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crowdfunding insurance i think is very dificult to run and work
in ico selling is high complexity , if safe ico selling i think is only escrow
but if still open crowdfunding insurance, who is in bitcointalk trusted can open service, i think only administrator is good open insurance service
Well why not read the white paper. The solution has been peer reviewed by a few people and so far I haven't found a single rebuttal for why it wouldn't work I have heard however that there may not be an incentive for insurers to participate but that is wrong because of the following: 1. Insurers can make money if they can evaluate and manage risk. 2. There is no competing investment types where you invest bitcoin and then get a your bitcoin back + a fiat premium for locking your bitcoin for a period of time. In any real market its simply a matter of finding the right price for the service. If you read the paper and are not convinced then I will genuinely be surprised. Thanks Joshua ok , the success of this scheme depends that a friend or a known of the project developer want to act like a vouch with those conditions, there must be some incentive for the voucher You "vouch" with your money. You put down a collateral deposit that is 100% equal to the future refund amount. In exchange you can collect an insurance premium. |
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humans are unpredictable, as long as crowdfunding relies in good will and possible benefits of the project, there will always be people who take advantage of this, take money for themselves. that is human nature
But in every market where insurance, warranties, guaranties, regulation has come in there has been less opportunity for fraud. How is crowdfunding the exception? Someone won the Nobel prize for their analysis of the mechanism which we currently see operating in crowdfunding markets today: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Market_for_LemonsSo no I disagree if you change the incentives you change peoples actions and that is what Peerback could potentially do. |
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crowdfunding insurance i think is very dificult to run and work
in ico selling is high complexity , if safe ico selling i think is only escrow
but if still open crowdfunding insurance, who is in bitcointalk trusted can open service, i think only administrator is good open insurance service
Well why not read the white paper. The solution has been peer reviewed by a few people and so far I haven't found a single rebuttal for why it wouldn't work I have heard however that there may not be an incentive for insurers to participate but that is wrong because of the following: 1. Insurers can make money if they can evaluate and manage risk. 2. There is no competing investment types where you invest bitcoin and then get a your bitcoin back + a fiat premium for locking your bitcoin for a period of time. In any real market its simply a matter of finding the right price for the service. If you read the paper and are not convinced then I will genuinely be surprised. Thanks Joshua |
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Yes there will always be predatory crowdfunding project creators. But do you really believe that the friends of the predators are willing to vouch for them and offer insurance to project backers.
this is peer to peer insurance in other words this is people who leverage their reputation to have their friends provide collateral for future refunds. If you are a predator you don't have any friends.
Thanks
Joshua
for that you need to be sure they are real people that could give a legit vouch, in that case, it is great to avoid all those scammers making crowdfunding campaigns It is a good idea to get first a vouch before investing. But what if the person that giving a vouch is paid by the devs itself? I think the best way to make sure that investment is safe is to check the profile of the devs by your own research. Ok I think this product is fundamentally being misunderstood. It works like this 1. Backers pledge funds 2. Backers pay a premium for insurance 3. Insurance is provided by someone who knows the project creator and needs to put up the ENTIRE VALUE of the collateral amt. for the future refund in advance. 4. Insurer places collateral bond into multisig. 5. If scammer doesn't ship a product then backer gets refund 6. Insurer looses their bond So this moves the risk of scams from the backers to the insurers for the price of a premium. Insurers need to realize that they should only put down collateral if they believe a project will succeed. Otherwise their collateral is lost. This shifts the due diligence from the backer to the insurer (refund seller). So if you want to do your due diligence you will get paid for doing it. That payment is called a premium. Its all there in the paper. Thanks Joshua |
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humans are unpredictable, as long as crowdfunding relies in good will and possible benefits of the project, there will always be people who take advantage of this, take money for themselves. that is human nature
Yes there will always be predatory crowdfunding project creators. But do you really believe that the friends of the predators are willing to vouch for them and offer insurance to project backers. this is peer to peer insurance in other words this is people who leverage their reputation to have their friends provide collateral for future refunds. If you are a predator you don't have any friends. Thanks Joshua |
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Hello, Can refunds using Bitcoin escrows solve the lemon problem in the crowdfunding space? That's the question I really would like to have answered with the help of the communities input. I really would like to hear your thoughts so that I can make active improvements to the paper I am writing. George Akerlof in his seminal paper "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism" once wrote: "The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence." Crowdfunding although still a very popular way to fundraise support for ideas, products and causes has suffered from a growing trend of disappointing failures. Have you ever wondered if the following might be true: 1. Legitimate business is being driven out of the crowdfunding marketplace because the average consumer cannot determine whether or not a project will be successful or will fail. 2. The past negative experiences of crowdfunding backers are leading to a situation where the market mechanics of fundraising will one day break down amidst the loss of trust between project backers and project creators. I would be really interested to hear your thoughts in the comments below as to how failures in crowdfunding affect successful well intentioned project creators. **Do you believe that what Akerlof described as the law of lemons is driving down the pledge amounts of legitimate crowdsales such that they cannot sufficiently fundraise to cover the costs of production?** Take a project like the coolest cooler. They ran out of funds which lead to significant delays and an inability to ship the product. 1. Was this failure just incompetence on their part (it was a lemon) or was the project really a peach that simply couldn't appeal to consumers to pay the price of a peach because consumers had no way of discerning that coolest was actually a peach? 2. Are consumers simply averaging the prices of lemons and peaches in the crowdfunding marketplace making it harder and harder for project creators to set reasonable pledge levels? 3. How much does information asymmetry affect the prices we currently see on Kickstarter and other platforms? **I really want to hear all of your comments below.** And as always if you find this discussion engaging, interesting, worthwhile please upvote. In addition if you can read and comment on the paper please do so, link provided below. Lets get some interesting discussion about some of these issues going. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W-OF_34dQ4KgynjiBvvZZoexY4HGL13_O23XnC0frvE/edit?usp=sharingAny really helpful or useful comments that become material for improving the paper will be included in publication and your contribution will be recognized. |
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Yes, we'll elaborate on that and how it can be done in a trustless mode
My absolute dream is a HW wallet that stores ethereum private keys tied into a smart contract. All of the keys have the same Hierarchical Deterministic seed which means that although all of the keys have different private keys that are not known between parties one HD seed can recover all the keys. So then I give these keys out and 1 key can unlock > 50$ per day 2 keys can unlock > 150$ per day 3 keys can unlock > 300$ per day 4 keys can unlock > 800$ per day 5 keys can unlock > 1500$ per day 6 keys can unlock > 2400$ per day 7 keys can unlock > 10000$ per day 8 keys can unlock > 20000$ per day 9 keys can unlock > all funds This would be my dream way to secure my funds within an ethereum smart contract and to secure my employees private keys with an affordable hardware wallet. Then I could just give these out to whomever needs it even if they are not technical and bundle them with a usb low profile thumbdrive / keychain with etherbrowser app software to provide the interface for the non technical user and VIOLA! Its my dream. Hope there is a product on the market someday that can allow me to make it happen  ! |
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also GreenAddress is probably the most complex integration example since it's already pretty secure when configured in paranoid mode (i.e. with an external second factor on a dumb phone), so here HW.1 adds a little bit of security by preventing a malware owning the computer or Chrome to get access to the seed when HW.1 is not connected, and that's pretty much it. It just reduces the attack surface a little bit more, and makes using the service more convenient when logging in and transacting, since you don't have to remember anything but your PIN and nothing is stored anywhere but on the dongle.
Id like someone trying to sell me on the scenario where I want to give bitcoin to a person and I am comparing using HW.1 to using blockchain.info to create a paper wallet and put it in an encrypted zip folder and emailing it to someone. I hope we all know how dangerous it is to give the uneducated person a digital paper wallet where they copy paste the private key into wallet software. If I was a hacker I would write code which does only one thing, namely it would monitor the clipboard for a 51 character string beginning with "5" and immediately send it off to a program which would empty that address from all of its funds. There may be malware which does more sophisticated attacks at stealing bitcoin funds but I only know the type of malicious code I would write being an incredibly lazy person. I've told people several times that they should type in the first few characters and then only copy a portion of the private key for the purpose of importing into wallet software. Not sure how much this minimizes the possibility of attack because I don't write malicious code and understanding malware is not my expertise. Would greatly appreciate getting a professionals POV on the subject. Being that I could give HW.1 to a friend and this would save them from needing to be exposed to this kind of attack I am weighing its value with respect to this specific scenario. So I would really really like a video showing someone wanting to give bitcoin to a friend and considering the various possibilities of how they might do that with HW.1 being compared to an encrypted zip file with a paper wallet inside and sent via a dropbox link which is later deleted. If someone can do a video on this and provide some genuine insight 0.025 BTC reward (10 dollars at time of writing). Video must contain the perspective of a minimally technical person receiving a HW.1 in comparison to receiving a paper wallet and the exact steps they take to initialize a new wallet software to be able to send the funds. In the youtube video comments link back to this post and provide a bitcoin address. Also email me joshuad31 -a t- yahoo -d o t- com. ~J |
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Hello,
I can say that I myself had some difficulties but two things really impressed me:
1. Very fast response times from Nicolas on the support team
2. Greenaddress's wallet is sleek and has a good UX experience
I have three laptops and each one had its own challenge:
1. windows 7 64 bit - I needed to install drivers and reboot the machine before the greenaddress app would recognize the wallet. Wasn't clear I needed a reboot
2. On my windows 8 machine it would recognize the wallet but it would also store my pin on the computer so it seemed like it didn't even need the card to access any funds until I went into settings to turn the pin remembering feature off.
3. On my windows 7 - 32 bit machine (company laptop) with some restrictive settings running the drivers never installed correctly.
My overall experience is tentatively positive but having spent many hours working with bitcoin technologies I can still say there is plenty I don't understand about this wallet:
1. The initial setup experience caused some confusion because I am not sure if I was able to get my mnemonic for backup done correctly. This is because greenaddress does not tell you its initializing with the hardware wallet BEFORE you create a new wallet and get your mnemonic.
There is no way to tell how the keys are generated. Are they generated by greenaddress and then written to the HW.1? Are they generated by the HW.1 and then the HW.1 tells greenaddress what the memonic should be? Since its unclear at what point the greenaddress wallet actually initializes with the HW.1 I can' figure this out.
2. The private keys are on the HW.1 but because the *quick login* feature can be active resulting in access to your wallet without needing to access HW.1 this must mean that greenaddress also stores these keys in some other location. How in the world was the greenaddress app able to open up the wallet with only a pin number when the *Quick login* - feature was selected? Where were the private keys stored if they were not stored on the wallet? Were they stored encrypted or unencrypted? If they were encrypted by only my pin number how strong could the encryption possibly be?
3. I'm still not sure that I believe this is better than 2 factor authentication using a cell phone. We already have seen that the greenaddress wallet has a habit of storing keys in some format (encrypted or unencrypted) on the computer anyways. If the keys are only encrypted using a weak pin then obviously blockchain.info's wallet is the better option.
4. I am familiar with handing paper wallets and loading actual private keys into software wallets. I am comfortable with adding / deleting private keys from a blockchain.info wallet to gain access to funds. I am not familiar with using a memonic to recover lost keys. There should be some videos to assist the consumer to learn more about this. I assume that this memonic is a feature of a Hierarchical Deterministic wallet but I'm not sure. So one memonic recovers all possible keys that could be generated by greenaddress / HW.1? Also what is the different / benefits between writing down an encrypted seed memonic and an unencrypted one? If greenaddress removes their app from the app store and I only have the memonic could I take and enter this into another wallet software to recover my private keys?
Also it would be really nice to have someone run a debugging program to isolate the type of communication taking place between the greenaddress wallet and the HW.1 to show us the following items:
1. Process of how private keys are generated - How is the mnemonic generated?
2. Showing how a request is inputted to the HW.1 and a signed transaction is outputted.
I'm not yet sold on this technology, I purchased it to learn about it. To convince me (and I am a pretty tech savvy consumer) that there is a benefit to using HW.1 there needs to be way more work done to educate the consumer as to the workings of this product.
~JD
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Ok so I received two of my hardbits today. I would like to direct people to the users manual which is located here: http://www.hardbit.cn/index.php/downloadsThe problem I have is this: 1. No way to upload your own private key. You must use the private key that comes with your wallet. This means we need to rely on a third party hardbit.cn to assure us that the private key they generated was either destroyed or is kept somewhere securely. 2. No way to download the private key on the wallet without using their proprietary backup system. 3. No way to via a usb connection transmit data to / from the device. Seems like the the private keys are generated automatically by the wallet when setup. They still needs to open up the software and how it works for trust to be established. I will say this that they were quick to process my refund. They refunded my shipping and handling. When I pointed out that I wasn't happy that their source code was not open source and there were trust issues they stated that maybe sometime in the future they would like to use open source source code. This company is genuinely trying to offer value in the bitcoin space I just am not interested in this particular approach. But their honesty is a positive. They would do much better if they decided to create online videos showcasing their product and how to use it. If I could have seen one I would have saved them the trouble of the return process. Joshua |
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Ok so I received two of my hardbits today. I would like to direct people to the users manual which is located here: http://www.hardbit.cn/index.php/downloadsAs the instructions show you use this device with software installed on another android device. How these two devices communicate are made clear in the users manual if you download the link. All communication is done via QR codes. The problem I have is this: 1. No way to upload your own private key. You must use the private key that comes with your wallet. This means we need to rely on a third party hardbit.cn to assure us that the private key they generated was either destroyed or is kept somewhere securely. 2. No way to download the private key on the wallet without using their proprietary backup system. 3. No way to via a usb connection transmit data to / from the device. For these reasons I feel that this product will not suit my needs. I will be returning this device because I need a device that fulfills the following requirements: 1. I have control of the private keys not a third party 2. If something were to happen to my private keys outside of the hardbit device then I can export the keys within the device to my computer in a format that can be loaded into any other bitcoin wallet. 3. USB is used to transmit data to the device to allow for the device to receive private keys generated outside of the device. If those keys are lost usb is used to send private keys within the device to an application running on my computer such as blockchain.info. USB is used to receive payment requests and it is used to send sign transactions to a wallet software such as blockchain.info. If the above is your expectation also then DO NOT PURCHASE THIS PRODUCT. Hi ，I'm the R&D leader for Hardbit.
Thanks everyone for your interest in Hardbit.
We've sent 14 Hardbits out .2 already in costomers' hands.
Currently we are busy working on polishing online side software and user's manual.
So please forgive us on slow response of questions.
I think the user's manual will answer most of your questions.
And, the full techincal white paper is already published in Chinese. The English version is only 1/3 of the whole article. We will transate that in a week.
Here I put some core ideas why we develop this product:
1 To make a solution that is best effort for Bitcoin safety for dummies.
(For experienced IT guys, they really don't need hardware wallet.)
(Don't try to teach dummies how to protect their Bitcoins. The more they know, the more possibility they lose their Bitcoins)
so,,convenience is not taking into consideration. Only safety, safety ,safety
So please don't compare convenience with online wallets. Hardbit will perfectly lose.
2 To make a system that online client and offline client can come from different providers. This system is based on a simple communication protocol. (An open-protocol system is much more powerful than an open-source software), this system will help build the offline payment eco system of Democurrency.
3 The hardware must be affordable and portable, and last but not least, not easily recognized as a Bitcoin wallet.
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Hello,
I am trying to receive some helpful insight as to future careers in the realm of cryptocurrency. I was wondering what skill sets map to what future possible job opportunities related to bitcoin. I want to consider which skillsets might be a good fit given my background and the amount of time I have to invest to learn something new. I have the following questions:
1. Do I really need to be able to program to develop a useful skill set for cryptocurrency analysis or for creation of new cryptocurrency integrations / applications? If so which programming language do I need to know?
2. Bitcoin represents an overlap of so many disciplines and technologies. In order to work in this domain for some of the jobs that will be available initially do you need to have knowledge of everything?
- the bitcoin protocol used to create transactions
- the programming that allows bitcoin clients / nodes to operate
- finance and contracts
- cryptography
- blockchain transaction analysis
- how network protocols allow for verification of transactions and distribution of the blockchain database.
3. I see many ways 3rd parties could offer services pertaining contracts, insurance, wills/deeds/trusts; what types of employers are likely to become initial early adopters to offer these services? When might we start seeing offerings for these types of services become available?
4. If I wanted to work for FinCEN today as a cryptocurrency analyst (I think they are the only ones that employ such people) what skill sets would I need to successfully interview and be hired for that job today?
5. What do you feel is the best learning path to obtain the knowledge that relates to these skill sets?
6. Specifically what job titles and job functions do you feel are on the imminent horizon?
Joshua
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Hello,
I am trying to receive some helpful insight as to future careers in the realm of cryptocurrency. I was wondering what skill sets map to what future possible job opportunities related to bitcoin. I want to consider which skillsets might be a good fit given my background and the amount of time I have to invest to learn something new. I have the following questions:
1. Do I really need to be able to program to develop a useful skill set for cryptocurrency analysis or for creation of new cryptocurrency integrations / applications? If so which programming language do I need to know?
2. Bitcoin represents an overlap of so many disciplines and technologies. In order to work in this domain for some of the jobs that will be available initially do you need to have knowledge of everything?
- the bitcoin protocol used to create transactions
- the programming that allows bitcoin clients / nodes to operate
- finance and contracts
- cryptography
- blockchain transaction analysis
- how network protocols allow for verification of transactions and distribution of the blockchain database.
3. I see many ways 3rd parties could offer services pertaining contracts, insurance, wills/deeds/trusts; what types of employers are likely to become initial early adopters to offer these services? When might we start seeing offerings for these types of services become available?
4. If I wanted to work for FinCEN today as a cryptocurrency analyst (I think they are the only ones that employ such people) what skill sets would I need to successfully interview and be hired for that job today?
5. What do you feel is the best learning path to obtain the knowledge that relates to these skill sets?
6. Specifically what job titles and job functions do you feel are on the imminent horizon?
Joshua
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After much consideration I believe that with the correct strategy it is actually worth playing Satoshi dice once and only once. It is possible to increase your initial investment by 20% if you are willing to take a 17.5% risk of loosing your entire initial investment. If you play for an increase of 10% there is even less risk associated to playing. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AnsZR1yoh3LrdE13OXNkeHRBQ01LaDctWF9IR1N2TlE&usp=sharingI provide a complete and detailed analysis showing that the only way you can ever win with the most advanced strategy is a combination of luck and limiting your winnings to a small percentage of your starting bet amount. |
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This is your solution? Ok so basically unless you are linux savvy then forget securing your wallet and what about portable devices? This is not a viable solution for the majority of people. Bitcoin is a hobby right now. The only way for people to take it seriously is if the security flaws are addressed by the software itself. Otherwise how can main stream people use it for everyday purchases? Your basically saying only people that are comfortable with installing and running linux should use it. Great that's less than 5% of people who make purchases online. How about a real solution. Right now if you ask me bitcoins should be trading for cents not dollars. Mtgox isn't secure, the wallet.dat file can't be secured in any real way see: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Talk:Securing_your_wallet#Flaws_with_argument_regarding_encryptionWhy would anyone want to speculate on a currency that can vanish into thin air? The cash in my physical wallet is far more secure even walking around the most dangerous neighborhood than the methods in place to use the wallet.dat file now. Forget trying to exchange currency on mtgox which also is lunacy. |
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How can you possibly even consider going in this direction when there has been so many security flaws discovered in the past week. So you want to take an inherently flawed system that does not allow for an always encrypted wallet.dat file and allow for a physical device that will be used to make store purchases. Ok right now do you know how many billions of dollars are already being stolen by credit card skimmers? But hey its alright because the bank will cover losses to these transactions. Now you want to take an inherently insecure system that has no bank to protect against fraud and make it also vulnerable to skimmers. Great idea. Put an rfid chip in it while your at it so they can do it at a distance.
Why don't we first decide to create a platform for secure transactions as they exist now and worry about applications like this later. I mean have you seen all the problems people are having with compromised mtgox accounts. Nothing about bitcoin is secure or reliable right now. Once we can secure the wallet.dat to be always encrypted and we can provide for a secure way to exchange this currency without worrying about an ewallet that can be compromised then lets talk about taking digital currency into the realm of the physical real world.
What we need is an always encrypted wallet.dat file. Till this change takes place everything else is vanity of vanities because it means bitcoin will never be taken as a truly secure form of currency.
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