[THREAD FOR ALTCOIN IDEAS]

[Ayers]

i like a coin that can solve completely the size of the blockchain by resume the blockchain from a previous more recent point without the need of pruning and with the possibility of using different wallet after you activate this not like pruning where you need to resync again, i also like faster confirmation but not with orpahn and more anonymous coin like zcash/zcoin

[Blockchain Mechanic]

i like a coin that can solve completely the size of the blockchain by resume the blockchain from a previous more recent point without the need of pruning and with the possibility of using different wallet after you activate this not like pruning where you need to resync again, i also like faster confirmation but not with orpahn and more anonymous coin like zcash/zcoin

i have been tackling the first idea you mentioned. I tried running it on a testnet, but my idea is incomplete. So far online wallets have no trouble with the transition, but new wallets have trouble with  syncing.

I'll highlight the problems

1) the new block created as a "balances checkpoint" must be dead accurate
2) How do we prevent a miner from manipulating balances in this block
  -- Maybe have local machines audit the data ? or
  -- Have the block only be produced with a special dev signing key ?
3) New wallets  they just start from the last "balances checkpoint"?
  -- If so how do they ensure they are on the right chain ? Genesis block isn't enough, since attackers can create a fork just as long or even longer than active chain.
4) In case of catastrophic re-org / fork , what then ?

[ArcCsch]

Have the block only be produced with a special dev signing key ?

"Hello federal reserve system!"

[iamnotback]

Idea #B:
This idea is related to the Bitcoin Tic-Tac Coopetition mining thread.
The idea is to use multiple types of PoW (SHA2-256, SHA3, scrypt, my scheme from idea #A) for the same blockchain, but to enforce the PoW to cycle over the blocks.
For example, the first block must be SHA2-256, the second must be SHA3 the third must be scrypt, the forth must be my scheme from idea #A, the fifth must be SHA2-256 again, and so on cyclically.
This supports the same idea as the Tic-Tac proposal, namely that specialized hardware must lay fallow for most of the time, and a 51% attacker must have a lot of each type of hardware.
This also allows unspecialised hardware to have a chance, as it can switch from one kind of mining to another.

Yours is based on two incorrect, flawed ideas:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1654457.msg17158224#msg17158224

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1709496.msg17159826#msg17159826

Please n00bs stop trying to think you are any where near expert enough to design a secure consensus ordering system.

[ArcCsch]

Idea #C
Additional incentives to mine, like a bitmessage type system or reserved space in blocks, those incentives have a marginal utility that declines quickly with amount, reducing the incentive for large centralized mining farms, those incentives must somehow be impossible to transfer or outsource. This would give normal people an incentive to mine.