Well, not really.
There is no need in your 2-of-2 proposal to back up the xpubs at all. xpub A can obviously be derived from seed A. If you have lost both seed A back ups, then having xpub A backed up alongside seed B isn't going to help you - your funds are lost at that point. In any scenario where you have recovered both seed A and seed B, then by definition you will also have access to xpub A and xpub B since you can derive them. And so if you simply back up the seed phrases on their own, then an attacker compromising one seed phrase cannot spy on your wallets.
Correct, I was wrong. So, in your opinion, what would be the contributing factor that would make you choose one of them? The obvious difference is that 2-of-3 requires 3 safe locations, whereas the 2-of-2 requires 4. |
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So the difference in size is 34 bytes (0x21 header byte followed by the 33 byte public key). But since those bytes are witness bytes, then the difference in size for any transaction is only 8.5 vbytes. So I wouldn't let that affect your choice too much, since the different is negligible unless you are consolidating hundreds of small inputs.
To be honest, I don't like the fact I mentionned above. I realised that if an attacker steals my backup they will be able to spy my wallet. So I tend to go to a 2-of-3 once again. Or perhaps I will totally switch my mind and go for a proper singlesig+passphrase. |
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Yes, the more the cosigners, the more the fee. But 2-of-2 have the same cosigners as 2-of-3. Also the more the pubkeys, the more the transaction fee as the virtual size or the weight of the transaction will also increase.
You mean while making transaction?
The difference between 2-of-2 and 2-of-3 is the number of pubkeys needed which is 3 in 2-of-3 and that will make its transaction fee to be higher.
Thank you both. So according to what you say, both numbers n and m are important in fee calculation. I thought that perhaps since 2 cosigners are needed, then the fee would be the same. But, the fact that one wallet has 3 total signers (xpubs) makes a difference too. 2. Is my backup set ups above optimal?
Well, I will answer to myself here, but I have just realised that my backup in the second case is not optional. If an attacker steals one of my packets, they can spy on my wallet since they have a seed and the other xpub. However on the first scenario, if an attacker steals one packet, they can't spy on my wallet. As far as losing funds is concerned, then I am safe in both occasions if I lose one packet. |
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There are two options in my mind, now that I think about creating a new multisig wallet for personal usage. I will be the one to take care of the cosigners. I have been thinking a 2-of-3 or a 2-of-2 set up. I already own a 2-of-3 wallet and I need another one, but perhaps I could change the set up a little bit. Option A (2-of-3):Cosigners A, B, C (Seed A, Seed B, Seed C, XPUB A, XPUB B, XPUB C) Backup (each item in different locations): - Seed A, XPUB B
- Seed B, XPUB C
- Seed C, XPUB A
Option A (2-of-2):Cosigners A, B (Seed A, Seed B, XPUB A, XPUB B) Backup (each item in different locations): - Seed A, XPUB B
- Seed A, XPUB B
- Seed B, XPUB A
- Seed B, XPUB A
Questions: 1. Is it cheaper to have less total cosigners to define the wallet? In that case, would a 2-of-2 be cheaper than a 2-of-3? 2. Is my backup set ups above optimal? 3. Any other thoughts? |
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He didn't. You can read Gavin's email discussions with Wright in the archive linked above.
In fact, it's pretty clear today that Wright was not aware of Gavin's discussions with Satoshi.
In Gavin's email dialog with Wright Gavin didn't challenge Wright's knowledge of Bitcoin in any meaningful way, it's a real shame because any detailed discussion about Bitcoin's programming should have exposed Wright or at least forced him to start suggesting the parts Gavin discussed with him were written by other people. It's telling that Roger Ver-- who also fell for Wright for a while-- ultimately saw the light when he realized that Wright didn't know Bitcoin addresses had a checksum. Roger's not an entirely non-technical guy but he's not a serious programmer... but given enough exposure to Wright they eventually stumbled into a subject where Roger knew enough to see through him.
Exactly. I think this can also be a contributing factor to the evidence against CSW claims that he is Satoshi. I mean, I can imagine that writing Bitcoin's code is something that the original developer would remember. Personally, I work as a dev and I can remember lots of code things I 've written in the past 5 years. At least I can easily understand it and why I wrote it - and realise the mistakes I have made. But if I had written something so important like Bitcoin, and having been engaged for multiple years in this project, I would definetely remember it and of course, I would definetely understand every single aspect of it. How fees work, how keys and addresses work, how signatures work, how mining works etc. |
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Satoshi (the real one) trusted Gavin the project.
I have asked before, but I will ask again, in case anyone knows. Did CSW provide evidence that he was talking to Gavin via email, or at least, anything that can prove that he gave him the project? If CSW = Satoshi, then CSW was the guy who was talking to Gavin via email and gave him the project. |
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You will know all the addresses which my paynym generates for you. You will be unable to deduce any of the addresses which my paynym generates for other people. If 100 different people all send me 10 transactions using my paynyn, you will only know the address for the 10 transactions you made, and you won't know anything about the other 990 transactions (or indeed, if there have been any other transactions at all).
Yes, but that requires me to be online, generate a new address, communicate it with you securely, etc. With a paynym, you can just generate a new address for me on the fly without any interaction needed from me at all.
Ok, seems like I got my daily knowledge. Here is my Paynym "+dampsun8A6". I will share it with multiple people now that I learnt about it. |
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I could post a paynym publicly, and everyone who wants can use that paynym to send me coins to a fresh address each time, and no one can use that paynym to spy on the addresses it creates for anyone else.
The transaction will obviously still be mined and therefore publicly viewable, just as any other transaction is. As the sender, you will know the address you are sending to.
How can those two be both true? Let's suppose that I am "drunkDog456" and you are "crazyLobster38". Feels fun already. Then if I send you 200k sats I will know your address after the TX is made. Then if I send you 100k sats again, it will be certain that the address will not be the same as before, but I will know the address again after the TX is made. Instead of asking your paynym, I could ask for 2 addresses and you could make sure it's not the same one. Correct? |
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This topic is old, but if I wrote it again, I would use the same title, so I 'll ask here.
1. if I create a wallet in Sparrow and then enter the same words in Samourai, will it produce the same Paynym? My question could also be "are paynyms produced by the same entropy that produces the seed phrase?"
2. if I get your paynym, let's say "orangeButterfly21" and I send you some sats using Sparrow, won't the system provide me with the txid ? So, won't I be able to view the address where I sent the sats ? I 'd like to test it, but if anyone knows, let me know and I will believe you.
3. if (2) is true and I can see the address, then the only purpose of paynyms is to make sure there is no address reuse? Because every modern wallet with coin control can do that by default.
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and 2 years will fly very fast, Trezor One will be retired and not available anymore.
Is this announced anywhere? Sorry for jumping in, I just have a trezor wallet since 2019 and I don't use it anymore, but I am curious to know. |
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Hello, we have had a similar conversation here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5469307.0I wanted it to have a camera for airgapped transactions personally. This is my major complaint. The price is ok in my opinion. Finally the BTC only version shouldn't be limited edition but a proper product. |
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Do you also use Samourai on the go while pointed at your Dojo? Or do you just use Dojo for Sentinel?
Currently my mobile experience with Bitcoin is: Sentinel I have some addresses in Sentinel and I use them to receive funds (on the go). Those are addresses from my cold storage wallet. I could also monitor the XPUB of course, but I didn't want to. I only have 10 - 20 addresses ready to be deployed in case I need to receive funds. Zeus I use Zeus to connect to LND node (CLN is also available of course). I like Zeus because it is mandatory to connect to own node in order to use it, so it helped me privacy-wise. Also the main dev is very approachable and we had a small conversation once (not too technical). The main reason why I use it is for LN transactions. I don't manage my channels with it. I have tried Samourai and I have used it for a while (connected to my Dojo). I liked it very much, but for several reasons I don't want to have an on-chain bitcoin wallet on my phone. In general, when "on the go", I need to have super minimal functionalities. I try to minimalise most of my everyday clutter (I hope this word makes sense here). I only need to pay fast or receive fast. I can pay fast with LN and receive fast both on-chain and on LN. So my set-up is very convenient so far. Of course being connected to my node is a must for me. |
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Note that the secure element is not open source. It's just a regular secure element. Pretty funny coming from the company that spent the best part of the last 10 years saying how closed source secure elements are a security risk and secure elements are unnecessary, while sweeping under the rug their unfixable seed extraction vulnerability.
It also isn't airgapped and still needs connected to the computer with a USB cable, and it also seems like you still have to enter any passphrase on the computer and not on the device itself, which remains a large security risk.
So all in all, this just looks like a rebranded Trezor One. Pretty disappointing to be honest, and still far behind some other hardware wallets on the market.
Blockstream Jade has all that and costs less  |
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Excellent set up, by the way. Your own node, own Electrum server, Sparrow, all via Tor, for endless free coinjoins. Which Electrum server package are you running on your Raspberry Pi? Next up you'll want your own instance of https://github.com/mempool/mempool. Thanks. Who said I don't run my own mempool instance? I do run my own mempool instance  I run 2 nodes, to be honest. Specifically: 1. I run Umbrel on an RPi. There I run btc core + electrs + dojo + robosats + LND (which I plan to remove soon) + my own mempool instance 2. I run Raspbian Lite (no GUI) on an RPi. I wanted to have clean custom setups here. So, for now, I run btc core + electrs + Sparrow + CLN (which doesn't work as expected but I don't have time to figure out what's wrong) Next steps: 0. I will properly install Tor on the second RPi. The first node (umbrel) works with TOR as expected. 1. I want to remove LND forever 2. I want to properly install CLN 3. I want to install mempool instance on the second node. |
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there should be another strategy called RDP Regular Dip Purchase. where people deposit but they dont simply buy when they deposit but have funds ready to buy the weekly dip.. where by if there is no dip that week THEN they just DCA at the whatever price of weekend
I agree but most people will argue they couldn't possibly know when the dip is reached. For Bitcoin, I consider every price at the level where it is now as a dip, so essentially DCA and RDP are identical processes |
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- And a limited edition bitcoin-only wallet.
So I was partially right. But why a limited edition? I think a bitcoin-only wallet would grant them higher revenue. Also, it may be bitcoin only (not as a separate option which is also available for models One and T)
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You would not gain any privacy with this method if you do not enable Tor, the Whirlpool coinjoin coordinator can simply link your inputs to your outputs for every mix by looking at the IP address that registered them.
Thanks for the info. It doesn't affect the tutorial itself though. Any addition is welcome, so If you have any technical details, let me know and I can add them to the OP. |
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This tutorial is no longer valid.
Since Sparrow 1.9.0 the mixing feature is no longer supported.
Links to other tutorials from the series:[BitcoinTalk Node Tutorial #1] Running Bitcoin Core on Raspbian Lite (GUI-less) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5476754.0[BitcoinTalk Node Tutorial #2] Installing Electrs from source https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5477339.0[BitcoinTalk Node Tutorial #4] Connecting BISQ to our node https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5478756.0[BitcoinTalk Node Tutorial #5] Hosting a Monero node on the same machine https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5480371.0
Sparrow terminal / infinite Whirlpool mixesInstalling SparrowSteps:Find the proper version for our architecture and download with wget: wget "https://github.com/sparrowwallet/sparrow/releases/download/1.7.9/sparrow-server_1.7.9-1_arm64.deb" Install the deb file using the command: sudo dpkg -i sparrow-server_1.7.9-1_arm64.deb By default, the Sparrow binary will be in
Running SparrowNote: Using ssh can be tricky. If you initiate a session, start sparrow and then close ssh, it will close sparrow too. So we will use the "screen" command. If it is not installed, run: Steps:Run screen command: Navigate to the path mentioned above ("/opt/sparrow/bin") and run Sparrow. It will load the following screen:  Insert the preferences tab and go to server:  Then choose the option you desire for the node to which you wish Sparrow to be connected. Personally I run Sparrow on the same linux device as my node, so it looks like this:  Then head back to the wallets tab and click on it:  Click on "Create wallet":  Go to the "Deposit" tab:  It will give you an address where you can send your funds:  Go to the UTXO tab and click on "Mix Selected"  Once the process goes further, head back to "Postmix" tab:  There, you will be presented with your UTXOs  Final StepsClick: this will get you out of the Sparrow app and it will leave it running on the background. Whenever you decide, you can enter Sparrow will be presented to you exactly where you left it and you can enjoy your free mixes. |
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I'll throw in a counter argument: what's the point of remembering the passphrase, if you don't remember the seed words it belongs to?
I do! However I will not remember them in the future. And I will not remember my passphrase in the future. I back it up so I don't need to remember it. Anyway, it's not the best discussion since I agree with both of you and I find it difficult to argue on behalf of other people :-p |
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