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1  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: Secret sharing scheme WITHOUT Shamir Secrete Sharing. on: May 18, 2020, 03:29:25 AM
Instead, would it be possible to use an Android device booted to a live OS (from a USB stick)?
An Android device as in a mobile phone? It's not possible to boot a phone to a live OS as far as I am aware - pretty sure you need to do a clean install or "flash" of your desired OS, but please correct me if I'm wrong.

Based on my initial research, I am afraid you are right... ;-)
2  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: Secret sharing scheme WITHOUT Shamir Secrete Sharing. on: May 15, 2020, 04:41:32 AM
All I meant was that it was set up in the same way you would generate any secret share, paper wallet, mnemonic seed, etc., to ensure that your secret isn't stolen in the process of you creating it. It should be done preferably on a permanently airgapped computer, but if that is not possible, then at the very least on a computer booted to a live OS from a USB drive or similar with the internet access disabled, printed using a "dumb" printer, with no one else around at the time, etc.

Instead, would it be possible to use an Android device booted to a live OS (from a USB stick)?

3  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: Secret sharing scheme WITHOUT Shamir Secrete Sharing. on: May 12, 2020, 03:15:48 AM
Provided this is set up securely, then the only additional knowledge about your secret that an attacker with one share can gain is its length. Knowing one share does not give an attacker any other information about your secret, and so they would still need to brute force 2128 combinations.

Thank you for your perfect understanding of what I am implementing. Could you please elaborate on what you mean by "Provided this is set up securely"?
4  Bitcoin / Project Development / Secret sharing scheme WITHOUT Shamir Secrete Sharing. on: May 11, 2020, 02:22:23 AM
Hello,

I am planning to use the following XOR scheme to divide a secret into only 2 shares (I do not want to use Shamir Secret Sharing for different reasons that are beyond the scope of this post).

Here's an example of the XOR scheme I have in mind.

SECRET   =  0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1  (…)  0 0 1 1 0

SHARE 1 =  TRUNC128 (SHA512 (SECRET))

         =  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1  (…)  1 1 0 0 1

SHARE 2 =  SECRET ^ SHARE1

         =  0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1  (…)  0 0 1 1 0

         ^  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1  (…)  1 1 0 0 1

        =  0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 1

SECRET   =  SHARE1 ^ SHARE 2

       =  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1  (…)  1 1 0 0 1

        ^  0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0  (…)  1 1 1 1 1

       =  0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1  (…)  0 0 1 1 0

I have a few questions about that XOR scheme as I am building a case for using it.

1) How resistant would such a scheme be to common attack vectors (brute force...)?

2) Are there any ways to evaluate what it (or how much it) would take to break that scheme?

3) Is that scheme already used in "notably safe applications"? If that is the case, which ones?
5  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: Taking over our AWS instance if we go out of business? on: May 04, 2020, 04:14:36 AM
Thanks. Now how can our customers know *for sure* that we always pay Amazon 2 years up-front?
6  Bitcoin / Project Development / Taking over our AWS instance if we go out of business? on: April 28, 2020, 06:59:22 AM
Hello,

We are a startup about to launch a service whose purpose is to automatically send one email (with private BTC-related information) at a specific date in the future (within a 2-year timeframe). We are currently using an AWS instance to send that one email.

After initial market survey, our prospective customers mentioned they are afraid that that one email may never be sent if we go out of business.

We want to provide our customers with the insurance that that one email will be sent as planned even if we go out of business. Are there, for example, insurance policies we could subscribe to, or some (insurance) companies that would take over our Amazon instance for 2 years following our going out of business (if that happens)?
7  Bitcoin / Bitcoin Technical Support / Secret-sharing scheme that can be “audited” without auditing code? on: April 24, 2020, 02:28:16 AM
I am designing an app that allows (among other things...) users to divide a secret into 2 shards and was planning to use Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) to do so.

However, I want to allow users of my app (who may not be coders...) to double-check--without having to audit my code--that my implementation of SSS is not flawed.

In other words, using another implementation of SSS available elsewhere (e.g. on the web, GitHub...), users of my app should ideally be able to obtain the same 2 shards as the ones provided by my app.

I understand that, considering the random data used in SSS to compute the shards, this request may not even make sense at all since it may simply be impossible by design (since SSS is not deterministic...)...

If that is indeed the case, which other reliable public (deterministic) solution/algorithm could my app use to:
a) separate a secret into 2 shards,
b) allow anyone to recompute these 2 shards outside of my app.

Thanks a lot for your kind support!
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