The big deal here is that you are looking up financial information, which many people will want to keep more private than a lot of their other web activity. If I Google the best recipes for lasagne, I don't really care if the website in question knows my IP, or knows that I was also looking at pizza recipes. If I look up one of my transactions, maybe I don't want the website in question to be able to link that transaction to my IP, and maybe I don't want the website in question to also see me look up my cold storage addresses and link those back to me as well. Some advertisers and marketing agencies may pay for the knowledge that I like Italian food so they can try to send me targeted ads, but there are a lot more third parties, governments included, who will be interested to know just how much bitcoin I am holding or when and where I am spending it.

That doesn't give them a right to spy on the rest of us, though.

A VPN just shifts your point of trust from the block explorer to the VPN provider. If you want privacy, use Tor.

I suspect quite a few people use it to try to follow where their own coins end up, particularly in the scenario that they have been hacked or scammed, in which case the website will be able to get some useful data from them.

I suspect every block explorer is collecting visitors' information to disclose to any third party which is willing to pay for it, governments included. The only block explorer I suspect might not being doing this is mempool.space since they are completely open source and community driven, but even then, I don't trust them enough not to use Tor or to go looking up my own transactions. If I had a great need to use a block explorer (I rarely do, and when I do it is almost always to look at someone else's transactions to help figure out an issue), then I would run my own instance of mempool.space using their code: https://github.com/mempool/mempool

The bill is awful for bitcoin. I don't often recommend reddit posts, but there is one here everyone in the US should read: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/pr7fow/new_shocking_us_crypto_regulation_far_more/. Also have a read of this thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5360520

In short, it heaps a whole bunch of new regulations on bitcoin and exchanges, tries to penalize anyone who takes their privacy seriously, tries to outright ban stablecoins, tries to make everyone who uses bitcoin responsible for collecting the tax details of the other party they are transacting with, and a whole host of other completely ridiculous things. In short, it makes using bitcoin legally an absolute nightmare, and thereby paves the way for the launch of a centralized digital USD. The whole point of the bill is that they don't want people to be able to use a currency that they don't control. So they heap a pile of ridiculous regulations on it in the hope that most people will choose the path of least resistance and opt for the digital dollar, which they can freeze, seize, and print more of at will.

If you only care about what the price of bitcoin will do in relation to this bill, then you are missing the point. You should be contacting your representatives now and telling them to either vote against this bill or to introduce amendments to fix its insane anti-bitcoin provisions.

Or maybe, rather than the FDA for some reason using redaction codes from the US military, they use their own redaction codes?

(b)(4) simply means the information is confidential commercial information.

Unless you think that "jerky pet treats" are also a secret classified US weapons system? https://www.fda.gov/media/84973/download

Lol, you anti-vaxxers really will believe any old shit without a second thought or a single piece of critical thinking.

Edit:
Double lol. This is what passes for "research" in the eyes of an anti-vaxxer. I guess BiG pHaRmA really are hiding secret 5G controlled death lasers in dog treats now. Hahahaha.

The only downside is that since it is all pre-bundled, they don't use the latest version. Last I checked, they are still on version 4.0.2. If you really want the latest version, then you can run it using the AppImage from electrum.com and saving it to your persistent storage. There are instructions here: https://electrum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tails.html

I'm not really a fan of that method. To spend from that encrypted paper wallet while on the go without any additional hardware on you (airgapped laptop, hardware wallet, etc.) then you are going to have to import it in to your hot mobile wallet. If you don't think a mobile wallet is secure enough for storing that amount of bitcoin long term, then you shouldn't really think it's secure enough to import that amount of bitcoin in to either.

I'm struggling to foresee a situation where I am out and about suddenly want to make a significant and completely unplanned purchase using bitcoin where such a paper wallet would be useful. Any time I want to spend a large amount of bitcoin in person (larger than I would be comfortable storing on a mobile wallet), then I have planned it in advance and have taken my hardware wallet with me.

Yeah, who knows? The courts themselves don't know until if and when such a case actually occurs, and even then I'm sure it would get bounced up through the chain of courts and appeals. In such a case where the defendant will be going to jail for embezzling $40 million anyway, would it make much difference if that number was actually found to be $200 million? Or would it make much difference if the defendant stuck to a story that they do not know the seed phrase/wallet password and so cannot reveal the true amount of bitcoin contained?

Anyway, to get somewhat back on topic, the safest wallet for you is going to be the one which protects best against the attack vectors which you deem most likely for you. If you honestly believe those attack vectors are from a three letter agency, then although a hardware wallet or encrypted airgapped wallet might prevent them from accessing your funds, you'll need to go to much greater lengths if you want to hide the existence of those funds altogether.

Lol.

So, this case is a little more nuanced than that.

If you read the court documents, you'll find that they specifically mention that the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant should have their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applied in such scenarios. The difference here is that the courts already knew what was on the encrypted hard drives (partly from testimony from another person and partly from records from the associated computer they were attached to), and they already had enough evidence from other sources to convict the individual in question. For those reasons, the court said that forcing the individual to decrypt the hard drives would not amount to self-incrimination since it would not change the outcome of the court case or their final ruling.

This scenario could potentially apply to bitcoin if law enforcement knew you had a bitcoin wallet and also knew the addresses in it, as unlocking it does not incriminate you any more. If you had a bitcoin wallet and they did not know which addresses were in it, could you argue for your Fifth Amendment rights? I don't know the answer to that.

No, but I'd still rather do that than use a web wallet. Hell, I'd rather memorize a seed phrase for use on the go (obviously knowing that the back up is written down and stored securely at home) than use a web wallet.

You don't have to carry the seed phrase around with you, but you should definitely write it down. You don't want to be in the situation of needing to receive a large transaction while you are on the go and only have an unbacked-up mobile wallet on you.

Yeah, as Loyce says, Tails will create a persistent storage on the same USB stick it boots from: https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.en.html

If you are a target of a major government or one of their agencies such as the FBI, then the security of your wallets is almost inconsequential. They'll put you in jail regardless.

Laws specifying whether you can be required to provide your decryption key or password for data files to law enforcement or other agencies vary depending on the country you live in. US courts seem to (so far) be saying that doing so would violate an individual's Fifth Amendment rights. I'm not aware of any rulings in the US relating to handing over your bitcoin wallet passwords, seed phrases, private keys, etc., though. There was a case in Germany of someone who spent two years in jail (he's since been released) for installing mining software on other people's computers, but refused to hand over the password to a wallet containing around 1,700 BTC. I can't find out whether he has since been able to recover or spend any of those 1,700 BTC without the police coming knocking, though.

But yes, I agree. When thinking about wallet security you should be focusing on the most likely attack vectors, which for most people will be the opportunistic attacker or maybe a targeted attack by one or two individuals. If you think that your most likely attack vector is that of a nation state, then you've got far bigger problems to deal with.

I would still prefer to either carry around an encrypted USB stick with my wallet file on it, or carry around a seed phrase written down on paper which I could restore my wallet from using some open source software such as Electrum. Again, both are far better from both a privacy and security view point than using a web wallet.

An even better solution would be to carry around a USB stick with Tails on it, so you can boot the computer you have been provided in to a clean, live OS, and then either load your wallet from the encrypted persistent storage, or recover it from scratch using your seed phrase.

Yes, it is possible. All a QR code does in the context of hardware wallets is to take an address or a transaction and encode it in a specific format which can be easily scanned by a camera. Any malware which can edit the information being encoded will result in a QR code being displayed which can potentially send all your coins to an attacker if you do not double check everything prior to signing and broadcasting. Further, you can still be a victim of clipboard malware on your internet connected device with any airgapped wallet, resulting in you pasting in an incorrect address before turning the unsigned transaction in to a QR code for your hardware wallet to scan.

---

Ledger and Trezor devices, when used in the "normal" manner, are not airgapped. But it is entirely possible to use them both in an airgapped manner by only connecting them to an airgapped computer, and using a separate online computer to run a watch only wallet. Although if you a have a secure, encrypted, properly airgapped computer anyway, then adding a hardware wallet on top of that might be a bit of overkill.

If you set a fee which is sufficiently higher to mean your transaction gets confirmed in an earlier block than it would have done with a lower fee, then yes, you make the attacker's life more difficult since they have less time to try to replace your transaction and convince a miner to prioritize it. This is unlikely to make a difference if the change is from being confirmed in 2 blocks to being confirmed in 1 block, but if the change is the difference between 1 week and 1 block, then it becomes potentially significant. If 1 sat/vbyte will get you in the next block and you pay 100 sat/vbyte, then you don't really make things any harder for the attacker. It might be more expensive for them, but since it is your money they are stealing and spending, then it won't really be a disincentive for them.

As above. If you can bump the fee sufficiently to get a much earlier confirmation, then it will be much more difficult for the attacker.

Absolutely. Or split your change between multiple addresses to make it seem as if you are paying multiple people. Or manually choose to send your change to a different address type to obfuscate that it is going to a change address. Or even better, leave no change at all. It's entirely possible to hide what is a change address (or even manipulate the heuristics in to actively identifying the payment address as the change address), but the vast majority of wallets don't do this and the vast majority of users don't know how to do this. If OP is using Electrum or Blockchain.com, and just makes a bunch of standard transactions which chain together all his change addresses, then it is trivial to identify them all and link all the transactions as originating from the same user/wallet.

I use a mobile wallet for small amounts which I need to carry around with me and spend on a daily basis. The security isn't great (although far better than that of a web wallet), but I've never been hacked and it is only small amounts that I can afford to lose. For anything larger I need to carry around with me and access anywhere, then I can take a very small hardware wallet which will link up with my phone. Both easily fit in pockets, bags, etc.

This is a far preferable option to using a web wallet if "accessing anywhere" is the goal. Your security is much better, your privacy is much better, the fees are much better, and you can still use advanced options like coin control or RBF which most Web wallets don't offer.

More deflection. Zero links. 

Cool. Now give me a researchgate link which says the vaccine is gene therapy or any of your other bullshit.

As per YouTube and Bitchute, I'll just repeat what I said above since apparently you didn't actually read it.

Feel free to quit spamming everyone with your obviously bullshit claims. Or you know, provide a single piece of evidence* for any of them, as I've asked you to dozens of times.

*A fellow lunatic ranting on bitchute is not evidence.

Correct, but in many cases it will still be trivial to link the two payments.

If I pay make a transaction from Address A, and I send something like 0.05 BTC to one address and 0.15820351 BTC to another address, then it is completely obvious to everyone that the latter address is my change address. If I then pay someone else from my change address, then they can easily link the two transactions as having come from the same person. The same is true for anything else which identifies the change address, such as one output being to a different address type from the input while the change output is the same address type as the input.

It's possible, but it's difficult to do, do consistently, and never once mess up, especially for newbies who don't understand all the intricacies involved. Even something as simple as looking up your KYC addresses and your non-KYC addresses on the same block explorer at the same time can be enough to de-anonymize you.

But UniSwap is for crypto-crypto trading. OP's site is targeted at the complete newbie. The complete newbie doesn't want to know how to swap some wrapped bitcoin for some random ERC20 token and back again, since they will have absolutely no idea what either of things are. If we are going to recommend DEXs (which I think we should to all newbies before they get sucked in to the nightmare of endless KYC and zero privacy they get with centralized exchanges), then we should recommend ones which allow them to safely buy bitcoin with fiat, since that is what they will be interest in. Bisq and LocalCryptos are the two best ones for doing that.