If option 3 is taken, should one party screw another, they damaged party goes to the arbitration firm, and the two parties hash it out until both are satisfied. Refusal to arbitrate means loss of contract with the firm, probably a black-balling from any other firm, and thus, inability to do anything with anyone. Essentially, they're stuck with option 1. (and nobody's likely to trust them)
This notion of "arbitration firm" will require coercive force totaling at-least the biggest party in the agreement; leaving the minor party the weakest and vulnerable to coercion from both the "arbitration firm" and major party.
The intentions of "major party" and "arbitration firm" underpin your whole argument.
[Rant]
Further to me "arbitration firm" is an "institution", an will require a "coercive payment". This actually shows that coercion arises from the selfish nature of agents that occupy all three parties. Major and minor parties know that both parties will on average behave in a selfish manner therefore there is the need for arbitration, but this arbitrating party also puts itself at risk therefore requires compensation. For any "fair transaction" to occur then an arbitrating party will always be necessary.
Eureka! To me this shows that no matter what practical ideology you have there will always be coercion/coercive payment........ To coercion arises because of the selfish nature of agents. Not because of guns, muscles, etc, but intentions.
The coercive potential of a party is defined as:
C.P(party) = Strength(party) * Intention(party);
Lets assume that Strength(party) is a measure of energy/mass.
Therefore given two parties Party(1) and Party(2) with C.P(1) and C.P(2) respectively and lets assume for "human interactions" to work there needs to be an arbitrator with C.P(arbit.) equal to max(C.P(1),C.P(2)).
Now approximate the cost of arbitration by the size of Strength(Arbitration-Party) and use this as the "taxation cost".
So given that
Taxation = Strength(Arbitration-Party) then
Taxation = max(C.P(1),C.P(2))
Taxation = C.P(Major-Party)
Taxation = Strength(Major-Party) * Intention(Major-Party).
But lets assume that we live in a universe where the Major-Party will take from the Minor-Party if Strength(Major-Party) > Strength(Minor-Party), then
Taxation = Strength(Major-Party)
InterpretationsTaxation can be reduced by a more altruistic intention.
Reduce the cost of taxation by shaping parties intentions.
For arbitration to be effective in a universe containing only selfish agents, taxation needs to be equal to Strength(Major-Party).
NotesThe intention of Arbitration Party is expected to be fully altruistic and fulfill its role as Arbitrator.
Maybe if you could explain in real world examples because your argument seems very abstract and hard to understand.