Thanks for pointing out. I have corrected my post.

While it is true that ledger should have this solution posted in their FAQ, this problem is not related to the nano s itself.
It is a problem with the combination of the nano s and windows.

As far as i know this problem does not occur on linux/mac systems. Only windows is affected.

achow101 already answered your question.

In case you did not found out how to use RPC commands:

• Start the bitcoin daemon (bitcoin -daemon) from command line
• Then use the bitcoin-cli for RPC calls

Command to scan from height X to height Y: bitcoin-cli rescanblockchain X Y
Both arguments (start-/stop height) are optional.

The documentation (with examples) can be found here.

If this is the first transaction you are receiving, it might be due to your firewall blocking access to the ledger server (to get the current status of your wallet).
If you have already received transactions successfully (and havn't reconfigured your firewall), resetting the application data should do the trick.

If resetting the data doesn't work, try to reinstall the Bitcoin chrome application.

If your transaction does show up in a block explorer as confirmed and the address is the same as generated/shown by your ledger wallet, then your coins have arrived.
You don't have to worry in this case. Its mostly just a display-/connection issue.

As TryNinja and i have already mentioned, this might be due to the wrong derivation path.
Which derivation path did you use when importing your seed into another wallet/online tool?


Correct derivation path for segwit is:

Did you actually check the device manager if one USB-device has a yellow explaination mark beside it?
If so, you simply need to open the properties and 'install the driver' (windows USB-driver; should be done automatically by windows).

If this is not the case: Are you able to access the ledger manager? Or is your nano s completely stuck?


If you really need to access your funds asap, you can simply import your seed into another wallet (e.g. electrum [1]).
But consider your seed as compromised from this moment on. When moving your funds back to the ledger, you should create a new seed.


[1] https://electrum.org/#home

Not at all.
A hardware wallet is NOT simply an encrypted storage for your private keys.

A hardware wallet lets you access your private keys within an 'airgapped' environment.
You can use it even on an infected pc, without your private keys getting compromised.
It is made for secured storage AND convinient daily usage.


An encrypted USB on the other hand can only store your private keys encrypted.
And the moment you plug it into an pc which might be compromised and decrypt it, your private keys are exposed to theft.

While an encrypted thumb drive is a good way to store a backup (additional backup; not as the only backup) it is not comparable to a hardware wallet at all.

What did you do with your passphrase?

If you have encrypted a wallet-file, you need this exact file to decrypt it (to be able to access your private keys).
If you have used your passphrase as a brain wallet, you need to hash your passphrase: sha256(your_passphrase).
If you were using an online wallet, you need your identifier or email and your passphrase to access it.

What wallet were you using? Did you use a HD wallet? Were you told to write down a 12/18/24 word seed? If so, do you still have it?
Your seed (if you have one) can be used to generate all of your private keys (without the need of the passphrase).

Your problem sounds strange.
Are you sure you were using segwit (Address starting with 3.. or bc1..)?

If yes, the most plausible option probably is that you have mistyped one word?
There are quite some words which are almost identical.

You might try out (even if you think your seed is correct) the seedrecovery.py from btcrecover on github to check your seed for misstyped words.

While it may sound odd to you, the chance still exist you have misswrote a word. I guess its worth trying.

If you have problems with the syntax of seedrecovery, feel free to ask.

Theoretically it does not return, because 'the coins' never left the wallet.




Nothing stays in 'limbo'. There is no 'limbo'.
The inputs of unconfirmed transactions did never 'leave' the wallet and can be used in another transaction.
The problem is just that quite a few nodes do not relay conflicting transactions.
But with the Replace-By-Fee tag, this can be 'bypassed'.

Miners can have conflicting transactions in their mempool. They just can't (or better: are not allowed to) include both of them into a block.
If they do, the block is considered as invalid from the whole network.

Connection to more peers won't help in syncing the blockchain.
The speed is mostly limited through CPU and Hard Drive, not amount of connections or internet speed.

A RAID is for redundat storage (done for reliability). It does NOT increase the speed in any way.

Only SSD do give a distinct advantage in speed.

If you are refering to electrum:
Bitcoin core is a full node wallet (does store the whole blockchain).
Electrum is a light-weight wallet (does NOT store the blockchain; it asks an online service to get information about addresses related to your wallet).

So, if the only reason you don't want to use electrum is the sync time, i can soothe you. You just have to download the wallet and start it (takes less than 3 minutes).


Trying out what Sellingaccs suggested is probably the fasted way to access/check your coins.

One does not really 'break' an hashing algorithm. It is more about finding collisions.
While it is true that no collision has been found yet, this does NOT mean this will also be the case in the future.




While it is true that TOR does increase your privacy by routing through several nodes, it is wrong to assume that TOR alone does increase your privacy in such an amount
that you can't be traced anymore. You still can be traced (by powerful authorities) either via compromised exit nodes or meta data.




I'd say hardware and paper wallets both have their pros and cons. Both are definetly a secure way to store coins.
But most hardware wallets do have a PIN which is required to unlock the device.
So, even if a hardware wallet gets stolen this does not mean your coins can be accessed (assuming the paper-backup of a seed does not get stolen).

What exactly are you searching for?
A lot of information can be found on the internet.

Xynerise already has mentioned which information can be obtained from a full node.

But if you are looking for a deeper insight into the privacy of bitcoin you might read this for the pros of core regarding privacy: https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/features/privacy.
Or this as a general article about privacy/anonymity of bitcoin: https://www.coindesk.com/anonymous-bitcoin-backgrounder-policymakers/

This should be the answer to OP's problem.
You can read about the importprivkey function here: https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-reference#importprivkey



[EDITED]

To convert your priv key into the Wallet Import Format do the following:

• Convert the priv key to a byte string using Base58Check encoding
• Drop the last 4 checksum bytes from the byte string
• Drop the first byte (it should be 0x80). If the private key corresponded to a compressed (started with K.. or [/tt]L..[/tt]) public key, also drop the last byte (it should be 0x01).

Edit: I have confused converting FROM and TO Wallet Import Format.
This is the correct way to convert into WIF (even though it is not necessary anymore):

• Add a 0x80 byte in front of the private key
• Also add a 0x01 byte at the end if the private key will correspond to a compressed public key
• Calculate the sha256 of the sha256 of this extended key
• Take the first 4 bytes (checksum) and add them to the end
• Convert the result from a byte string into a base58 string using Base58Check encoding

(Still the same) Source: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Wallet_import_format

Anything signed with a private key can be verified with the corresponding public key.
I suggest you read this article about asymmetric cryptography.
This should let you understand the whole private-/public key infrastructure.



You can transfer BTC's from any address to any other address. This does require an on-chain transaction, of course.
Either between online wallets (what your question is) or to any other wallet (e.g. desktop-, mobile-, hardware- or paper wallet).

While it would be (theoretically) possible to run a payment gateway with a light client i would NOT recommend this at all.
When running such a service you don't want to rely on others for correct information.

Its definetely better to run a full node to get 100% correct information .




You can definetely run both on the same server.
Just don't have your wallet files (or any other sensitive information) lying on this server (e.g. private keys, seed, etc.).




This can be done on the same server without problems.

There is no security risk in downloading the whole blockchain (assuming the blockchain file itself is not infected with malware).
It would be a problem if someone would download the chainstate. But the blockchain itself is fine.
Since core does verify the whole blockchain itself it would attract attention if some blocks were incorrect.

Therefore this does not open up a new an additional attack vector.

Since you already imported it into electrum: Which derivation path did you use?
And what kind of addresses did you use? Segwit (starting with 3.. or bc1) or legacy (starting with 1..)?

You might try again to import your seed into electrum choosing the correct derivation path:



If you have used your trezor with segwit address:


If you have used your trezor with legacy address:

It is true that such an attack is really really unprobable.
But i think this does not really always have to be a targeted attack.

IMO there is definetely a possibility of a malware (in this case: virus) which does spread itself onto thumb drives targeting offline storages without being directly targeted.

Sure, this sounds more like paranoia and won't happen to 99.9% of the people, but the possibility does exist (even though a very small chance of happening).