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Proof of Activity: Extending Bitcoin’s Proof of Work via Proof of Stake
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/452.pdf
No, no, no, no.http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/452.pdf
PoS is a great way to shell out lots of coins to those who already have lots of coins, or the world's greatest pre-mine scamming system ever.
Sure, it may eliminate PoW issues, but giving out the coins is far worse than mining them at a high difficulty. I'd rather have the community mine then have them sit there and collect coins for no reason. And, guess what! Few coins with PoS have been very successful in terms of adoption...
PoA is not PoS. read the paper. Activity (run a full node) is the matter for which the full node receive a portion of the reward sometimes. not only the strongest ones also the not so strongest ones. and this will help to develop the network of full nodes. otherwise it will turn to centralization in the next time because there is no incentive to run a full node with little hash power. little hash power will go into pools as the situation is since years. it is time to change the minting process. now!
Quote
Money supply
With pure Proof of Stake cryptocurrencies, distributing the coins to the interested parties in fair manner is
less straightforward than with PoW cryptocurrencies. For example, it is informative to observe the hardships
that Ripple runs into as it handles the initial distribution of its built-in coin [38].
With PoA, we have the bene t of the PoW aspect that is incorporated into the system, which can be
used for handling the initial distribution of the coins. However, if the PoA protocol speci es that the block
reward subsidy is divided about equally between the miner and the N lucky stakeholders, starting from the
genesis block, then this is likely to enable the rich to get richer in an unfair manner. One alternative is to
use a pure PoW protocol until the fi rst block reward halving after 4 years, and only then roll out the full
PoA scheme. Another alternative is to always give the entire reward subsidy to the PoW miner who solved
the block, and share the transaction fees between this miner and the N lucky stakeholders. This may imply
that users will have to pay nontrivial transaction fees starting from the genesis block, in order to incentivize
stakeholders to run full online nodes. However, it is reasonable to expect that the fees paid to stakeholders
would not be excessive. This should mean that the added incentive to hoard will be small, i.e. the fees can
be a nice added bonus if the stakeholder wishes to save the coins anyway, but if she has alternative uses for
the wealth then these fees will not be enough to make her hold.
The apportionment can be speci ed according to certain constants. The portion that goes to the Nth
stakeholder should be relatively big, unless perhaps if all the N lucky stakeholders must maintain the UTXO
set (see Section 3.2.2). E.g., with N = 3 the protocol can dictate that 1/2 of the reward goes the miner, 1/4
goes to the 3rd stakeholder, and 1/8 goes to each of the two other stakeholders. The apportionment can also
be dynamic, in accordance with Section 3.2.1.
With pure Proof of Stake cryptocurrencies, distributing the coins to the interested parties in fair manner is
less straightforward than with PoW cryptocurrencies. For example, it is informative to observe the hardships
that Ripple runs into as it handles the initial distribution of its built-in coin [38].
With PoA, we have the bene t of the PoW aspect that is incorporated into the system, which can be
used for handling the initial distribution of the coins. However, if the PoA protocol speci es that the block
reward subsidy is divided about equally between the miner and the N lucky stakeholders, starting from the
genesis block, then this is likely to enable the rich to get richer in an unfair manner. One alternative is to
use a pure PoW protocol until the fi rst block reward halving after 4 years, and only then roll out the full
PoA scheme. Another alternative is to always give the entire reward subsidy to the PoW miner who solved
the block, and share the transaction fees between this miner and the N lucky stakeholders. This may imply
that users will have to pay nontrivial transaction fees starting from the genesis block, in order to incentivize
stakeholders to run full online nodes. However, it is reasonable to expect that the fees paid to stakeholders
would not be excessive. This should mean that the added incentive to hoard will be small, i.e. the fees can
be a nice added bonus if the stakeholder wishes to save the coins anyway, but if she has alternative uses for
the wealth then these fees will not be enough to make her hold.
The apportionment can be speci ed according to certain constants. The portion that goes to the Nth
stakeholder should be relatively big, unless perhaps if all the N lucky stakeholders must maintain the UTXO
set (see Section 3.2.2). E.g., with N = 3 the protocol can dictate that 1/2 of the reward goes the miner, 1/4
goes to the 3rd stakeholder, and 1/8 goes to each of the two other stakeholders. The apportionment can also
be dynamic, in accordance with Section 3.2.1.
