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Local / Trading und Spekulation / Re: Klage gegen MtGox
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on: March 16, 2014, 06:29:40 PM
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Die sind auch recht teuer mit wohl mindestens 2 BTCs pro Kläger Was umgerechnet über 1200 EURO für die geringe Wahrscheinlichkeit jemals auch nur einen einzigen Penny wiederzusehen? Oh Mann verlorenem Geld sollte man vielleicht nicht noch welches hinterherwerfen.. Eigentlich sollten Sammelklagen ja billiger für die einzelnen Kläger sein. Was würde denn dann wohl erst eine Einzelklage kosten?
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2
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Local / Trading und Spekulation / Re: Klage gegen MtGox
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on: March 16, 2014, 06:14:48 PM
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Hallo,
weiss jemand ob sich auch ein deutscher Anwalt bereits der Sache angenommen hat? Ich bin fuer die Sammelklage bei diesem Selachi wohl etwas zu spät und denke ausserdem es wäre besser wenn man einen deutschen Anwalt hat.
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3
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Economy / Service Discussion / MtGox and transaction mallebility
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on: March 01, 2014, 08:10:19 PM
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Does anybody know how exactly MtGox was robbed? If some MtGox users were indeed able to claim their withdrawals multiple times from their accounts due to the transaction mallebility issue, then MtGox should know which accounts that was, right? If theses were verified accounts we also should know the real names and adresses of the thiefs? Even if not, if MtGox would make their history data public (internal withdrawal adresses, time and amount of withdrawn btc, one could find out using the blockchain which transaction were manipulated).
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5
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Economy / Service Discussion / MtGox Trading API still active?
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on: March 01, 2014, 04:39:51 PM
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I have the Bitcoin Widget from Andreas Schildbach installed on my Smartphone and Prices on MtGox still seem to change from time to time. From two days ago 130.6 to 132.5 today. Strangely enough, a different app, the Bitcoin Checker is showing 135$ What does that mean? Is their Engine still running and they shut down only the website?
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7
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Local / Trading und Spekulation / Re: Habe grade 5000€ nach MtGox geSEPA'd, drückt mir die Daumen.
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on: February 20, 2014, 07:08:59 PM
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soo riskant wie viele behaupten ist das garnicht. Wer schon beim ersten Rückgang des Preises unmengen Geld auf Gox überwiesen hat, konnte und kann sein Geld zurzeit mit 100% sicherheit vervielfachen. Man braucht sich ja nur den Kurs bei bitcoinbuilder anschauen. Demnach ist die sichere Methode: Geld bei Gox einzahlen, davon Goxcoins kaufen (135$/BTC), diese dann im Verhältnis von 1/0,381 in echte Bitcoins tauschen und verkauft sie z.b auf Bitstamp. Dadurch macht man sicher aus 600$ -> 1000$ klappt natürlich nur, solange auf bitcoinbuilder genug Trades mit so einem Verhältnis sind.
Begreife ich nicht. Wie willst du die Bitcoins aus MtGox rausbekommen?
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9
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Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Worst case scenario
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on: October 11, 2013, 03:24:02 PM
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- An attacker could hack a computer of one of the bitcoin client developers (Either through direct physical access or through some trojan) - The attacker could threaten one of the bitcoin developers and such force his to do what he wants
If the system is vulnerable to this, then you can remove the third party "attacker" from the equation: One of the developers could just do this if it were possible. Hopefully, enough people are auditing all changes that this wouldn't be possible. If someone puts a manipulated client on bitcoin.org with his own source, that is without checking in anything? - An attacker could break into the website bitcoin.org and place his malicious client for download, or redirect bitcoin.org via some dns attack to his own (same looking) website With this attack, the checksum of the client won't be ok but how many users will (or even know how to) check that?
About 1% check. But users update very slowly and we intentionally do not have a forced auto-update. And there are people running automated signature tests who would quickly notice a problem. If done from a computer of a bitcoin developer, the executable could also be signed valid, so no one will notice the difference. It would be great some kind of multi key signing would be used, that is, multiple persons have to sign with their private keys to make the signature valid.
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10
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Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Worst case scenario
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on: October 10, 2013, 03:41:25 PM
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Could it happen that an attacker injects malicious code into the satoshi client? For example that all money of the user's wallet is transferred to the attacker (If the wallet is encrypted, as soon as user enters the password). Then the infected client would have to made available for download on official site bitcoin.org. Even if the problem is noticed within a few hours, the attacker could have gained lots of money, so such an attack would be very attractive for a criminal hacker. Additional to the damage done to the users, this could do much damage to bitcoin itself, if not even destroying it.
I can think of a lot possible access points for the attacker:
- An attacker could break directly into the source control where the source code is stored and unnoticed injects his code which is then automatically include in the next version. But since bitcoin is open source, the attacker should hide its code in a file where people rarely look into or file which at first glance does not look important but are indeed source files
- An attacker could hack a computer of one of the bitcoin client developers (Either through direct physical access or through some trojan)
- The attacker could threaten one of the bitcoin developers and such force his to do what he wants
- An attacker could break into the website bitcoin.org and place his malicious client for download, or redirect bitcoin.org via some dns attack to his own (same looking) website With this attack, the checksum of the client won't be ok but how many users will (or even know how to) check that?
This are my greatest fears. Please tell me that these scenarios are almost impossible to happen. So the question is, could this be possible?
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12
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Bitcoin / Hardware / Re: Which ASICs products actually currenly available? Recommendations?
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on: July 17, 2013, 08:18:49 PM
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But at the end if you think a bit about it.. Why should any producer of ASIC actually sell their products as long as they can use it to mine and gain in one week much more money than the mining device actually costs? They all will all wait until time to ROI > 1 Month, and only after that sell the device. I think this is the reason why orders take so long.
In other words:
Nobody would sell a gold pooping donkey until it gets too old and is about to die...
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14
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Bitcoin / Hardware / Which ASICs products actually currenly available? Recommendations?
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on: July 14, 2013, 07:20:58 PM
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Hi folks,
there are lots of sites out there listing mining ASICs, often with wrong/outdated data and it is hard so find out what is actually available. This is what I've found:
Name Price GH/s $/GH/s Notes 5 GH/s Bitcoin Miner $274 5 18,25 BitForce 5 GH/s SC Butterfly 25 GH/s Bitcoin Miner $1249 25 20,02 BitForce 25 GH/s SC Butterfly 50 GH/s Bitcoin Miner $2499 50 20,01 BitForce 50 GH/s Miner Butterfly 500 GH/s Bitcoin Miner $22484 500 22,24 BitForce 500 GH/s Mini Rig SC Butterfly Avalon #1 $1299 65 50,04 Avalon #2 75 BTC 65 8,67 Orders Opened On: Feb 2nd, 2013 65 Gh/s 620w@120v AC Avalon #3 75 BTC 65 8,67 Orders Opened On: March 25th, 2013
I have found only Butterfly and Avalon. Are there other Companies already delivering? It seems that Avalon is getting more and more expensive although GH/s stays the same??? Their website is somewhat unclear, can I still order Batch #1???
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20
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Local / Trading und Spekulation / Re: Der Aktuelle Kursverlauf
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on: April 16, 2013, 07:25:27 PM
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Das mit Ripple.com verstehe ich nicht, das ist doch nichts schlechtes für Bitcoin. Im Gegenteil so wie ich es verstehe, kann man damit Währungen schnell und kostenlos ineinander umtauschen, v.a. Bitcoin wird explizit unterstützt, das steht auch ganz groß auf der Website.
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