maqp - I finally read through the whole paper.  Nice work!  The one-time-pad is the way to go.  For high security applications I would definitely add two redundant sniffers onto my transmit line to make sure only properly encrypted packets were being broadcast.  The sniffers would have copies of the OTP to let them do the proper checks on the data.  The sniffers could have a buzzer or flashing lights or something, or even better an auto-disconnect, if they discovered any thing wrong in the outgoing packets.

This system could be applied to voice as well.  To stop any kind of timing analysis the outgoing data stream itself would have to be at a constant bitrate.  That would obviously limit what kinds of compression could be applied, and you would have to use a bigger one-time-pad.  I can't wait for the OTP to come back into style.  Or maybe just into style for the first time?  I am seeing myself always traveling with dvds or even blu-ray discs full to the brim of truly random bits, each one representing 5GB or 30GB worth of secure communication.  They will be numbered, and I will have a copy of each at home.  When my friends and I have run out of bits to pad our communications with, it will be time for another trip to meet in person.

Wow, I'm so glad you brought this thread back.  Looking forward to reading the paper.  Just flipped through it though - separate transmit and receive stations, each with diodes - that is the way to do it.

By the way, I was in Helsinki in October.  It's an amazing place.

main stumbling block I have come to is how to verify that the outgoing packets, leaving the computer you are typing on, have truly been encrypted with the intended public key.