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can this project actually reward fitness
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any updates on the wallet fix?
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Q: Do you actually have 70% of creditors supporting your plan?
We have had productive discussions with blocks that represent 70% of the creditors. That includes the OKCoin group, which wrote a press release to support our efforts to stop liquidation.
http://www.savegox.com/?page_id=35Why Sunlot (savegox) sais that OKCoin is with them?
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[...] Hi everyone, my name is John Betts, and I am leading the proposed rehabilitation effort for Mt Gox, and Goat asked me to post here and communicate with you. [...]
They have a site set up at savegox.com John Betts is a former Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs executive, and former child actor turned venture capitalist Brock Pierce, are a part of a group of investors who want to resuscitate Mt.Gox. http://siliconangle.com/blog/2014/04/17/does-bitcoin-really-need-mtgox-probably-not/
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I am a little confused. I though Magical Tux (the nickname) = Mark Karpeles (the person) and Magical Tux (the nickname, whoever owned it then) opened Mt.Gox (the exchange, which wears his name, Mt.). And now I see Mark bought an existing company but owned the nickname from the begining. How is this add up? Was he a partial owner from the begining and bought the shares of others later?
MtGOX = Magic the Gathering Online e Xchange It was a Magic cards exchange originally. This article claims that Mark used funds stolen from a client to buy it: Again, if accurate the most interesting part of this report is that this alleged theft is its correlation in timing to the partial purchase of Mt. Gox in March 2011. If accurate, it is highly probable that Mr. Karpelès turned around and used these (basically) stolen funds to buy MtGOX from Jed McCaleb.
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Ha ha!!  Your site is incredible!! Look at Roger Ver in 2nd place. Amazing work. Keep it up! Just for the record: is not my site nor I'm involved in any way with it. There has been people asking about removal of the e-mails: Keep in mind this information was already public (it comes from the 2011 hack)
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GoalReach a conclusion about Mark Karpeles trading activity on mt.gox. Expose lies. Identify possible insiders and curiously work to understand the bitcoin market, who caused major crashes and rallies. Identify good/bad traders and their effect on the market. Need help to:- Plot Mark Karpeles trading history on a graph showing the price related to his trades
- Figure out if Mark Karpeles was losing 220k btc by making bad trades (please note that trading logs from 2011-04 to 2013-11 only were released, we don't have all data)
- Identify Mark Karpeles involvement in major crashes and rallies.
- Study dates with major market movement, can we identify other insiders by looking at the trading history?
- Can we plot large volume traders usernames/userid on a graph of the bitcoin price?
How can you help? Read more here: http://mark-karpeles.com/m.php?page=about
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There's a rumor that the remaining Gox coins are being anonymized, possibly using CoinJoin. Anyone can confirm this?
coinjoin and or any other company that is found to be complicit in any activity to defraud the bitcoin community will be subject to both the community and or various authorities in the case of mixers if you can determine that any such funds have entered such mixer it shall be sufficient evidence to hold such mixer up for public condemnation. coinjoin is not a company, but a type of bitcoin transfer. You can do that without any company cooperating https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=279249.0
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Who are these guys in the list? Search results for '0x18c09e865ec948a1' Type bits/keyID cr. time exp time key expir pub 1024D/5EC948A1 2008-10-30 Fingerprint=DE4E FCA3 E1AB 9E41 CE96 CECB 18C0 9E86 5EC9 48A1 uid Satoshi Nakamoto < satoshin@gmx.com> sig sig3 5EC948A1 2008-10-30 __________ __________ [selfsig] sig sig 04143362 2011-11-01 __________ __________ lzsaver < lzsaver@gmail.com> sig sig DAB591E7 2013-03-27 __________ __________ theymos <theymos+pgp@mm.st> sig sig F2E50027 2013-04-19 __________ __________ Antony Bailey < support@antonybailey.net> sig sig 2346C9A6 2013-05-10 __________ __________ Wladimir J. van der Laan < laanwj@gmail.com> sig sig FFDB1CCC 2013-07-01 __________ __________ [] sig sig F91975FE 2013-09-20 __________ __________ Cubaguy < cubaguy@gmail.com> sig sig 7471C2D0 2013-09-21 __________ __________ Harald Schilly < harald.schilly@gmail.com> sig sig1 67E4FA04 2013-10-12 __________ __________ Peter Todd < pete@petertodd.org> sig sig 7B536415 2014-03-06 __________ __________ Satoshi Nakamoto (Resident of California) < satoshin@gmx.com> sub 2048g/D6AAA69F 2008-10-30 sig sbind 5EC948A1 2008-10-30 __________ __________ [] http://sks.pkqs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&fingerprint=on&search=0x18C09E865EC948A1Just guys that signed satoshi key with their own key and uploaded it to a keyserver. You can do that yourself with gpg in a matter of minutes if you want to be on the list.
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"Resident of California" could be a trap, there are many Japanese people living in California. Do you realize the creation date of the key on 2014-03-06? The key of Satoshi is this one http://sks.pkqs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&fingerprint=on&search=0x18C09E865EC948A1 (Curiosly the guy of that key also signed the Satoshi original key to fool you, but he wasn't smart enough to fake the creation date also) Source: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.org/commit/19e0c74df2162d4510db5df9e50d5ac53b38c498
Edited post to add this: The key "2013-04-01 __________ __________ Dorian S Nakamoto < mtn_sssh@hotmail.com>" is fake. It has been added (faking the creation date) after I wrote this. Look at google cache: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http%3A%2F%2Fsks.pkqs.net%2Fpks%2Flookup%3Fop%3Dvindex%26fingerprint%3Don%26search%3D0x18C09E865EC948A1Just copying here the contents of the cache for future reference: This is Google's cache of http://sks.pkqs.net/pks/lookup?op=vindex&fingerprint=on&search=0x18C09E865EC948A1. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on 25 Dec 2013 16:34:31 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press Ctrl+F or ⌘-F (Mac) and use the find bar.
Text-only version Search results for '0x18c09e865ec948a1'
Type bits/keyID cr. time exp time key expir
pub 1024D/5EC948A1 2008-10-30 Fingerprint=DE4E FCA3 E1AB 9E41 CE96 CECB 18C0 9E86 5EC9 48A1
uid Satoshi Nakamoto <satoshin@gmx.com> sig sig3 5EC948A1 2008-10-30 __________ __________ [selfsig] sig sig 04143362 2011-11-01 __________ __________ lzsaver <lzsaver@gmail.com> sig sig DAB591E7 2013-03-27 __________ __________ theymos <theymos+pgp@mm.st> sig sig F2E50027 2013-04-19 __________ __________ Antony Bailey <support@antonybailey.net> sig sig 2346C9A6 2013-05-10 __________ __________ Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> sig sig FFDB1CCC 2013-07-01 __________ __________ [] sig sig F91975FE 2013-09-20 __________ __________ Cubaguy <cubaguy@gmail.com> sig sig 7471C2D0 2013-09-21 __________ __________ Harald Schilly <harald.schilly@gmail.com> sig sig1 67E4FA04 2013-10-12 __________ __________ Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
sub 2048g/D6AAA69F 2008-10-30 sig sbind 5EC948A1 2008-10-30 __________ __________ []
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That's no surprise that OVH didn't respond to this ticket for hours, but at 11pm UTC I realized that there's another succesful password reset at OVH. This is complete mystery to me, because I'm aboslutely sure that nobody else had access to my mailbox and the email with reset link has been untouched (unread, not deleted). I'd say that attacker won't bother by changing status of the email to "unread", but he'd delete the email instead.
This time I realized that the attacker resetted the machine with the wallet to rescue mode, which means that I lost the control to this machine. I was still succesful by logging into the database and I took the snapshot of database and transferred it to safe location. Few seconds since the migration finished, attackers restarted all remaining machines to rescue mode.
So far it looks like yet another inside job, like Linode two years ago. Or attackers found some shortcut how to gain access to Manager without confirming the request from the email. I don't know what's worse option. I'll investigate this issue in detail later and I hope OVH won't close eyes to this.
Did OVH already told you something? I'm interested in knowing what they have to say about this issue.
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Is that the best 3176 image that you can find? Really? What about this?  
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I'm starting to get tired of too many "LA" posters 
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