To me everything points to the former, closing registration + extending payout time in a last ditch effort to retain value of the hyper-inflated currency...
Registration is open. Furthermore closing registration is pretty much the very last thing a Ponzi scheme would ever want to do. I think it's great to see the big fish of monero debone his own reputation for this. You get hundreds of thousands of dollars, I get something to point at and laugh. So this is win-win. Almost... He is the big winner if he can cash out. Good guys finish last. Someone wrote today that Ned is raking in $700K per week. |
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iamnotback, before investing your time in this, have you considered the possibility that the devs's ultimate goal is to enrich themselves instead of making steem a success?
To me everything points to the former, closing registration + extending payout time in a last ditch effort to retain value of the hyper-inflated currency...
Of course. Yet there may be something worthy here... but might need to be forked ... not sure yet... |
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I'm not convinced much changes if you divide into N like-minded segments. More relevant ranking results, yes. But still stake-weighting means that the few will have the bulk of the influence.
My prior post Edit means I choose who I want to have influence on me. I can choose which stake I want to follow. Unbounded degrees-of-freedom. TADA! And solves the potential Grassmannian issue also. |
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If the issue is the eventual distribution then the current whales and their stakes don't really matter. Either stake-weighed systems work, or they don't.
... We need a smarter algorithm which can measure like-mindedness so that we can relevant ranking results, not stake game theory wars against the power-law distribution.
Edit: new idea. We don't need to compute the k-clusters. Each user can form their own cluster for their personalized ranking computation based on who they follow. We can introduce some randomization so they can find new people to follow (which somewhat comes from recommendations of whom they already follow). |
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So with a post with less than say 1000+ votes, you should be able to double or more its ranking. Ah, but look, already with the relatively tiny user base the top posts have 500-700 votes. Multiply the user base by 100 and they will have not 500 votes by 50000 votes. Will number of users voting increase faster than number of blog posts? I think it should be the reverse, if people post more than one blog simultaneously (which I assume they eventually will do). The number of people voting will probably increase much more than the number of blog posts in the short term, because the site is currently dominated by active bloggers. Longer term it will probably converge where they increase at a comparable rate. Increasing the number of users dilutes their share of the debasement. It is a zero-sum. Bottom line is the whales must be diluted, but the problem is the power-law distribution will dominate because you can't 100% annual debasement forever. We need a smarter algorithm which can measure like-mindedness so that we can relevant ranking results, not stake game theory wars against the power-law distribution. |
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So with a post with less than say 1000+ votes, you should be able to double or more its ranking. Ah, but look, already with the relatively tiny user base the top posts have 500-700 votes. Multiply the user base by 100 and they will have not 500 votes by 50000 votes. Will number of users voting increase faster than number of blog posts? I think it should be the reverse, if people post more than one blog simultaneously (which I assume they eventually will do). |
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When there are 100x as many users voting on posts, the influence of whales will decline by at least 10x.
Smooth what happened to your math skills  If you have a million SP, then it requires 100,000 free signup users (10 SP each) to match your voting power. If you argue there are 10,000 users with 1000 SP each, then it requires 10% (1000) of them (voting on the same post) to match your voting power. So with a post with less than say 1000+ votes, you should be able to double or more its ranking. Actually quadruple or more, because of the total being squared (quadratic not linear). (I am not saying you personally are benevolent of course) |
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Dump the pegged asset STEEM DOLLAR. It is entirely unneeded for where we are headed...
If we don't get users to use STEEM POWER as their unit-of-account, then the entire concept is DOA.
The hard part is getting out   |
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When there are more users whales won't be able to get anyone near the front page.
Fact is if 80% of the stake votes together, they can influence which content goes on the front page. You presume all whales are benevolent. Stake will eventually end up in a power-law distribution, because perpetual 100% debasement is not sustainable (even the transactions fees of the entire earth could not support it).
but the more you divide things up into more pieces, the more likely it is that the number of whales present in any given segment will be zero.
Hypothetically the solution is to divvy up by like-mindedness, so that no group can collude to control all the rankings. With k-means, it is impossible (unless you can somehow game the algorithm by splitting up your accounts) to have your voting power in more than one of the k clusters simultaneously. I do worry though that the power-law distribution will always find a way to win. Even if we allow users to control their own clusters (e.g. via a Follow button), the power-law distribution may influence which users they are exposed to. I'd suggest adding some randomization. |
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Whales will become totally irrelevant when the user base and posting volume increases by 10x or 100x or even 1000x. There just aren't that many whales and whales have the same voting power restrictions as anyone else. A rare whale sighting will be a big deal.
You presume all whales are benevolent. Stake will eventually end up in a power-law distribution, because perpetual 100% debasement is not sustainable (even the transactions fees of the entire earth could not support it). Also it is incorrect to say they play by the same rules. 3 x 3 = 9 is not 1/2 of 6 x 6 = 36. Any way, I have proposed a partial solution. By voting power I was referring to the declining weight according to frequency of votes placed. Just like anyone else, whales can only make about 40 votes per day without depleting their voting power. So with millions of posts and comments and a handful of whales making at most 40 votes per day each, do the math. But those 40 (times many whales) are enough to influence (with quadratic weighting) the Top 100+ ranked posts on the site which earn perhaps 90% of the rewards. I have an idea to add the recent blogging rewards as a significant component of voting power. Those who are generating good content should have more weight even if their stake hasn't accumulated yet. It would be more dynamic. We can't assume whales are benevolent any way, so we need to have game theory that won't allow whales to increase their percentage of stake via voting. |
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My analysis thus far: So far, the most significant flaws I observe thus far in Steem are: - There is too much selling pressure because users get paid 50% of blogging rewards in STEEM (and miners/liquidity providers) which can be cashed out immediately, and this amounts to > 50% debasement per year that can be sold. The users who are coming to earn money because they need or want money, so they are likely to cash out as much as they can. If rewards were predominately paid in STEEM POWER which has a 1 year weighted average divestment schedule (2 years total), then users might be less incentivized to signup?
- The dysfunctional voting+ranking system and the whales having too much influence needs overhaul, but at least this is probably doable. However there is a tension between the promotional hype value of very high rewards (that motivate users to join) and fairer distribution of rewards.
- Eternal 100% debasement is not sustainable. The debasement rate should be supported by actual transaction fees and drop to that level at some point.
- The 80-90% "pre"-mine is resented by many potential investors who could otherwise be supporting the funding model while transactions are given time to be developed and ramp up. Note that new signups need to have some tokens, else they have no stake-weight to even post or get started with. Perhaps we could use UNPROFITABLE proof-of-work mining instead to get them enough tokens to get rolling in a decentralized paradigm?
- Nothing is incentivizing transfers other than cashing out. I have a radical proposal in mind to improve this.
Whales will become totally irrelevant when the user base and posting volume increases by 10x or 100x or even 1000x. There just aren't that many whales and whales have the same voting power restrictions as anyone else. A rare whale sighting will be a big deal.
You presume all whales are benevolent. Stake will eventually end up in a power-law distribution, because perpetual 100% debasement is not sustainable (even the transactions fees of the entire earth could not support it). Also it is incorrect to say they play by the same rules. 3 x 3 = 9 is not 1/2 of 6 x 6 = 36. Any way, I have proposed a partial solution. |
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My analysis thus far: So far, the most significant flaws I observe thus far in Steem are: - There is too much selling pressure because users get paid 50% of blogging rewards in STEEM (and miners/liquidity providers) which can be cashed out immediately, and this amounts to > 50% debasement per year that can be sold. The users who are coming to earn money because they need or want money, so they are likely to cash out as much as they can. If rewards were predominately paid in STEEM POWER which has a 1 year weighted average divestment schedule (2 years total), then users might be less incentivized to signup?
- The dysfunctional voting+ranking system and the whales having too much influence needs overhaul, but at least this is probably doable. However there is a tension between the promotional hype value of very high rewards (that motivate users to join) and fairer distribution of rewards.
- Eternal 100% debasement is not sustainable. The debasement rate should be supported by actual transaction fees and drop to that level at some point.
- The 80-90% "pre"-mine is resented by many potential investors who could otherwise be supporting the funding model while transactions are given time to be developed and ramp up. Note that new signups need to have some tokens, else they have no stake-weight to even post or get started with. Perhaps we could use UNPROFITABLE proof-of-work mining instead to get them enough tokens to get rolling in a decentralized paradigm?
- Nothing is incentivizing transfers other than cashing out. I have a radical proposal in mind to improve this.
Whales will become totally irrelevant when the user base and posting volume increases by 10x or 100x or even 1000x. There just aren't that many whales and whales have the same voting power restrictions as anyone else. A rare whale sighting will be a big deal.
You presume all whales are benevolent. Stake will eventually end up in a power-law distribution, because perpetual 100% debasement is not sustainable (even the transactions fees of the entire earth could not support it). Also it is incorrect to say they play by the same rules. 3 x 3 = 9 is not 1/2 of 6 x 6 = 36. Any way, I have proposed a partial solution. |
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Whales will become totally irrelevant when the user base and posting volume increases by 10x or 100x or even 1000x. There just aren't that many whales and whales have the same voting power restrictions as anyone else. A rare whale sighting will be a big deal.
You presume all whales are benevolent. Stake will eventually end up in a power-law distribution, because perpetual 100% debasement is not sustainable (even the transactions fees of the entire earth could not support it). Also it is incorrect to say they play by the same rules. 3 x 3 = 9 is not 1/2 of 6 x 6 = 36. Any way, I have proposed a partial solution. |
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So far, the most significant flaws I observe thus far in Steem are: - There is too much selling pressure because users get paid 50% of blogging rewards in STEEM (and miners/liquidity providers) which can be cashed out immediately, and this amounts to > 50% debasement per year that can be sold. The users who are coming to earn money because they need or want money, so they are likely to cash out as much as they can. If rewards were predominately paid in STEEM POWER which has a 1 year weighted average divestment schedule (2 years total), then users might be less incentivized to signup?
- The dysfunctional voting+ranking system and the whales having too much influence needs overhaul, but at least this is probably doable. However there is a tension between the promotional hype value of very high rewards (that motivate users to join) and fairer distribution of rewards.
- Eternal 100% debasement is not sustainable. The debasement rate should be supported by actual transaction fees and drop to that level at some point.
- The 80-90% "pre"-mine is resented by many potential investors who could otherwise be supporting the funding model while transactions are given time to be developed and ramp up. Note that new signups need to have some tokens, else they have no stake-weight to even post or get started with. Perhaps we could use UNPROFITABLE proof-of-work mining instead to get them enough tokens to get rolling in a decentralized paradigm?
- Nothing is incentivizing transfers other than cashing out. I have a radical proposal in mind to improve this.
That frees up $95,040 a day. What would be a better use of this money?
Leave it unallocated at least until it is determined that some sort of replacement liquidity incentives aren't needed. Lack of liquidity is potentially a catastrophic problem in this system, with most of the supply locked up tight, and the pegged asset requiring high liquidity to serve its purpose (being convertible in practice at close to the pegged price). If replacement liquidity incentives are needed then my vote goes to elected liquidity providers at this point (who would be charged not only with providing general and useful liquidity but also explicitly spending their allocated funds to help maintain the peg). I don't know of a good structure for autonomous liquidity incentives. Dump the pegged asset STEEM DOLLAR. It is entirely unneeded for where we are headed... If we don't get users to use STEEM POWER as their unit-of-account, then the entire concept is DOA. |
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I wrote about the password security issue upthread and this adds to the discussion: https://steemit.com/steemit/@steemitblog/steemit-to-update-password-policyDeferring to LastPass will not be popular and will radically increase the attrition rate of people who abandon at the signup stage. We don't want to be storing the user's private key(s) on the server, because the hackers will be incentivized to hack the server and get all the users' private keys. The best solution I can think of is to save the private key on the user's device and keep a copy in cold storage. If the user loses their copy of the private key file, they can then go through a process to get a copy out of cold storage. For example, they could pay something and provide KYC documentation perhaps both scanned and in videochat. Users with large balances would be encouraged to adopt a hardware wallet. |
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He did what any rational person would do if the potential for $4 million was laid out in front of you.
You also need to consider that he holds a delegate spot, which is worth $4,800 per day or $1,752,000 per year. Call me crazy, but he is being overpaid by a lot. I would do it for less than 10% of that in a heart beat. There is no way each delegate is bringing that much value. Lol. I don't know how stakeholders aren't raising a big fuss about this. I guess everyone doesn't want to miss out on up votes from a whale because they spoke up about it. Delegates are whales. Just add it to the laundry list of how unfair Steemit is. So you understand why I am contemplating forking it (but the source doesn't allow forking so we have to start from scratch). But the devil is in the details. There is a massive amount of work to do to duplicate and exceed what they already have. I am busy analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. Also analyzing if the concept is even worthwhile. Golden Rule: never rewrite a project from scratch unless it is unsalvageable. |
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Steem will generate no revenue in 2016 and have MUCH higher expenses than Reddit because it's paying users for content.
Incorrect. I added the following to my blog post to explain it: Steem is generating revenue for STEEM POWER investors taken from those who hold STEEM instead of STEEM POWER. We need to upgrade our conceptualization of revenue. Revenue is any gain in value not paid by the long-term investors! It is actually quite a clever paradigm-shift innovation on the definition of a revenue generating investment.
Yes but as I said, The minute speculators stop buying Steem it may collapse because there is no business model or revenue source only the hope speculators will value a site attracting users and not use common sense. So you're just relying on a greater fool/speculator buying Steem to support those expenses because there is no actual underlying business model or revenue source. Not if they can generate significant transaction volume. Please read the rest of section that I linked you to. Whereas, STEEM holders are paid nothing while the total supply of tokens is debased by 100% annually. Thus, STEEM holders lose 0.19% per day³, 1.34% per week, and 50% per year of the total Steem market capitalization. https://poloniex.com/lending#BTCWhy do you think borrowers on Polo are rarely willing to pay >0.02% a day to borrow? (Because there's very few investments speculators confidently think can consistenly outperform that borrowing rate.) Yet you're expecting a greater fool to continue buying Steem even though there is no revenue or business model and at a daily cost of >0.1%... Unfortunately once speculators start to look into it more I think you will find demand for Steem drying up. You didn't even read carefully my blog post which I told you refutes your points: https://steemit.com/steemit/@anonymint/it-s-so-easy-to-become-a-millionaire-with-steemThose holding STEEM (and not STEEM POWER) are doing it for short-term price speculation. They are diluted every block, thus providing the funding and cash flow. The others who MUST hold STEEM are those who need to transact in STEEM. Again while holding STEEM (even for short periods of time), they are diluted every block, thus providing the funding and cash flow. Please don't make me repeat the same point 4 times. |
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