Thank you!

As I said, I have to think more about it (I'm thinking on pool cheaters part of two different pools and how to control it). And I thought about it because I think the current situation is not fair, miners can get a fair fee for the calculations, but running nodes and propagating miners new blocks is done by some fools who wants to do it for free. I think it is not fair.

I do not agree with some part of your article. In my opinion, on bitcoin we have now clearly a representative democracy system (that, as we say in my home country, doesn't work): we have delegated our votes to the mining pools. It is not true that people who run a full node get to "vote" on bitcoin system. Nobody can buys votes by setting up nodes, because nodes don't vote. We can open posts following the number of XT nodes, create spoofing XT clients or whatever we want. At the end, Gavin only has to convince five or ten people from the mining pools, and his fork will win.

If every node of the network could choose to ban today any new block with a XT flag in the header (not all the blocks in the blockchain, as I think there is one right now for example, just the last one that wants to be propagated), things would be much different, I think. I would find this a more effective (and direct ) way for voting against XT than spoofing. Threating miners to not validate their blocks if they dare to flag it as XT and risking that some other pool without the XT flag will make their block validated would make harder to create a network effect in which every pool starts to mine with the XT flag "just in case".

Yes, I know that we could do it right now, and that could potentially be another extra hard fork issue right now instead of waiting to January to see if Gavin wins, but much more people could take part of this, instead of trusting that 5 people signing a PDFs written in chinese will "represent" ( ) us.

I have always thought that running a node should be rewarded in some way. But instead of thinking in charging the users, I was thinking in charging the miners.

My idea was some sort of "pool of nodes", similar to a pool of miners. Imagine that some nodes are part of the pool of nodes, once the miners send the new block mined, the pool of nodes will check if that block has included a "tip" to the pool's address (or may be it is better to call it a fee), and the pool will propagate the block only if the fee is present.

The incentive to the miners for tiping the pool is that there will be a higher risk of their new mined block will not be accepted as good as it could be competing with another block mined by other miner that paid the fee, and it is propagated by the pool A.

But I need to think of it deeply.