Thanks, gmaxwell, and thanks, shinohai, for jumping in.What I hear you saying (in simple terms):• This is not new. People have put malware or signatures in the chain for years.
• Exporting blocks and poking them until an AV trips is not a real-world workflow. If someone does that, it is their problem.
• Bigger OP_RETURN cannot be stopped without a consensus change, and data can go in other places anyway.
• If this were going to cause trouble, we would have seen it already. At worst a few Windows nodes get annoyed, and XOR on disk helps.
• P2P encryption keeps dumb firewalls from killing connections.
• You are skeptical of AI-flavored posts trying to make Bitcoin look bad.
My reply:•
Agree on history. Bytes in the chain are old news. My point is narrower: on v30.0rc1 a common AV
flags the block file itself when a ZIP’d signature is embedded via OP_RETURN. That is a specific, repeatable result with scripts anyone can run.
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Exports and plaintext copies are real. Teams export blocks for debugging, research, support, and backup. NAS and backup scanners, CI and email gateways create and scan plaintext copies. I even had a security email bounce because the gateway flagged the artifact. This does not require exotic steps.
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XOR helps at rest, not end to end. Fresh v28+ IBD uses XOR on disk. It does not help when you export, back up, or share data, or when Core reads data to serve it. Many nodes have mixed or non-XOR data.
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Other data paths exist, yes. That does not change this point:
making OP_RETURN larger makes it easier and more frequent to drop content AVs already search for (ZIPs, nested archives, multiple signatures). Easier and more frequent means more incidents for operators.
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Not a consensus ask. I am not proposing a consensus rule. I am asking that this operational risk be acknowledged while discussing OP_RETURN policy, because it affects real nodes and backups.
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P2P encryption is unrelated. The repro is about files and exports being scanned at rest or in transit on backup and mail systems, not about in-flight P2P filtering.
Concrete ask If this exact operational risk was already considered and accepted, please point to the issue, PR, or mailing list discussion. If not, a short acknowledgement and a tracking reference for v30.0rc1 would close the loop. I am happy for others to run the scripts and post their results.
Thread with scripts and proof (regtest, safe malware test string):
Security disclosure: OP_RETURN embedding of Malware signatures into Blockchain