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it wouldn't surprise me if the .NET framework is an epicly gigantic codebase that no one person could be reasonably expected to read and review, like 100's of thousands of LOC.
So there's not much point in saying "open source baby", the Game of Thrones books are open source and I'm still not going to read them. And more importantly, is the byte-code interpreter open source?
When you're dealing with a product from an organisation with such a bad reputation as that of Microsoft, the questions are endless, and the answers are likely to be unsatisfactory. I don't want to waste my time.
(not to mention, Microsoft are now openly collecting all user data from their Windows users, what's the point in developing privacy software for an OS that openly exploits user privacy, why even bother?)
.NET Core is not .NET Framework. The former is cross platform the latter is Windows only. Yes, they are both open source and yes, the Roslyn compiler is open source, too. In fact I managed to contribute to the .NET ecosystem once or twice in the past, too. Please don't make comments like this when you have no knowledge of the subject. Regarding your ad hominems on Microsoft, I believe they are worthy topics to discuss, but falls outside the scope of this discussion. |
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Wasabi is built with .NET Core. Core is open source and cross platform, so I am not sure what you mean.
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For the record I don't have any association with Samourai. Back then I wanted to build Wasabi Wallet for Samourai, but they were not interested/responding my messages and nagging, so I went ahead alone.
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You want to send to your hardware wallet don't you? Next release will have Coldcard integration and probably Ledger Nano S, KeepKey, Trezor and BitBox, too, so you may want to wait for it.
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Since I did not receive a reply to my previous application[1] for the coinjoin bounty, which I submitted half a year ago, with the exception of Pieter Wuille, who to my knowledge did not succeed to discuss this with the rest of the keyholders, I will consider this as a rejection. So in this post I would like to report a status update and ask you to reconsider the application with the new developments to Wasabi Wallet[2,9] in mind. - Half a year ago Wasabi created 110 BTC equal coinjoin outputs in total[1], today this number is 22941 BTC.[2] - Wasabi now does P2P communication over Tor, too.[3] - Wasabi now broadcasts transactions over Tor to a peer. Previously transaction broadcasting happened to the backend over Tor.[3] - Wasabi now provides .dmg[4] and .deb[5] packages. - Wasabi now mixes on the changes, resulting in more efficient mixes.[6] - Wasabi now partially integrates full nodes: If a full node is running in the background, block fetching happens from it by default instead of connected peers.[5] - Wasabi now comes with a daemon that can be used for mixing.[7] - Wasabi have deterministic builds.[8] Thank you for considering my reapplication! Cheers, nopara73  References. |
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1. Why minimum amount of Bitcoin constantly changed? Few days ago, it was about 0.099BTC, but now it's about 0.11BTC
2. Is it possible to manually select connected peers, such as our own full nodes?
1. Sorry, this was the first change the past half a year. I've been wanting to make this change a long time since it's simpler to work with 0.1x than 0.09x and I thought this may be the right time. 2. Partly. For now if you have a full node running on the same computer Wasabi will download blocks from that instead of peers. We are working on more comprehensive full node integrations, too, we just added this partial Bitcoin Core integration first, because it was a low hanging fruit. |
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It is terribly chatty for me. I'd like to check if my quick glance takeaways are correct:
1. First you identify a traditional mixing service's transactions.
2. Then you mess around with the possible timeframes for the mixes.
3. Finally you do a subset-sum analysis. (Amount based analysis of mixing inputs and outputs.)
Thus you get most of the links between incoming and outgoing transactions, except those that happen to be equal within the appropriate mixing window.
Is this a fair way to describe what you did?
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I try install on Mac I see error .
What error do you see? |
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BitcoinFog is a selective scam, it is verified by their own thread on this board, but it may be livesaving to note that you still have a chance to get back your coins, because the emphasis is on the "selective" part. They only take your coins if you send too much. When I was experimenting, they took my coins at first, then I sent a support request and they gave me back in a week or so, so good luck.
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There's one problem with Wasabi's built-in mixer though, it uses "ConJoin" method which will mix your coins to others who want to mix their coins.
The second half of your sentence is correct, you are mixing coins with hundreds of people and not exchanging your coins with a centralized service. Thus Wasabi provides anonymity within a set of anonymous peers, while the centralized mixers provide confidentiality. You are not anonymous towards the centralized mixer, only towards blockchain and network observers, at least in theory. In practice centralized mixer transactions are identifiable and other than ChipMixer, I don't know any other centralized mixers that tries to tackle subset sum analysis, as a consequence, most centralized mixers are selling an illusion of privacy. In the end, it won't completely remove the taint, just "scrambled" all of the user's outputs to fool blockchain analytics.
True, but again, just because the mix in centralized mixers (when there's a mix) is not happening within one transaction, thus block explorer doesn't show attempt to show the mixes, it doesn't mean blockchain analysis won't do it, too. From blockchain analysis point of view it just means you pay for 2 transactions instead of one, like in a coinjoin. What would solve the tainting issue (if it ever becomes a real thing) those would be techniques those are trying to mislead blockchain analysis or achieve unobservability by for example moving transactions off-chain. But if coin tainting becomes a norm and exchanges start to refuse mixed coins, I guess that's pretty much would be the end of many of us working on Bitcoin in good conscious, since most BC anal misleading techniques are so weak, we'd inevitably end up building just another mass surveillance tool, instead of sound money. Most Blending services uses traditional method with different "flavors" like Tx fee and Tx timing randomization that will totally blow their (blockchain analysis tools) mind.
Sorry but, that's objectively false: https://medium.com/@nopara73/traditional-bitcoin-mixers-6a092e59d8c2If privacy is an issue, use Tor-based services  Agree. Although it only matters for network level privacy and even it doesn't fully cover that. There's the issue of private transaction broadcasting and private transaction retrieval without address linking. Tor solves the first one and it comes pretty useful for the second one assuming a privacy preserving wallet architecture: full node, full-SPV node and Neutrino node. The big part is the blockchain level privacy for what Tor is not useful (admittedly DiceMix (described in the CoinShuffle++ paper) has been built on top of DC-nets, which came from mixnets, which progressed toward onion routing and eventually Tor, I2P, and Sphinx what the Lightning Network uses) Anyway, Wasabi comes with built-in Tor (and it doesn't work without it.) |
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Let me try answering this question. It's best to use Wasabi alone. Meaning, this is bad:
1. Send coins to Wasabi.
2. Mix.
3. Send coins to hardware wallet.
The reason this is bad is, because every wallet, except full nodes, fullspv nodes and client-side-filtering nodes fall for network analysis or network spies (like your wallet companies backend.)
After that:
1. Don't combine red shield coin with green shield coin. - If their histories cross each other the green shield coin is deanonymized.
2. Try closing the loop as fast as possible. - Use the "Max" button to spend whenever you can. The dead change may problematic later.
3. Try avoiding coin merge if you can. - Merging 2-3 coins is fine, there're definitely people coming to mixes with more than that. Maybe up to 10 doesn't ruin much of your privacy, but over 10 be careful.
And finally to address your specific question:
> is it a bad practice to move them to my real wallet in a short range of time?
It's a bad practice for the above mentioned reasons, but not a terrible one depending on your threat model. In fact you can completely eliminate privacy issues if your "real wallet" is a full node and you are using its coin control features to spend.
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Hi there, I understand that the launch of Wasabi is not the best for your business, but please, let's try to keep things factual. Before I get into your specific comments, I'd like to note that I greatly appreciate your work on Bitcoin privacy and I cannot imagine how it may feel to rule the market, then one day another wallet comes along with a service that does the same that you do, except in a way that it doesn't take possession over user's money, nor cryptographically able to deanonymize them, and on top of those, it even undercuts your service fees 10 times. If you would like to, please consider applying for a job at Wasabi, I am positive that we will be able to use your valuable expertise and experience somehow. The main problem of Wasabiwąllet is that EVERYONE knows the incoming address and EVERYONE knows the receiving addresses.
Everyone may know the addresses, but not the identities, nor the links between the addresses. That is the point of mixing. Such companies as Chainalysis will not investigate who is who, and analyze transactions, amounts, etc. They will mark the incoming and receiving Wasabiwąllet addresses with a special flag — 'suspect'. The moment the global filter starts and you want to send your coins to the exchange, your transaction will be blocked.
Your transactions are just as easy to identify with a blockchain analysis tool, so your blacklisting argument is null. Furthermore you are not even trying to use equal amounts, so your mixes can be deanonymize by subset-sum analysis, simply by looking at the incoming and outgoing amounts. Plus we are a legitimate company and if we would notice that any of the CoinJoin outputs get blacklisted, we would be ready to fight for a precedence to make sure it never happens in the future. Privacy rights are no joke. BestMixer is better because we understand how blockchain analysis works and we know how to protect our customers' anonymity.
Really? I have three years of research all over the internet, over 200 articles and tens of thousands of GitHub commits on privacy projects to put up against that ad hominem argument. Are there also real-time statistics anywhere about how many BTC BestMixer has mixed so far? The demonstration of any financial statistics threatens the anonymity of our customers. We will never publish this data.Actually there is, search for "Elliptic Report". It's a great, while terribly worded report by a blockchain analysis company on Bitcoin mixing. Sorry for not using references in this post, as you noted, the previous commenter's posts has been removed, because he posted a link. Oh, and one more thing. If anyone is interested search for "Traditional Bitcoin Mixers", I believe I succeeded to put together a great analysis on this type of services. |
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Are there any plans to implement more privacy-focused features like TumbleBit? I have been told that Breeze wallet did that but until now, I'm not sure what are the differences between it and CoinJoin and If it's any better.
You can read about our plan under the "IV. Bitcoin Privacy Improvements" section of our "A Technical Overview of Wasabi Wallet, Future Ideas, Plans and Strategy" document: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/Meta/#iv-bitcoin-privacy-improvements Regarding TumbleBit: no. I spent a year of trying to make that work, but when I wrote the blog post "TumbleBit vs CoinJoin" ( https://medium.com/@nopara73/tumblebit-vs-coinjoin-15e5a7d58e3) I realized we can do better with a specific type of CoinJoin, which at the time I called "CoinJoin as envisioned" and ended up designing and later implementing ZeroLink into Wasabi: https://github.com/nopara73/ZeroLink/ |
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Nice! I'm just checking in here, so the I'll be notified by the replies to this thread.
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Hi there, I am nopara73 and I would like to apply for a part of the CoinJoin bounty.[21] During the past 3 years I worked tirelessly to improve the privacy of Bitcoin. I wrote over 100 articles on privacy,[22] participated in a privacy workshop[1] and gave privacy presentations on various conferences.[2,3] I designed ZeroLink: Bitcoin Fungibility Framework,[4] within that detailed Chaumian CoinJoin Bitcoin mixing technique[5] and participated in the creation of Pay To EndPoint scheme.[1] I created the the Tor library for .NET Core,[6,12] I am a maintainer of on NTumbleBit,[7] I participated in the early stages of the creation of Stratis: Breeze wallet,[8] created and deployed the a full block downloading SPV wallet on the mainnet: HiddenWallet.[9] I also lost an impressive amount of weight during the past few months on Ketogenic diet.[10] The past year I was lucky enough to meet and work together with great people who helped me rewrite and release the latest iteration of HiddenWallet: Wasabi Wallet,[11] which brings me to the CoinJoin bounty. Wasabi is an open-source, desktop Bitcoin wallet, working on Windows, Linux and OSX, written in .NET Core (C#),[12] which is the cross platform and open source .NET. Wasabi uses NBitcoin[13] as its Bitcoin library, to which Wasabi developers are frequent contributors: @lontivero,[14] @nopara73.[15] Wasabi uses Avalonia[16] library as its UI framework where Wasabi developer @danwalmsley[17] is a maintainer. Wasabi does not support and does not plan to support other currencies in the future. Wasabi uses and ships with the Tor anonymity network. In Wasabi we implemented and deployed a BIP157-BIP158-like Golomb-Rice filtering light wallet architecture. To my knowledge Wasabi is the only light wallet that has been deployed on the mainnet and has strong protections in place against network observers, unless we consider Stratis's Breeze wallet[8] a light wallet (it's full block SPV.) (ToDO: what's the state of Neutrino?) Wasabi have various privacy features, among many, its compulsory coin control feature and a built-in intra-wallet blockchain analysis tool combined with compulsory labeling system to give feedback to the user and guide her to make educated, privacy-aware decisions at spending. Wasabi's main feature is the built in Chaumian CoinJoin, which has already mixed (created equal outputs) over 110 bitcoins on the mainnet. For real time statistics and last five coinjoin txids, see: http://wasabiukrxmkdgve5kynjztuovbg43uxcbcxn6y2okcrsg7gb6jdmbad.onion/ Wasabi's CJ implementation works as it was described in the first post of this forum thread: Using chaum blind signatures: The users connect and provide inputs (and change addresses) and a cryptographically-blinded version of the address they want their private coins to go to; the server signs the tokens and returns them. The users anonymously reconnect, unblind their output addresses, and return them to the server. The server can see that all the outputs were signed by it and so all the outputs had to come from valid participants. Later people reconnect and sign. For more information, a detailed and up to date description of the inner workings and future plans of Wasabi can be found here: A Technical Overview of Wasabi Wallet, Future Ideas, Plans and Strategy: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/MetaThe document is not a marketing pitch. In there we honestly detailed the tradeoffs and rationales behind every major design decision we made. I hope it will satisfy all your doubts. Where does the money go?A software is not a static, but a living and breathing creature that requires nurturing. Therefore the sustainability of Wasabi is also an important factor, that we did not neglect. There is a (0.003%*anonymity set gained*denomination) per user CoinJoin fee that adds up to 0.3% for a CoinJoin with 100 participants, which is our goal. (Denomination:0.1BTC, only take fee after the denomination, CJ changes doesn't count.) When we reach this number (currently 20) we will let the rounds to happen faster (currently 1/day.) Bootstrapping this system is a balancing act. The bounty would go to sustain and improve of the wallet and we hope by the time the bounty money runs out project will be able to sustain itself. Finally, it may also be worth pointing out that I have been accepting donations myself: Thank you for considering our application! Cheers, nopara73 References. |
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It's possible. Although the probability of Bulletproofs getting into Bitcoin is not that great, because of quantum computers, but let's assume it will. https://medium.com/@nopara73/anonymous-bitcoin-1fae5d1e33b7> Here comes Confidential Transactions! CT solves exactly this. It replaces the output values with Pedersen commitments. The problem is, these commitments are huge and the bigger your transaction is the more you have to pay for it. For this reason, CT was unlikely to ever to be seen in Bitcoin and even if it would have got into it, some kind of hybrid half CT, half CoinShuffle/ZeroLink model would have needed to be done in order to keep the fees in bay. > Then something happened. In November, 2017 Bulletproofs was introduced, which is an improvement on Confidential Transactions. It makes the commitment sizes smaller. Instead of huge, now they are only big. More importantly, if you want to have many CT outputs in a transaction, then your transaction size does not grow linearly with the number of outputs, which is great for CoinJoin, where the number of outputs can reach high numbers. Numbers, where the cost of CT becomes insignificant. Participating in this CoinJoin would result in similar transaction fees, as the user would send a normal transaction! > It gets better! There is another technology coming to Bitcoin called Schnorr Signatures. Today when a CoinJoin transaction has 100 inputs, then it must hold 100 signatures as well. With Schnorr, we can do it with only one signature. This will make CoinJoin transactions about 30–40% cheaper than normal transactions. > What did we achieve here? Making a CoinJoin mixing transaction with a high anonymity set becomes about 30% cheaper than making a transparent, traditional Bitcoin transaction. |
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