A risk market...

[Anonymous]

The 30 day block on withdrawing cash from mtgox means there might be a market for a service that charges extra fees to assume the risk of earlier withdrawals.

What would the fee need to be to cover the risk involved?

Would you pay extra to be able to withdraw in  shorter time frames such as 2 -5-10-20 or 25 days?

What if you paid a security deposit to let you have this feature in all your future withdrawals? Once you reached a certain trusted user level you would get this paid back to you?


Maybe this is something mt gox might offer its customers?

[SmokeTooMuch]

Maybe we need an exchange market with "real ID's", like with post-ident or something.
Maybe I`m wrong here, but I think anonymity isn't necessary while exchanging currencies.
When we know the identity of our trading partner we can press charges against him.
This could lead to less-doubious trades, but I guess it isnt 100% safe, and the need to reveal a persons true identity will probably lead to a very small user base ...

An alternative to this would be a good "trust system", maybe with different layers of trust. the higher you are (the more you become trusted) the more you can trade. Only thing I'm not quite sure about is how the process of "trusting someone" is supposed to be.
Maybe something like a karma (thumbs up/down) system I've seen in some boards. Or maybe like a detailed rating like ebay has.

Another alternative would be a real official escrow service (I hope my definition of escrow service is right). Best without the option to retract the money (breach of contract).
A real Ltd. or something with someone who is responsible for all actions, someone who can be charged if he is stealing BTC's or (other) money. But I guess the only way to make this system attractive will be relatively high fees, and who wants to pay even more than with paypal ?


I don't know what the best option will be but what I do know is that we need to realise something like that soon.

[gekko]

Maybe we need an exchange market with "real ID's", like with post-ident or something.
Maybe I`m wrong here, but I think anonymity isn't necessary while exchanging currencies.
When we know the identity of our trading partner we can press charges against him.
This could lead to less-doubious trades, but I guess it isnt 100% safe, and the need to reveal a persons true identity will probably lead to a very small user base ...

I think this is a necessity if bitcoin is to gain mainstream acceptance. The rules and laws of the First Realm must be obeyed when crossing into and out of the Second Realm. Here is a  chart illustrating the concept:

BTC <-> $ =  FIRST REALM: Real ID necessary for tax reporting for any entity to exist legally in the "real world". Also provides legal accountability for large transactions. No entity can avoid this and hope to exist in any large scale.

BTC <-> Goods and Services  = SECOND REALM: Tax reporting may or may not be required and is largely unenforceable if it is. Parties can remain anonymous if they chose.

[jgarzik]

The 30 day block on withdrawing cash from mtgox means there might be a market for a service that charges extra fees to assume the risk of earlier withdrawals.

What would the fee need to be to cover the risk involved?

Would you pay extra to be able to withdraw in  shorter time frames such as 2 -5-10-20 or 25 days?

What if you paid a security deposit to let you have this feature in all your future withdrawals? Once you reached a certain trusted user level you would get this paid back to you?

Seems like a Catch-22, to ask for extra payment because the payment itself may be bogus.

[kiba]

A withdrawal insurance company. Interesting idea.

I love how people come up with solutions that doesn't coerce people.

[srb123]

bitcoinmarket.com will get around the 30day block would it not?

I think we are going to see a big spike in volume over there next week as people who want to take their profits get impatient. (about next tuesday, because tuesday's are boring.)

[Anonymous]

The 30 day block on withdrawing cash from mtgox means there might be a market for a service that charges extra fees to assume the risk of earlier withdrawals.

What would the fee need to be to cover the risk involved?

Would you pay extra to be able to withdraw in  shorter time frames such as 2 -5-10-20 or 25 days?

What if you paid a security deposit to let you have this feature in all your future withdrawals? Once you reached a certain trusted user level you would get this paid back to you?

Seems like a Catch-22, to ask for extra payment because the payment itself may be bogus.

I suppose they could just do the same with the security deposit payment.  Maybe paid in btc would stop some of it.

[ribuck]

The problem isn't occurring on MtGox's side of things, it's occurring on PayPal's.

The scammer gains access to a PayPal account that isn't theirs, then uses the PayPal funds to buy Bitcoins. If the scammer can withdraw the bitcoins before the owner of the PayPal account finds out and gets PayPal to reverse the transaction, the scammer has won.

Even if the legitimate owner of the PayPal account has a perfect reputation, PayPal is still going to reverse the transaction if someone else uses that account fraudulently.

If someone offered insurance to cover this, it wouldn't work. The honest user would never buy the insurance, because they know their PayPal payment will be good. The scammer would always buy the insurance, because they know there is a high risk of PayPal reversing the transaction. The insurance company would go out of business.

On the other hand, a valid and viable insurance model would be to allow people to pay a premium to cover the risk of losing their MtGox balance if MtGox went out of business in the 30 days after an exchange is carried out and before the bitcoins can be withdrawn. I wonder what the market rate would be for that, per month?

[Anonymous]

I never blamed mt gox I know paypal are douchebags and always sell out their merchants. What we really need is a payment processor that doesnt have chargebacks.

[idev]

What we really need is a payment processor that doesnt have chargebacks.

Take your pick:
Liberty Reserve, Pecunix, Liqpay, Strictpay, Routepay, Solidtrustpay, c-gold, Global Digital Pay, ECUmoney, WebMoney, V-Money, Fethard,
PerfectMoney, Epayarea, Epassport, Procurrex. Contact, OkPay, Ukash, CashU, Wallie, Paysafecard, Gbullion. HDmoney.

[SmokeTooMuch]

Take your pick:
[...]Ukash, CashU,[...] Paysafecard,[..]

But you can't change back prepaid cards into money, and I guess all the others are little to none known.
I guess we should compare all of them and pick the best one for our purposes and make it a quasi-standard.

[idev]

Take your pick:
[...]Ukash, CashU,[...] Paysafecard,[..]

But you can't change back prepaid cards into money, and I guess all the others are little to none known.
I guess we should compare all of them and pick the best one for our purposes and make it a quasi-standard.

Oh yes you can, you can exchange them for cash or other e-currencies like BC.

[SmokeTooMuch]

I was thinking of something a bit different.
If one of us would host an own Payment Processor, I mean a real business, then I guess (not sure if my thoughts are bulletproof, having some headaches right now) there could be a way of making sure that every real person only owns one account.

The scheme would be like this:

A customer registers at the PP(payment processor) with all of his data.
Real name, real adress, real phone number, (maybe a copy od his ID),a public key and two passwords.
One of that is a usual password, you type it on the keyboard. The other one consists only of numbers (5+ digits) and won't be typed on the keyboard, but on a virtual keyboard on the screen with the mouse. The virtual keyboard looks like the number block on the keyboard but the position of each number is randomly chosen.
7 8 9              5 1 0
4 5 6   ---->    3 8 4
1 2 3              7 9 2
   0                   6
This way we make sure, that no keylogger can log the registration process.
Then all of this data gets encrypted and send to the PP which will decrypt it.

Now the PP checks all of this data for validity. Adress (and maybe phone number) have to be connected to the provided real name, like in a public phone book or somehting. Then the PP will send a letter with some random text to the adress. The customer have to call the PP via phone with the provided real phone number and repeat the received text.

After the verification process the PP creates a certificate with the customer data and encrypts it with his own private key (to make it save against edits). then another encryption with the customers puplic key and sends it to the customer (maybe on a usb drive via mail, not sure about this yet).

The customer now decrypts the file with the PP's public key and now has his authentifaction file.
Now everytime the customer logs in he has to upload this file, has to type his password and again his "number password" on a rotating virtual number block.

This processing makes sure:
-that the password cant get logged
-cracking a password is a lot more difficult because you will need to crack the real password plus the number password which will provide the 100000th fold security of the normal password (5+ digits = at least 5^10) plus to make a automated cracking script you first need to make the script recognize the number fields on the virtual keyboard
-sniffing the network for the certificates isnt enough because you also need the password
-if you are able to crack the password you still need to sniff the network for the certificate file



Well I really hope this would work and I'm not typing bullshit right now, this headache is killing me.