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1  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Why maturity rule on coinbase tx requires too many confirmations w.r.t an arbitr on: February 15, 2018, 03:17:35 PM
For an arbitrary tx, it is often said that 6 confirmations is sufficient. However, maturity rule states that coinbase tx can't be spent until it receives 101 confirmations. Why do we have this disperancy?

Why 6 confirmations on coinbase transaction is not considered as sufficient for example ?
2  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / A different way to create coinbase transaction on: February 15, 2018, 02:17:58 PM
AFAIK when a miner succeeds in creating a block, he puts a special transaction (coinbase) in it which spends no input and sends a fixed amount of BTC to an address he can arbitrarily specify.

Instead of doing so, can we do the following: Miner simply puts an address in the block header. When he succeeds in creating the block, all nodes that receive this block create the coinbase transaction -which spends no input and sends the fixed amount to the address in header- in their UTXO pool.

Would that work?
3  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Dividing miner reward over a k-length jumping window on: January 08, 2018, 08:02:13 PM
Sorry I don't follow this part:
Quote
This would not necessarily work since a coinbase transaction can pay to multiple outputs, i.e. pay multiple people simultaneously instead of just one person/entity.

How this invalidates the scheme I described ?
4  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Dividing miner reward over a k-length jumping window on: January 08, 2018, 07:43:40 PM
Yes Danny, you're right. I ignored the default reward (12.5 BTC) for simplicity and assumed revenue is earned solely from tx fees.
5  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Dividing miner reward over a k-length jumping window on: January 08, 2018, 06:42:19 PM
Quote
It's impossible to know how many miners there are and impossible to detect if someone is is pretending to be multiple miners so that they get paid more and everyone else gets paid less.

Why ? Can't we learn the identities of miners simply by checking the k-length window blockchain? Of course I meant, in my original post, we divide the reward to miners of the window. I'm not talking about distributing the reward to whole network.
6  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Dividing miner reward over a k-length jumping window on: January 08, 2018, 09:41:36 AM
Nowadays, a miner can gain more than another one even when they mine the same amount of blocks due to variance in tx fees. It's expected that, especially once the coinbase reward is gone, this will result in miners competing for "juicy" txs and hence damaging the stability of the system. See https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2978408 for future reference.

I've been thinking if it's possible to overcome this simply by changing the rewarding mechanisms of Bitcoin. So let's say we keep a k-length jumping window, take sum of fees in that window and divide it evenly to miners. So if we have k=4 and 1st block has 20 in fees, 2nd has 20 in fees, 3rd has 10 in fees and 4th has 30 in fees each miner will get (20+20+10+30)/4 = 20 in fees.

What would be shortcomings/downsides of such a mechanism ?
7  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Can a majority of nodes impose shorter block intervals without harming Bitcoin? on: November 25, 2017, 03:36:36 PM
We know if a majority (in terms of hash power) of nodes form a coalition, they can basically reap all the rewards by refusing to add blocks mined outside of the coalition to chain. However, this also severely damages security of Bitcoin as the same coalition can also mount double-spend attacks. It is very likely that this will drop the value of currency and hence, might be unprofitable for miners.

However, I wonder what happens if the majority just decides to agree on a lower PoW difficulty and hence, shorter block intervals. There seems to be some research that suggests Bitcoin might still be secure with shorter block intervals. See the quote from https://www.coindesk.com/lower-bitcoin-block-time-scale/:

    ”According to my research the one-minute block interval seems like the most plausible. I don’t mean that it provides sufficient security, but that it would provide the same security as bitcoin has today.”

So my question is basically, is this behavior somewhat possible to observe in practice? Because if they do so, they will mine blocks more often and the blocks mined by others who follow the real difficulty will be valid too.
8  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Can we "decouple" the tx fee from the txs themselves ? on: October 16, 2017, 07:48:04 AM
Quote
1 Idiot with 1 BTC could send 50.000.000 Transactions (1 Satoshi TX + 1 Satoshi Fee)

I was thinking about putting a limit of number of txs that could be sent with the token, e.g. say 100 or so. Anyway, I see that removing tx fees would do more harm than good.
9  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Can we "decouple" the tx fee from the txs themselves ? on: October 13, 2017, 09:01:49 AM
Hi guys,

We know that, in general, miners prefer putting txs with higher fees into blocks. In particular, this is bad for users who do microtransactions as it doesn't make much sense to put a lot of fee if you're only sending a small amount. I've been thinking whether it is possible to overcome this.

Basically, if we somehow find a way to decouple fees from the txs themselves then every tx will look equal to the miners. When this is the case, there's no incentive to prefer one tx over another. I believe this would make the Bitcoin more "fair" to the users.

However, I can't tell whether it is possible to come up with such a protocol while maintaining the properties of the Bitcoin. What I have in my mind is basically as follows:

1) Users first send some "participation tax" to an adress/adresses which is collectively maintaned by the miners.
2) Miners in turn collectively sign a token and send back the token to users.
3) Users then include this token in their txs to prove their validity. Txs without tokens can be either be discarded or might have less priority.
4) The total tax sum in the pool is distributed to miners according their fraction of hash power.
5) The process repeats over time periods.

The key point in here is, every tx with a valid token would look the same for miners. So, there's no reason to choose one over another.
Of course, as it is, it probably has many flaws. For example, a user can pay participation fee and his txs might still not make it to the block. In this case, he basically pays the participation fee for nothing. Maybe we can overcome this with a "decentralized escrow" mechanism (not sure if this even exists) but anyway, this needs to be worked on.

What do you think ? Might such a system help the Bitcoin in a way ?
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