risk or lower returns. Apply some math and probability theory. I don't have time to explain in detail. Perhaps monsterer or other astute person can.

You can't escape from the fact that something to stake is nothing at stake, because the stake is not a resource that is globally consumed. Create local Coasian barrier by locking the coins, but the attacker can short the coin on the external markets (thermodynamics insures us that every such Coasian barrier is not durable as the universe trends to maximum distribution of probabilities). The reason I have chosen "inertia" as the resource of objectivity is because it consumes itself because it can only have one copy of self. There is no way to digitally reproduce "inertia", if it represents an inertia that isn't just digital.  Wink

Inertia and space (via partitions, thermodynamics, and energy) are fundamentally an emergent phenomenon originating (that can be shown deriving) from the entropic force, i.e. the organization of microstates:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785
4187  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 16, 2015, 04:19:07 AM
right now you are spending all your time procrastinating, posting about conspiracy theories and making polls about nonsensical details.

Foolish statements made by blind fools are good for motivation and feedback (as well as providing a record of those who will "eat crow" soon).

The joke (and priorities suggestion) portion of your post was interpreted humorously (including the n00b, naive, humorous notion of de-prioritizing branding & marketing), but the quoted portion is not a factual statement (which you could have verified by simply checking my latest posts by clicking my profile before posting your comments).

I've been busy doing 1) math; and 2) designing how micro-transactions scale and the impacts of value hiding of (Compact or just) Confidential Transactions (which also pertains to my derivative Zero Knowledge Transactions):

1. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1085436.msg12964946#msg12964946

2. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1249015.0

Don't care about eating crow and will never invest in your Coin no matter how good it is because you continually assault anyone that have any objections. You have this "higher than thou" attitude that I find absolutely repulsive, you have a high mathematical aptitude but suck at social interactions. Time is ticking in order to gain network effect so why should I choose your project out of thousands of others when you can't manage to run a team without running them off? Are you going to solo the entire project?

Well that is good, we finally have someone who states they will never invest in anything I create. And then if what I create is spreading like wildfire to millions of users then you will simply step aside from crypto as Bitcoin dies, because YOUR EGO is bigger than YOUR RATIONALITY.

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=1404

Quote from: original famous progenitor of "open source"
Ego is for little people

When I got really famous and started to hang out with people at the top of the game in computer science and other fields, one of the first things I noticed is that the real A-list types almost never have a major territorial/ego thing going on in their behavior. The B-list people, the bright second-raters, may be all sharp elbows and ego assertion, but there’s a calm space at the top that the absolutely most capable ones get to and tend to stay in.

My claim is that egotism is a disease of the incapable, and vanishes or nearly vanishes among the super-capable.

No. It’s more that ego games have a diminishing return. The farther you are up the ability and achievement bell curve, the less psychological gain you get from asserting or demonstrating your superiority over the merely average, and the more prone you are to welcome discovering new peers because there are so damn few of them that it gets lonely. There comes a point past which winning more ego contests becomes so pointless that even the most ambitious, suspicious, external-validation-fixated strivers tend to notice that it’s no fun any more and stop.

I’m not speaking abstractly here. I’ve always been more interested in doing the right thing than doing what would make me popular, to the point where I generally figure that if I’m not routinely pissing off a sizable minority of people I should be pushing harder. In the language of psychology, my need for external validation is low; the standards I try hardest to live up to are those I’ve set for myself. But one of the differences I can see between myself at 25 and myself at 52 is that my limited need for external validation has decreased. And it’s not age or maturity or virtue that shrunk it; it’s having nothing left to prove.

What I have to prove now is prove to myself that my illness and my age has not removed my ability to do important work, i.e. that I have not become useless.

I am not striving for your validation (as in a personal one of comparing myself personally to you or any other person for validation of my ego). I recognize the talents of others and have commended them on their capabilities when they shine such as smooth, gmaxell, vitalik, etc.. I have also expressed my disgust with individuals who abuse their skills to ridicule others (such as gmaxwel ridiculing me in some forum interactions) who are sincerely trying to contribute and always willing to mea culpa. What I am saying is that OTHERS DO THEIR DAMNED BEST TO TURN WHAT SHOULD BE A MERITORIOUS COMPETITION FOR THE BETTERMENT OF ALL INSTEAD INTO PETTY EGO BATTLES. And when I state that, then those same people (e.g. including apparently yourself) then claim it is my ego that is the source of the acrimony. It is just so nonsensical that I am reaching the point where I think the best course of action is to ignore these B-listers and just focus on what I am trying to accomplish.

The other thing I am trying to prove right now is the myopia of all those who think that the only correct way to create a better crypto-currency is the Monero way, and basically that you must join together in open source, "steal" ("improve" or "open source") someone else's invention (and claim perhaps rightly so that the inventors abused their invention), and then use groupthink to make all the creative decisions.

So many people have criticized me for refusing to join a groupthink at the nascent stage, and do not seem to understand that I want the flexibility to apply my own creativity until I have proved something that is worthy of open source collaboration.

I competed in team sports and individual sports in my youth. At various stages of my life I was an MVP in both American football (one with the helmet in playground leagues and again in college) and Track & Field (at middle distance in high school). Later in life I competed in software, several times being involved with software that reached out to millions of users. What I learned is that there is a role for individual competition (e.g. in Track and Software you are often going alone and competing against yourself) meshed with team based competition (e.g. in Football and even in Software if you create a successful open source effort).

So I have experience in discerning where the optimum sweet spots are in terms of the balances between individualistic and team based efforts. The Mythical Man Month applies especially to highly flexibility, iteractive, creative nascent stages that require an abundance of communication to accomplish within a group effect.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Mythical_Man-Month

"Therefore, assigning more programmers to a project running behind schedule will make it even later. This is because the time required for the new programmers to learn about the project and the increased communication overhead will consume an ever increasing quantity of the calendar time available. When n people have to communicate among themselves, as n increases, their output decreases and when it becomes negative the project is delayed further with every person added.

Group intercommunication formula: n(n − 1) / 2

Example: 50 developers give 50 · (50 – 1) / 2 = 1225 channels of communication."

Quote from: original famous progenitor of "open source"
And yet, there are people out there who are going to read the previous paragraph and think “Oh, that’s Eric’s ego again. The blowhard.” I’ve had a lot of time to get used to such reactions over the last decade, but it’s still hard for me not to collapse in helpless laughter at the implied degree of Not Getting It.

If you’re the kind of person who can make it to the top even in a single field (law or CS or whatever) you may not have started out with better things to do than compete for attention and glory, but by the time you make the A-list you’ve almost certainly discovered subtler games to play that are much more fun. You’ll maintain a reputation because a reputation is a useful tool, but it’s not the point any more. If it ever was. In my experience this is even more true of polymaths, possibly because their self-images as competent people.have broader and more stable bases.

I think there are a couple of different reasons people tend to falsely attribute pathological, oversensitive egos to A-listers. Each reason is in its own way worth taking a look at.

The first and most obvious reason is projection. “Wow, if I were as talented as Terry Pratchett, I know I’d have a huge ego about it, so I guess he must.” Heh. Trust me on this; he doesn’t. This kind of thinking reveals a a lot about somebody’s ego and insecurity, alright, but not Terry’s.




You have failure of logic and rationality as follows. Which can severely impact your ability to be an expert speculator.

you have a high mathematical aptitude but suck at social interactions.

Personal social interaction is not marketing genius or luck which drives a million user adoption. Personal social interaction scales far too slowly. Duh. I couldn't even personally interact with a million people in my lifetime.

So my personality has nothing at all to do with it. This is I presume your butthurt ego standing in front of the line of your rationality telling you that I can't possibly succeed. If you say to yourself, "there he goes again using 'butthurt' and offending the community", my response is that I am tired of this forum and the attacks. Enough already! And besides this forum does not matter to the success of my project as you will soon see once you see my marketing and distribution method.

And also your assumption that I don't excel in social interactions is incorrect and based on some nonsense forum with 99.999% males who are constantly trying to prove their big egos. I have in fact entertained large groups at Comdex exhibits.

When it comes to interacting with other programmers in an open source setting, the key is to be factual and meritorious. That is what the A-listers want, because A-listers care about results, not time wasting egos. The B-listers of course are all elbows and acrimony and that is why you want them to go "contribute" to your competitor's open source in order to bog their project down in molasses and least common denominator groupthink. That means every eyeball is helpful and welcome, but even Linus Torvalds said he has about 5 people who he trusts and everyone else is an idiot. He is very outspoken this way, yet runs the largest and most successful open source project on the planet.

Time is ticking in order to gain network effect so why should I choose your project out of thousands of others when you can't manage to run a team without running them off? Are you going to solo the entire project?

1. Time is ticking.

2. I never ran off a team, I chose not to grab the opportunity to collaborate with others who offered, because flexibility is more important in the nascent stage. And because I didn't want to suck others into my grand experiment and make them suffer for any failure on my part. A team makes much more sense when they can contribute on their own volition to something that already has a demonstrated position. To organize a team when everything is a projection, requires a partnership in risk and binds people in ways that means I really can't lead 100% without taking responsibility for the effects of my decisions on others who have staked their future on their investment (contribution of effort and time).

3. I am solo right now, because it made the most sense after all considerations. But of course no one who is serious about long-term viability is going to remain solo on an open source crypto-currency any longer than it is beneficial to do so, which is a very short nascent stage when flexibility of leadership is a higher priority than the shared resources of open source.

Note that if I had an ongoing software engineering relationship experience with another or others, then it is possible I would have made the decision to leverage teamwork during the nascent stage, because I would have had confidence from past experience with those individuals that we possessed the working synergy to make it work at the stage where the ideas around the designs and the issues are changing so fast. Even just working in the same building so able to talk at-will instead of working virtually could have impacted that decision. But given the situation I have and the time criticality of releasing something asap, the decision was made that the quickest result would be to not involve any others in the programming and engineering. I have involved the community in the naming and marketing conceptualization in this thread.

Another failure of logic is to assume that a team of 3 guys could scale a crypto-currency any better than a solo developer. Unless you can get the project to the point where many, many people are contributing, then 3 programmers can't scale it by themselves. That is why it is irrational to conclude that a project with 2 devs is somehow more likely to succeed than a project with 1 dev. A project with 3 devs might be more likely to fail, because more opportunities for the 3 devs to cheat each other and cause a devolution of the project. The only thing that brings stability is long-term popularity of the project.
4188  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 16, 2015, 03:50:36 AM
edit: hardware RAID is more reliable, has better performance..that's what sticked in my mind (based from what i've read back then)

To repeat what I wrote in my prior post, that is likely because RAID 5 and other levels that require extensive computation for the parity bit benefit from an additional hardware ASIC that is optimized for that specific computation. But it appears for RAID 1 that there is no such onerous computation, as the OS is simply writing two copies to two disks. Hardware controllers at another ~3% annual risk of failure to the existing ~1.5% annualized risk that an SSD will die. Also hardware controllers are proprietary and add another layer of issues to sort out.
4189  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 16, 2015, 03:19:16 AM
Can anyone add anything to my knowledge about software RAID 1?

Quote from: myself
I think I need to run a Raid 1 with 2 x SSD, and it seems you are selling a hardware controller solution for $25 per month, but I am thinking I don't want a hardware controller because it is another device that can fail. Linux has built in software RAID support, and it works very well with RAID 1. Really only need hardware conrtoller if using RAID 5.

Quote
we can setup software raid but STONGLY suggest against it
thats why we only offer hardware raid
and we would not support it going forward

I need RAID1 because my data is critical. I need to make sure the data is protected even between daily backups. Also Raid 1 will be 2X faster on random reads, which is a critical need of my application. I am not doing typical web site stuff. I am processing incoming crypto-currency transactions.

Why strongly suggest against software RAID?

I can be reasoned with. I haven't seen a reason in my research thus far. Why is it undesireable?

Quote
just what our hardware team and build team says...its software.....hardware is more reliable I think their mind

No your team wrote the opposite in your blog. Let me go find the link.

Quote
im just telling you what they tell me every time I ask about it
they say...go with hardware

https://www.hivelocity.net/blog/ssd-sata-vs-sata-raid-1-a-comparison-of-reliability-and-performance/

"Another issue with RAID is if an add-in RAID controller card is used. This introduces another point of failure. While most RAID cards will last a lifetime, approximately ~3% fail per year. In the event of a RAID card failure, you run the risk of your data being corrupted or entirely lost. Using on-board RAID is risky as well, if the mainboard fails, you risk losing the array, and your data. Either one will likely end up causing you a lot of downtime and misery."

By on-board RAID, I don't think they mean software RAID.

Quote
right

Also when they say you lose the array, I think they are refering to RAID 5 where there is no redundancy. RAID1 should be essentially the same as no RAID, except the OS writes 2 copies, one to each drive. If the motherboard dies, it is no worse than writing one copy to one drive.

It seems to me that the blog and the advice the tech guys gave you doesn't apply to software RAID 1. I will do some more research on it, to see if I am wrong about failure of the motherboard with s/w RAID 1.

Quote
well anything other than raid1

you can lose it in raid0,5 or 10

Agreed.

I will research more before ordering to make sure.

Quote
ok

I think we are almost done. Apologies to consume so much of your time.

Realize in the longer-term, I will need to get some smarter guys on these issues to harden them more. And willing to pay for that. So the RAID 1 setup is just a way to get through the initial months, while I am ramping up self-funded without any indication yet if this project will have a long life. So I am think the software RAID 1 is a reasonable step for the start.

Quote
sure you can do whatever you want and we can set it up for you
its just what we suggest

One more thought on the RAID issue is that if the hard disk dies I will lose data. With RAID1 I might not. I think there is a risk of losing data no matter what you do. That is why I am going to have an aggressive policy of writing changes periodically to the Cloud storage. So I need the RAID 1 so that when i am reading from files to write to backup, then my read bandwidth hasn't dived.

Quote
you can also get our back up service
takes a full server snap shot every day
and you can restore the whole server if you lose a drive
or a single file
its really nice

I am a programmer, so i think about the small details. The worry I have with your backup service is the way it may interfere as it tracks what has changed or not. I think I can do the backups more efficiently with my own coding because of the way I am always extending files then I know exactly what data has changed without needing complex tracking. In short, I can optimize backups more than a general backup solution. I think. I still will need a whole disk back up though, but only when I change OS configuration, so maybe I can just do those myself manually.

Quote
ok
just a thought

I am not sure. When I have more time, I will research the daily backups issue more in depth.

But that can come later. I want to get rolling asap on a server.
4190  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice on: November 15, 2015, 08:51:39 PM
But the main point that makes PoB less a "rich get richer" game for me is that in most actual PoS systems there is practically no risk when "forging" or "staking", because you can retire the coins when you want, for example if you think price is about to fall. So "rich get richer" without risk. In PoB systems like Slimcoin, burning large amounts of currency is equivalent to a "locked" deposit of several months, that means you always are at risk to lose value in bear markets. So PoB is, in terms of risk, roughly equivalent to a PoS system with long-term security deposits like proposed by Vitalik Buterin and others.

If it becomes a widely used liquid currency, exchange volatility is minimized, so then the risk argument fades away.

That may be true or not. Even with currencies like the Euro there is a certain risk of losing at least some value (about 30% in the past 3 years or so compared to the US dollar), so even in a pretty stable cryptocurrency the risk would be always significant.

If your unit-of-account is in Euros, then normal fluctuations in the currency are irrelevant.

Capital is fleeing Euro because EU is imploding (because they separated the unit-of-exchange from the unit-of-account for fiscal debt). Thus an example of what I said, then that the security is low.

In the nascent stage, what you are saying is that proof-of-deposit-at-risk coins that don't have very favorable risk will have very low security.

No, that wasn't my intention, this part of the post was only about fairness, not about security. I think in terms of security PoS and PoB should be equivalent, they're both depending on "weak subjectivity".

I was speaking about short-term double-spend risk where "weak subjectivity" doesn't apply. If the currency's exchange rate (to normally used units-of-account) is too volatile, then the PoB variant you described will have low security because it will be too risky to participate in the long-range PoB commitment risk.

So my point is that requiring risk does not fix the problem that rich get richer (and centralization results). When there is risk, the coin loses viability. When there is insignificant risk, the rich get richer (as they do in all block chain consensus algorithms thus far invented).

What is true that in both PoS and PoB the nascent stage with low value is the most risky, but that is basically the same even with PoW because of the low hash rate of nascent coins.

True.

Eliminating that attribute should be another coup of my "Tour de Force" of block chain consensus paradigm shifts coming soon...
4191  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 15, 2015, 07:59:38 PM
Dropping some hints about what is unique about my block chain consensus algorithm...

It has the nice property (at first glance) that no double spend is profitable once the transaction is confirmed, because an attacker would need to burn an amount of currency equal to the transaction size in order to get a double spend confirmed.

I believe you are stating that no one would assume a transaction is confirmed until the amount of accumulated burn was greater than all the possible transactions that could be double spent.

1) Randomness (or entropy) in a p2p system is bounded by the data present in the chain. What this means is that (at the very least) an attacker can know ahead of time whether he will win the block reward, because he has all data necessary to compute the result of the random function, no matter what components he is required to use.

2) Finney attack. It is completely trivial for an attacker to generate an infinite sequence of valid blocks in which he is the solo participant and is also the winner. Since the chain is ordered by maximum burn, this makes any double spend profitable because he can simply dump a massive pile of finney blocks on the fork containing his double spend. Using block timestamps to discard quickly submitted blocks is not a viable solution, since timestamps in a p2p system are unreliable.

The key distinction from PoW is that the PoB variant you described can be spent in more than one chain. This is the "nothing at stake" problem of PoS as well. To address this weakness, the PoS algorithms attempt to penalize applying stake (mining power) to more than one prospective chain and/or to the orphaned chain(s).

Another key distinction is you've assumed the randomness (entropy) of PoB is fully preimaged so that the attacker can set up his coins to burn such that he can burn on every block of his secret chain. PoS algorithms attempt to make the entropy larger than what could be practically computed to find the prerequisite preimage.

The popular counter-argument that "it costs more to attack than to participate in the security" is flawed.

As I was explaining in the "block lattice" thread (RaiBlocks) yesterday, if a resource is not irreversibly burned as proof of the longest chain, then the only possible objectivity is the "weak subjectivity" of social memory of historical consensus. In the long-term, the memory of (and investment in[1]) the verifiably recorded historical consensus overwhelms any alternative realities that can be conjured from "nothing at stake". In the short-term, arbitrary alternative realities are indistinguishable from reality unless there is an objective measure of the longest chain (with a sufficient penalty for not joining the longest chain to motivate convergence on one chain). In PoW, the short-term objective metric is the probability of double-spend by a given % of total network hashrate.

A non-PoW algorithm could in the short-term use an objective metric of the long-term historical consensus to limit the rate of deviation of the short-term consensus. Think of rolling checkpoints, but applying this inertia to the future as well, analogous to anti-aliasing. There is your strong hint as to what I am doing differently than other attempts to overhaul the block chain consensus algorithm.

[1] Include all the dependent transactions in that history as a social investment that won't be revertible.

3) Making the block reward equal to the burnt amount makes this functionally equivalent to Proof of Stake for the case of the single miner. However, if you don't make the block reward at least equal to the amount burnt, it is not profitable to mine.

You are (perhaps unconsciously?) identifying a more significant economic fact: there is no way to secure a block chain without centralization due to power law distribution of wealth coupled with the Iron Law of Political Economics when any resource is involved in the objectivity of the consensus. With inertia as the objectivity, I think it will be much more difficult to centralize the block chain.

Bitcoin is being raped TO DEATH by disproportionate cost of security (investor's money is being siphoned off to the electric utilities):

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/bitcoin-is-unsustainable

“a single Bitcoin transaction uses roughly enough electricity to power 1.57 American households for a day”

That electricity consumption cost per transaction will decrease as TX/s scaling increases, but currently the only way to do that is to drive centralization of mining (whether it be larger blocks or even Lightening Networks will be large corporate servers doing the glue between user level channels). But centralization is economically inevitable in Bitcoin any way...

Bitcoin pays about 1.35 million BTC to mining annually and consumes roughly 365 x 24 x 250,000 kWh annually. Thus roughly 1600 kWh per BTC in electricity cost. Thus Bitcoin mining is marginally profitable up to nearly 20 cents per kWh ($320 per BTC), which is roughly the marginal rate for residential electricity.

Yet mining farms locate where they can get subsidized water dam generated electricity for as low as 4 cents per kWh, thus $64 per BTC.

But the above assumes that all miners have the same electrical efficiency, which is not the case. Thus the mining farms are mining BTC at probably less than $50 per BTC (not counting hardware amortization).

http://www.neucoin.org/en/whitepaper/download#page=10

Quote
As a result, slowly but surely from 2010 through mid-2013, but after that in a landslide,
hobbyist and small-scale miners have gotten knocked out of business. It’s a very simple
dynamic. When a miner with access to capital enjoys lower overall costs than the competition,
he simply buys more computer power, driving up the difficulty of earning mining rewards,
and knocking the least efficient competitors out of business. Lower costs can either take the
form of lower cost hash rate or lower cost electricity. Bitcoin mining is rapidly becoming
controlled by a handful of companies with tens of millions of dollars of the most efficient
ASICs11, operating from facilities with the very lowest electricity and cooling costs on the
planet (e.g. Iceland and northern Sweden).

The point being that Bitcoin mining is economically driven to be controlled by those who have the highest economies-of-scale and are beholden to the governments which regulate utilities and subsidize cheap electricity with massive infrastructure spending with public debt.

Thus Bitcoin's mining is in effect controlled by the (oligarchy which controls the) governments, and this will become more evident over time.

Ditto PoS mining redistributes the coins over time to the largest stakeholders.

But the main point that makes PoB less a "rich get richer" game for me is that in most actual PoS systems there is practically no risk when "forging" or "staking", because you can retire the coins when you want, for example if you think price is about to fall. So "rich get richer" without risk. In PoB systems like Slimcoin, burning large amounts of currency is equivalent to a "locked" deposit of several months, that means you always are at risk to lose value in bear markets. So PoB is, in terms of risk, roughly equivalent to a PoS system with long-term security deposits like proposed by Vitalik Buterin and others.

If it becomes a widely used liquid currency, exchange volatility is minimized, so then the risk argument fades away.

In the nascent stage, what you are saying is that proof-of-deposit-at-risk coins that don't have very favorable risk will have very low security.
4192  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice on: November 15, 2015, 07:55:25 PM
It has the nice property (at first glance) that no double spend is profitable once the transaction is confirmed, because an attacker would need to burn an amount of currency equal to the transaction size in order to get a double spend confirmed.

I believe you are stating that no one would assume a transaction is confirmed until the amount of accumulated burn was greater than all the possible transactions that could be double spent.

1) Randomness (or entropy) in a p2p system is bounded by the data present in the chain. What this means is that (at the very least) an attacker can know ahead of time whether he will win the block reward, because he has all data necessary to compute the result of the random function, no matter what components he is required to use.

2) Finney attack. It is completely trivial for an attacker to generate an infinite sequence of valid blocks in which he is the solo participant and is also the winner. Since the chain is ordered by maximum burn, this makes any double spend profitable because he can simply dump a massive pile of finney blocks on the fork containing his double spend. Using block timestamps to discard quickly submitted blocks is not a viable solution, since timestamps in a p2p system are unreliable.

The key distinction from PoW is that the PoB variant you described can be spent in more than one chain. This is the "nothing at stake" problem of PoS as well. To address this weakness, the PoS algorithms attempt to penalize applying stake (mining power) to more than one prospective chain and/or to the orphaned chain(s).

Another key distinction is you've assumed the randomness (entropy) of PoB is fully preimaged so that the attacker can set up his coins to burn such that he can burn on every block of his secret chain. PoS algorithms attempt to make the entropy larger than what could be practically computed to find the prerequisite preimage.

The popular counter-argument that "it costs more to attack than to participate in the security" is flawed.

As I was explaining in the "block lattice" thread (RaiBlocks) yesterday, if a resource is not irreversibly burned as proof of the longest chain, then the only possible objectivity is the "weak subjectivity" of social memory of historical consensus. In the long-term, the memory of (and investment in[1]) the verifiably recorded historical consensus overwhelms any alternative realities that can be conjured from "nothing at stake". In the short-term, arbitrary alternative realities are indistinguishable from reality unless there is an objective measure of the longest chain (with a sufficient penalty for not joining the longest chain to motivate convergence on one chain). In PoW, the short-term objective metric is the probability of double-spend by a given % of total network hashrate.

A non-PoW algorithm could in the short-term use an objective metric of the long-term historical consensus to limit the rate of deviation of the short-term consensus. Think of rolling checkpoints, but applying this inertia to the future as well, analogous to anti-aliasing. There is your strong hint as to what I am doing differently than other attempts to overhaul the block chain consensus algorithm.

[1] Include all the dependent transactions in that history as a social investment that won't be revertible.

3) Making the block reward equal to the burnt amount makes this functionally equivalent to Proof of Stake for the case of the single miner. However, if you don't make the block reward at least equal to the amount burnt, it is not profitable to mine.

You are (perhaps unconsciously?) identifying a more significant economic fact: there is no way to secure a block chain without centralization due to power law distribution of wealth coupled with the Iron Law of Political Economics when any resource is involved in the objectivity of the consensus. With inertia as the objectivity, I think it will be much more difficult to centralize the block chain.

Bitcoin is being raped TO DEATH by disproportionate cost of security (investor's money is being siphoned off to the electric utilities):

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/bitcoin-is-unsustainable

“a single Bitcoin transaction uses roughly enough electricity to power 1.57 American households for a day”

That electricity consumption cost per transaction will decrease as TX/s scaling increases, but currently the only way to do that is to drive centralization of mining (whether it be larger blocks or even Lightening Networks will be large corporate servers doing the glue between user level channels). But centralization is economically inevitable in Bitcoin any way...

Bitcoin pays about 1.35 million BTC to mining annually and consumes roughly 365 x 24 x 250,000 kWh annually. Thus roughly 1600 kWh per BTC in electricity cost. Thus Bitcoin mining is marginally profitable up to nearly 20 cents per kWh ($320 per BTC), which is roughly the marginal rate for residential electricity.

Yet mining farms locate where they can get subsidized water dam generated electricity for as low as 4 cents per kWh, thus $64 per BTC.

But the above assumes that all miners have the same electrical efficiency, which is not the case. Thus the mining farms are mining BTC at probably less than $50 per BTC (not counting hardware amortization).

http://www.neucoin.org/en/whitepaper/download#page=10

Quote
As a result, slowly but surely from 2010 through mid-2013, but after that in a landslide,
hobbyist and small-scale miners have gotten knocked out of business. It’s a very simple
dynamic. When a miner with access to capital enjoys lower overall costs than the competition,
he simply buys more computer power, driving up the difficulty of earning mining rewards,
and knocking the least efficient competitors out of business. Lower costs can either take the
form of lower cost hash rate or lower cost electricity. Bitcoin mining is rapidly becoming
controlled by a handful of companies with tens of millions of dollars of the most efficient
ASICs11, operating from facilities with the very lowest electricity and cooling costs on the
planet (e.g. Iceland and northern Sweden).

The point being that Bitcoin mining is economically driven to be controlled by those who have the highest economies-of-scale and are beholden to the governments which regulate utilities and subsidize cheap electricity with massive infrastructure spending with public debt.

Thus Bitcoin's mining is in effect controlled by the (oligarchy which controls the) governments, and this will become more evident over time.

Ditto PoS mining redistributes the coins over time to the largest stakeholders.

But the main point that makes PoB less a "rich get richer" game for me is that in most actual PoS systems there is practically no risk when "forging" or "staking", because you can retire the coins when you want, for example if you think price is about to fall. So "rich get richer" without risk. In PoB systems like Slimcoin, burning large amounts of currency is equivalent to a "locked" deposit of several months, that means you always are at risk to lose value in bear markets. So PoB is, in terms of risk, roughly equivalent to a PoS system with long-term security deposits like proposed by Vitalik Buterin and others.

If it becomes a widely used liquid currency, exchange volatility is minimized, so then the risk argument fades away.

In the nascent stage, what you are saying is that proof-of-deposit-at-risk coins that don't have very favorable risk will have very low security.
4193  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Nothing-at-Stake & Long Range Attack on Proof-of-Stake (Consensus Research) on: November 15, 2015, 07:10:02 PM
so in several blocks you spread out your orders to sell 15% of the currency. Well I am no rocket scientist, but I would think that still you would run into some liquidity issues. Actually it might create more of a panic. Imagine a 100,000 BTC sell order, then another, then another, then another, .... That would probably be more panic creating than a single million BTC sell order.

And by selling the coins, your entire attack is based on the false chain you cleverly made so you get one shot to make it pay off.

so this magical instant selling is to me nonviable, which means the N@S will cost you the amount to acquire the stake, so a lot at stake.

I hope James saw the following comments pointing out that shorting is a means to profit from the destruction of a currency as alternative to needing to sell or double-spend:

So it I understand this correctly an attacker could borrow rather than buy say 10% of the target POS coin. This could be done for example using a pirateat40 type scheme. Sell half of the borrowed POS coins short, and use the remaining 5% of the borrowed coins to launch the attack. This would cause the price of the coin to collapse creating massive profits for our short seller / attacker.

Your assumption ignores the possibility of profits from shorting a currency, large bets, or eventual gains from investments in other currencies when the competition is removed.

Simply dumping a large stake on an illiquid market isn't as profitable as repeatedly manipulating the market and taking profits in another currency before taking one large exit with a leveraged short that is assured when one performs a 51% attack.
4194  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 15, 2015, 04:02:39 PM
Does anyone have an opinion on which is better for a dedicated server host?

Hivelocity
Codero

Or any other suggestions? I am looking at (to start with) a E3-1230 v3, 16GB, dual s/w RAID 1 SSDs running Node.js as the web server.

On Hivelocity, I figure I can write frequent backups over the 1 Gbps private VLAN to the server mountable CloudStorage, in addition to the RAID 1 redundancy.

I have some tricks to maximize SSD performance and to track changes more efficiently because I am writing everything to files (absolutely no LAMP!) and always extending the file (with periodic batch file "defrag").

The two hosts above seem to be roughly the same price, but Codero includes the "Essential Management" service at no charge and Hivelocity requires cPanel to be bundled with management, but it seems these standardized LAMP monitoring solutions aren't going to restart Node.js if it crashes. Hivelocity provides the superior Intel data center SSDs (Codero the inferior Samsung 840):

http://www.storagereview.com/intel_ssd_dc_s3500_enterprise_review

Hivelocity seems to more completely detail their data center and Tier 1 connectivity.

I am a bit perplexed about server monitoring, as I've never done it before. Do I have to stand by my mobile phone 24 x 7? (Good luck with that, when I haven't taken a shower in a monthtwo months, haven't opened my email in a month, and my mobile phone is under the seat in my car and check it once a week!) Aren't there any third party 24 x 7 services which can do customized monitoring for a Node.js set up?

Hivelocity allows you to buy down a server's monthly price by up to 35% for $500 per $50 buy down. I wouldn't do that until I was sure the project was scaling as hoped.

I am leaning towards Hivelocity, because they appear to be a more contained unit whereas Codero appears to have grand aspirations of competing with Amazon AWS:

http://www.codero.com/blog/cloudopoly-why-we-need-an-alternative-to-aws/

Edit: I also looked at VPS offerings with SSD such as Host9, but it doesn't seem to make sense to attempt to save $70 a month but have much less precise baseline to compare resource utilization when deciding what to scale up to next. VPS resources seem to be somewhat nebulously specified.

Edit#2: I run a Ubuntu derivative on my desktop (in addition to an old Windoze XP machine), but seems CentOS is the standard for dedicated servers. I've read up on this, and so unless you can say something I didn't likely already read, then no need to comment about which OS is better. I figure it doesn't really matter much in general. I just know I don't want cPanel because it doesn't interopt well with manual edits to configuration files.

Edit#3: also Hivelocity has some moderate-level DoS protection service, but it is quite expensive and DoS is most effectively squelched with decentralization by not giving attackers only one NOC to attack and then using clever filtering strategies that minimize resource usage:

4195  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin? on: November 15, 2015, 01:48:11 AM
Programming now hoping to launch next week or so.

You will be able to join easy-as-pie with an email address and choosing a password. No balances stored on the servers, thus you and only you control your funds.

Once again this is not targeted to investors. You will soon understand.

Haters prepare to be taught a lesson in marketing and efficiency.
4196  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Protection against botnet DDoS of invalid (signature or otherwise) transactions? on: November 14, 2015, 04:36:17 PM
Thus I raised the issue that as TX/s scale, then probability of banning an innocent user by IP address increases. I am questioning whether banning by IP address is a robust DDoS defense at-scale.

At the generative essence conceptualization, doing any functionality by IP address breaks the fundamental end-to-end principle of the internet.

For example, banning by IP address is incongruent with anonymity mixnets such as Tor.
4197  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Block lattice on: November 14, 2015, 11:59:37 AM
The record of who are the majority throughout the history of time must be recorded in the history of the consensus, otherwise there is no consensus about what the majority was and thus what it is now.

That's not correct, the consensus now is all that matters.  For instance as humans we don't have a record of all governments and all decisions going back to the beginning of time yet we have a consensus about what we agree to at this moment.  A historical record can be interesting but the only thing that matters is consensus at this current point in time, only historians care about anything else and currency isn't about a history lesson.

Perhaps you missed the fact that I already stated that without recording of the voting, there is no way to know when "now" is as it pertains to confirmation of consensus being attained. How is the payee supposed to know when to trust the payment and release the goods or services?


Without recording the voting, the confirmation of a transaction is unknown (nebulous).



For example, if someone controlled sufficient coins in the past (greater than the number of coins that were locked for voting in the current public consensus history), they could erase the entire history from that point,

This seems to be erroneous.  Historical consensus cannot override contemporary consensus, contemporary consensus is the only thing that matters with RaiBlocks.  The only way to erase history is for the current consensus to flip blocks a.k.a. a true, >50% attack.

This is because you have no objective means of determining which set of "now" is the reality. Thus you assume that the online nodes will just magically agree on the "now" they all have. The fact that you can't see that you've failed to even define the way the majority chain is objectively determined, should be indicative of that you are not sufficiently knowledgeable to design a new block chain paradigm.

Two or more errors don't make it correct. You can state that your system flies to the moon and if that assumption is based on foundational errors then no one can disprove your claim. The proof will come in the fantastic devolution of your system in the wild.

Also you seem to have lost the point that if the historical coins locked was only 1% of the coin supply, then only 1.1% of the coin supply would need to be retroactively locked to rewrite history in the lack of durable objectivity in your system.

I am not going to go back and forth with you on the comedy of errors. It is a pointless waste of my scarce time.


by publishing a new block for their historical UTXO (even if they historically spent them subsequent to the historical block where they were UTXO) locking their coins for voting and then voting to make their revision of history the dominant majority.

This is describing a >50% attack, all cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to this though RaiBlocks give a stronger guarantee.  With RaiBlocks >50% of the MARKET CAP needs to vote to flip, with PoW only 50% of the mining strength needs to flip.  If you look at BitCoin's market cap of ~4billion, and ask: could you gain majority mining power with ~2 billion in mining hardware?  Absolutely.  PoW is a weaker guarantee.

Logic fail. You are assuming every coin is locked so every coin votes, which means no coins can be transacted. Duh.

, if you don't store the history then there is no way for a node which is not omniscient to know what the objective consensus is without invoking trust (and decentralized currency must be trustless else it devolves in numerous ways to centralized currency).

That's true, in fact most people who use bitcoin are invoking trust because they trust the wallet they're using to correctly evaluate which chain has the highest block work and not log the password to their private keys.

You habitually conflate orthogonal concepts.

Even if the vast majority of users do not run full nodes, the security of Bitcoin is still based on the objectivity of the full nodes, which your design does not possess.

Assuming you work out how to penalize short-term adversarial activity (and not just rely on the non-quantitative game theory myopia that adversaries won't be self-interested because they devalue the coin and thus their holdings in the coin)

You're stating this is myopic but this is the exact rhetoric people use when rebutting against why miners wouldn't start mining forks in to BitCoin.  Destroying the protocol destroys future profit in the protocol hence it's in the miner's and voter's best interest to come to consensus instead of creating volatility.  This seems to be a fundamentally flawed application of game theory.

The astute people such as Gregory Maxwell understand how critical it is that no party has 51% or even 25% of the network hashrate. Do not let what fools write misdirect you on the objectivity of Bitcoin.
4198  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Block lattice on: November 14, 2015, 11:06:27 AM
design—for Byzantine fault tolerant consensus

There is no such thing as Byzantine fault tolerance since the byzantine problem is stated in terms of separation of communication a.k.a. network partitioning.  Only after partitions have been merged can a final conclusion be reached for instance bitcoin isn't tolerant against partitioning since if the network was partitioned and each separate segment was generate separate block chains, a conclusion as to which is the longest couldn't be reached until the partitions were merged and the results compared, hence it would no longer by a byzantine problem.  Please read up more on the topic before commenting on them.

Do NOT again write an absurd condescending remark that assumes I hadn't yet researched the fundamental concepts.

Try to remain respectful please (and leave the ad hominem diarrhea aside) as we had been up thread.

I have no idea what rational basis you have told yourself to justify assuming I don't understand the definition of Byzantine fault tolerance. How could I possibly be commenting with so much technical knowledge in your thread if I hadn't yet researched the fundamental concepts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault_tolerance

Quote
Byzantine fault
 Any fault presenting different symptoms to different observers
Byzantine failure
 The loss of a system service due to a Byzantine fault in systems that require consensus

Your understanding of Byzantine fault tolerance is incorrect. Per the definition above, Bitcoin delivers the same expectations (symptoms) for CAP (consistency, access, and partition tolerance) to all observers which are participants in the longest chain partition. The probability of a failure decreases probabilistically over time as the number of confirmations on the longest chain increases. There are degenerate cases such as the 51% attack where Byzantine failure occurs.

Note the double-spending on a minority chain is not a Byzantine failure, because by definition the minority chain is invalid.

There is no such thing as absolute anything in the universe, thus arguing that Byzantine fault tolerance is not universal is a vacuous assertion. Byzantine fault tolerance is defined for a system and the defined objectivity of the system, not for universal absolutism.

, so I have now expended the time to research, think, and hopefully correctly define it.  Your design's frame-of-reference for Byzantine fault tolerant consensus is majority of the vote by the "voters" which have locked a suitable amount of coins (value). We must determine the (game theory) objectivity of this frame-of-reference and the impacts within the CAP theorem.

Again, the CAP theorem states that all three states cannot simultaneously be achieved so by the nature that RaiBlocks, in addition to any crypto currency, does not claim it can operate while partitioned, this means at most we're claiming 2 out of 3 which by definition satisfies the CAP theorem and no cryptocurrency out there is violating it.  Please read more before commenting.

This ad hominem noise again.

Yet another vacuous argument demonstrating that you do not understand that Bitcoin is partition tolerant within its Byzantine fault tolerant objectivity. Byzantine fault tolerance doesn't mean that CAP has to be fulfilled for those observers who are ignoring the longest chain rule or who are unwilling to accept the probabilitistic nature of the expectations (and thus the fault tolerance). Within Bitcoin's objectivity of the longest chain, all three of the CAP attributes are attained. And my criticisms of your design are about its ill-defined objectivity.

The continuous citation of the CAP theorem is ridiculous.  BitCoin does not have partition tolerance according to the cap theorem "the system continues to operate despite arbitrary partitioning due to network failures"  BitCoin does not operate in the presence of arbitrary network failures, this it categorically wrong.  No cryptocurrency can operate while partitioned, they can recover from partitions but they cannot operate while partitioned.  CAP does not apply to any cryptocurrency ever, repeating it at all is absolutely absurd.

Bitcoin does "continue to operate despite arbitrary partitioning due to network failures".

Again you conflate the double-spend on a forked network in your mind a claimed refutation of CAP, because you assume CAP is only useful in an absolute frame-of-reference. But absolute frames-of-reference do not exist in the universe. And this shows you do not understand the definition of "Byzantine fault tolerance", because it only applies to the nodes on each of the forked networks as to whether the objectivity of the system has remained intact and the nodes can continue to operate within that defined objectivity.

Essentially what you are trying to say with your design and your arguments in this thread, is there is no possible objective frame-of-reference, because there never can exist an absolute one. You conflate absolutism with relative objectivity (which btw is all we have in our universe, because nothing is absolute).

At least Bitcoin achieves CAP up to the limitation that networking partitioning can fork the Bitcoin network and the participants on each fork can continue to operate. Whereas, your design doesn't even achieve assurances of objectivity even without network partitioning.

I do not appreciate your ad hominem accusations claiming/implying that I am generally not correct in my logic because it is another attack on my person instead of refuting a stated technical issue. (Nothwithstanding that my logic is correct and you are not skillful enough to discern it yet)

Also you conflate a) refuting a stated fact; with b) making a statement about a person's need to read before commenting. The former is not ad hominem, the latter is ad hominem. Period.

Edit: also you are assuming CAP only applies to the physical network partitioning, but it also applies to logical partitioning. Bitcoin is resilient to logical partitions (forks) because of the longest chain rule. Your design is not analogously resilient, which monsterer and I have explained.
4199  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Digital Credits seeks suggestions on burn targets from you! (Burn Details Here) on: November 14, 2015, 10:51:28 AM
Touché. Agreed.  Wink
4200  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Altcoin Discussion / Re: Block lattice on: November 14, 2015, 10:40:01 AM
afaics you have not definitively stated the frame-of-reference—employed by your ("every UTXO output has its own block chain")

Those words are in quotes though it is not factually a quotation.

Perhaps American English is not your native language? I did not quote you. If I did, I would have used the normal forum quoting as I always do. Placing a phrase between double quotes can also mean that the quoted description is an example of how someone might say it (not specifically any person, since the quote was not attributed to any person)

According to the writer's handbook https://writing.wisc.edu/Handbook/QPA_quoting.html  Quotations are literal quotations and should cite references, Adding Clarification, Comment, or Correction requires square brackets around what you're modifying.

http://www.apastyle.org/learn/faqs/use-double-quotes.aspx

Quote
Observe the following guidelines for uses of double quotation marks other than in material quoted directly from a source.
to introduce a word or phrase used as an ironic comment, as slang, or as an invented or coined expression. Use quotation marks the first time the word or phrase is used

http://www.scribendi.com/advice/when_to_use_double_or_single_quotation_marks.en.html

Quote
n much specialist writing, including linguistics, philosophy, and theology, terms with particular meanings that are unique to that subject are often enclosed in single quotation mark



I'm sure you'll have no problem writing up another post Wink

I warned you not to write condescendingly to me again. Now I will more forcefully state the facts.

I can see I am dealing with a pedantic Dunning-Kruger jackass who has too limited understanding of the technical field to discern technobabble from expertise.

Arguing with someone who is not knowledgeable enough in the field to know whey are acting as a Dunning-Kruger jackass, ends up being an enormous waste of time and effort for the expert.

When you are ready to come down from your ignorant high horse and learn, let me know.

Note most readers here are not knowledgeable enough to discern that you are not an expert. Thus you can probably convince them to invest in your project. The proof of failure will come down the line. No need for me to educate you beforehand, given your attitude.
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