This address has been linked to a customer appearing in the leaked MtGox transaction history, see this:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=508683.msg5614972#msg5614972

Everyone selling big amounts of goxBTC at the moment is arbitraging. You can easily make 50% in just a few hours by doing this:

1) Deposit into Gox via OKPay - it takes a few hours to clear.
2) Buy goxBTC
3) Sell goxBTC for "real" BTC at 0.6ish while the real price is 0.4

Example: at $250/goxBTC, for $10,000 you get 40 goxBTC, you can sell them for 24 realBTC. 24 realBTC on stamp at $625 equal $15,000.

4) You can send the real bitcoins back to OKPay and get ~$15,000.
5) You now have $15,000 to buy more goxBTC with.

Rinse and repeat and it's a money printing machine, a pretty fast and incredibly profitable arbitrage.

Prices are going down because there's a lot of competition between people doing this, so the market corrects itself.

Those are the wrong coins. This is SR 2.0 not SR.

Not sure onthe amount of coins stolen, but I don't think it's over 500ish or so based on the withdrawal addresses they disclosed.

This hack was possible because of a bug/oversight in their implementation...

More info here: http://www.deepdotweb.com/2014/02/13/silk-road-2-hacked-bitcoins-stolen-unknown-amount/
http://www.reddit.com/r/DarkNetMarkets/comments/1xtqty/sr_has_been_hacked/
http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1xtsrq/silk_road_got_hacked_all_funds_stolen_cheap_coins/

EDIT: Looks like the summed balances of all the addresses given is 4083BTC.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512
I am sweating as I write this.
Christmas brought grave news. I cannot adequately express how deeply honored I was by your unconditional support of my staff.
I do not expect the same reaction to today’s revelations. This movement is built on integrity, and I feel obligated to be forthright with you.
I held myself to a high standard as your leader, yet now I must utter words all too familiar to this scarred community:
We have been hacked.
Nobody is in danger, no information has been leaked, and server access was never obtained by the attacker.
Our initial investigations indicate that a vendor exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol known as “transaction malleability” to repeatedly withdraw coins from our system until it was completely empty.
Despite our hardening and pentesting procedures, this attack vector was outside of penetration testing scope due to being rooted in the Bitcoin protocol itself.
This attack hit us at the worst possible time. We were planning on re-launching the new auto-finalize and Dispute Center this past weekend, and our projections of order finalization volume indicated that we would need the community’s full balance in hot storage.
In retrospect this was incredibly foolish, and I take full responsibility for this decision.
I have failed you as a leader, and am completely devastated by today’s discoveries. I should have taken MtGox and Bitstamp’s lead and disabled withdrawals as soon as the malleability issue was reported. I was slow to respond and too skeptical of the possible issue at hand. It is a crushing blow. I cannot find the words to express how deeply I want this movement to be safe from the very threats I just watched materialize during my watch.
I’ve included transaction logs at the bottom of this message. Review the vendor’s dishonest actions and use whatever means you deem necessary to bring this person to justice. More details will emerge as we continue to investigate.
Given the right flavor of influence from our community, we can only hope that he will decide to return the coins with integrity as opposed to hiding like a coward.
It takes the integrity of all of us to push this movement forward. Whoever you are, you still have a chance to act in the interest of helping this community. Keep a percentage, return the rest. Don’t walk away with your fellow freedom fighters’ coins. DPR2 returned the cold storage. I didn’t run with the gold. But two people alone cannot move us forward. It takes an entire community committing to integrity – and though this crushing blow will not stop us, it sure is a testament to how greedy some bastards truly are.
Being a part of this movement might be the most defining thing you do with your entire life.
Don’t trade that for greed, comrades.
I will fight here by your side, even the greedy bastards amongst us.
This community has suffered great financial loss over and over again, and I am devastated that it has happened again under my watch.
Hindsight is already suggesting dozens of ways this could have been prevented, but we must march onward.
The only way to reverse a community’s greed is through generosity. Our true character is revealed during trying times.
If this financial hardship places you at risk of physical harm, contact me directly and I will do my best to help you with my remaining personal funds.
- —————-
Now what.
- —————-
Never again store your escrow bitcoins on a server.
Silk Road will never again be a centralized escrow storage.
This week has shown the collateral damage we can cause by being a huge target and failing in just one unforeseen area.
I am now fully convinced that no hosted escrow service is safe.
If I cannot trust myself to keep a hosted escrow solution safe, I cannot trust anyone.
Multi-signature transactions are the only way this community will be protected long-term.
I am aggressively tasking our devs on building out multi-sig support for commonly-used bitcoin clients. Expect a generous bounty if you have the skill to implement this.
- —————–
Until then.
- —————–
1. We will never again allow ourselves to be a single point of failure. We will never again host your Escrow wallets.
2. Vendor registration is closed while we regroup.
3. All listings on Silk Road are now No-Escrow (Finalize-Early) for 1-2 months while we implement multi-signature transactions and lobby for mainstream Bitcoin client multi-sig support.
4. All unshipped orders have been cancelled.
5. Vendors may link to other marketplaces on a trail basis until we launch multi-sig, then we will re-evaluate based on community input. We do not want to be a centralized point of failure, but we also do not want to lead our buyers into dangerous waters.
6. From this point forward DO NOT trust markets with centralized escrow. Use multi-signature transactions whenever possible, with trusted third parties as escrow providers.
Everything will be offline for 24-48 hours to minimize variables as we continue to investigate. The evidence we have below will be expanded based on our findings.
- ——————
No marketplace is perfect. Expect any centralized market to fail at some point. This is precisely why we must unite in the decision to decentralize.
We are relieved that our security procedures protected user identities, and that no servers were compromised. This was not a worst-case scenario: nobody will be getting arrested from this. Financial loss is terrible, but will not put all of us behind bars.
The details we have on the hacker are below. Stop at nothing to bring this person to your own definition of justice.
Humbled and furious,
Defcon

I wouldn't take Hazard seriously seeing how he doesn't respect other people around here and how he's clueless about programming yet he makes topics about code issues, commenting on basic code constructs he doesn't understand (source: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=204829.0 )


Just so you finally understand Hazard, a >> shift by 1000000* in this case is essentially the same as dividing by 2^1000000 which would result in an incredibly small number which a computer wouldn't be able to reproduce anyway, hence you can consider it 0. Source: I'm a programmer, relevant programming 101 guide for you: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/510681/in-c-programming-can-i-use-multiply-and-divide-to-shift-bits

* Note that I'm not sure why a shift by 1000000 was put in the code in the first place, that's wrong for other reasons which I'm sure the OP has discovered by now and has since fixed.

{
    "blocks" : 15441,
    "currentblocksize" : 1000,
    "currentblocktx" : 0,
    "difficulty" : 1.58178658,
    "errors" : "",
    "generate" : false,
    "genproclimit" : -1,
    "hashespersec" : 0,
    "networkhashps" : 281410631,
    "pooledtx" : 0,
    "testnet" : false
}

(run elacoind getmininginfo and paste it here, there's a fork with an older chain and some people being on it)

If you're on this chain, then I bid 1 LTC.

I bought Aggrophobia's 35. Not sure if he has more to sell or not.

Ah, that sucks Sorry.

Hmm... I don't seem to have received them in my client. I traded with Aggrophobia earlier and they got here instantly.

Hopefully you're not on the wrong fork?

Can you paste the output of elacoind getinfo ?

Current block count should be 14879

Okay, but you must send first. We can do it in smaller chunks if you want less risk.

Address:
EVA6abzxTzEVdWcTHVzhym6rURrkZu4BN3

PM me after you send with your litecoin address.

Buying 100 ELC @ 5 LTC.

0.2

One solution to the Sybil problem would be to only allow a certain amount of "providers" in the network. Say, not more than 10,000 (exact number to be determined, you could start with less)

Then, have some sort of proof of work system through which interested parties generate a "provider node" token *. Make it extremely difficult, exponentially, so that it is very hard to become a provider. Make provider nodes expire after say 1 month, but allow existing owners to renew their nodes once they have them.

Allow banning of nodes, effectively making them lose their provider node if they become untrustworthy, and return the node to the pool, giving someone else a chance to run a trusty provider node.

* As an example, you could start with a fork of bitcoin, allow people to mine coins which they can use to buy provider node tokens. Say the first provider node costs 100 qucoins, the second 200, the third costs 400, etc.

If you truly want to make a long-term coin, I would suggest a few things:

• Changing the POW algorithm.
  
  Changing the POW algo gives the coin the ability to grab its own long term miner share. Make it minable only by CPUs.  Take a look at Hokkaido or MBound.
  
  
• Also, consider a Bell curve for generation so that after 5-6 years your generation rate starts dropping until there is a fixed inflation of 2-3% per year forever. This will actually make the coin useful in a future economy, and is on par with the inflation of the world population and even the mining of precious metals such as gold.
  
  
• I would also suggest having at most 2 decimals, if Bitcoin started at Satoshi levels instead of Bitcoin when pegged on exchanges, it would've been much more psychologically attractive to buyers. $1 for 980k ish Satoshi sounds better than $100 for 1 Bitcoin for the "terminally stupid.".
  
  Since value will obviously be small to begin with, you could take the example of Ripple, where things are traded for 100K Ripples for example, rather than the much more confusing .001 BTC or 1mBTC, with the added pressure of this having to change again to uBTC and Satoshi at a further point in time when the value becomes too great.
  
  Say you tried to mimic Bitcoin which has 2,100,000,000,000,000 total units, your block reward could start at 1 billion (equivalent of 1 in 21,000,000 units) and increase from there. Denominating trades in 1 billion currency units is not unheard of, obviously, and will lead to a lot less problems down the road.
  
  
• Not naming it -coin. 'Ripple' sounds much better than 'bitcoin' and is definitely more SciFi/futureish than -coin. It will also help differentiate the new currency among the plethora of alts.

In 2011 there wasn't an actual flash crash, it merely went from a quick rise to $31 back to $18 in the timespan of a few days, after which there was a major hack at MtGox which knocked it offline for a few days.

There was a lot of bad press surrounding this, and people lost confidence - also, there was much less liquidity in the market then, and barely any places to spend any coins. Hardly any bad press now.

I disagree, the bubble did not pop because people cashed out. It popped because people wanted to make a day trade and grow their portfolios. This is apparent from the record volume following in the days after the "pop".

Personally, after seeing lag get to 20 minutes+, I sold for this exact same reason. I knew people would sell after me, I was almost guaranteed a good trade by the time it executed, and I could always cancel it if it didn't pan out as planned.

I assume there's a very minor percentage of people that actually cashed out, as in, withdrawn their fiat after selling.

But yes, the trading lag did contribute greatly to the bubble popping the way it did. It offered everyone who was vigilant an incredible advantage. I'm fairly certain that if there wouldn't have been any lag, the drop would've stopped much sooner - maybe in the ~$180 range.

I would support this idea in concert with some sort of decentralized exchange.

MtGox can then issue MtGoxUSD colored coins, which get exchanged for BTC, and can be redeemed at MtGox later on by their new owner. MtGox would just be a broker, and so would the rest of the current exchanges. The decentralized exchange would handle the trade of colored coins for BTC, and work through some sort of publicly auditable blockchain.

A market order is either a sell at $0 or a buy at $inf as far as the trading engine is concerned. You won't be selling at 0 or buying at $inf because it matches bids so you get the best deal. However, there's no extra complexity in a market order.

At most 180k coins were sold as per the MtGox volume of that day, but realistically, much less than that because volume includes both buys and sells, and any day trades.

If someone indeed sells 1 million coins, the price would go down to $0.1, not $50, not $30. There is not enough depth in the bid side to accommodate a 1 million selloff.

Looks like MtGox not only froze trading but also bitcoin withdrawals, I've withdrawn 4 hours ago prior to trade being stopped and even though it shows the withdraw in my account, there is no record of it in the blockchain whatsoever.

I'm mostly annoyed, and a little concerned.