No. Splitting your seed using Ian Coleman's method is very insecure and not recommended, as I explained above. The discovery of one of the cards is enough to brute force the remaining unknown words.

Why do you keep asking this question? No matter how many times you ask it, the response you get will always be the same. You should not store your seed phrase online, regardless of what you think you have done to protect it. You seem hell bent on doing this, and it seems like you are waiting for someone, anyone, to say "Sure, that seems like an OK idea" so you can justify it to yourself.

If you want to do it, we can't stop you, but you are putting your coins at risk.

Note that you cannot reverse a RIPEMD-160 function (or SHA256 followed by RIPEMD-160, for that matter) and find the original user's public key. It would be possible (although incredibly unlikely) to find a collision with another random public key, but there would only be a roughly 1 in 2⁹⁶ chance that the public key you found was the same public key as the user in question used when generating that address.

According to this article, there are a fairly static number of bitcoin, around 2 million, in P2PK addresses, and this hasn't really changed since 2014. These are mostly early coins which have never moved since being mined, some of which will belong to Satoshi.

Can you elaborate? If I set up a 2-of-3 secret sharing scheme, where is the single point of failure? If I lose one of my shares, I can still recover my seed from the other 2 shares. Although as I said above, you should always have two back ups of everything, so a 2-of-3 scheme would necessitate 6 separate back ups, and so you could lose between 3 and 4 shares

Splitting seeds is a bad idea if done carelessly, as is any back up method. If you do it properly then it can be both very secure and very safe, although admittedly it is much harder to do properly than just backing up a seed normally. As with any back up, only having one back up is a recipe for disaster. If you split your seed in to parts, then you need at least 2 copies of each part, all in separate locations.

Better to use a Shamir's scheme or similar, where you can set up any m-of-n you like, and where knowledge of any less than m parts reveals nothing about your secret. Splitting a 12 word seed in to 3 parts using Ian Coleman's method is a bad idea, since one card gives 8 out 12 words, meaning the remaining can be brute forced.

Multi-sig doesn't address the same problem as seed splitting. It is not feasible to store your 3 multi-sig keys in 3 different bank vaults, go and retrieve two of them every time you want to make a transaction, and return them securely after you are finished. And that's without tying yourself in to the larger transaction sizes and higher fees that you get with multi-sig.

Looking at it now, it seems it has again flipped back to saying "Purging", with a value of < 2.2 sats/vbyte, which again matches up with Jochen's site. I'm not sure why it changed and changed back? Perhaps their mempool size limit is slightly larger than standard so they were accepting transaction with lower fees which other nodes were rejecting? Or perhaps once the "Purging" value drops below 2 sats/vbyte, it simply ignores it and states a minimum fee of 1 sat/vbyte.

You can still use https://mempool.space/, just pay attention to the Memory usage. Once it is less than 300 MB, then low fee transaction will stop being purged. Or you can use https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#BTC%20(default%20mempool),8h,weight, and just watch for when the 1-2 sat/vbyte band shows up again at the bottom of the graph.

However, waiting for this time and then broadcasting your transaction at 1 sat/vbyte is probably unlikely to achieve very much. Worst case scenario it will just get purged when the mempool fills up again; best case scenario you are waiting weeks for the mempool to empty down to 1 sat/vbyte.

It seems that mempool.space has changed that value from "Purging" to "Minimum fee", which doesn't really make sense given it is still showing the mempool being 415 MB, and so obviously low fee transactions are still being purged.

If you take a look at the "Default Mempool" setting on Jochen's site (https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#BTC%20(default%20mempool),8h,weight), you can see the lowest band visible is for transactions paying 2+ sat/vbyte, which matches ranochigo's node as above.

If you want the transaction to have any prospect of confirming within the next few days, I'd go for at least 6 sats/vbyte.

There has been more than one occasion I have thought "I don't remember writing that" when reading one of their posts...

This.

"DICE" doesn't exist. It isn't a coin or a token. It has no blockchain, no nodes, no miners, no wallets, no addresses. You cannot deposit or withdraw it because it literally doesn't exist. It's just a number on Yobit's internal database. If you look through all the different markets, there are around 2 trillion "DICE" stacked up in sell orders with zero buyers. Yobit create a fake token, people buy it from them for bitcoin, Yobit profit, and users are left bag-holding a non-existent scam.

Rinse and repeat. Yobit have been doing this for years. I cannot fathom how people are still falling for it.

---

Here is a post I made over a year ago about another non-token called "X10" in which Yobit did the exact same thing: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5217581.msg53650350#msg53650350
And here is another post showing the order books for 4 other non-tokens, filled with sell orders with zero buyers: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5217581.msg53670926#msg53670926
Here is a post I made a few months ago about yet another non-token they had just launched called "MINEX": https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5272982.msg55121849#msg55121849.
If you go look at the "MINEX" markets on Yobit, you'll see I was proven right.

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Yobit is a scam.

I haven't done it myself, but it should work just fine.

If you look at the Wasabi docs here - https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/FAQ/FAQ-UseWasabi.html#what-is-the-password-used-for - it says that the password you set on your Wasabi wallet is used as a passphrase as described in BIP39, which is exactly how Trezor uses the passphrase.

Also here - https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/using-wasabi/WalletRecovery.html#mnemonic-recovery-words-and-password - it says you can recover a wallet generated from any BIP39 software, again by inputting your seed phrase and then by inputting your passphrase as the password.

Why not create a dummy wallet on your Trezor and test it yourself?

That's not how restoring a 2FA wallet works. If you have the seed phrase, then when you restore the wallet you are given the option of keeping or disabling the 2FA. At no point during the restore process are you asked for a 2FA code. If also doesn't matter if you select "Standard wallet" or "Wallet with two-factor authentication" when you are restoring - when you enter your seed phrase from a 2FA wallet, Electrum will detect that it is a 2FA seed and proceed as such regardless of which option you have chosen.

The reddit thread you've linked to includes a comment saying that this was likely a fake or phishing site rather than the official site. Further, the archive page you linked to includes the phrase "The wallet was turned offline immediately after the Bitcoin was confirmed to have been sent", which means they used the live bitaddress site while connected to the internet, which is obviously a massive security risk and not the fault of bitaddress.

As I said, I cannot vouch one way or the other, but I suspect we would have seen many, many more scam accusations if bitaddress was malicious. At the end of the day, it is up to you whether you want to move your coins or not, but if we assume your paper wallet was created properly and has remained secure, then any non-paper wallet you choose is likely to be less secure.

I cannot vouch for it personally since I have never sat down and read through the entire code myself, because I've never used bitaddress to create a wallet that I intended to fund with any more than a few thousand sats for various tests or experiments. However, bitaddress is widely used by the community, and the code on GitHub hasn't been changed in over 4 years, so I imagine there are many people out there who have sat down and read through the code, and if there was anything malicious in it I suspect it would have been identified by now.

I don't think you need to move your coins. If you followed the other steps of running a local copy of bitaddress offline and not saving any copies of your paper wallet digitally (including on your printer), then you are pretty safe. As you say, generating a new wallet will also come with a risk.

And Revolut will give you a US bank account? As I said, last I looked in to Revolut (which admittedly was probably several years ago by now) it was for EU customers only. Have they expanded to offering US accounts?

If you have a US account which other people can send US dollars to, then there is no reason you could not trade peer to peer. You would sign up to one of the platforms I have mentioned above, search for someone looking to buy bitcoin via a US dollar bank transfer, send the bitcoin to escrow, receive the US dollar payment, and then release the bitcoin from escrow. No method of trading is completely risk free, but I find that as long as you stick to the platform you have chosen (and ignore anyone suggesting to talk on a different platform such as Telegram or Discord), always make sure to use the platform's trading methods and escrow (and again, ignore anyone suggesting to skip the escrow), and only choose reputable users with lots of good feedback to trade with, then you will have no problems.

I though Revolut was an EU only thing? Have they expanded?

Anyway OP, if you have managed to open a Revolut account, then what currencies are available to you? Can you convert to your own local currency and then spend from the Revolut app? Does Revolut offer a card that you can access?

The reason I ask, is that there is always the possibility of peer to peer trading. You sell your bitcoin or other crypto directly to another person, who transfers fiat of your choice to your Revolut app, which you convert to your local currency. There are platforms such as Bisq, HodlHodl, and LocalCryptos which are designed for this kind of trading.

Which is it? Your 12 words restore a wallet without any funds in it, or the 12 words do not restore a wallet at all?

If your 12 words are restoring a wallet with different addresses and no funds on it, then you have the wrong 12 words. You either need to find the correct 12 words, or contact TrustedCoin and ask them nicely to remove the 2FA on your account. They have done this for some users in the past, but only if you can email them from the email address you used when you first set up your 2FA wallet.

There are a lot of steps when creating a paper wallet to ensure the safety of your coins.

• First, you need to download the source code of the website or wallet you are planning to use, and then review the code to ensure it is doing what you think it is doing. If you are unable to review the code yourself, then you are going to have to rely on the community to do it for you.
• Then, you need to run it offline. Ideally this means on a permanently airgapped computer which will never have an internet connection again. If this is not possible, then you should disconnect your computer from the internet (and ideally also disconnect your hard drive and any other storage devices) and boot to a live Linux OS from a USB stick, and run it on that.
• You want to use the oldest, dumbest printer you can find. You do not want to use a modern, WiFi-enabled printer, which can be targeted by malware or will store copies of what it has printed on its internal memory or cache.
• Then there are all the practical aspects, such as doing all this with your curtains closed and without any webcams or phone cameras in the room, and storing it securely after you have created it.

The times I have seen people use fake paper wallet generators, the coins are generally swept within a few days. It is impossible for anybody to say that you are coins are definitely safe, but if they haven't been touched in years then I think it is highly unlikely that someone else knows your private key.

Blockchain.com and BitPay won't support it, but these are two of the worst wallets in existence and there a plethora of reasons you should not use them, with lack of passphrase support being the least of your worries.

However, both Wasabi and Ledger will support seed phrases with additional passphrases (also known as the "25th word"), as will a number of other wallets such as Electrum. There are even open source tools such as https://iancoleman.io/bip39/ which will allow you to import both a seed phrase and an additional passphrase (don't do this on an online computer!)

The passphrase/25th word/seed extension/etc. is a very standard part of seed generation, and is detailed in BIP39 itself:

Both Trezor and Ledger can be used without requiring you to use their own servers or software, by pairing them with Electrum or similar.

If you are opening a wallet which shows no balance, no history, and different addresses to your previous wallet, then you are opening a different wallet. This is not the same wallet that you were using on your Mac.

No and no.

If you still have the seed phrase from your original wallet, then restoring from this seed phrase is going to be the most straightforward way of recovering your wallet. If you restore from this seed phrase and the wallet is still incorrect, then you have either used the wrong seed phrase or there is an additional passphrase you will also need to enter.

Ahh, my bad. I just tried to use the autosave feature on mine and couldn't get it working either. On closer inspection, it seems it is only implemented for btcrecover (for passwords) and not for seedrecover (for seed phrases). There is an open GitHub issue about it, but it has not yet been implemented: https://github.com/3rdIteration/btcrecover/issues/45

I guess the best option for you then is going to be to simplify the tokenlist file as much as possible, and run it multiple times. So lock Word3 in to position 3, for example, and run that to completion. If no matches, then change Word3 to position 4, and go again. And so on.