There is an assumption that Bitcoiners wants decentralization. That is false, most of them are in it for the money unfortunately. When you're in it for the gains, you think less about the other intrinsic benefits that Bitcoin offers.

Pin this on the centralized services because that is the first point of contact for many and they stop right there. If you truly want them to take control of their own funds, we have to abandon the regulations and the licensed exchange and services. We all know that is not happening anytime soon.

Was it a connection issue, or a data directory issue? I just started running a few nodes on Ubuntu via Snap and all was okay. Did the logs say anything?

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@OP


Snap configures everything for you and you just need to run the app. If not, then you just have to navigate to the snap/bin folder and execute it. A default data dir will be in ~/snap/bitcoin-core/common/.bitcoin

Generally VPN over VPS is rather slow, and also more expensive with insufficient benefits to the network. Instead of having one hop, data goes through your VPS and then to your computer. Cheap ones are generally quite slow and likely wouldn't have sufficient bandwidth for a very large node. 1TB upload is probably not very sufficient if you have a VPN running through it and nodes connecting to it.

It shouldn't be an issue if you're unable to accept inbound connections. If you want an easy to setup and a free solution, then you can route it through Tor.

You don't have to. During the initialization, if Bitcoin Core doesn't detect a data directory then it would prompt the user to specify a data directory. Else, it would automatically create a data directory for you in the default data directory path.

Correct, KYC doesn't stop money laundering or terrorist financing. However, KYC does make it harder by the logic of requiring the users to identify themselves to transmit funds. That by itself provides them with the ability to track and otherwise shutdown many crime syndicates and ensures that those who are regulated are accountable of their operations. If governments cares about your privacy, then the world would be pretty different today; Edward Snowden wouldn't have anything to share, there wouldn't be NSA, significant number of terrorist attacks wouldn't be twarted, etc. It is far easier to just impose a blanket ban than a soft KYC, which doesn't benefit the community either.

Identity theft is a whole other topic; that has to do with the multitude of mismanagement of individual organisations rather than the government. GDPR and other similar laws are enacted precisely to tackle this problem. If done properly, KYC is not an issue with proper data security and governance and this shouldn't be the reason why we shy away from KYC; organizations should do better to protect our personal data. FWIW, I've had the opportunity to see how data governance works in competent organizations and I don't see how identity theft would be a problem for them, as opposed to certain less competent companies.

You can expect proportionality to be thrown out in court for cases involving surveillance or national security, as historically seen by v. NSA for surveillance related lawsuits.

A ban on conventional mixers doesn't result in better opportunities for criminals to launder their funds; atomic swaps or other anonymizing methods were always available to all and it is widely and easily accessible for everyone. Banning these centralized mixers never really increased or otherwise exacerbated the rates of money laundering, decentralized mixers has always been preferred as opposed to centralized mixers. Even for the average Joe, this is the way to go.

For the record, I'm not advocating against privacy. Giving basic rights to the citizens seems to be detrimental in the eyes of the government and if they are able to make money laundering harder, then I don't think they would be reversing their decisions anytime soon.

Lawmakers might not, but they probably wouldn't care. However, inaction is seen as incompetence.

KYC and AML policies has resulted in banks being able to detect and stop these transactions. These are policies proven effective in the real world, and whenever it seems to fail, they punish the banks and smack them with a lawsuit. I bet this would happen if you were to legalize mixers. My question is: How do you answer the points about how criminal proceeds has been funnelled over through mixers, and the steps taken towards stemming them. Given that these aren't detectable, save for the large ones, how should we ensure that the principles of Bitcoin is upheld (no censorship, fungibility, etc).

If we were to continue with mixers and lawmakers discovers that criminal proceeds were to be funnelled through the mixer, then would the mixer be liable (and thereby should the owners be shouldering responsibilities) or should we just blame it on the privacy restrictions that affects how a mixer can conduct due diligence? If not, then why should banks be treated any differently than them?

I think that this topic has brought up numerous points about how privacy is important, and how we should balance the importance of privacy and stemming the funds from dubious origins. However, I personally don't think regulating mixers would be the way to go. It would be difficult to try to convince them otherwise, and a waste of effort because it would inevitably result in draconian restrictions and regulations if it happens. Keeping it decentralized and difficult to shutdown makes the most sense.

You can't, but it is also possible to make a centralized Blockchain though that will be quite a bit different in function from Bitcoin. They would likely differ in quite a few areas as compared to Bitcoin to try to mimic their fiat system. If that happens, then it would possibly be recognized as a legal tender. Else, registering your wallet to regulate Bitcoin doesn't seem to be as good of an idea.

That's great. Privacy goes beyond the topic about engaging in illicit activity but it also concerns about the ability for your government to collect metadata on you, and for a thirdparty to be able to intrude into your privacy. If this does not concern you, then we can continue in this tangent.
Not exactly. Government prefers fiat because they are essentially controlling it; they can enact any exchange policies to influence the prices by printing more money or encouraging saving, etc. If the majority of the population are using crypto, then they don't have as much power to do it anymore.

There is a reason why the restrictions exist and that is to make it prohibitively expensive for citizens to do something that doesn't align with the government. And no, I'm not talking about any illegal activities; capital control is an example that comes to mind. Again, Bitcoin advocates having your own bank which wouldn't align with your point about forfeiting your Bitcoins if there is a court order. Allowing them control over your coins is like Paypal or central banks (peep Cyprus's crisis in 2013) all over again.

If forfeiting your rights to the government is the way to go, then we probably wouldn't have a decentralized network in the first place. Just let them create their own with absolutely zero privacy. It goes far beyond the problem about AML, KYC or any other illicit activities that comes with a pseudonymous system.

KYC policy exists for a good reason; to reduce the likelihood of money laundering going undetected and for them to stem it right when the transfer is taking place. It is absolutely necessary, because there is no way platforms would take the initiative to stop these transfers or perform their due diligence to prevent the transfers from taking place on the platform.

Generally, you need to have the data (ie. their real identity) to be able to link and investigate possible money laundering. There is no way around this in the area.
Swiss KYC is quite active, and even if there is no KYC for most services, anything that involves money transfers be it deposits or withdrawal will reveal some information about the customer. If you're talking about normal crypto, for eg. POS payments, services payments, then KYC is of course not necessary. It is prevalent where there is a chance for money laundering to take place.

Thanks. Money transmitter is not illegal, but being an unlicensed money transmitter would be. They lack the capabilities to conduct the appropriate due diligence, evidently and they can potentially aid money launderers in achieving what they want. In the eyes of the government, having the threat of doing so is a good enough reason to charge them with it.

Banks, and all of the financial institutions are also compliant to all of the laws and regulations as stated.

Now, just to further our discussion a little:
I'd like to pose this question as well. Let's say the community wants to see a legalized mixer, but the key benefits of a mixer is maintained (No KYC, no logs, no freezing of coins, and let's say minimal cooperation with the authorities (see protonmail). How would they operate considering all of the AML/KYC laws? I don't think a pushback from these measures are possible unless met with an alternative that is equally effective at stopping money laundering and terrorist financing.

Bitcoin should be treated as a currency, the fact that arbitrage opportunities or any profit making opportunities should be considered independently of its core function.
You underestimate the importance of privacy to most. The reason why privacy appears to be a smaller issue than it really is would be because of the lack of education and knowledge. Privacy is important and a fundamental human right. If it doesn't seem to be important to you, then I believe fiat would be far easier for you to use.

There is also an assumption that people who want privacy are necessarily people who transact in illicit funds or are involved in them. This is false.

Pseudonymous != Zero Privacy. If you think someone can easily track your transactions, then you do not value privacy and you should absolutely declare all of your transactions and every single one of your activity to the government. Bitcoin is designed to be pseudonymous, and it cannot be done without the users intentionally taking steps to ensure this. Issues should not revolve about whataboutism but should focus on what we should achieve with our privacy.
Don't you think this defeats the purpose of your suggestion?

Unfortunately, coming under regulations means KYC is necessary, for the current regulations. This is to ensure absolutely 0 illicit transactions are going through. There is no way whatsoever that any country will come up with a middle-ground because there would still be illicit transactions going through, and that is unacceptable for any authorities. Samourai was actually charged with money laundering, instead of being an unregistered money transmitter. As mentioned, the authorities would set a bar so high, that it would appear that they are valuing your privacy but is in effect having full knowledge and control of your privacy. None of us should trust them with their words, we should've learned the lesson by now.

I disagree with the point about the status quo. Having privacy means that you should be able to use basic tools to protect your own, you should be able to use Tor and ensure that there is no privacy leakage during the mixing process. What I imagine legal mixers to be like would be having your coins mixed, but the tracing of the transactions to be readily available to the authorities and their ability to halt and identify any users at will.

If there is ever a regulated mixer, I doubt the community would use it. The community is fine without having a government honeypot mixer.

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To further expand on this point:
- From the government perspective, their argument for shutting down mixers are always because of money laundering or the evidence of money laundering. It is unlike exchanges where they are required to have a license to operate. In a similar vein, exchanges are granted the license because they can prove that their platform has the ability to track, freeze and report suspicious transactions because of the stringent KYC/AML policies. This is unlike the concept of mixers where users are supposed to be anonymous, and privacy should be guaranteed. Any subpoenas will take too long to serve and that logically mixers would find that most of them should be challenged before freezing coins, or handing over information -> See Protonmail for example. Hence, this would probably never happen and doesn't fit what the community would want to see in a mixer.

- An ideal solution that I can see for a mixer to exist and legalized is that the mixer should be able to conduct KYC/AML on their users, flag suspicious transactions to the authorities, and be ordered to turn over data at will. This essentially functions like a bank, but that is the final "goal" of the government to defeat and make money laundering harder. The argument within the thread mostly points to the ideal solution being that privacy conscious users should be knowledgeable enough to use decentralized mixers, which are sufficient to break the link and that centralized mixers being both legalized and trustable to be a far fetched dream.
Has it ever been established that ChipMixer stored logs? I don't recall them doing so, other than the fact that they retained the keys, which doesn't lead to the loss of privacy since it's quite obvious on-chain just that the connection is difficult to establish. All the more reason why I don't trust centralized mixers.
I don't think both should be acceptable, or we are setting the bar too low and giving up too much of our rights. Delaying or freezing the funds would be unfair for the users, Bitcoin is fungible and for the mixer to be the judge of whether your funds are clean or not is not acceptable at all. This would be akin to exchange arbitrarily freezing funds of their users. This is not something that I can get behind.

If mixers were to freeze or delay funds, then they would probably collect whatever data you have to prove either your innocence or if you're guilty. Either doesn't bode well for Bitcoin.
For the sake of discussion, I'm interested in knowing the neutral governments that supports their citizens to retain their own privacy. Generally, national security laws covers that part and doesn't need justification to obtain user data as long as it poses an inherent threat to the government.

What are they going to do if people don't register your addresses with them? Are they going to stop you from using Bitcoin? They probably can't and they can't do anything about it. They have no way of knowing what addresses you have if they don't register it and if you do; hey, I'll let you track me however much you want!

Surrendering your privacy to the government goes against the very basis of Bitcoin, if you want to do this, then using fiat would probably be more efficient. The day that people willingly do this is when Bitcoin fails.

Any form of cooperation or agreement should be construed as a total agreement. Mixers achieves the exact opposite of what the government wants; total surveillance, zero privacy, etc. It goes far more than just combating money laundering, China didn't want anything to do with Bitcoin because it results in huge capital outflows, etc. Governments always and will always put themselves first before your rights.

IMO, most people who are paranoid about privacy will never accept any mixer that cooperates, or otherwise allows governments to dictate their service. So long as the mixers are within any jurisdiction, US for example; there are covert and overt means for the authorities to get the data that they want. Bottom line is that if there is a mixer that is approved by the government, the large majority would think of it as a honeypot.

In that regard, it is not necessary for us to change the status quo at the moment. Mixers can still be used and most jurisdiction would never outlaw it.
Fungibility should not be compromised, IMO and coins probably wouldn't be moved that quickly regardless. The pre-conditions above makes it such that it is easy to circumvent to introduce plausible deniability no matter what. Mixers would probably be freezing more funds, and perhaps even liberally to toe the line with the law enforcement. Any money laundering that goes through them would be subjected to regulatory actions - Even bankers have to go to jail and banks are fined.

Depends on how you think the security can be weakened. If you think that a random hacker cannot exhaustively search the key space and can randomly stumble upon your private key, then splitting it into 10 would be the better idea. If you think that the vulnerability would affect each of the addresses and their key pair, then neither would be effective.

The chances of it happening is exceedingly low. Maintaining 10 separate seeds and addresses is too much of a hassle to justify any possible security improvement, for which there is practically close to none. Most people confidently keeps their funds without any splitting whatsoever.

My view of mixers is that it is a double-edged sword that has no good solution. I agree that banning or cracking down on mixers is a futile endeavour, but it doesn't mean that whatever the government is doing is wrong, nor is it right.

The day that your mixers cooperates with the government is a critical failure of what mixers is trying to do. Your mixers should provide a single function of mixing your coins, and removing the links between the previous coins and the current coins. If they have any say otherwise, lets say they want to freeze your coins because it seems to be from a dubious origin, then it becomes non-fungible and your privacy is impacted. Mixers, nor any party for that matter should never freezing their customer's funds and should only carry out its purpose only. Censorship and funds seizure goes against the ethos of Bitcoin. I personally would not want any mixers who is dealing with my funds to be able to freeze it for no good reason, nor have any form of cooperation with any authorities; it becomes a rabbit hole for, let's say if they cooperate to track down political dissents, sensitive individuals, capital control, etc. Even if the mixers doesn't want to cooperate, there is no choice because they are a registered entity within their jurisdiction.

Government cracks down on mixers because they shoot at anything that is tainted with illicit activities. From a government perspective, it is rightfully so; mixers are always off-shore and out of their jurisdiction. If they have an opportunity to do something, you bet that they will close it down. Having them closed doesn't mean that it is bad, it just exposes the fact that centralized mixers are not infallible and we should be moving off to alternatives which cannot be tracked nor influenced by authorities.

FirstBits was a method used to shorten the address, and you can give someone lets say the first 10 characters and they can identify your address. The way this works is that the service will label each address with its unique prefix; For example, if my address is 1abcdefg, and there is already 3 other addresses that is given the FirstBits of 1a, 1ab, 1abc then I'll get 1abcd as my first bits.

The caveat of this is that it'll still be pretty ambiguous as the number of unique addresses on the blockchain grows. In addition, this also encourages address reuse which is more than enough of a reason this doesn't have much utility nowadays. Note that it is never an official implementation but it was a nifty service back in the days.

In short, there is no reason for someone to choose MultiSig over P2WPKH because it would be insecure in the future; they are somewhat providing the same level of security. To answer that, you have to understand what makes up a valid transaction. Some of the responses above are strictly assuming that the redeem script can become vulnerable if and only if addresses can easily be cracked, but that is hardly a concern at all.

Given that we've already established pre-image of 160bit hashes to be difficult and infeasible, there is really no reason why you would care about the security of the individual keys. If you were to get an attack, a pre-image of your hash would be used to attack rather than exhausting the entire key space of your keys. For P2WSH, it would be 256bits and P2PWKH is 160 bits, which is not a sufficient security increase. While on the topic, even if you use more keys in your locking script, your security level assumes the security of your hash of your redeem script; used to generate your address.

Any rational attacker would not bruteforce individual seeds because it would be too inefficient, but finding the pre-images of hashes that would hash to the different addresses would naturally be more efficient. There is also no reason to believe that there would be flaws in the cryptography that we're using; it won't be cracked overnight and marginal speedups would be more reasonable.

The code is from: https://github.com/trezor/python-mnemonic/blob/master/src/mnemonic/mnemonic.py.

Looks okay to me, but I'm not exactly a security researcher. Your code looks okay assuming that the code is working as intended.


Edit: Please do not use anything that can be easily determined as seed when you're trying to generate something random. Use the secrets module, and if you're unsure about how exactly CSPRNG should be implemented, don't touch it or you might inadvertently generate something insecure.

If you're unsure about the technicalities behind generating a Bitcoin address, you should also refrain from implementing your own. Any errors can result in you being unable to access your funds.

RPC is not encrypted, the support for SSL was removed quite a while ago. Even if you're connecting locally, I advise having a secure tunnel directly to the computer rather than connecting through RPC in cleartext.

The entropy is the raw bytes before it was converted into your mnemonics. It is not useful to you.

Entropy is random, and you cannot exactly measure randomness, or at least to any accurate extent. Seemingly random strings can be deterministic and vice-versa. You can safely stop at generating the mnemonics without going further.

I haven't seen the code yet and I can't comment much on it. I would recommend just using another wallet that generates BIP39 instead of going with a less well-known script, or just go with Electrum. No downsides there.

That is provided that there is no database corruption, which can be quite common for Bitcoin Core which are in the midst of writing to disk.