Here is the relevant code from GitHub (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/ad2952d17a2af419a04256b10b53c7377f826a27/src/validation.h#L65), which sets the DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY to 336 hours, which is 14 days.

Users can change the expiry period using the command -mempoolexpiry=<n>, which <n> is the number of hours. See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/e9fc8f6e7f572224d2bd4577eee6d538331ef663/test/functional/mempool_expiry.py#L8

Even if she deletes the attachment, if she is using a terrible email provider like Google or similar, then the attachment will be backed up unencrypted on dozens of servers around the world, putting any coins at considerable risk.

I often see suggestions like this when talking about gifting bitcoin, and I 100% disagree with them. You should not gift pre-generated wallets in any format, regardless of how secure/encrypted they are, because it teaches the person bad habits. If this is their first experience of bitcoin, then right from the outset you are teaching them to trust a third party (you), rather than verify for themselves. They have to trust that you have set up the wallet securely, and they have to trust that you haven't kept a copy of the seed phrase or private key for yourself, or if you have kept a copy "for their own safety" that you have secured it well. The whole process is the opposite of what bitcoin is supposed to be.

Don't trust, verify. Far better to sit down with them, talk them through setting up and backing up their own wallet, and then send some coins to one of their addresses.

Claims to be a top 5 wallet despite no one having heard of it and only a handful of downloads.
Claims to keep 90% of users' funds in cold storage with no proof, but is therefore custodial.
Has their own pointless token.
Claims their token will offer x50 returns.
Claims FDIC insurance with no proof.
Claims 90% ROI per year with staking.
Placeholder website - https://atswallet.io/
Not open source, no GitHub.
Apps flooded with obviously fake and paid for reviews.

Yup, this is going to be HARD pass from anyone with sense.

You definitely still need to trust the escrow.

Lets say I'm trading with a malicious third party who is trying to steal all my bitcoin. I send all my bitcoin to the multi-sig escrow address, with one key controlled by me, one key controlled by the malicious third party, and one key controlled by you. The third party sends you a message saying "Why don't we steal all his coins in a 50-50 split?" If you are untrustworthy, then the two of you make that deal and I lose everything. A 2-of-3 set up doesn't remove the need for a trusted escrow.

A user with zero trading history or trust feedback offering escrow services is always a red flag for me.

What do you mean by this?

Not quite. You simply make s equal to N-s.

If s is greater than N/2, then you would replace s with -s. Since we are using modular arthimetic, -s becomes N-s.

Here's the relevant text from BIP62:

Agreed. I've also said before that it is ridiculous that they are focusing on adding shitcoin support when Ledger Live still doesn't allow address or UTXO control/management. I initially refused to use it over Electrum because of the UTXO control, but as time goes on and they add a ridiculous trading platform and ads (ads in a product I've already paid for, no less), as well as the horrendous privacy concerns, I'm glad I never use it and it will take some significant changes before I ever do use it.

This applies to pretty much everything to do with crypto, not just hardware wallets.

Is there any suggestion that there was a similar bug bounty submitted to Trezor, or have they just seen the Ledger one, examined their own devices, and realized they were also susceptible?

Samesies. I don't remember writing tha... oh.

This is not accurate. It is only completely safe to use an offline password generator if it is open source, you have reviewed the code yourself, and you have compiled it yourself.

A malicious password generator could give you one of a number of pre-generated paawords, which an attacker also has stored on their own device, giving them a very short list to brute force from.

There is such a thing as a passphrase, which essentially becomes a "25th word" as you put it, but it is not the same as the PIN you use to unlock the hardware wallet.

To set up a passphrase on a Ledger, you can either attach it to a secondary PIN so the Ledger device saves it and automatically uses it when you enter your secondary PIN, or you can just use the one PIN and manually enter your passphrase each time you want to use the wallets protected by that passphrase. You can use multiple different passphrases to unlock multiple different wallets, but you can only have one attached to a secondary PIN. The longer and more random the passphrase then the more secure it is, but you should also back it up separately from your 24 word seed phrase, as if you forget your passphrase then your coins will be lost.

See here for more information: https://support.ledger.com/hc/en-us/articles/115005214529-Advanced-passphrase-security

I think this vulnerability was particularly bad, actually. Lots of people claim bitcoin forks such as cash, gold, diamond, private, etc. Lots of people who claim these forks have never used those respective coins or their wallets before, and are unfamiliar with the processes involved. There have been quite a few instances of people losing all their fork coins to malicious wallets. Imagine now if these people had also lost all their bitcoin, via a vulnerability Ledger knew about but hadn't fixed or warned anyone about?

Sure, and I have multiple different passphrases I use for multiple different wallets, but the point Captain-Cryptory made was how to travel with no trace of bitcoin and avoid all scrutiny by border agents. A border agent who is specifically looking out for bitcoin hardware wallets is probably well aware of what passphrases are and how they work. If you want to carry bitcoin secretly across a border checkpoint or through airport security, then a hardware wallet is not the best bet.

Deleting or hiding an icon will only fool the most cursory of checks. Any slightly in depth examination of your phone would still find the wallet application, and therefore prompt the search for your wallets themselves.

Sit on the problem for 3 months, claim that they are too busy to fix it, blame COVID and the holidays, and then push a fix 24 hours after the bug is publicly revealed due to community backlash. At the moment I still prefer my Ledger devices over my Trezor devices due to the unfixable Trezor vulnerability, but this really isn't a good look for Ledger as a company.

At least it's fixed. Everyone make sure to update. And if you haven't already, think about creating properly airgapped and encrypted cold storage.

If hiding the fact that you are traveling with bitcoin is your goal, then using a hardware wallet is a poor choice. The common ones (Ledger, Trezor, Coldcard, etc.) are instantly recognizable to someone who is looking for them, and there is literally no other reason you would be carrying one if not to carry around cryptocurrency.

If you wanted to hide a wallet to carry it across a border without raising suspicion, I would either disguise a seed phrase in among some hand written notes which look like the minutes to a meeting, notes from a lecture, or something similar, or encrypt a seed phrase and hide it among some data I could plausibly claim was for something else.

COVID and the data breach I could accept. Holidays is unacceptable. If you have a critical vulnerability that can result in your users losing all their bitcoin, I expect people to be working overtime to get it fixed ASAP. And they knew about it for months. The entire security team was on holiday for 3 months? Come on.

Ledger released a list of all the coins affected on the link I shared above: https://donjon.ledger.com/lsb/014/

That's actually a very good point. Ledger Live trading was launched a couple of months ago, which means they were developing and launching this while they were fully aware of this bug. COVID and holidays aren't an issue when it comes to launching a service with ridiculous fees to bump up their profits it seems.

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I use very few altcoins, the ones I do use wouldn't make my bitcoin susceptible, and the altcoin wallets I do have are stored under different passphrases from my bitcoin wallets, so it wouldn't matter anyway, but I am incredibly unimpressed by Ledger's attitude to this.

There's some more context in this reddit thread: https://www.reddit.com/r/ledgerwallet/comments/i3kr76/new_ledger_vulnerability/g0c2x7i/. btchip is one of Ledger's co-founders and executive. The TL;DR is that they knew about it, were working on it, but missed the deadlines because of COVID and being busy dealing with the data leak. That I could maybe accept if they had previously made a post saying "There is a vulnerability and here is what you need to do about it until we get it fixed", but to leave all their users completely in the dark is unacceptable.

Agreed.

Look on my Mobile Icon, ye Mighty, and despair!

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Simple Machines Forum has a couple of different WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) modes, to make browsing from mobile somewhat easier. These can be reached by appending ";wap" or ";wap2" to any page. ";wap" is very bare bones, and you cannot post from it. ";wap2" has a little bit of formatting and will allow you to post. If you post from a ";wap2" link, you get a mobile icon. You don't actually have to be on mobile.

Here's the WAP2 link for this thread if anyone wants to get a mobile icon for themselves: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5266655;wap2

Removed

A fix is in the works, but has not yet been released - https://donjon.ledger.com/lsb/014/. It seems Ledger was notified of this via their bounty program months ago, and have been working on the fix, so it's not entirely clear why they haven't released it yet before this was made public. Apparently it will released in the next few days.

Until then, you should either avoid using altcoins stored on your Ledger altogether as dkbit98 has said, or if you must use altcoins then first transfer your bitcoin to a separate wallet. You could generate a new wallet on your Ledger by using a brand new passphrase and move all your bitcoin to there, which would let you continue to use your altcoins without risk to your bitcoin.

Hardware wallets generate the seed phrase on the hardware wallet itself and display the words on the screen of the hardware wallet. Taking screenshots of your computer display is irrelevant when you use a hardware wallet as the seed phrase never appears on the computer display.

bob123 is correct. The only way screen grabbers could have stolen his seed phrase is if he manually entered it in to his computer, in which case there are 100 ways his seed phrase could have been compromised.

My only concern using your set up would be that for a significant period of time, two out of the three devices (your phone and your laptop) will be vulnerable to the same physical attacks. From when you leave your house, in the taxi/bus/train/tram/whatever, through the airport, out the airport, to the hotel, etc. Also, especially since you say business travel, if you are taking your laptop with you to meetings or appointments, to do work on in between times, etc. Provided the wallets are encrypted then you don't have to worry about them being emptied, but you potentially need to worry about your recovery if you've lost or had stolen 2 out of the 3 cosigners.

I would be tempted to create a 2-of-2 wallet between my laptop and my phone, and keep both parts backed up on my encrypted airgapped computer at home.