But I still can not start qt-wallet. debug.log not been wirted any and no been changed. It broken

Yes, can not start. No window

bitcoin\debug.log  no changed, nothing been writed into it.

I  have download bitcoin-0.10.2.tar.gz, then I  have compiled client 0.10.2 succee. But I double-click bitcoin-qt.exe , It automatic quit without warning or error message.
I need your help ,thank you in advance .

My development environment
Windows 7.1 32bit and mingw4.9,
boost1.58
db-4.8.30.NC
openssl-1.0.1i
protobuf-2.5.0
qrencode-3.4.4
gmp-6.0.0
QT5.3.1

my bitcoin-qt.exe size is 179MB.

I  have download bitcoin-0.10.2.tar.gz, then I  have compiled client 0.10.2 succee. But I double-click bitcoin-qt.exe , It automatic quit without warning or error message.
I need your help ,thank you in advance .

My development environment
Windows 7.1 32bit and mingw4.9,
boost1.58
db-4.8.30.NC
openssl-1.0.1i
protobuf-2.5.0
qrencode-3.4.4
gmp-6.0.0
QT5.3.1



my bitcoin-qt.exe size is 179MB.

Who can give a C++ implementation ?

How to set up a development environment for Android wallet ?

Any help here would appreciated.

Feathercoin [FTC], I like it

You're wrong. feathercoin had the new multisign address, prefix f. Litecoin is still 3. This is a problem for LTC.

See https://github.com/litecoin-project/litecoin/issues/179#issuecomment-62039275

羽毛币在这里  http://www.ftc-c.com

I don't like ASICs, I like feathercoin 

当年，世界币-WorldCoin 为什么要和我们羽毛币-Feathercoin 分道扬镳，英国人就是矫情。

我们在这里 www.ftc-c.com

Wow, Let feathercoin fly.

Good work sir.

I am compiling bitcoin-0.9.3, I have some undefined reference about UPNP. But I had made miniupnpc-1.9.

make[3]: Entering directory `/D/BTC/Dev/bitcoin-0.9.3/src'
  CXXLD  bitcoind.exe
  libbitcoin_server.a(net.o): In function `Z13ThreadMapPortv':
d:\BTC\Dev\bitcoin-0.9.3\src/net.cpp:1066: undefined reference to `_imp__upnpDiscover'
d:\BTC\Dev\bitcoin-0.9.3\src/net.cpp:1073: undefined reference to `_imp__UPNP_GetValidIGD'

I vote for design 6, Mr. IawgoM.

I vote for iawgoM 

how to fix ?

Neoscrypt, a Strong Memory Intensive Key Derivation Function
Neoscrypt，一种超强的强化内存型加密算法

ABSTRACT. Hereby presented a new password based memory intensive cryptographic solution designed for general purpose computer hardware. A particular 32-bit implementation is described and evaluated.
摘要——特此呈现一款新的专为普通计算机硬件设计的内存密集型加密解决方案，它属于一个特殊的32位描述和评价。

NEOSCRYPT SPECIFICATIONS
Although a very innovative design back in time, Scrypt has developed certain vulnerabilities. The first announced differential cryptanalysis of Salsa20/8 by Tsunoo et al.in 2007 did not deliver any advantage over 256-bit brute force attack, but the following research by Aumasson et al. [6] reduced time complexity to break it from 2255 to 2251 with 50% success probability. It was improved by Shi et. al in 2012 to 2250. Although this is not critical yet, better attacks on Salsa20/8 may be developed in the future.

PBKDF2 is a very popular KDF and may be configured to require considerably large amounts of processor time, but it does not require complex logic or significant amounts of memory to operate. Therefore brute force attacks can be carried out on general purpose hardware such as GPUs or custom designs (ASICs) with reasonably low costs.

SHA-256 also allows numerous performance optimisations in this context. It is also worth to mention that Scrypt relies very little on PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 strength as it is configured to run in the fastest 1-iteration mode even though 1000-iteration minimum advised in general.NeoScrypt addresses these issues. The core engine is configured to employ non-reduced Salsa20 of 20 rounds (Salsa20/20) as well as non-reduced ChaCha20 of 20 rounds (ChaCha20/20). Both of them are used to produce the final salt as their outputs are XOR’ed into it.

They may be configured to run either in series or parallel depending on application objectives. The default NeoScrypt configuration is (128,2,1). A single instance of NeoScrypt utilises (N + 3) * r * 128 bytes of memory space, i.e. 32.75Kb, in series mode or (2 * N + 3) * r * 128 bytes, i.e. 64.75Kb, in parallel mode. Every run of the NeoScrypt core engine executes Salsa20/20 and ChaCha20/20 1024 times each which might seem inferior to 4096 times of Salsa20/8 of the Scrypt core engine. However NeoScrypt operates with double the memory segment size requiring larger temporal buffers, also with higher round count of each stream cipher iteration as explained above. If approximated to abstract load/store units, NeoScrypt is 1.25 times more memory intensive than Scrypt.
There are no known successful attacks on non-reduced Salsa20 and ChaCha20 other than exhaustive brute force search.NeoScrypt replaces SHA-256 with BLAKE2s which is a further development of BLAKE-256 [10], one of 5 NIST SHA-3 contest finalists. Based upon ChaCha20 , operates with a lower round count of 10, supports keyed hashing, is native little endian and faster significantly than SHA-256 and even BLAKE-256. It could be interfaced directly to PBKDF2 with no need of HMAC. However PBKDF2 constructs derived keys using blocks. It means a minor change in an input datum, such as nonce increment, may not result in an entirely different derived key. A replacement KDF has been developed to address this issue.

FastKDF is a buffered password based KDF which also supports salting. It operates with 2 primary buffers for password and salt each.They must be a power of 2 in size and not less than any input
(password, salt) or output (derived key) data. The default configuration works with 256-byte buffers. Password and salt are loaded initially into these buffers in a repetitive manner until the end of buffer is reached. The salt buffer is modified through operations while the password buffer remains constant. The buffer pointers are set to zero (start) on the first run. When a PRF chosen delivers a digest, a sum of all its bytes modulo buffer size defines the next buffer pointer. The digest is XOR’ed into the salt buffer at the new buffer pointer and the next iteration starts. If a read or write operation goes past a buffer end, it is continued from the buffer start. BLAKE2s is configured to operate with 64-byte input (password), 32-byte key (salt) and 32-byte output (digest). When the final FastKDF iteration is completed, the password buffer using zero buffer pointer is XOR’ed into the salt buffer using the last buffer pointer to produce the derived
key of length required which is copied into the output buffer. FastKDF-BLAKE2s is configured to run through 32 iterations by default. It is little endian for easier deployment and additional minor performance advantage on popular general purpose computer hardware.

Yes,need a new hashing Algorithms