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Life is not that simple, we do not always get what we want. Think of it as a simple business transaction or investment. If you are being specific about energy consumption and environmental impact of mining then there are many so-called eco-friendly coins out there, you should consider joining their project if it makes you feel you will meet your goals. But I want PoW.
It's just that I don't like the impact on the environment.
All that energy has it's purpose, so what I am looking for is a better usage of that energy. Without compromising the competitive mining.
And now, from what I've learned, I have some thinking to do on how the aggregate mining cost fits the equation. We also want to reduce that. I got the feeling that karoke interest in this topic had to do with a desire to create a new project for himself. And not to specifically join this project. Maybe i got the wrong impression. No, I am already with Dash. ATM I just have a vision for a solution and kind of concrete intuition on how it could be implemented with Dash and using Dash Platform. The project is half baked and might solve to nothing. Way too early to share any details here. I have a lot of studying and thinking to do to fit the pieces together and that is the main motive of my engagement here (to study and understand). My other motive is trying to understand both sides related to the proposal of changing the block reward distribution. I do not attribute too much importance to this initiative (IMO the time should have been spent on development of Dash Platform) because my interests are very long term. I consider this period of low blockchain activity a temporary phase. If Dash survives in the next 5 years (and from what I see it is very well positioned for that), the activity on the blockchain will thrive and the problem will be solved by itself. The service provided by masternodes will grow significantly and so will the costs leading to equilibrium between masternodes' and miners' cost margins (or the market will take care of that anyway :-( as I have been shown). For that matter if anything comes out of my vision above (a better use of PoW energy), the implementation as I envision it now would surely create a lot of additional activity on Dash blockchain. |
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But shouldn't in theory reducing the mining reward reduce the aggregate mining cost passed on to the market?
What I assumed was:
mining rewards reduced => some miners shut down (buy masternodes instead or exit altogether) => more rewards for other miners, aggregate mining cost reduced
The equilibrium would be restored with less hashrate, but there is plenty of it to secure the network left.
What you are saying is that in practice the miners don't shut down, but continue to mine at a reduced profit? So aggregate mining cost stays the same, but there are more masternode rewards to be sold.
That would explain it. What is the evidence for it? Is there a miner here that can confirm or add some info?
I understand the second part now, thank you.
Look this way: imagine that Satoshi created Bitcoin as POS. Ha, got it? But I want PoW. It's just that I don't like the impact on the environment. All that energy has it's purpose, so what I am looking for is a better usage of that energy. Without compromising the competitive mining. And now, from what I've learned, I have some thinking to do on how the aggregate mining cost fits the equation. We also want to reduce that. |
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And always remember the main point for me (economics aside): We don't need the 45% PoW force anymore. DASH as a project don't need to waste the energy for it. And that's something important for me, and I'm sure for more people out there.
Not wasting energy is also very important for me. But I also like PoW for 'philosophical' and monetary reasons related to competitive mining and scarcity giving value to a blockchain. That is what currently motivates me to study some interesting solutions that keep harnessing PoW while not wasting energy. The PoW is still necessary in Dash because it provides an entropy pool for the randomness used by Chainlocks (for random selection of LLMQ, masternodes, etc). It is also a fall-back method when for some reason (very improbable but it can happen) Chainlocks fail to lock the block. Are there other reasons for PoW now that we have Chainlocks? Where can I find more information that would allow me to estimate how much entropy is needed? If someone knowledgeable would be so kind to point me in the right direction I would be grateful. Have you read this thread ? https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/source-of-entropy.49136/I am not sure it gives you a clear answer, but it is the thread that discusses entropy specifically and explains why ChainLocks could fail (due to BLS signatures still having the possibility to fail). Perfect. Thanks. Will take a look. |
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And always remember the main point for me (economics aside): We don't need the 45% PoW force anymore. DASH as a project don't need to waste the energy for it. And that's something important for me, and I'm sure for more people out there.
Not wasting energy is also very important for me. But I also like PoW for 'philosophical' and monetary reasons related to competitive mining and scarcity giving value to a blockchain. That is what currently motivates me to study some interesting solutions that keep harnessing PoW while not wasting energy. The PoW is still necessary in Dash because it provides an entropy pool for the randomness used by Chainlocks (for random selection of LLMQ, masternodes, etc). It is also a fall-back method when for some reason (very improbable but it can happen) Chainlocks fail to lock the block. Are there other reasons for PoW now that we have Chainlocks? Where can I find more information that would allow me to estimate how much entropy is needed? If someone knowledgeable would be so kind to point me in the right direction I would be grateful. |
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How and why this 'pressure' on the investors is manifested? Should the investor be interested in how much the distribution of the block rewards is skewed from an 'optimal|ideal|equilibrium'? He cares about the emission schedule and what not, but not about the 'inner' distribution of rewards and who bears the cost of producing the block Of course an average "investor doesn't care" about the inner distribution. The question is rather, how does reducing the mining reward reduce the aggregate mining cost passed on to the market ? That's the aim of the DCG proposal. (Although it's stated in terms of miners supplying less Dash to the market but actually, to be consistent with their premise that miners sell to cover costs, it should be restated as "drawing less fiat from the market"). Mining costs are denominated in fiat (because electricity companies). Therefore it's the fiat cost that's passed to the market to pay. To achieve the objective of "drawing less fiat" therefore the mining costs would have to be less (in relative terms). For the mining costs to reduce, competition for the next block would have to also reduce. That only happens when demand for the coin overall reduces, not necessarily by changing the reward ratio. (As quizzie has most helpfully pointed out above). In my observations, a reduction in reward ratio does not manifest in reduced aggregate mining costs. Instead it manifests in reduced marketcap share and reduced capital influx relative to 100% mining reward coins. In other words less competitive as an investment. Since the market (miners or investors) covers the mining cost but only receives partial supply, it reacts by devaluing the balance of the supply it doesn't receive, since this represents the supposed "value added tax" to pay for the masternode network. It can do this happily without masternode revenues becoming unprofitable (they're at near 100% margin). Even miners can stay viable via difficulty adjustments if necessary. The only aspect that loses out is the capital value of our holdings. That decreases relative to competing 100% mining ratio assets. When I say "devalue" I don't necessarily mean devalue in absolute terms but relative to competing mined chains. That's why ranking IS important. Not per se, but because it shows up the opportunity cost of our protocol decisions such as reward splits. Why it is the market that intervenes to massacre high margins? There's some commentary about this back here. See from "consider why bear markets happen". Also here on the problem of distinct groups of holders at different cost bases and chronic "profit taking". But shouldn't in theory reducing the mining reward reduce the aggregate mining cost passed on to the market? What I assumed was: mining rewards reduced => some miners shut down (buy masternodes instead or exit altogether) => more rewards for other miners, aggregate mining cost reduced The equilibrium would be restored with less hashrate, but there is plenty of it to secure the network left. What you are saying is that in practice the miners don't shut down, but continue to mine at a reduced profit? So aggregate mining cost stays the same, but there are more masternode rewards to be sold. That would explain it. What is the evidence for it? Is there a miner here that can confirm or add some info? I understand the second part now, thank you. |
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afbitcoins, I have read your paper. I agree that there is more than just securing the network. There are monetary principles at stake and these are the ones I am currently trying to understand. And I am much closer to you and toknormal in this regard than what transpires from my earlier posts. I may come back talking about competitive mining and scarcity as related to Dash when I am ready. But first I want to understand what I currently do not: The point of Tok (as I understand it, oversimplifying it) is that the masternodes get "free" coins for their service, contrary to the miners. They need to pay it with electricity bills. That is the "pressure" force.
How and why this 'pressure' on the investors is manifested? Should the investor be interested in how much the distribution of the block rewards is skewed from an 'optimal|ideal|equilibrium'? He cares about the emission schedule and what not, but not about the 'inner' distribution of rewards and who bears the cost of producing the block. What is a mechanism that restores the equilibrium? Ok, maybe this answers my questions: Where I struggle is at the beginning, point 1. that looks at the cost of producing the block. I know that it costs to miners to find blocks, but the link of this cost with the block reward is what bothers me. The block rewards are created by software independently of the mining cost. Sure, you can look at it that way. i.e. The block has value..."because"...rather than the block has value "because the prevailing level of competition to mine it represents the starting value for the block". However, taking that approach has consequences - namely that half the supply ends up being held at a zero cost base and free markets do like to massacre high margins where they have the option. So you end up with chronic profit-takes from masternode rewards competing with miners for limited fiat liquidity and undermining them (because they can afford to right down to a price of zero). It doesn't matter which way you model it IMO, the long-run behaviour (in the absence of massive added service value to justify the MN rewards) tends towards chronic loss of marketcap share. Hmm .. I am almost starting to understand your point. But why don't the miners start shutting down their mining equipment and purchase masternodes instead then? The mining rewards would go up, masternode rewards down and soon the equilibrium would be reached (The difficilty adjustment would take care of the rest). Why it is the market that intervenes to massacre high margins? This is the part I don't understand. Unless ... the investor values the "mining" more than other services. |
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For Toknormal the assumption is that it is the competitive mining (scarcity) that gives value to Dash That's not what I'm arguing here. (Though philosophically I do subscribe to that idea). I'm pointing out that investors in the primary (mined) supply who pay 100% of the mining costs receive only half the proportional supply they do with other coins (100% mining reward ones). We therefore lose marketcap share to them. Masternodes do not "bring coins into existence" as quizzie asserts in the sense of bearing the cost of their production. Miners do. But miners aren't the problem because they just pass the cost on to the market and difficulty adjustments can keep them viable. The overhead (of the "free masternode coins") is felt in terms of loss of marketcap share as the phenomenon acts like an "anti-magnet" to new capital. See this post. I have seen the post and I understand (most of) it. Where I struggle is at the beginning, point 1. that looks at the cost of producing the block. I know that it costs to miners to find blocks, but the link of this cost with the block reward is what bothers me. The block rewards are created by software independently of the mining cost. I think that the cost of producing a block reward is irrelevant for the investor, unless the investor values the "mining" more than other services. The investor does not think who bears the cost of producing the block. So I am not convinced that the investors receive only half the coin they pay for. They receive exactly the coins they payed for. If we, however, assume that mining per se adds value (the 'philosophical' assumption that you subscribe to) to the network, then I understand your argument and agree with you. |
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I am trying to understand this issue. Can you please correct me if I got something wrong in the following.
The block reward follows a predictable emission rate. The inflation is known and predictable. How this block reward is distributed between miners, masternodes and treasury in the end does not change the fact that the sw (the protocol) predictably creates new dash at each block. Miners are not the ones to create the block reward to be sold, it is the software as specified in dash specification.
This newly created DASH has to be SOLD to the market, to investors. Shouldn't this be the "primary supply" as referred before by toknormal? Why should investors care about the distribution of the block reward? The investor sees the specified, known and predictable coin emission rate (the inflation). This is all that interests him (isn't it?). Who bears the cost of creating the block is irrelevant to the investor. If this is not true, than implicitly the investor values more the 'work' of one of the parties that gets the block reward over the others (for example it values more the service performed by miners than the service performed by masternodes and/or treasury in this case).
It seems to me that there are some more or less hidden assumptions behind different points of view expressed here that need to be made explicit.
For Toknormal the assumption is that it is the competitive mining (scarcity) that gives value to Dash (to any blockchain for that matter). So PoS coins are not as valuable as pure PoW ones for store of value. It is a monetary reasoning (the more hashrate the better).
For the other camp, the assumption is perhaps that mining serves the purpose of securing the blockchain (and producing much needed randomness at the same time). It is a technical reasoning (just enough hashrate is needed to be the 'dominant' coin). It is the utility of the coin that gives it value.
Perhaps we need to agree on the assumptions first to have a constructive debate.
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Hello there
I am missing
210.41080478 XMR
Withdrawal Status
Requested
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someone was able to setup raspberry pi to stake BC ?
I haven't tried, but raspberry pi should be the same as setting up a linux client. The only difficulty I can foresee is that you have to cross compile due to limited ram and speed. Did you, or somebody, have any problems? |
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Ok, here is my first effort. I compiled a 32bit linux version of the wallet and shared it on the link below. Compiled on Ubuntu 14.04 with qmake "USE_UPNP=-" (does not compile with UPNP support) and tested on Ubuntu 14.04. The link on mediafire was for 64 bit linux. Also someone previously asked if the wallet was tested on Ubuntu. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ckqxf0h3ic8c20n/energycoin32.tar.gz |
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I posted my user and wallet at facebook page, please add me in. I am a newbie, low activity, but want to support this coin. Good luck!
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