The shelling of an intercity passenger bus by Russian terrorists near the town of Volnovakha in the Donetsk Oblast "cannot be considered anything other than an act of terrorism," said Konstantyn Yeliseyev, Ukraine's representative to the European Union. As a result of the shelling, 11 passengers died and 13 were injured.

http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/01/13/ukraine-calls-for-firm-eu-response-to-the-volnovakha-bus-shelling/

10 bus passengers killed by insurgent artillery strike in Donetsk region

 Multiple civilian fatalities in militant attack near Volnovakha



https://www.facebook.com/Vyacheslav.Abroskin

At about 14:30 on 13 January artillery fire from Kremlin-backed insurgents in east Ukraine struck a civilian bus killing 10 passengers, according to Donetsk district police chief Vyacheslav Abroskin.

"Insurgents based in Dokuchaevo shelled a Ukrainian position in Volnovakha and struck a civilian bus. At the moment we have information about 10 fatalities and 13 wounded."

The conflict in east Ukraine has already claimed almost 5,000 lives, with approximately 1,400 fatalities since a nominal ceasefire was introduced in September 2014.  

UPDATE: Information posted to a 'Novorossiya' social media page this afternoon confirmed that insurgent forces had launched an attack on a Ukrainian checkpoint at exactly the time and place where the civilian bus was struck. As news of the civilian deaths emerged, the post was edited to remove confirmation of the insurgent attack.

The original post read:

Breaking news: 13.01.2015, 16:53 (NB: insurgents operate on Moscow time, meaning that this post appeared at 14:53 Ukrainian time)

Volnovakha

Information received: Ukrainian checkpoint destroyed at the exit of Volnovakha in the direction of Donetsk



UPDATE 2: The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's office has stated that insurgents fired 40 Grad rockets in the 13 January east Ukraine attack which resulted in the death of ten civilians on a passenger bus. Officials confirmed that the attack was being treated as an 'act of terror'.

 

UPDATE 3: Donetsk Administration reports 18 wounded. One of them has already arrived in Mariupol for treatment. Previously there was an information about 13 wounded as a result of terrorist attack.





http://uatoday.tv/news/10-bus-passengers-killed-by-insurgent-artillery-strike-in-donetsk-region-402496.html

This post comes from Russian Government Community Group: Росси́я - Российская Федерация – Russia. At the bottom of the picture where Putin looks like an Emperor it says, “Vladimir – the Wise, the Liberator of Crimea and the entire Europe.” Those of you who live in Europe, get ready, the Russians are planning to “liberate” you.



^ Emperor Huilo I

Look at the ruSSians bailiff  



Kommunisten und Juden haben Sie?

girkin and nyasha- now in postage service too

The new uniforms for ruSSian postal workers




Bist du jude? Wo sind die Partizanen??? Antworte, du, Schweinehund!!!

Nuclear weapons in Crimea



Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that Russia has every legitimate right to deploy nuclear weapons on the Crimean peninsula. This act not only violates multiple international treaties, but also threatens the security of the entire region.

http://uacrisis.org/nuclear-weapons-crimea/

Russian Army units in Krasnodon blocked the base of local terrorists. At least 4 Russian BPM-97 “Vystrel” in the video.

Today early in the morning Russian Army units blocked the base of local pro-Russian terrorists who control Krasnodon, a city on the way from Russian border to Lugansk. In the video there are soldiers in Russian winter uniform and at least 4 BPM-97 “Vystel” modification “Dozor-N”, that type of armored vehicles are only used in Russian Federation. Same vehicles has been seen training together with terrorists on December 31 and later have been seen near university on the East of Lugansk, you can read more about it here http://lugansk-news.com/russian-army-units-taking-part-in-military-actions-on-a-side-of-terrorists-in-lugansk-ukraine-video/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W60GEa1dRxw

On January 1 2015 one of the leaders of terrorist group called “Batman” and his bodyguards were burnt on the road between Lugansk and Lutuhyne. The leaders of so-called Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) posted a message on their information resources and claimed that they tried to arrest “Batman” and his men, but they started to fire, so they have been killed during the fight. The rest of the “Batman” group and witnesses claimed that the leader of  LPR Plotnitsiy is removing everybody who is independent from his “army”. “Batman” and his team were moving in 2 vehicles and they had no chance to fire back as they were attacked without warning from 2 sides of the road from very close distance. Russian Federation citizens who were part of the group called “Rusich” and were ally with “Batman” left LPR territory. The leader of “Rusich” Aleksey Milchakov in his interview later said that people who killed “Batman” were using Russian APC “Tigr” and BPM-97 “Vystel”.

So today same heavily armed unit with armored personnel carries BPM-97 “Vystel” and other vehicles has arrived to Krasnodon and surrounded the base of local pro-Russian terrorist group called “Odessa”. The leader of “Odessa” group with nickname “Varyag” gave interview to pro-Russian separatist channel and explained the situation. He said that a group called “Private Military Company” surrounded their base and offered to surrender their weapons.


The leader of Krasnodon terrorist group “Odessa” with nickname “Varyag”

The road from Krasnodon to Lugansk has been blocked. Later it was reported that “Odessa” group has surrendered and nobody was killed. Obviously Russian Army units are helping the leader of LPR to take under control all terrorist groups in different cities. Formally all those groups support LPR, but in reality they are acting independently from each other and not always recognize the central command center of terrorists located in Lugansk.

On the screenshots below are 4 Russians BPM-97 Vystrel Dozor-N spotted in Krasnodon today.








Below is detailed analyses of the video that shows where the video was taken.


irst of all the person who took the video was moving from the direction of Lugansk to Krasnodon. Right at the beginning of the video you can see fighter jet at the entrance to the city which was put there as a monument. Here it is on Google Map




And here is the path and direction the operator was moving.


In the screenshot below is the entrance to the terrorist base. Just before it there is a bus stop called “RMZ”. -


And here is the entrance to terrorist base on Google map


http://lugansk-news.com/russian-army-units-in-krasnodon-blocked-the-base-of-local-terrorists-at-least-4-russian-bpm-97-vystrel-in-the-video/

Russian really have only 2 things - duraki & dorogi  























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Making sense of the latest Russian offensives in eastern Ukraine

This morning, the Ukrainian army reported that the number of Russian invasion forces attacks “over the last day” stood at 50 in total. Such a figure was not reached since the Minsk agreement took effect in early September last year. 4 Ukrainian soldiers were killed during these 24 hours, and another 8 injured. At the same time, 2 civilians were killed and 8 injured in Donetsk city due to shelling over the same period of time, according to the city administration.

While over the last 4 months of the Minsk “ceasefire” and the Ukrainian-called in “silence mode” from December 9, the number of daily Russian attacks never fell below 5 and in average stood at 10-20 per day, 50 is a new peak and the final proof that the current appeasement policy by the Ukrainian government, namely the September 5 and 19 “truce” and the December 9 “silence mode”, are not working. However beyond that doubtless admission, the question arises, what the strategical aim of these attacks could be and why Russia is willing to turn up the heat again despite the fact, its territorial gains inside Ukraine are not challenged and it could consider itself satisfied with the strip of land, it has brought under its control so far.

A – meanwhile – good indicator for the daily spatial allocation of the Russian aggression is the situation map, published with daily updates by the Ukrainian defense ministry. After months of showing a far too “optimistic” picture, it is now quite accurately filled with most recent information and, despite missing some attacks, a good foundation for a more detailed analysis.

This is today’s map:

ATO map, showling the situation in the Donbas between January 8 and 9

At a first glance, the large number of “locations of combat” – indicated by the small orange explosions – along the front strikes the eye. While an exact count of those little “blast” symbols is not possible, it is fair to say, that their number is well below 50, showing the difficulty that comes with such sources. However what can be seen is that those symbols indicating fighting are ranged along the border between the Russian-held and the “liberated” Ukrainian territory with some dots being further inland, signaling long distance weapons fire.

The following map is an – informed – strategic assessment of those “locations of combat” (also known as “Russian assault target areas”), dividing the entire territory into four combat zones. Doing this, it becomes possible to make sense of these dozens of attacks, assigning them to possible mid- and long term in strategic goals of the Russian invasion army. What becomes visible are four main theaters starting with the “Kalmius offensive” in the south, the “Donetsk airport campaign” in the west, operation “Closing the gap” in the center and the “Northern expansion” in the north. These four offensives will be discussed in the following paragraphs, trying to understand what could be Russia’s purpose by leading them.


ATO zone, devided into Russian campaigns, January 8-9

The Kalmius offensive

After invading southern Donetsk region in late summer last year, Russian forces quickly advanced via Novoazovask and Telmanove towards the west. Not the Ukrainian army, but a natural barrier, the river Kalmius slowed down their advance, giving retreating Ukrainian security forces the time they needed to build a line of defense -behind the river. Between September an December 2014, Russian forces mainly attacked the towns and villages east and north east of Mariupol, but only very rarely the wide strip of land between the coastal town and Starobasheve.



This changed on January 3rd, when Russian invasion forces started using heavy weapons like artillery, tanks and multi launch rocket systems to launch attacks on several towns right along the river as well as Ukr-held towns and villages behind it, serving as resupply bases or simply resting areas for Ukrainian troops – and homes to thousands of civilians. These attacks intensified over the last week, expanding not only to indirect fire, but also to actual crossings of the river and attemps to flank Ukrainian troops, taking Hranitne, one of the few towns with a bridge across the Kalmius. Several Russian troops were killed during these attempts. Nonetheless, during the last 2 days, this offensive was even intensified with a double-digit number of attacks between January 8 and 9.

 

Attacking the Kalmius river (Minsk demarcation line) on the entire front bears several strategic advantages for an invasion army, not feeling bound to any signed treaties. During August and September 2014, it attempted to directly attack Mariupol, which didn’t work due to a strong buildup in Ukrainian army and National Guard troops. Later, they tried to bypass the city with the aim to encircle it, some 5-10 km north. This also miscarried. By broadening the active front line by around 60 km, Ukrainian defenders are forced to stretch thin, trying to halt any possible crossing of the river along the sparsely inhabited riverside. This is of particular importance as we are in the middle of winter and the river may freeze, allowing troops and vehicles to cross it without the need of a bridge. The riverside was until a few days ago only guarded by scattered Regiment Azov National Guard troops, being equipped with mostly light vehicles like jeeps and small arms with a few heavier weapons like T-64 tanks or ATGM to defend against attacking armored vehicles. Furthermore, the Kalmius river frontline is one of the closest to the Russian border and the main invasion hub, making it easy to resupply advancing forces from inside Russia. If Russian forces manage to push back Ukrainian defenders at only one sector of the river front, they will be able to establish bridgeheads on the left side of it, being able to directly attack cities like Mariupol or Volnovakha, which might be the final aim in this region.

 

The Donetsk airport campaign

It is no secret that Russian forces seek to entirely control Donetks airport which must feel like a sting in their meat, being a – hypothetical – direct port for attacks on the DNR’s wannabe capital Donetsk. Thus, this front was always one of the most active, also and especially during the almost 4 months of the Minsk ceasefire farce. Until December 9, Ukrainian forces defended like lions, firing back with all kinds of weapons at Russian attackers and killing up to 500 of them within a few weeks (maybe even more between late August and early December).



However then president Poroshenko decided to forbid his forces returning fire “until their lives were in acute risk” and Russian forces established launching grounds for attacks all around – and not more than 50 meters from Terminal 1 and the Tower, which are today the only installations held by the so-called “Cyborgs”, the defenders of the area. Still, all attempts by the invader to directly attack the terminal complex were fought back with huge casualties on the Russian side. This fact plus the circumstance that attacking forces are now too close to the target to use heavy weapons against it led to a final change of mind pincer movewith the attackers, deciding during the last 7 days not to cut the airport from the Ukrainian-held territory anymore but the territory from the airport, encircling it in a wide curve, forcing – then – besieged forces to surrender as for the lack of food and ammunition. Similar tactics were used successfully in Saur Mohyla and Ilovaisk in late August last year. On January 5, the Ukrainian intelligence service voiced exactly that concern, namely that a pincer movement by Russian invasion forces from Spartak and Donetsk’s Kuibyshivs’kyi district is in the planning and would have the price of the entire airport.



Such move has to be prepared, taking into account that strong Ukrainian army formations are positioned all to the north, north west and west of the airport. So Russian army artillery and missile troops started shelling not some but literally all Ukrainian held towns and villages in the three cardinal directions of the airport. As the ATO map is not able to show such concentration of fire in a meaningful way, I developed a map with the exact targets according to the Ukrainian army reports.



Thanks to the RT cam, live footage of the shelling can be seen and heard day and night, week for week, month for month. After realizing that a direct assault would be impossible and the Ukrainian-given period of time to gain strength, Russian forces seem now self-confident enough to prepare for a much wider offensive, not only trying to invade the airport, but all the Ukrainian-held front line towns around it.

Operation “Closing the gap”
debaltseveThe Ukrainian-held area leading to the important railway knot city of Debaltseve not only looks like a cut into the “self- or rather: Moscow-declared people’s republics of Luhansk and Donetsk”, it also feels like one for the both regimes and their Russian masters. At the same time, it is an obstacle in logistical terms for invasion forces, wishing to move freely between Luhansk and Donetsk city. Thus, it is a declared goal by the Russian occupation command to close that gap, if not by negotiations (as was hoped for in mid September), then by force. This target was never given up during the “ceasefire” and there was not one day without attacks on front line villages like Nikishyne. However rare footage from the area (by Graham Phillips) showed some rather poorly-equipped Russian and pro-Russian infantry troops, not being able for major offensive operations in October and November. Now, Russian forces use large caliber weapon systems like Grad missiles and even tanks, especially over the last 48 hours. This indicates, they move from “provoking” Ukrainian forces holding that front to rather serious offensive operations, possibly resulting in territorial gains and the ability to directly attack Debaltseve itself.



Northern expansion

northern luhanskLast but not least, Luhansk region remains another hot spot of Russian invasion ambitions. During the first months of the “ceasefire”, the area along the Bakhmutka highway (M04), leading from occupied Luhansk to liberated Lisiciansk was one of the most active zones of confrontation. “Russian Cossack” terrorist troops felt – seemingly against all agreements as they received multiple heavy weapons to invade Ukraine – not bound to any orders from Moscow anymore and attacked at will, capturing “Checkpoint 32″ and Smile in late October, taking more than 100 km² of Ukraine. However after this, troubles grew between those forces and the Moscow-loyal “LC (Luhansk Poeple’s Republic)” regime, resulting in battles against each other and a lull in fighting the Ukrainian army. Ultimately the most rebellious Russian commanders were either killed (January 2) or forced to return to their homeland (January 5) and the Russian army took control of all fighting forces in the area. Since then, the front is even more active and dangerous with a Russian invasion army, willing to recapture the earlier-lost territories around Severodonetsk and Rubizhne in the north west as well as Stanitsa Luhanska in the east. Especially this area would Russia give more kilometers of direct border line between its mainland and the invaded territories inside Ukraine, being a win-win situation in its perspective.



In conclusion it is simply a fact that shortly after the observed and confirmed reports of rotation and replacement of former paid mercenary forces with regular Russian army troops all across the occupied territories of Donbas, attacks on Ukrainian positions and towns as well as their deadliness have sharply increased. After those 50 attacks being shown in the map used for this analysis which took place between January 8 and 9, the following 12 hours brought another 24 attacks on Ukrainian forces, indicating that there won’t be any let up in the near future.

Russia definitely has once again turned up the heat and increases its efforts to control even larger parts of Ukraine, willing to conquer those in a brutal and way which is against international law and against all its promises to at least calm down the situation or even better withdraw its forces from Ukraine.

On the Ukrainian side – and I know, this sounds like a broken record, actions must be taken now to spoil Russia’s appetite for more Ukrainian land by letting them pay for every square meter they attack as much as possible. This might be the only way to lead it to a major decision: “Blink” once again like in the end of August and being punished with more international sanctions .. or finally come to its senses and stop its obvious efforts to illegally capture more soil of its western neighbor.

http://conflictreport.info/2015/01/09/making-sense-of-the-latest-russian-offensives-in-eastern-ukraine/

Flight MH17 - Searching for the truth



    On July 17th Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over Eastern Ukraine. All 298 passengers died. Back in the middle of June, the Nato showed pictures of Russian tanks in the city of Snizhne in Eastern Ukraine. The German Bundeswehr and Nato know that Russian tanks do not move through enemy territory without the protection of BUK missile systems. Therefore, the flight altitude of ordinary planes was essentially a war zone since the middle of June. According to the CORRECT!V investigation, the German government and all other Nato countries would have had to warn the airlines not to fly across Eastern Ukraine. The Dutch government already confirmed our investigation. The German government still rejects it.
    CORRECT!V talked to witnesses of the downing of Flight MH17 in Eastern Ukraine. In a complex investigation in Vienna, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Russia, we talked to military experts, warlords of the separatists, former BUK engineers and former soldiers of the 53rd Air Defense Brigade. All of them confirm: The separatists were not able to use such a complex missile system. Therefore, only Russian officers could have given the order to down Flight MH17.
    On July 17th a lot of pictures and videos were taken of the BUK missile system in the part of Eastern Ukraine that was controlled by separatists. The international investigative team Bellingcat identified the BUK as part of the Russian 53rd Air Defense Brigade. CORRECT!V checked the locations of the pictures and followed the path the Russian BUK took.
    CORRECT!V is publishing this investigation in cooperation with the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel and the Dutch daily newspaper Algemeen Dagblad.

Full article:

https://mh17.correctiv.org/english/

A 120 "former" police officers from Chechnya arrived in the Donbas - new cannon fodder, possibly part of those who paraded in a stadium in Grozny not so long ago.

http://nr2.com.ua/hots/ATO_Donbass/Na-Donbass-pribyla-policiya-CHechni-87802.html

BBC finds Russians fighting in eastern Ukraine

9 January 2015 Last updated at 06:34 GMT

It is eight months since the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the fighting has claimed more than 4,000 lives.

Russia has consistently denied its forces are involved, but the BBC has spoken to Russian fighters in Ukraine who talk openly about taking on the Ukrainian army.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30739110

Part III

 Russia still utterly fails to understand the vastly superior flexibility and resilience of western economies and democracies compared to other types as explained by Adam Smith, Alexis De Tocqueville, Karl Popper and many others. Their self-correcting ability stands in marked contrast to authoritarian regimes, which continue making the same old mistakes over and over again. Russia's inability to produce sustainable, high-quality growth since at least 1913 is a case in point.

Россия по-прежнему совершенно не понимает безмерно превосходящую гибкость и устойчивость западных экономик и демократий по сравнению с другими видами политического строя, как объяснили Адам Смит, Алексис де Токвиль, Карл Поппер и многие другие. Их способность к самокоррекции абсолютно контрастирует с закостенелостью авторитарного режима, совершающего одни и те же ошибки снова и снова. Неспособность России воспроизвести устойчивый качественный рост по крайней мере с 1913 года – тому подтверждение.

Had Russia in 1990 or 2000 made an unambiguous decision to join the western club - by far the richest, healthiest and safest group of countries in global history, despite their current problems - it could have not just modernised, but westernised its society, industry, science and technology, increased its exports and put its growth on a more sustainable footing - and finally put to rest its paranoid security concerns since liberal democracies do not fight each other.

Если бы в 1990-ом или 2000-ом годах Россия приняла бы однозначное решение присоединиться к западному клубу – с большим отрывом являющейся самой богатой, здоровой и безопасной группой стран в мировой истории, несмотря на свои нынешние проблемы – она могла бы не только модернизировать, но и вестернизировать свое общество, промышленность, науку и технологию, увеличить экспорт и поставить свой рост на более устойчивую основу и, наконец, покончить со своей параноидальной заботой о безопасности, так как либеральные демократии не воюют друг с другом.

In short, it could have helped create what Anatoly Chubais once called for - a "liberal empire" stretching right around the northern hemisphere, although even here, Russia just cannot give up its imperial thinking.

Короче говоря, она могла бы способствовать созданию того, к чему призывал раньше Анатолий Чубайс – «либеральной империи» опоясывающей Северное полушарие, хотя даже в этом случае Россия просто не может отказаться от своего имперского мышления.

Instead, Russia still prefers the failed policies of the last 300 years and the associated relative poverty. Moscow is therefore now stepping up its own long-mooted "pivot to Asia", but its Ukraine policy has made itself a hostage to its former pupil China - a much more dynamic country with a much greater imperial hubris than Russia itself. But this could have failed before it started. Independent Russian energy experts say China does not need Russian gas - even at below cost price - and as German Gref admitted recently, the Asians are not queuing up to throw money at Russia either.

Вместо этого Россия предпочитает провальную политику последних 300 лет и связанную с ней относительную бедность. Поэтому Москва в настоящее время меняет вектор в сторону Азии, но ее украинская политика сделала ее заложником своего бывшего ученика, Китая – гораздо более динамичную страну с гораздо большим имперским высокомерием, чем сама Россия. Но этот разворот скорее всего закончился, так и не начавшись. Независимые эксперты в области российской энергетики говорят, что Китай не нуждается в российским газе, даже по цене ниже себестоимости и, как признал недавно Герман Греф, азиаты также не выстраиваются в очередь, чтобы инвестировать в Россию.

Ian Pryde, Founder and CEO, Eurasia Strategy & Communications
Suzanne Stafford, Senior Advisor, Eurasia Strategy & Communications

Йен Прайд - Основатель и Генеральный директор, Eurasia Strategy & Communications

Сюзанн Стаффорд - Старший советник по стратегии Eurasia Strategy & Communications

https://www.facebook.com/slava.rabinovich.9/posts/810151482379501

Part II

 Как показал провал уличных демонстраций еще несколько лет назад, российский средний класс по-прежнему мал, или, по крайней мере, слишком апатичен, чтобы сильно протестовать, в то время как – по наблюдению российских либералов – большая часть населения России может легко выжить на своей традиционной диете из «водки и картошки».

A Russian friend recently returned from two years working in the U.S.A. reported in summer that her mother expressed the widespread view here that "annexing Crimea was necessary, no matter how much it costs."

Недавно наша знакомая, вернувшаяся этим летом в Россию после двух лет работы в США, сообщила, что ее мать выразила распространенное здесь мнение, что «аннексировать Крым было необходимо, независимо от того, чего это стоило».

In short, Putin has reversed Yeltsin's priority of getting the economy right and dialling back Russia's great power claims - something most Russians support - at least for now.

Короче говоря, Путин поменял приоритет Ельцина поправить в первую очередь экономику и сократить претензии России как великой державы – и большинство россиян это поддерживает, по крайней мере сейчас.

The collapse of the oil price and rouble will test that assumption. Doubtless all will depend on just how bad things become.

Провал нефтяных цен и рубля проверят это предположение. Несомненно все будет зависеть от того, насколько плохо все будет.

It is, however, also false to assume, as many analysts do, that sanctions are not working. As German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen has pointed out, without sanctions, Russia may have gone much further than it has.

Однако также ложно предполагать, как это делают многие аналитики, что санкции не работают. Как указала немецкий министр обороны Урсула фон дер Лайен, без санкций Россия, возможно, пошла бы еще дальше.

Many in the West - virtually none of whom are Russia experts - compare Putin's allegedly dynamic moves with the "wimps" at home, but parts of Russia's political and business elite thought Putin's chess move to "castle" Medvedev in order to reassume the presidency was extremely unwise due to the country's huge structural problems, most of which are insoluble even in the medium to long-term and indeed forecast to get even worse. As a result, Putin has virtually no exit strategy politically. Indeed, that is precisely the reason that many in Moscow believe he annexed Crimea, although the Russian president hardly reckoned on serious sanctions, serious Ukrainian resistance or a collapse in the oil price.

Многие аналитики на Западе, практически ни один из которых не является экспертом по России, сравнивают якобы динамические ходы Путина со «слабаками» дома, но многие в политической и бизнес-элите России думали, что «рокировка» с Медведевым была ошибочной в связи с огромными структурными проблемами страны, большинство из которых нельзя решить даже в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе, и прогнозы на этот счет неутешительны. В результате у Путина практически нет стратегии политического выхода. В самом деле, многие в Москве считают, что именно по этой причине и был присоединен Крым к РФ, хотя президент вряд ли ожидал серьезные санкции, упорное украинское сопротивление или падение нефти.

Russia's huge problems include its unreformed - and perhaps unreformable - energy-based economy and the threats to it not just from shale oil and gas, but from increasing alternative sources, its demographic crisis and its declining human capital.

Огромные проблемы России включают ее нереформированную – и, возможно, нереформируемую – экономику с ее зависимостью от энергоносителей, и угрозы для нее создают не только сланцевая нефть и газ, но и развитие альтернативных источников энергии, демографический кризис и снижение уровня человеческого капитала.

Take energy. In 2011, we warned of the huge threat to Russia's economy from both shale oil and gas and breakthroughs in alternative energy. Some experts are now saying that renewables could render hydrocarbons obsolete in the next 20-30 years, as could a breakthrough in nuclear fusion - Link - http://www.theguardian.com/…/has-lockheed-martin-really-mad…. Earlier this year, Toyota announced that it was launching the production of cars running on hydrogen, which obviously require no fossil fuels and whose only waste product is water. The cars will sell for just $62,000.

Возьмите энергетику. В 2011-м году мы предупреждали про огромные угрозы российской экономике, и от сланцевой нефти и газа, и от прорывов в области альтернативной энергетики. Некоторые эксперты сейчас говорят, что возобновляемые источники энергии могут заместить углеводороды уже в ближайшие 20-30 лет, как, например, мог бы сделать прорыв в ядерном синтезе. Ранее в этом году автомобильная компания Toyota объявила, что она готовит запуск производства автомобилей, работающих на водороде. Такие моторы, очевидно, не требуют ископаемого топлива, а их единственным выхлопом будет вода. Автомобили будут продаваться за всего лишь $62000.

LINK: http://www.theguardian.com/…/has-lockheed-martin-really-mad…
LINK: http://asia.nikkei.com/…/Is-Toyota-s-new-hydrogen-car-about…

Last week, Bloomberg magazine featured this story on its cover.

На прошлой неделе журнал Блумберг поместил эту статью себе на обложку.

LINK: http://www.businessweek.com/…/toyota-embraces-fuel-cell-car…

20-30 years might sound like a long time, but a few years ago, German Gref, formerly Minister of Economics and Trade and now head of Sberbank, told the journalist Vladimir Pozner that the Russian car industry would take 10-15 years to develop - and that assumes that it would be successful.

20-30 лет, возможно, звучит как очень большой период времени, но несколько лет назад Герман Греф, бывший Министр экономики и торговли, а теперь глава Сбербанка, сказал журналисту Владимиру Познеру, что развитие российского автопрома займет 10-15 лет, если предположить, конечно, что оно будет успешным.

Russia's elite says that western sanctions now give the country a chance to develop its own industry, but this has more to do with hubris and wishful thinking than reality, and developing internationally competitive sectors and modern businesses under the "Muscovite Model" will be extremely difficult. Russia's most famous export is probably the Kalashnikov - a technology developed in the 1940s! That is just one illustration of Russia's deep problems. The authors have been involved with the Soviet Union, Russia and the CIS since the 1970s and 1980s and have heard repeated claims of breakthrough science, technology and products that "have no analogues anywhere in the world". We know of none which has been successfully commercialised globally.

Российская элита говорит, что западные санкции дают стране шанс развить свою промышленность, но скорее всего это просто попытка выдать желаемое за действительное, и развить секторы, которые будут конкурентоспособными на международном уровне при «московской модели», будет крайне сложно. Самый знаменитый экспортный продукт России – пожалуй, «калашников», технологии которого были разработаны в сороковых! Это только одна иллюстрация глубины проблем России. Авторы были связаны с Советским Союзом, Россией и СНГ с 70-х и слышали множество громких заявлений о прорывных разработках в науке, технике и о продуктах, «не имеющих аналогов нигде в мире!» Мы не знаем ни одной такой разработки, которая была бы успешно воплощена в глобальном масштабе в коммерческом плане.

Link to Ian Pryde's article: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/…/russias-dull-he…/482359.html

Russia's aging population has dropped drastically since the early 1990s, and although it has seen a bump since 2009, the population growth rate has fallen, while the Muslim population is rising rapidly. Central Asian and other (im)migrants "top up" the population, but work as builders or cleaners in shopping malls and lack the qualifications Russia desperately needs to modernise. Ten million people are due to retire in the next ten years, and the brightest and best are leaving the country in droves - 40,000 Russian computer programmers work in Silicon Valley alone. Last year, a National Bureau of Economic Research paper put Russia's fiscal gap (the difference between the present value of a country’s future expenditures and its future receipts) in 2013 at a whopping $28 trillion! Russia's "uni-polar" moment after Crimea was always going to be fleeting and is ebbing away already.

Стареющее население России резко уменьшилось с начала 1990-х годов и, хотя было небольшое увеличение рождаемости с 2009 года, темпы роста населения упали, но в то же время мусульманское население быстро растет. (Им)мигранты из Средней Азии и других стран «пополняют» дефицит населения, но в основном работают как строители или уборщики в торговых центрах, и у них нет тех квалификаций, которые отчаянно необходимы России для ее модернизации. Десять миллионов россиян должны выйти на пенсию в ближайшие десять лет, а самые яркие и лучшие кадры уезжают из страны в массовом порядке – 40000 российских программистов работают в одной только Кремниевой долине. В прошлом году Национальное бюро экономических исследований США опубликовало отчет, по которому фискальная нехватка России (то есть разница между дисконтированной стоимостью будущих расходов страны и ее будущими поступлениями) в 2013-ом году достигла колоссальных 28 трлн. долларов США! «Однополярный» момент России после Крыма будет мимолетным и уже сходит на нет.

LINK to NBER article:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19608

The Soviet Union/Russia has been a power in decline since the mid-1970s, but Putin cannot solve the problems not only because the "correlation of forces" are moving ineluctably against the country, but also because any more democracy and economic efficiency would endanger elite rule à la Hosking and Rosefielde.

Советский Союз/Россия переживает спад с середины 1970-х годов, но президент не может решить проблемы не только потому, что соотношение сил неизбежно двигается против страны, но и потому, что больше демократии и экономической эффективности поставило бы под угрозу правление элиты, по теориям Хоскинга и Розефилда.

Russia's commodities-based economic bounce has long since run its course, but instead of urgent reforms, ever-increasing autocracy has undermined Russia's new and fragile democratic institutions, while ever-increasing bureaucracy and corruption suffocate SMEs in the cradle, the mainstay of every advanced economy.

Скачок российской экономики из-за устойчово поднимавшихся цен на сырье давным-давно исчерпал себя, но вместо срочных реформ, все большая автократия подорвала новые и хрупкие демократические институты России, и все более растущая бюрократия и коррупция душат малый и средний бизнес, главный стержень каждой развитой экономикой, в колыбели.

Russia thus remains deep in its centuries old cul-de-sac, irrespective of any current bump in presidential popularity, and has failed utterly to even begin building a trust-based society, a concept wholly alien to the country and a leadership which thinks in terms of zero-sum games.

Таким образом, Россия остается глубоко в многовековом тупике, независимо от любого текущего скачка популярности президента, и даже не начала строить общество, основанное на доверии, понятии совершенно чуждом стране и руководству, размышляющему в категории игр с нулевой суммой.

In addition to the Kremlin's fear of losing control, the country's schizophrenic mentality also hinders its progress.

В дополнение к страху руководства потерять контроль, шизофренический менталитет страны также препятствует ее прогрессу.

Russia continues to swing constantly between two extremes - indeed these extremes co-exist, despite their logical incompatibility. On the one hand, Russia has a huge inferiority complex born of its constant awareness of its own backwardness combined with its astounding inability to get its politics and economy right at the same time. On the other hand, it has a deeply-ingrained hubris born of its imperial past - most Westerners are unaware that Russia's imperial period lasted far longer than those of the maritime powers of Portugal, Spain, Britain, Holland and France.

Россия продолжает колебаться между двумя полюсями, несмотря на их логическую несовместимость. С одной стороны, Россия страдает от огромного комплекса неполноценности, рожденнего от постоянного осознания собственной отсталости в сочетании с поразительной неспособностью правильно обустраивать одновременно свою политику и экономику. С другой стороны, у нее есть глубоко укоренившееся высокомерие, рожденное ее имперским прошлым. Большинство людей на Западе не знают, что имперский период России длился гораздо дольше, чем у тех же морских держав – Португалии, Испании, Великобритании, Голландии и Франции.

Russia's own leaders let slip occasional glimpses of these extremes.

Руководство России иногда показывает проявления этих крайностей.

Speaking about the government's botched monetary reform, the then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin uttered in 1993 what instantly became a "winged phrase" typifying Russian reality in general:

Говоря о неудачной денежной реформе правительства, тогдашний премьер-министр Виктор Черномырдин в 1993 году произнёс фразу, которая стала крылатой, поскольку показала российскую действительность в целом:

“хотели как лучше, а получилось как всегда”
literally: “we wanted (to do) it better, but it ended up as always”

Vladimir Putin gave vent to Russia's typical hubris, denial, and touchiness at Davos in 2009 when dismissing an offer of help to expand Russia's economy and help it out of the crisis from Michael Dell, CEO of the eponymous company:

Владимир Путин дал волю типичному высокомерию России, ее отрицанию проблем и обидчивости в Давосе в 2009-ом году, отклоняя предложение помощи в развитии российской экономики и в выходе из кризиса от Майкла Делла, генерального директора одноименной компании:

“The thing is, it isn't necessary to help us. We are not invalids. It is necessary to help the poor, invalids, pensioners, developing countries...”

«Фокус в том, что нам не нужно помогать, мы не инвалиды. Реально нужно помогать бедным, нужно помогать людям с ограниченными возможностями, нужно помогать пенсионерам, нужно помогать развивающимся странам...»

LINK to video of Putin's reply:
http://www.cnews.ru/news/top/?2009/01/29/336134

Russia is thus certain to continue cutting off its nose to spite its face - far better that than to lose face by admitting weakness to the West.

Россия, таким образом, безусловно, продолжит вредить себе, чтобы досадить другому – это гораздо лучше, чем потерять лицо, признав свою слабость Западу.

Russia remains a nuclear superpower and the largest country in the world territorially, but if existing trends continue, Russia's population will fall to between 100-107 million by 2050 and the country already lacks the population to exploit its resources and increase production, while the ongoing rise of China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria and other countries with larger and faster growing populations and more dynamic economies will see it fall behind relatively and increasingly sidelined from international affairs in coming decades as its economic growth will be lower than the global average.

Россия остается ядерной сверхдержавой и самой большой страной в мире по территории, но если существующие тенденции сохранятся, население России сократится до 100-107 млн. до 2050 года, хотя стране и так уже не хватает населения, чтобы эксплуатировать свои ресурсы и увеличить производство, в то время как продолжается подъем Китая, Индии, Индонезии, Бразилии, Нигерии и других стран с более крупными и быстрее растущими населениями и более динамичными экономиками. В результате Россия, в относительном выражении, уступит другим странам и отойдет в сторону от международных дел в ближайшие десятилетия, так как ее экономический рост будет ниже, чем среднемировой.

Moscow's only "correct" policy solution remains modernisation, not adding more territory consisting of poor and backward regions such as Crimea or Eastern Ukraine which require huge investment and subsidies and involve huge opportunity costs. Astonishingly, Russia's elite, it turns out, thought these were affordable,

Единственным «правильным» решением Москвы остается модернизация, а не расширение территории, состоящей из бедных и отсталых регионов, таких как Крым или Восточная Украина, которые требуют огромных инвестиций и субсидий, и сопряжены с огромными упущенными возможностями. Удивительно, что российская элита, по-видимому, считала, что она может это все себе позволить,

Link - http://www.bloomberg.com/…/putin-s-secret-gamble-bet-on-ukr…,

...but one western estimate put the cost at some $440 bn in the first year alone - not including sanctions.

...но одна западная публикация оценила стоимость Крыма только за первый год примерно в $440 млрд - не включая санкций.

Link - http://www.bne.eu/…/crimea-will-cost-russia-least-400bn-year

Hitherto, Russia has always sought modernisation from the West, but has been ignoring Western advice for centuries, while at the same time trying to catch up - and always failing because of its rulers' insistence on empire and autocracy.

До сих пор Россия всегда искала модернизацию на Западе, но игнорирует советы Запада на протяжении веков, в то же время пытаясь его догнать – всегда безуспешно из-за настроенности своих правителей на империю и самодержавие.

In short, as Rosefielde points out, Russia has modernised, but not westernised. Many Russian and Western analysts now argue that Putin has not only rendered ineffective Russia's already feeble institutions, such as its political parties, parliament and the judiciary, but achieved an unprecedented concentration of power in his own hands - with all that that implies for the post-Putin period, whenever it might begin.

Если говорить коротко, как отмечает профессор Розефилд, Россия модернизировалась, но не вестернизировалась. Многие российские и западные аналитики утверждают, что Путин не только сделал неэффективными и без того шаткие российские институты, такие как политические партии, парламент и судебная система, но и достиг беспрецедентной концентрации власти в собственных руках, с тем, чем это грозит для пост-путинского периода, когда бы он не начался.

Part III

[Attention: this article is published in English and in Russian, with English and Russian paragraphs following each other; see below]

[Внимание: эта статья публикуется на английском и русском языках, с английскими и русскими параграфами один за другим; см. ниже]

Attention media: re-print is permitted by the authors.

Вниманию СМИ: перепечатка разрешена авторами.

Sometimes I write for other people or organizations. Sometimes other people or organizations write for me. The below article is a brilliant example of the latter.

Иногда я пишу для других людей или организаций. Иногда другие люди или организации пишут для меня. Статья ниже – блестящий пример последнего.

The article “Putin's Prism” by Ian Pryde and Suzanne Stafford at Eurasia Strategy & Communications was initially written several months ago for the Letter to Investors published by the Diamond Age Russia Fund, but since the Letter has not appeared since June 2014 and instead the Investment Advisor now writes frequently on Facebook, the piece has not yet formally appeared until now.

Изначально статья «Призма Путина» была написана Йеном Прайдом и Сюзанн Стаффорд из компании «Евразийские Стратегии и Коммуникации» несколько месяцев назад специально для письма инвесторам Diamond Age Russia Fund, но поскольку письмо не выходило с июня 2014 года, а вместо него Инвестиционный Консультант сейчас регулярно пишет на Facebook, статья так и не была формально опубликована, до этого момента.

In the summer of 2014 it was clearly impossible to predict the "perfect storm" that has now hit Russia: the rapid fall in oil prices and the attendant collapse of the rouble have compounded the problems of an already stagnant or declining economy and international sanctions.


Crude Oil price at $48.64 per barrel

Летом 2014 года очевидно невозможно было предвидеть весь этот «идеальный шторм», который сейчас ударил по России: быстрое падение цены на нефть и сопутствующее падение рубля усугубили проблемы уже впавшей в застой или даже сокращающейся экономики и международных санкций.

The authors show, however, that these problems and the inability to respond to them are almost wholly due to Russia's own failings, despite Moscow's claims: as the economists say, Russia's problems are not exogenous, but endogenous.

Авторы показывают, однако, что эти проблемы и неспособность реагировать на них почти полностью явились результатом собственных промахов России, несмотря на заявления Москвы: как говорят экономисты, проблемы России не экзогенны, а эндогенны.

As 2014 drew to a close, Ian and Suzanne's article remains important since it is one of the few analyses published in English or Russian this or last year which takes a broader view of Russia's past and the country's longer-term prospects.

В то время как 2014 подошел к концу, статья Йена и Сюзанн остается важной, поскольку она является одним из немногих анализов, опубликованных на английском или русском языках в этом или прошедшем году, который бросает более широкий взгляд на прошлое России и ее долгосрочные перспективы.

The authors have undertaken only minor updates since subsequent events have vindicated their analysis and forecasts.

Авторы лишь незначительные дополнили и обновили статью, поскольку последующие события подтвердили обоснованность их анализа и прогнозов.

Putin's Prism

Russia's Problems Cannot be Solved by Policy Tinkering
By Ian Pryde and Suzanne Stafford
For the Letter to Investors published by the Diamond Age Russia Fund

Призма Путина

Проблемы России нельзя решить без кардинального изменения политики
Авторы: Йен Прайд и Сюзанн Стаффорд
Специально для Письма Инвесторам, Diamond Age Russia Fund

As 2014, an unusually eventful year, drew to a close, Russia was yet again in the global headlines for all the wrong reasons. The collapsing oil price has dragged down the rouble, leading to domestic fears of 1998 redux, when the masses learnt a new foreign word - "defolt".

В то время, как 2014 год, этот необычайно полный событиями год, приблизился к завершению, Россия снова попала в заголовки мировых СМИ по довольно нерадужному поводу. Коллапс нефтяных цен спровоцировал падение рубля, вызывающее мрачные воспоминания о 1998 годе, когда широкие массы изучили новое для себя слово «дефолт».

Russian and Western analysts have penned countless policy recommendations to "solve" these problems, but few understand not only why these recommendations will not be implemented, but will not work even if they were.

Российские и западные аналитики наперебой предлагают бесчисленные меры для решения этих проблем, но немногие понимают не только почему эти меры не будут введены, но и не сработали бы, если бы даже и были введены.

LINK - El-Erian - http://blogs.ft.com/…/putins-limited-options-to-halt-the-c…/
LINK - Anders Aslund - http://www.ft.com/…/770f73c2-8541-11e4-ab4e-00144feabdc0.ht…

According to many analysts, the Ukraine/Crimea crisis and Russia's gas deal with China exposed the weakness of Russia's economy. In late April, the IMF said that the country was already "experiencing recession" - despite oil costing over $100 per barrel. If so, this would have been Russia's second recession in five years. As of October 2014, however, Russia had apparently escaped recession, but most experts were forecasting stagnation and increasing inflation.

По мнению многих аналитиков, кризис с Украиной и Крымом и сделка с газом между Россией и Китаем показали слабость российской экономики. В конце апреля МВФ заявил, что страна уже испытывает рецессию - несмотря на то, что стоимость нефти была более $100 за баррель. Если так, то это уже была бы вторая рецессия в России в течение последних пяти лет. По состоянию на октябрь 2014 года, однако, Россия избежала рецессии, но большинство экспертов прогнозировало стагнацию и рост инфляции.

Then Russia was hit by what many call a "perfect storm", but the real reasons for Russia's current condition are not understood by most observers. On 26 March 2014, for instance, the World Bank stated that...

После этого, однако, Россия столкнулась с тем, что многие называют «идеальным штормом». Тем не менее, большинство наблюдателей не понимает истинных причин текущего состояния российской экономики. 26-го марта 2014 года, например, Всемирный банк заявил, что...

“In the past, the lack of comprehensive structural reforms was masked by a growth model based on large investment projects, continued increases in public wages, and transfers – all fueled by sizeable oil revenues. Recent events around the Crimea crisis have compounded the lingering confidence problem into a confidence crisis and more clearly exposed the economic weakness of this growth model.”

«В прошлом недостаточное внимание к проведению полномасштабных комплексных структурных реформ привело к ослаблению доверия инвесторов, что скрывалось за моделью экономического роста, основанной на крупных инвестиционных проектах, неуклонном повышении зарплат в государственном секторе и трансфертов, чему способствовали значительные нефтяные доходы. Последние события вокруг крымского кризиса привели к тому, что сохраняющиеся долгое время проблемы доверия переросли в кризис доверия и обострили экономические недостатки действующей модели роста.»

LINK
http://www.worldbank.org/…/2014/03/26/russian-economic-repo…

This is flat wrong. The World Bank fails to understand the term "project" - a temporary endeavour done over and above normal business - and nothing was "masked" since it was obvious all along that in Russia's case, such projects did little, if anything, to diversify the country's economy, let alone solve Russia's deep underlying structural problems. That is why genuine Russia experts long since forecast looming problems - even during the go-go years between 2000-8.

Это просто-напросто неправильно. Всемирный банк не понимает термина «проект» - временные усилия сделать что-нибудь сверх нормального бизнеса, и ничего не «скрывалось», так как это было очевидно с самого начала, что в случае России такие проекты действительно мало сделали для диверсификации экономики страны, не говоря уже о решении глубоких основополагающих структурных проблем. Именно поэтому осведомленные эксперты по России давно предупреждали о надвигающихся проблемах – даже во время бума между 2000 и 2008 годами.

In fact, Russia's weak economy and failure to reform are deeply embedded in centuries of elite rule and the country's counter-productive policy choices since 2000, especially after about 2004-5, when an initial burst of reform ground to a halt.

На самом деле, слабая экономика России и неспособность проводить реформы неразрывно связаны с веками элитного правления и контрпродуктивной политикой страны с 2000 года, особенно после 2004-2005 годов, когда начальный прорыв в реформах застопорился.

British historian Geoffrey Hosking observed in his 1997 book “Russia: People & Empire 1552-1917” that

Британский историк Джеффри Хоскинг (Geoffrey Hosking) отметил в своей книге 1997-го года «Россия: Народ и Империя 1552-1917»:

“What is striking is not that Russia was economically backward in either the sixteenth, eighteenth or early twentieth century, but rather that every attempt at reform and modernisation in the long run tended to reproduce that backwardness... the economic policies deemed necessary to sustain the empire systematically held back the entrepreneurial and productive potentialities of the mass of the people.”

«Поражает не тот факт, что Россия была экономически отсталой в шестнадцатом, восемнадцатом или в начале двадцатого веков, а то, что любая попытка реформирования и модернизации в долгосрочной перспективе воспроизводила эту отсталость... экономическая политика, которая считалась необходимой для поддержания империи, систематически сдерживала предпринимательский и производительный потенциал масс людей.»

Plus ça change!

Черного кобеля не отмоешь добела!

In his 2003 article “The Russian Conundrum” for the “Cambridge Review of International Affairs”, co-author Ian Pryde stated that

В своей статье 2003 года «Русская загадка» для научного журнала «Cambridge Review of International Affairs» соавтор Йен Прайд заявил, что

“Russia has resumed many of the reforms that were put on hold during the instability following the crash of August 1998 and is seriously attempting to create the conditions for sustained economic growth. However, implementation will prove difficult, and policy slippage will be costly.”

«Россия возобновила многие реформы, которые были остановлены во время нестабильности после краха и дефолта августа 1998-го года, и предпринимает серьезные шаги для создания условий устойчивого экономического роста. Тем не менее, реализация будет трудной, и промахи политики будут стоить дорого.»

Why? Because implementation in Russia is always difficult and meets tough resistance - recall Peter the Great cutting the beards of his boyars - because if a large and sustained drop in oil prices were to occur, Russia would be in serious trouble, and because hitherto, investment in the non-energy sectors had remained far too low. The Russian elite also recognised then that major reform was needed if the country were to avoid slipping to Third World status.

Почему? Потому, что воплощение реформ в жизнь в России всегда вызывает трудности и упорное сопротивление – вспомнить, к примеру, как Петр Великий резал бороды своих бояр – потому, что если произойдет большое и устойчивое падение цен на нефть, Россия будет испытывать серьезные трудности, да и потому что пока инвестиции в другие секторы, кроме энергетики, оставались слишком низкими. Российская элита также признала, что масштабная реформа была необходима, если страна не хочет стать страной третьего мира.

LINK to Ian Pryde's article: http://www.tandfonline.com/…/…/10.1080/0955757032000075771a…

The ideology of "Resurgent Russia" has since replaced the fear of Third World status, but right up until the global financial crash in 2008, we continued to warn in both English and Russian that Moscow was failing to carry out meaningful reforms when the going was good.

Идеология «возрождающейся России» погасила страх ранних 2000-х годов стать страной третьего мира, но, вплоть до глобального финансового кризиса в 2008 году, мы продолжали предупреждать на английском и русском языках, что Москвой не были проведены полноценные реформы, пока господствовали благоприятные условия.

LINK to our website:
www.explaining-eurasia.com

The subtitle of the 2005 book by economics professor Steven Rosefielde at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, explains why.

Подзаголовок книги профессора экономики Стивена Розефилда (Steven Rosefielde) 2005-го года Университета Северной Каролины в Чапел-Хилл объясняет почему.

In “Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower”, Rosefielde updates Hosking's argument to the Soviet, Yeltsin and Putin periods, noting that Russia's "deep structures" and solutions dating from the rise of the "Muscovite Model" in the post-Mongol period now appear in a modernised, liberally autocratic form: patrimonialism, rent seeking, networks of mutual support, plunder, protectionism, subjugation and extreme inequality. The rule of men continues unabated and property rights are just as alienable as ever, as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and many "lesser lights" have found out. The latest high-profile case was that of "oligarch" Vladimir Yevtushenkov, who was placed under house arrest in September 2014 and released in December 2014 after his oil company Bashneft had been nationalized.

В книге «Россия в 21-м Веке: Блудная Сверхдержава», Розефилд продолжает суть аргументации Хоскинга в советский, ельцинский и путинский периоды, отметив, что «глубинные структуры» России и решения, датируемые с утверждения «московской модели» в период после монгольского ига, сейчас проявляются в модернизированной, либерально-самодержавной форме: патримониализм, патриархат, воровство, круговая порука, грабеж, протекционизм, верноподданичество и крайнее неравенство. Верховенство одного человека не ослабевает, и права на собственность не являются неприкосновенными, как обнаружил Михаил Ходорковский и другие, рангом пониже. Последним резонансным примером стало дело Владимира Евтушенкова, которого поместили под домашний арест в сентябре 2014 и освободили в декабре, после того, как его нефтяная компания Башнефть была национализирована.

Links: http://www.theguardian.com/…/oligarch-yevtushenkov-arrest-d…

http://www.ft.com/…/6b5cd064-8619-11e4-b248-00144feabdc0.ht…

Rosefielde also argues that in the 2000s, the economy's potential was hardly any greater than during the Soviet period and remained structurally militarised, i.e. it is...

Профессор Розефилд также утверждает, что в 2000 годы потенциал экономики был едва ли больше, чем во время советского периода, и она остается «структурно военизированной», т.е. речь идет о...

“...a productive system with a large embedded military-industrial sector capable of persuading political leaders to provide sufficient resources to deal with worst-case security threats in the long term.”

«...продуктивной системе с большим встроенным военно-промышленным сектором, способным убедить политических лидеров обеспечить достаточные ресурсы для противостояния наихудшим из угроз безопасности в долгосрочной перспективе.»

In short, the economy remains dominated by the security concerns of the leadership, general staff and military-industrial complex. Put more simply, security and power considerations trump the economy. If this did not change, forecast Rosefielde, Russia would have to chose between guns and butter.

Вкратце - экономика по-прежнему доминируется заботами безопасности со стороны руководства страны, генерального штаба и военно-промышленного комплекса. Проще говоря, безопасность и геополитика доминируют над экономикой. По прогнозам Розефилда, если ситуация не изменится, России придется выбирать «между пушками и маслом».

Russian economist Yevsei Gurvich, a member of the Presidential Economic Council, duly echoed Rosefielde's view in an article appropriately entitled "Guns or Butter" on 23 April 2014 in Vedomosti, a joint venture between the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal and one of Russia's leading business newspapers.

Вот и российский экономист Евсей Гурвич, член Экономического совета при Президенте РФ, практически повторяет мнение профессора Розефилда в статье под названием «Пушки вместо масла» 23-го апреля 2014 года в газете Ведомости, совместной публикации газет Financial Times и Wall Street Journal, одной из ведущих в России бизнес-газет.

Gurvich pointed out that at 4.5%, Russia's military budget as a percentage of GDP is nearly twice as high as the global and NATO average of 2.5% and that while defence spending is set to increase by 61% during 2014-6, spending on health and education would only rise by 22-23%. This is against the background of a largely stagnant economy down to 2030, as Russia's Ministry of Economy forecast in 2013.

Гурвич отметил, что при уровне 4.5% военный бюджет России в процентном выражении от ВВП почти в два раза выше среднего уровня в мире и у НАТО, которые тратят 2.5%, в то же время как расходы РФ на оборону увеличатся на 61% в течение 2014-2016, а расходы на здравоохранение и образование вырастут только на 22-23%. Это на фоне застойной в значительной степени экономики вплоть до 2030 года, как Министерство экономики РФ и прогнозировало уже в 2013 году.

Gurvich also noted that the Russian public remained unaware of these costs since they had hardly been discussed on TV and radio, the main source of information for most Russians. Instead, Russian TV had focused on the much narrower issue of sanctions.

Гурвич также отметил, что российская общественность оставалась в неведении относительно этих расходов, так как они почти не обсуждались на радио и телевидении, основных источниках информации для большинства россиян. Вместо этого, российское телевидение сосредотачивало свое внимание на более ограниченном вопросе санкций.

LINK to Vedomosti article:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opini…/news/25711741/pushki-ilimaslo

Pressures against the Russian economy have of course mounted considerably since Gurvich's April article, but Western views that broader sanctions could bring Putin to reverse direction could be wide of the mark.

Давление на российскую экономику и факторы, сдерживающие рост, конечно, значительно выросли со времени публикации статьи Гурвича в апреле, но западное мнение о том, что санкции вынудят Путина поменять направление могут быть далеки от истины.

As the failure of the demonstrations showed a few years ago, Russia's middle class is still small, or at least too apathetic to protest, while - as Russian liberals point out - much of the Russian population can easily survive on its traditional diet of "vodka and potatoes".
Part I