It is the first time that I heard about swisscoordinator.app, it seems they don't announce their coordinator as others do and that makes difficult to discover them. Something curious is that I really don't understand why they claim they charge a 0.5% coordination fee when Wasabi doesn't allow coordinators to charge you any coordination fee. It is important to understand that the coordination fee concept was removed from the protocol in order to prevent malicious coordinators from charging you money, it is a security measure.

About trust, you should assume that all coordinators could be compromised, even when the Wasabi client does the best effort to protect your privacy you should assume that they could find ways to learn something. For this same reason you shouldn't trust 100% what they claim, most coordinators will say "we have the most private policy ever", "we never log anything", and so on and on.

No, it does not. It only prevents receiving to **used** addresses. Receiving small amount to unused addresses it not an attack and that's why it doesn't prevent such a perfectly valid scenario.

It is even better than that, a dust attack is when your wallet receives a very small amount of sats to an **already used** address. That's why the Wasabi dust attack threshold doesn't prevent you from receiving very small amount of sats but from receiving very small amount of sats to addresses that have already been used.

Nobody would and nobody can because Wasabi 1.x was discontinued in 2022 and the WW1 coinjoin service provided by zkSNACKs stopped in 2023 once most liquidity went to WW 2.0.


zkSNACKs, the company that developed Wasabi, doesn't exist anymore. It closed its doors during the first quarter of 2024, since then Wasabi has been maintained by volunteers from the community. The question here is why these people are pretending to be able to track a service that doesn't even exist, for a CoinJoin technology that was obsoleted several years ago, and presenting proofs that nobody can read or verify.


Because those denominations allow us to decompose any number with minimal or no waste, what means that Wasabi coinjoins don't generate change.

I assume that SlowMist did not trace anything because otherwise they would have used that case to prove the entire world how good they are with a detailed article, blog post, video or any other ways to bust their reputation. Instead the wrote: "Case of study #2 - Tracing Wasabi coinjoins: we did it, believe us. That's all, folks"

That document doesn't provide any proof of their claim; it is a "just trust me, bro" pamphlet, in my opinion.


You are asking what else could have be done to escape with the stolen money. Are you stupid or what? 

Electrum does not generate bip39 seed phrases. So, you can only recover your electrum seed phrase using electrum.

Hi, Wasabi maintainer here.

I think your assumption doesn't match reality. None of the "attacks" that I have read come from Wasabi fans, but from people who also criticize Wasabi. Privacy advocates, freedom fighters, or however you want to call us, have been very cool and welcoming regarding Whirlpool's comeback, and we have rushed to audit the code and report our findings publicly ASAP because at this early stage it is easier and cheaper to fix the app and the protocol (once your user base grows it become almost impossible to do).

These findings are not destructive FUD but real problems for which we also suggest solutions. Look at this one, for example: https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqzgvgp66qxznw3mqvw9xsl9c9j6t8warcgvh283n67mlzuucdsppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0qyg8wumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytnddakj7qg3waehxw309ahx7um5wgh8w6twv5hsp94pph

Go to Settings and switch the Terminate Tor On Exit.


Tor doesn't prevent you from using internet without Tor at all.

There is not "they". Wasabi is not developed by a company anymore and everybody can run a coordinator, in fact the coordination service is currently provided by independent volunteers (you can become one).


Hahahaha I believed that nobody with an average IQ could ever believe it but it seems I was wrong. This was just another of the Samourai's masterlies targeting idiots.

It seems to work okay but it doesn't get much participants and that means that your anonymity set will be very low in comparison with other coordinators, however that can be okay for many scenarios where you want to gain privacy from non-super-wealthy adversaries, what I imagine is the case for 99% of people.

The reason Wasabi doesn't have multi signing is because those scripts cannot participate in a coinjoin because they would make the whole conjoin transaction malleable, that's why only segwit are allowed. However, once we have an standard way to do multisig with schnorr we could consider adding support for it.


Wasabi has three different coin selection modes but they are hidden by default because the automatic coin selector does a much better selection than most users do. That's possible because the wallet knows who knows about each of your UTXOs and then it can select automatically UTXOs that are already known by the payee or, if that's not possible, it allows you to decide who can know about the payment transaction. Wasabi also tries to avoid creating change as Bitcoin Core does and suggests different amounts close enough to the attempted payment to avoid it.

However advanced users don't like automatic coin control because most of them believe that they can make smarter selections; what's almost always false. In other cases it is because they need to verify or narrow the selection of coins or, because they have some very special needs and they know exactly what they want, like spending one very specific UTXO as a whole (1-in, 1-out) or a set of specified coins as a whole. In those cases, users are able to select the coins themselves. Wasabi allows you to do that too but it displays who is going to be able to track that transaction and alerts you in case you are mixing private coins together with non-private coins, for example there are cases where the user thinks they can do better than the software and wants to see for themselves the set of coins it will use and change it. This scenario is not absurd; in fact, users feel more internal peace/safety if they select the coins. Wasabi, for example, allows users to select the coins but the software will inform you if your selection can be improved, if it ruins your wallet's privacy, who will be able to track you, and whether change can be avoided or not.

Wasabi will always try to improve your privacy with an smart coin selection like when you have more than one utxo with the same script (you have reused an address) and in that case Wasabi will try to spend those utxos together to stop leaking info about your wallet every time you make a transaction. Manual coin selection risks overriding those automatic decisions. Also, for wallet with tons of utxos with different amounts, scripts, and histories it is hard to believe that a human can solve that kind of knapsack better than the computer. Anyway, three different coin selection methods with expert recommendations is enough.


Wasabi synchronization takes a lot of time only the first time and it is not expected that users resynchronize their wallets again and again. It is slow because Wasabi is a privacy wallet and for that reason it need to compute the balance by itself without sending information to any random server. This means that wasabi has to download all the blocks containing transactions relevant to your wallet.

There are basically three mechanisms light wallets use:

* [FAST - no private] Send your wallet's addresses to random Electrum servers run by who knows what "benevolent" entity
* [FASTEST - privacy nightmare] Send your xpubs to some server that persists them in a database and derive all your addresses (sometimes you need to identify against the server using an API key)
* [SLOWEST - private] Send nothing to anyone and download blocks. <-- This is what Wasabi does.

Wasabi can synchronize pretty fast even if it is the first synchronization using your own bitcoin node with version 2.6.0 only if your node provides compact filters.

That's correct, but in my opinion, it is even worse than that because centralized exchanges try to over-comply with regulations, going much further than any other kind of financial institution by tracking what you do with your bitcoins AFTER you withdraw from them. If they see that you participate in a CoinJoin with bitcoins that you withdrew from them, they request additional information from you under threat of closing your account, which in some cases means they take the money in your account if they don't like your explanations; what creates an incentive to request more information.

If you want to do something impactful you could go to Wasabi Wallet and finish the Silent Payment receiving part which is almost done or implement the UI por payments in coinjoin or implemente the coinpool idea from scratch. There are also less complex things to do like publishing indexers and coordinators behind onion services by default and even trivial tasks as allowing Wasabi to connect a chosen list of trusted bitcoin nodes instead of random ones discovered using the p2p gossip protocol.

Wasabi and Bitcoin Knots

Wasabi used to depend on Bitcoin Knots but since v2.6.0 that's not the case anymore. Bitcoin Knots provided an RPC feature that was not available in Bitcoin Core: GetBlock with previous outputs (verbosity 3), which was necessary to create the Wasabi custom compact filters without needing to keep a UTXO set as it did in previous versions. Additionally, both client and server made use of another exclusive RPC, GetMempoolInfo with fee rate histogram, which allowed Wasabi to estimate the fee rate better.

After Bitcoin Core merged the PR that extended the RPC GetBlock to provide previous outputs and the fee histogram was made optional in Wasabi, there is no more need for Bitcoin Knots. These changes were done long ago, much before the current discussion about OP_RETURN, and the reason behind them is purely technical.

Wasabi also redistributed Bitcoin Knots binaries as part of the Wasabi Wallet installers, something that makes no sense anymore in v2.6.0. Even though Wasabi v2.6.0 installers still come with Bitcoin Knots, why? Well, because the release was done while the OP_RETURN discussion started warming up, and we didn't want users to misinterpret our motives (You can see removing Knots was discussed months ago: https://github.com/orgs/WalletWasabi/discussions/13796).

The next Wasabi release will not redistribute Bitcoin Knots binaries because it is not a required dependency anymore and because Wasabi devs are not the ones to decide on behalf of Wasabi users what Bitcoin node they have to use.

A coinjoin is just a bitcoin transactions as any other bitcoin transaction, the only thing that makes them different is that it is created by many people instead of only one. That means that those people can do whatever they want with their money, they can send it to someone else or send it to themselves. Here you can see that someone decided to donate to El Salvador bitcoin address in a Wasabi coinjoin: https://mempool.space/tx/8c58beccc25acc763c528515b3a23bb92eeb6dc41b519ef681f76dfcc76cc19d#vout=433 Was that the only one making a payment? There is no way to know, however we can assume that most people send the money back to themselves because that's how Wasabi works by default.

Now, it is so obvious that that transaction is a Wasabi coinjoin that someone could decide to reject coins coming from it and in fact that's what many exchanges do: they just rejects those coins.

But the real problem with of this is not technical at all, people who wants privacy and deal with exchanges are not different from those who want a hot icecream. If you use an exchange then do not coijoin and if you coinjoin do not use an exchange because exchanges are the perhaps the main reason why we don't have privacy in bitcoin and coinjoins are one of the fee tools that allow us to have some privacy in bitcoin.

Hey Wasabi Wallet dev here.


You are right, this is the main use of a coinjoin: protect your financial privacy.


There are basically two options currently: Wasabi Wallet and JoinMarket.


That's not so easy. Even one of the biggest and wealthier actors in this industry as ByBit offers chain analysts unbelievable bounties for those who help them to track the stolen funds across coinjoins and it seems they are not having any luck, see by yourself: https://www.lazarusbounty.com


Coinjoins help to protect you and your money from entities that want to track you, absolutely. Can it protects you from a wealthy and powerful organization like a big state intelligence department? I really don't know, it seems it can but I can't bet my hat. Can you --the user-- make a mistake after coinjoining that ruins all your wallet privacy? Yes, absolutely.

I develop Wasabi Wallet and as a general recommendation I would prefer a desktop wallet for anything real usage. Bitcoin Core, Sparrow and Wasabi are good wallets and the final decision depends on what the user want to achieve with them.

What a shameful statement!

In my experience users screw up their privacy precisely because manual coin control and that's why IMO manual coin control should be hidden by default.


Separating non-KYC from KYC wallets is a sad solution. It means that your wallet does a poor job managing the knowledge about how hows what and how to minimize it. If your wallet doesn't allow you manage manage that then you will screw it up sooner or later.


This is in most of the cases a very bad idea. It is very unlike that users know exactly all people or entities that can track each of their utxos.