Have msgd u..plz check n respond
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Hello Anyone who is looking to buy merits can contact me. Thanks
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Hello
I would like to sell Full & Senior Member Accounts at a very good price.
If you are looking to buy Merits then I can help you out.
You can send me PM for further details.
Thanks.
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Bitcointalk Username : trout BTC Address for Payouts : 12VJ6QhnbLuQXdmBQwbL1YmZx4JPeUpsVP
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are there any other DAG coins now besides IOTA and Byteball?
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The idea is kinda similar to firstbits (if you haven't seen, look it up - it's pretty neat), but the CRC part is a clear advantage. Firstbits pretty much died off and I think it happened because of errors in calculating firstbit addresses by a popular service (blockchain.info) which resulted in some loss of funds.
However, I suppose the fact that you have to get a transaction in the blockchain before you can use an address, as well as the implied mandatory address reuse, could be a killer
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Even if segwit is activated, that doesn't mean a particular web site will accept witness transactions. So wallets will need to support both for some time.
AFAIU, non-segwit-supporting wallets will still recognize transactions with segwit inputs. So no need keep creating P2PKH addresses in order to be able to pay to non-segwit wallets
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nice work, but I'd like to add a couple of general comments on steganography which are very important for anyone who wants to use it to store real money.
First of all, steganography for now is not nearly on the same level of security as cryptography. In fact, *every* steganographic method can be broken with currently available stegoanalitic methods(which are typically statistical methods). The only question is whether there is enough data, but practical amounts are sufficient (no astronomical figures like in crypto). While it is easy to hide something in an image so that the image with hidden data looks the same to a human eye, it is so far practically impossible to hide anything from statistical analysis methods.
The only practical use of steganography is obfuscation. If you want to hide the fact that you are storing private keys on a machine from someone who is not too much intent on finding them, then it's useful. Otherwise it's not. For example, a security agent at the border which decides to do a "random" Check of your laptop will probably not find anything. If there was a "tip off" on you - then they probably will.
Another note: these methods are typically very sensitive to any change in the image such as rescaling, change of resolution, not to mention printing/ scanning etc. Be careful and check in advance how much destortion the steganographic method is designed to handle (typically - no distortion).
The above are just general considerations, I didn't check which methods OP used. (Besides, there are off-the-shlef stego methods which you can use to hide any files, not only wallets/ private keys.)
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May have lost 0.05 BTC sent by the faucet...
OMG, this is such an awesome thread for this post alone. Can you imagine getting a payout like that from a faucet these days? How much could you claim a day back in 2011 or whenever it was that faucets started? I was not into btc yet back then. In January 2011 there was only one faucet that I know of, run by Gavin. I got my first 0.05 BTC from it: back in the day, the faucet also displayed the message along the lines of: Weren't you offering 5 BTC before? with a link furhter explaining that, indeed, it was sending 5BTC before, but at *that* time, 1BTC had only been worth around 0.005$ And about a daily limit: yes, there was some sort of abuse control in place, complete with a captcha and some denigrating message about those that abuse a faucet offering such a little value. so, yeah, there's some nostalgia for you. back on topic, there must be quite a few of those 5 BTC faucet payouts lost forever, which we'll never able to write off conclusively.
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specifically for altcoins, it is worth notifying the exchanges where the altcoin is traded that you were hacked, providing the address where the coins were sent to (by the hacker) and convincing evidence that the coins are indeed yours (and were stolen from you).
Then the exchanges may block the coins if they already received them - and might eventually even return them to you.
I say specifically for altcoins since for most of the alts there's pretty much nothing else to do with them apart from keeping them or sending to an exchange - i.e. no good ways of laundring.
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I read somewhere that this is a name registration distributed service, similar to namecoin but on the bitcoin blockchain, and that the 40 BTC payment was to register the name " .id ". (The registration is by proof-of-burn ) But now I can't find where I read this. Maybe someone with better googling skills can try checking this.
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since every peer has to receive every transactions eventually, it seems that Transactions * Peers is the absolute minimum of transaction sends you'd need. Am I missing something trivial here?
You are! Imagine if the network were wired such that if a message was relayed along connection 0 on each peer it would form a Hamiltonian cycle and reach every node in the network. Thus, each peer would receive and send each transaction exactly once. This shows the bound cannot be transactions*peers. OK I see I was just talking about a different quantity. In your ideal example, each transaction is sent Peers times from someone to someone (which is what I was talking about), though indeed each node only sends it once. Anyway, this settled, are you saying that currently (without set reconciliation) each node sends each transaction roughly Peers times? (Where Peers is the size of the whole network - not just the number of neighbours). That's ... pretty bad indeed.
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since every peer has to receive every transactions eventually, it seems that Transactions * Peers is the absolute minimum of transaction sends you'd need. Am I missing something trivial here?
As far as I understand, a peer will send every transaction to everyone he hasn't received it from. So this results in an additional multiplicative factor of something like k/2, where k is the average number of neighbours for a node. (Or is it much more than that?)
Is it this factor that you'd like to get rid of, gmaxwell?
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Am I missing something? 1) You are missing that miners are interested in fees. They have a right to include/exclude any transaction. 2) You are missing that it is almost impossible to upgrade relay policy on thousands of nodes. BTW. This is funny test. Miners just raised the minimum fee, leaving a lot of unconfirmed transactions and screaming users. Blocks are not filled. Right now mempool on https://tradeblock.com/bitcoin/ is 12mb (note: transactions with a fee less than 5 satoshi per byte are ignored) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons Edit: 3) Since the start of this stress test the price on exchanges rized up. Everybody likes it Are you sure that you really want to fix this issue? A lot of people would vote against I've been just speaking about the default policy in the "Core" client. In this sense, fixing the issue is trivial. After such an update miners/ relay nodes are of course still free to run any code they like - nobody forces them to update their policy Edit: All I'm saying is that it is easy to make this kind of attack as expensive as the "traditional" block-size-filling spam attack. I'm surprised this is not done yet.
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the fix seems trivial - calculate the min relay fee (and all the rest of the fee thresholds) based on the size and the number of sigops, rather than the size only. I don't get why it's not in the latest release. Am I missing something?
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according to blocktrail.com , there are already > 13% "v4" blocks. v4 corresponds to BIP 100 Are these actually BIP 100 blocks, or are they just putting v4 in the header? Also, is this already discussed somewhere? It seems important (at least, if these are actually v4 blocks) but I don't see any discussion anywhere. According to the wiki BIP 100 is still a draft. The wiki can lag behind though.
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