I have given up doing business with e-bay due to problems being both a buyer and being a seller.

As a buyer, I have occasionally misplaced winning small bids on an item.  Realizing that the item does not justify the shipping costs, I simply remit the bid amount for the item with the instructions not to ship.  Usually I am then subject to unlisted "inconvenience fees", as if simply relisting the item is more trouble for the seller than shipping it, even after having received the amount of the winning bid.

More problematic is my issues as a seller.  Since the auction is published to close at an absolute time, software has evolved to bid up an item seconds before the close.  This successfully hides the real interest in the item, so that obscure items routinely grossly undersell.  Contrast this to the experience of attending a real auction.  The auctioneer sings out asking prices in cadence, and if no bid is received in cadence announces "going once".  In a cadence about one-third the bid-up cadence, "going twice" is announced.  At this point an interesting game emerges.  The auctioneer is attempting to dig up any additional interest in the item to maximize his commission which also helps the consigner.  At the same time the auctioneer is eager to get to the next lot to move things along.  At an unexpected time, "sold" is announced, and the auction closes.

The emergence of new valid blocks in the block chain can automate this process and remove the advantage buyers have of bidding for items seconds before the announced close.   Unlike in e-bay, a listed item is in the "preview" state with a deadline time.  In this state, e-bay's model applies, but the bids received only serve to place the "opening bid" amount.  At the emergence of the first valid block after the deadline time, the auction then "goes live".  In this state, ask and bid prices are listed, and new bids are received.  At the emergence of each new block, the winning bidder during the previous block period is required to send his bid amount.  If in at the emergence of the next block he is outbid, he is credited back his bid amount, otherwise "going once" is declared.  The appearance of the next valid block without any additional bids declares "going twice".  The auction then closes after the next block appears without any bids received.  Any bids placed during any of these "going" periods reverts the auction to the "live" state.

Since the emergence of new blocks is a Poisson process with an unpredictable exact event time, attempting to hide interest in an item by bidding close to the close risks losing the bid.  It also holds the auction open for the duration of the appearance of two additional new valid blocks in the block chain.  Further, the validation waiting time is built in, and the consigner and auctioneer may then be paid immediately.  --LeeO

Here's some fun ideas I have been playing out in my mind while shoveling the season's first significant snowfall from my driveway:

I.  The testnet pyramid scheme.  There are a number of ways to approach this one.
. A. The soft sell: call it a "gifting club".
. B. The multi-level sell: offer special "insider privileges" for recruiting more suckers into the scheme.
. C. The big hype:  place an add into the click-stream ad net that reads something like:

Yes you too can sucker your friends and family out of their fake play money.  Just fill out the form here and you are on your way.

II. The testnet Ponzi scheme.
. A. The exclusive approach (i.e. Bernie Madoff).  Exclude entry only to those who have 10 testnet BTC or more to outvest.  (my own nounce.)
. B. The public service approach (i.e. Pat Kiley).  Publish scathing articles on the current money system including mostly truths.  Advertise in your publication an outvestment using "arbitrage" to achieve "double-digit" returns on your fake money.  Then pull the plug and run.

III.  The fake paramutual betting pool.
. A. Attract all of the gambling bugs out there (place ads in the click-stream on gaming sites) for your ultra cool gambling site.
. B. Pull the plug and run.

I was thinking with regard to the fake paramutual betting pool to program in a "pull the plug and run" factor with every bet received.  With regard to the Ponzi scheme, why not fake a "raid" on the share holders [this is a simulation, after all], and send them coolly worded letters demanding claw-backs.

If I had the time and technical knowledge it may be fun to program this.  It would be the "Monopoly" of the twenty-first century.  I would program all of the proceeds to be thrown back at the fountain.  However, personal ethics prevents me due to the possibility of someone taking these programs as models for actually doing the real thing.  --LeeO