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Author Topic: Why Proof of Burn cannot work cleanly in practice  (Read 1581 times)
TPTB_need_war
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November 16, 2015, 01:51:56 PM
Last edit: November 16, 2015, 02:34:40 PM by TPTB_need_war
 #21

Inertia is an interpretation of the (history of the) UTXO. It it is the context in which it is interpreted that gives rise to my design. Sure anyone can make transactions to themselves and even avoid TX fees if they are also the confirmation delegate to Sybil attack the UTXO, but...

I don't have enough info to reason about this Smiley I'll have to wait for your doc

I was purposeful too vague and abstract Embarrassed.

Just because someone can Sybil attack the UTXO, doesn't necessarily follow they can Sybil attack the "inertia" which an interpretation (a chronological, partitioned structuring) of the UTXO. Someone could send a zillion transactions to their Sybil addresses (if they can recoup the TX fees by running their own full node), but if the rest of the inertia doesn't consume those UTXO, then it isn't inertia and it is a private, virtual "subnetwork" of the attacker.

I have mentioned the long-term inertia limits the rate of change in the near-term (a form of anti-aliasing) so that objective reality in the near-term moves into the long-term history before the rate of change could enable a double-spend by "replacing the 51% of delegated authority".

It is not possible for collusion of delegates to prevent even very small percentages of the inertia from being confirmed by an ever spreading percentage of the inertia, thus the colluding delegates implicitly remove themselves from the system by censoring the growing inertia. Unlike with PoW, there is no way to stomp out all permission-less activity as it acts more like a virus that spreads. The only way to be congruent with the virus-like quality of the inertia is to not censor any portion of the inertia. During battles over perspective, there can be partial orders (partitions) in terms of consensus, but there can't be invalidity because of the anti-aliasing. The payee only has to fear that a particular partition will complete die, but due to the way inertia infects itself, this is extremely unlikely. I think I read that all of us are connected by on average only 5 degrees-of-acquaintances. Again consensus systems are probabilistic. Just like with Bitcoin, the probability of an orphaned virtual partition declines over time. One difference from Bitcoin is there isn't the requirement of not more than one virtual partition (just one longest chain), yet convergence is probabilistically inevitable. If you conceptually combined DPOS and Iota, you'd be closer to my design.

The inertia is in control. It is a force of the users. It is what we idealistically thought PoW was supposed to be as a decentralized vote. The incentive of the user to be able to transaction freely (with any human at any time, not just some portion of the UTXO) is the inertia.

One of the important aspects of making this work correctly is going entirely against the concept that Bitcoin should be only for a reserve currency for the large stake holders. To make my design work, the users of currency must be the determinants of the inertia. Micro-transactions and the need to transact widely with any one at any time without any Lightning Network corporate servers building "harvestwalls" (or however data harvesting is employed to extract profit) or other means of the rich continuing to parasite on and interfere/throttle/limit the individuals (the entropic force) that is the real economy.

I think that will be enough hints for now.

Edit: one more point is that if there are multiple long-term histories, the most objective one is the one which has all the (valid) transactions, i.e. combine the multiple histories if no one else has yet. In my analysis thus far, I have not found an ambiguity in the objectivity. The key design insight was employing anti-aliasing to make validity unambiguous.

d5000
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November 17, 2015, 01:02:07 AM
 #22

My point is that unless the currency fluctuation is extreme to the point of causing general economic malaise, then the users of that currency as a unit-of-account have no appreciable individualized risk risk w.r.t. to the international exchange fluctuations.

I got your point here and it's perfectly acceptable for me. I have some doubts if it's possible for a cryptocurrency to become that stable (that's why I mentioned national fiat currencies). Ideally it should be that way, yes. I don't want to profoundize this issue because I think it's not that relevant for the discussion of Proof-of-burn's security.

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Thus if a crypto-currency is intended to become a currency (e.g. a unit-of-account), then the "nothing at risk" will apply and my point is the "rich get richer" applies.
So let's take an ideal crypto-currency without significant price variations. Then the risk still is larger than zero because Proof of Burn does not return you exactly what you deposited, like Proof of Stake does. There are several variables that have incidence, being the most important the fluctuation of the amount of total "burnt" coins (if you burn, you cannot predict if there will be larger burns in the near future that may affect your profit).

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In short, I don't see how adding risk to stake or burn deposits improves the issues with "nothing at stake" and advantage to those with the most to stake.

Here i think you misinterpreted me (I am sorry, I am not a native English speaker). I don't think PoB improves over PoS when considering the Nothing at stake problem. What I think is that in PoB there is a less direct relation between wealth and mining/minting rewards. That whole sentence was an answer to clemahieu's posting.

I also am aware of the "Short sell / Pirate attack".

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It is a simple fact that volatility declines with increased liquidity (participation) and thus price. So by definition a more volatile and risky investment will have a smaller market cap and thus less security (relatively speaking). Even in my proposal to use "inertia" at the objective metric of consensus, the larger the participation, then the stronger the security of more inertia (at least the "inertia" I have in mind scales by n2 though).

That's completely true, my intention was not to put this into question.

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Whereas, your described a design where risk declines as value increases, thus your security that depends on risk declines as the value increases which could provide more security. So you have two things working against each other in that design. Seems flawed.

That would be totally flawed, I agree Wink. But again, you misunderstood me. The equation of the Slimcoin and similar PoB designs is not "more risk - more security". It is totally true that in a mature market with less volatility also in Slimcoin's design the security is higher.

Perhaps I was not clear enough to make this distinction: In the first stage of a cryptocurrency - talking about the first six months, for example - in a Proof of Burn design like Slimcoin's, there can be a high participation rate although the value still is small and volatile. In Slimcoin, this ocurred, because many people saw burning in the first stage as an opportunity to grow their amount of coins and speculated on a increasing or at least stable price. But that does not mean that it's security is higher in this first volatile phase. First, because in a mature market participation should be high too because of the lesser risk, as you correctly point out, and second, because of the then probably higher price of the coins you must burn to have a possibility to attack the chain.

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earonesty
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March 07, 2016, 07:15:05 PM
 #23

You have to burn within the last 50 blocks, you cannot burn more recently than the last 10 blocks.   This effectively implements a "checkpoint".   Change the numbers of blocks as needed so that you're talking about days and hours.
monsterer (OP)
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March 07, 2016, 07:39:04 PM
 #24

You have to burn within the last 50 blocks, you cannot burn more recently than the last 10 blocks.   This effectively implements a "checkpoint".   Change the numbers of blocks as needed so that you're talking about days and hours.

'When' are the last 10 blocks?
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