You've responded to NONE of the points made by Schneier et al. and have disingenuously brought up straw dogs that have never been mentioned. FAIL, re-enroll logic class.

Bye.

No, Schneier here was referring to the more recent NIST fumbling with the arguably inappropriate changes of the "winning" Keccak hash variation, not a backdoor.  Schneier's far more serious concern has long been that expressed in "Did NSA Put a Secret Backdoor in New Encryption Standard?" by Bruce Schneier, 
Wired News, 
November 15, 2007:

"But one of those [NSA PNRG] generators -- the one based on elliptic curves -- is not like the others. Called Dual_EC_DRBG, not only is it a mouthful to say, it's also three orders of magnitude slower than its peers. It's in the standard only because it's been championed by the NSA, which first proposed it years ago in a related standardization project at the American National Standards Institute.

The NSA has always been intimately involved in U.S. cryptography standards -- it is, after all, expert in making and breaking secret codes. So the agency's participation in the NIST (the U.S. Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology) standard is not sinister in itself. It's only when you look under the hood at the NSA's contribution that questions arise.

Problems with Dual_EC_DRBG were first described in early 2006. The math is complicated, but the general point is that the random numbers it produces have a small bias. The problem isn't large enough to make the algorithm unusable -- and Appendix E of the NIST standard describes an optional work-around to avoid the issue -- but it's cause for concern. Cryptographers are a conservative bunch: We don't like to use algorithms that have even a whiff of a problem.

But today there's an even bigger stink brewing around Dual_EC_DRBG. In an informal presentation (.pdf) at the CRYPTO 2007 conference in August, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson showed that the algorithm contains a weakness that can only be described as a backdoor."
 
If Schneier et al. have ever changed their view on the PRNG Backdoor or expressed regret on their somewhat hedged probabilistic/weakness interpretations, I've never seen it in print and would appreciate any citation of such.

As Schneier has said, only a new Church Committee will ever reveal convincing truth and reform, and until such time it seems only fools use AES-256 without an open, proven, fully disclosed PRNG alternative to Dual_EC_DRBG (e.g.Twofish) and that it's possibly risky to use the NIST-Keccak hash variation rather than a similarly reliable hash, e.g. SKEIN.

...unless that is, in 2005 the NSA installed a PRNG backdoor in the AES-256 SHA-3 "NIST-approved" protocol for encryption, as Bruce Schneier et al. have shown long ago is highly probable.

Bruce Schneier has long written that the probability is unacceptably high that the NSA has installed a PRNG backdoor in the widely accepted SHA-3 standard protocol for cryptography (which NIST grudgingly accepted only with a footnoted caveat that one might prefer to use a more efficient alternative).  If such a backdoor exists (which seems nearly certain to me), the NSA can rather easily crack into any level it chooses of such encryption, and that means virtually all the BTC and altcoin protocols - which would be the rather instant death of such cryptocurrencies.  Is Quarkcoin the only alternative cryptocoin that claims it does not use the tainted PNRG?

This paper points out an interesting weakness in PRNG's, but the real threat to BTC with respect to PRNG's may be far more serious: Bruce Schneier has long written that the probability is unacceptably high that the NSA has installed a PRNG backdoor in the widely accepted SHA-3 standard protocol for cryptography (which NIST grudgingly accepted only with a footnoted caveat that one might prefer to use a more efficient alternative).  If such a backdoor exists (which seems nearly certain to me), the NSA can rather easily crack into any level it chooses of such encryption, and that means virtually all the BTC protocols - which would be the rather instant death of such cryptocurrencies.  Is Quarkcoin the only alternative cryptocoin that does not use the tainted PNRG?