There is pretty strong evidence that this guy was involved in some theft of BTC. I'm trying to talk to him to make absolutely certain.
Finally I get reason why my mtgox.com account was blocked. anyone can get into situation like mine, when someone sends you stolen BTC, How do I know that BTC was stolen or not? I never said, but I saying now , that I received from that man from IRC only 9000 BTC, in that day when I received BTC rate was about 0.30/BTC, so it's total of ~3000 USD, so it's necessary to block all my money ( all 45 000 USD) ?
I want to forget this situation and save my nerves.
I agree to return that money(3000 USD) to bitcoin member from which was stoled funds, because it's too small amount to waste my and I think mtgox time, or even involve lawyers. I am holding my BTC ( not withdrawing , or exchanging ) to do this, everytime I am ready to send money. I am asking mtgox.com to tell me bitcoin address from witch was stolen money, so I could send it back. Also I suggest adopt some sort of rules that this not happen to others. Also as every website , mtgox.com should have at least some "terms of use" in his website, because he operate with real money, he should explain what realy means "volume" and other terms in his page (it's hard to find out what really stands behind that word, there is nothing like FAQ pages). Mtgox.com must warn about withdrawing/depositing limits. wat |
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In American courts a jury decides what is right and wrong. Right and wrong is based on personal experience. So, FatherMcGruder is right, in my opinion.
MtGox's opinion pretty much represents the opinion of the people on the forums of bitcoin.org.
Juries do not decide right and wrong. They decide guilt or innocence. The law (poorly attempts) to define right and wrong. If members of this forum are going to start deciding the guilt and innocence of various participants in the bitcoin economy and deprive them of their property, based on some discussions on a message board, then we are all in trouble. Whining is wrong and I hereby find you guilty of whining. For your punishment, you get to imagine me playing a tiny violin. |
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That's easy for the individual user (e.g., plankhead), but where do I find plankhead's address?
Cheers,
You ask him. |
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The question isn't so much about righting a wrong, it is about who gets to decide who did what, and what constitutes a wrong. Don't we all have that right? |
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More easily, you could always put your address on your profile page at your social network of choice.
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I have a 460 and get ~70 Mhash/s with Diablo's miner.
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Is it so wrong that any of us should act on our own accord to right a wrong? I don't see it any differently then putting the litter of someone else in the proper receptacle.
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What if the card stores an actual wallet.dat file, and the vendor just loads it into his client to make the transaction? On a separate network, he could rapidly confirm with other vendors that a multi-spend isn't going on. If the vendors' computers could talk, it would go like this in the case of a good transfer: Computer 1: beep boop Hey guys, I have this wallet here with 200BTC, trying to transfer 5BTC. Does that check out?
Other computers: boop beep We think so. We have no evidence that the value on that wallet is inaccurate. In the case of a bad transfer: Computer 1: beep boop Hey guys, I have this wallet here with 200BTC, trying to transfer 5BTC. Does that check out?
Other computers: boop beep Nope. Within the last ten minutes, that wallet just transferred some bitcoins to one of us and claimed that it also held a value of 200BTC. Fail. |
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Can we really call it a crash?
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I view it as a benefit, eau d'Cocaine and ass-crack isn't exactly my cup of tea.  I know of no finer scent then that of debauchery and broken dreams. I can, however, see the draw of issuing your own paper money.
One thing, though: the biggest benefit of debit cards is their convenience and speed. Would a bitcoin debit card be able to compete? the current credit/debit card system works thus:
Cust. swipes card
merchant transmit card data to operating company (visa, MC, etc)
Data is passed to issuing bank
Bank checks if customer has available balance (or credit, as the case may be)
If yes, bank places hold on funds
bank sends response (approve/deny) back to operating company
Operating company sends response back to merchant
At the end of the day, the merchant totals up all his actual charges, and sends them to the operating company(ies)
the operating company confirms the transaction with the issuing bank
customer's balance is updated, and the hold is removed
One example of this is, at some gas stations, the pump "authorizes" for $50, to make sure you have enough in your account to cover if you fill up your tank. Let's say you only buy $20 worth, though... That $50 hold is still there, until the gas station closes out it's books for the day and sends the finalized $20 charge.
Seeing as Bitcoin combines those two transactions when you attempt to spend some, and the confirmation doesn't come until another block is made... Can it keep up?
I would think that a bitcoin card would work just like a typical debit card, except the transfer of funds arrives an hour later instead of a day later, and the bank and operating company would probably be one in the same. The vendor would have to trust that entity. The bank would be a computer that holds the wallet of the customer, it would fire the transaction as soon as requested, it would take the usual time for BTC online transfers but if the wallet holder is reliable, the busyness places would believe when the bank says the customer has funds and the transaction is gonna take place.
Perhaps the customer's home computer or smart phone could act as the bank/operating entity. The vendor would just have to make sure somehow that the customer doesn't run cheating software. Is that possible? |
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Boy, you are married to that invisible ink idea, aren't ya? I think the difference here is in our ideas of the use case. I see it as a replacement for giftcards, being secure enough to get to the grandkids intact. You see it as a replacement for FRNs, needing to stand up to the abuse and attacks that they do. Certainly, you're welcome to print access codes to digital money on a note that would then be subjected to getting "folded, crumpled, washed, used as narcotic paraphernalia, and manipulated by moist genitalia." If you can keep the cost of such a note low enough, while maintaining security, go for it. I'd still say that digital, via debit cards, smart-phone apps, and the like, will replace FRNs for daily use, though. Why give up all the advantages that digital currency has over printed? That clears it up. Making bitcoin payments via "gift card" makes sense. I think it could get me a beer rather easily. However, it involves vendors charging an account, which opens up the possibility for charge-back fraud. Bitcoin bills would avoid that just like actual bitcoins they represent. Also, I like the idea of issuing my own paper money and the way US FRNs smell. Bitcoins don't smell, one of their few drawbacks. |
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I don't recall seeing scratch-off layers on anything except for relatively stiff card stock or plastic. Paper money gets folded, crumpled, washed, used as narcotic paraphernalia, and manipulated by moist genitalia. Could a bitcoin note utilizing a scratch-off layer stand up to such abuse? I doubt it. In fact, I have a used scratch-off game right here. After folding it a few times, I see cracks in the remaining paint. We'd do well to look into other more durable methods. Perhaps invisible ink can satisfy that requirement.
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spisa sicni? http://jbovlaste.lojban.org/Surprisingly, I couldn't find a word for Boolean, which I think would work better for bit than piece. |
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Or... He could cover the sensitive data with metallic paint. Works fine for the lottery.
Global community note: in the US, scratch cards such as ptmhd suggested are used extensively, in raffles of all kinds, but mostly in state-run lottery schemes. They are priced at 1-5 dollars per scratch cards, and have prizes in excess of $1000, depending on the state and card. It's a proven technology, and fairly secure.
That said, I don't see why BOTH technologies couldn't co-exist, though I do lean towards scratch cards being more economically viable. (code + paint vs code (special ink) + UV layer (special ink) + IR layer (Special ink) + solvent to redeem)
But one only has a small probability that cheating a scratch-off game will earn a reward. Assuming an honest issuer, freshly issued notes carry a probability of 1 that they represent bitcoins. Scratch-offs would only work if the issuer printed a difficult to replicate but easily verifiable image on top of the scratch area. That requires three layers of printing, versus one or two for invisible ink. Therefore, scratch-off bitcoin notes are more expensive and must represent more bitcoins to offset their production cost. Subsequently, they are a nicer target than invisible ink notes. If the notes are cheap to produce then the issuer can afford to periodically recall notes and issue new ones. This way, the issuer can keep up with technology, preserve the value of his notes and reclaim the bitcoins associated with lost or destroyed notes. Holders who can't bring their notes back to the issuer to receive new ones can just reveal the invisible ink and redeem the bitcoins themselves before the end of the recall period. Here's how I think a one bitcoin note might look. I'm happy to share the .idw file if anyone would like. |
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It's invisible to every specrtum of light, or just the human-visible ones? Let's say you have ink that is invisible to human eyes, but it is visible in IR. You could just print it on top of ink or paper that is as visible in IR. You can do the same with UV too. Beyond the UV to IR spectrum though, the cost of trying to read this invisible ink gets high. The issuer can avoid this problem by not letting the note represent too many bitcoins. |
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Better idea, Scan the note, digitally process it to bring out the private key (using filters, perhaps?), transfer the money out, then spend the original, now worthless, paper. But the ink is invisible. There's nothing to filter. What's to stop someone from painting another scratch-off layer? also no need for standardization. printouts will remain a marginal form of btc circulation, more or less as gift cards
+a way to build reputation in community (issuing printed btc requires audience that trusts that they will not be spent by issuer)
It'd be nice though to just use a code without having to figure out which standard it followed. |
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I'd think phones would be much more convenient, if implemented well. Buying beers is always a slow process with cash because of fiddling with change. With an NFC smartphone it could just be take phone out of pocket, unlock screen, tap on the bar ... done.
Emphasis on "implemented well". Some smart phones stink ("hold on, I have to run app-kill") and the prospect of getting drunks and technology to play nice doesn't sit well with me. An electronic system would have to work easier than a paper/plastic one. For example, the bartender would tell me the price, I touch the screen no more than once after unlocking my phone, wave it, and get beer. Having to aim the phone at a QR code or coordinate precisely with the bartender won't work. Photocopy the invisible ink bitcoin bill, and spend it. When the new owner tries to redeem it, they discover that the invisible ink is a lie.
This is not directly defrauding the issuer of the bills, but it would bring the system into disrepute. The issuer can employ watermarks that show up on photocopies, as banks already do with checks. |
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Is there really no way to read the invisible ink without leaving obvious signs the ink has been seen already?
The probably depends on the particular invisible ink. I suppose some might show under UV, but the issuer could always print the private key on top of ink that also fluoresced under UV. How might one defraud the issuer of invisible ink bitcoin bills? What countermeasures can such an issuer employ? |
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I still think handing bitcoin addresses around on paper like this is kind of dumb, but whatever. I rather like it. I imaging that handing a bartender a bitcoin bill could more easily get me a beer than fiddling with a smart phone. You'd just have to trust the bill's issuer, but no more than you would have to MyBitcoin, for example. I like the idea of a mutual bank issuing bitcoin bills utilizing invisible ink. Normally, the bill would display a public key that one could use to verify the bill's backing in bitcoins. To redeem these bitcoins, one could apply some heat iodine to the bill, and its invisible ink would display a private key and QR code. Doing so, of course, would void the bill.
http://blog.makezine.com/archive/2008/11/invisible-ink-printer.html |
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it's not that complicated. just 3 or 4 steps but requires some coding experience.
Well, my coding experience consists of me floating through CSE 123 eight years ago and then a little bit of Matlab here and there. So, pardon me for looking for something along the lines of the OP's link but in reverse. |
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