the most important part of the paper is this:
Money supply
With pure Proof of Stake cryptocurrencies, distributing the coins to the interested parties in fair manner is
less straightforward than with PoW cryptocurrencies. For example, it is informative to observe the hardships
that Ripple runs into as it handles the initial distribution of its built-in coin [38].
With PoA, we have the bene t of the PoW aspect that is incorporated into the system, which can be
used for handling the initial distribution of the coins. However, if the PoA protocol speci es that the block
reward subsidy is divided about equally between the miner and the N lucky stakeholders, starting from the
genesis block, then this is likely to enable the rich to get richer in an unfair manner. One alternative is to
use a pure PoW protocol until the fi rst block reward halving after 4 years, and only then roll out the full
PoA scheme. Another alternative is to always give the entire reward subsidy to the PoW miner who solved
the block, and share the transaction fees between this miner and the N lucky stakeholders. This may imply
that users will have to pay nontrivial transaction fees starting from the genesis block, in order to incentivize
stakeholders to run full online nodes. However, it is reasonable to expect that the fees paid to stakeholders
would not be excessive. This should mean that the added incentive to hoard will be small, i.e. the fees can
be a nice added bonus if the stakeholder wishes to save the coins anyway, but if she has alternative uses for
the wealth then these fees will not be enough to make her hold.
The apportionment can be speci ed according to certain constants. The portion that goes to the Nth
stakeholder should be relatively big, unless perhaps if all the N lucky stakeholders must maintain the UTXO
set (see Section 3.2.2). E.g., with N = 3 the protocol can dictate that 1/2 of the reward goes the miner, 1/4
goes to the 3rd stakeholder, and 1/8 goes to each of the two other stakeholders. The apportionment can also
be dynamic, in accordance with Section 3.2.1.
to the core devs: you have an issue with the amount of full nodes and you have an issue with the centralization of hash power by pool mining. the network is one of the most essential part of Bitcoin like a payment backbone of other instituations.
this proposal could be a solution for the issues. act now!
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