Miner anonymity & pool capping - Also, Hi!

[Chakravanti]

Okay so this is kind of a rough intro but I've been reading a while to figure this out so bear with me and help me figure out what I may be missing! 

I've read about instituting a proof of work over on mining pools and was wondering if a shorter, block sized (avg diff 10m) proof of work were determined to be integral to your signing the proof of work  then for that ten minutes.  Doing so generates a report on your collective working capabilities for network expectations and also creating a medium for a reliable forward means of estimation of difficulty response to network preformance (if desired).  The proof of work can then be sent back to the network for checking and the cost of checking computational power can be afforded the checker after the proof of work's key begins work.  At the network level this can be based on a checker's power against participation odds. 

Then, single largest processing participant of the network is considered responsible for verifying new participants unless other users opt to ask for a share within their processing capabilities.  Offering miners a smaller stream of reliable income an compensation for participation regardless of odds of block generation success against larger pools.  Because you can't come to the table demanding a large share of computational power required to be verified unless you actually have that computational power.  Note that the network could demand a proof of work multiple times the network expectancy based on requests to join the network and the network power itself to continue hashing while checking.  Making it insular to infiltration but difficult also creates a distraction if an attacker tries to generate a steady stream of pow's instead of actually preforming work scalability of difficulty can make it next to impossible to join and adding a veteran's hash that can earn a standard difficulty pow issue from the network under such stresses (or scalable relative to a rank to work done).  So that resilience can be selective.

Proofs of work also mean that miners can be anonymized by non computing network participants opting in to network stabilization and buffering routing assistance.  Origin of work sent ot the network can be irrelevant.

With short proofs of work required to gain entry into hashing, participation of greater than %50 can be blocked for one block.  In exchange for preforming a majority (?) of pow verifications a participant can be allowed to participate up to two blocks generated if network demand for it is high (though this can be denied if an attack condition is triggered).

Preventing finny attack by making it progressively impossible to hold a majority of repeated generations while compensating them for the responsibility of network integrity under stress regardless of actual size.  The extra work of verification creates an 'over %50' power buffer value that can buy a majority miner some forgiveness by reason of subverted work toward blocks generated. 

Anyway, that's my 2BTC.  Any feedback is appreciated, thanks in advance.