JOIN OR DIE! United We Stand... Divided We Fall!

[gjhiggins]

Actually, companies co-operatives are generally formed as a way to pool resources so that they can accomplish something bigger than the individual members could do otherwise.  Some bring ideas.  Some bring talent.  And some bring cash.  All are necessary to the success of the company co-operative and owning shares is a way to keep track of relative contributions and to proportionally distribute the rewards of success.

Placing overly-generalized specialized labels on things limits you to the minor leagues in the arena of ideas.

ftfy

Cheers

Graham

[iGotSpots]

Why is the snake in pieces if it's supposed to be a united effort?

Because, if the snake doesn't unite against the threat it faces, it will die.

Fair enough. You win this round

[TheMage]

Loaded poll questions are loaded....

[StanLarimer]

Actually, companies are generally formed as a way to pool resources so that they can accomplish something bigger than the individual members could do otherwise.  Some bring ideas.  Some bring talent.  And some bring cash.  All are necessary to the success of the company and owning shares is a way to keep track of relative contributions and to proportionally distribute the rewards of success.

Yes, you can build a big company and it can become evil like any human-run institution of any type.  
But the core idea of a company as a way to organize pooled resources is neither good nor evil.

Placing overly-generalized labels on things limits you to the minor leagues in the arena of ideas.

Stan, I don't have a problem with corporations.  I have a problem with corporations which attempt to control entire economic systems to monopolistic ends.  Monopoly is the menace of free enterprise.

Then you don't understand the BitShares Ecosystem. 
Every business built on BitShares is independent.
Think of BitShares as a shopping mall that provides common services like utilities, internet, and parking lots for independent businesses who move in to take advantage of an environment in which they can prosper.

In this case, the common services provided by BitShares include:

The Origin of BitShares
Part 9
What is a SuperDAC?

SuperDAC - noun - soup-er-dak
A Decentralized Autonomous Company (DAC) providing common services that support layering of other DAC business models onto a common public ledger for the sake of shared network effect.

The need to merge our various DACs into a single "SuperDAC" was based on the realization that they all needed a whole bunch of common services that are much less effective if they aren't common services:

• A unified basket of stable, robust global currencies (bitAssets)
  
• A unified set of well compensated, best-of-breed delegates.
• A unified name system.
• A unified secure messaging system.
• A unified set of on and off ramps - portals to the fiat world.
• A unified marketing message.
• A unified consensus-based governing system.
• A unified family of tools and wallets.
• A unified way for newcomers to make instant friends with everyone already there.
• A built-in venture capital system where you can compete for start-up funds - democratically.

New business developers (DAC engineers) shouldn't want to reinvent these things any more than I would want to reinvent my computer's device drivers and operating system.  And what sense would it make to have different competing operating systems, each with a subset of drivers and services?

Gee, I sure wish I could go back in time and invest in MS-DOS. 
Rats. 
An opportunity like that will never come around again.

BitShares took the whole ecosystem into one DAC friendly free-trade zone with all the services that benefit from network effect already in place.

Any developer who wants to build a business would be crazy to stay on the outside and try to replicate that.  Even if they can pick up the toolkit and get all the functions - the network effect doesn't come with the toolkit!  You get that by joining the club.  You still run your own business with its own custom storefront and Internet presence.  You just skipped a year or two of trying to get traffic to stop by!

[DecentralizeEconomics]

Actually, companies are generally formed as a way to pool resources so that they can accomplish something bigger than the individual members could do otherwise.  Some bring ideas.  Some bring talent.  And some bring cash.  All are necessary to the success of the company and owning shares is a way to keep track of relative contributions and to proportionally distribute the rewards of success.

Yes, you can build a big company and it can become evil like any human-run institution of any type.  
But the core idea of a company as a way to organize pooled resources is neither good nor evil.

Placing overly-generalized labels on things limits you to the minor leagues in the arena of ideas.

Stan, I don't have a problem with corporations.  I have a problem with corporations which attempt to control entire economic systems to monopolistic ends.  Monopoly is the menace of free enterprise.

Then you don't understand the BitShares Ecosystem. 
Every business built on BitShares is independent.
Think of BitShares as a shopping mall that provides common services like utilities, internet, and parking lots for independent businesses who move in to take advantage of an environment in which they can prosper.

I understand Bitshares perfectly.  Because you use "approval voting", a very small minority of the wealthiest shareholders can effectively rig all the delegate elections in their favor, thus controlling the entire Bitshares ecosystem.  This is Corporatism.  The delegates (aka business interests) of the Bitshares plutocracy are funded by forced wealth redistribution carried out via taxation (aka inflation) without representation.  This is Communism.  Corporatism / Communism is not free market capitalism.

[cosmoo]

Nice thread, I'm enjoying it

[StanLarimer]

I understand Bitshares perfectly.  Because you use "approval voting", a very small minority of the wealthiest shareholders can effectively rig all the delegate elections in their favor, thus controlling the entire Bitshares ecosystem.  This is Corporatism.  The delegates (aka business interests) of the Bitshares plutocracy are funded by forced wealth redistribution carried out via taxation (aka inflation) without representation.  This is Communism.  Corporatism / Communism is not free market capitalism.

And a very small (but slightly bigger) group of small stakeholders can unite overrule them!

The project is run by the 101 people most trusted by those who own the shares.
The only people who own the shares are those who agree that they want to own something that can fund its own growth.
Those who don't like the direction of the majority are free to sell, and are thus not coerced to have any of their wealth redistributed.
(Votes control what the future dilution rate will be and anyone is free leave in 10 seconds, before it can happen to them.)
... or move into bitAssets which are not affected by the the tiny core asset issue rate (about a quarter percent total over the past 5 months).

Compare that to Bitcoin.  How many small stakeholders does it take to overrule the top two mining enterprises?  What about the 10% annual dilution that is burned unnecessarily by its miners?

How is Bitcoin handling such issues these days?  
BitShares is explicitly designed to avoid the very problems Bitcoin is experiencing right now:

https://bitcoinfoundation.org/forum/index.php?/topic/1284-the-truth-about-the-bitcoin-foundation/

[Daedelus]

Can delegates be shareholders?

Your explantion assumes that they can't.

[StanLarimer]

Many shareholders are delegates.
Since delegates get paid in shares, I'd venture to say that ALL delegates are shareholders.
Whether you are a delegate or not you get to vote your shares like anyone else.

[Daedelus]

Many shareholders are delegates.
Since delegates get paid in shares, I'd venture to say that ALL delegates are shareholders.
Whether you are a delegate or not you get to vote your shares like anyone else.

How many shares would it take for delegates to be able to vote themselves in indefinitely?

[StanLarimer]

Each delegate candidate is evaluated separately.
Each share either approves or does not approve of each and every candidate.
Approving of every candidate is the same as approving of none - you don't change the pecking order at all.

The top 101 candidates with the most number of approving shares serve while they are most approved.
That can change in 10 seconds.

So, if a whale owns 1% it will take just 1% of the other shares agreeing on some other slate of 101 to cancel her out.

[Daedelus]

How many shares would it take for delegates to be able to vote themselves in indefinitely?

[StanLarimer]

How many shares would it take for delegates to be able to vote themselves in indefinitely?

If any group of owners forms a coalition of 51% of the stake, they would be able to lock in their set of delegates.

To the extent that the rest of the owners are unable to unanimously agree on a different slate, that number could be lower.

Sound familiar?  Same as some group getting 51% of Bitcoin's hash power.

But, since behavior of a slate of delegates is transparently visible to everybody, a "bad" slate would be immediately apparent.
Outraged wailing and gnashing of teeth would ensue.

Should that happen, someone would surely launch a competing clone by doing a sharedrop on only keys that did not continue to support the evil slate.

Now, the market and businesses in the ecosystem would have to choose
between the rogue fork and the fork with the rest of the stakeholders.

Presumably, if the behavior was sufficiently objectionable, the honest chain would win out.  Those "left behind" on the bad chain would have lost their whole attacking stake to the discipline of the marketplace and would have to start over with new capital for their next attack.  Those on the new fork would be compensated by having the shares left behind burned, with a corresponding increase in their percentage of the market cap.  We strongly encourage attackers to do this over and over again.  

With DPOS, crime doesn't pay.

Compare that to POW.  You could try to clone an honest fork, but all that rogue hash power remains untouched, and would follow you there.  

Welcome to the Hotel Hashifornia.
You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.

[DecentralizeEconomics]

We've all been down this road before, but for the sake of any new people reading this, let's show how the Bitshares Plutocracy really controls the blockchain.

How many shares would it take for delegates to be able to vote themselves in indefinitely?

If any group of owners forms a coalition of 51% of the stake, they would be able to lock in their set of delegates.

To the extent that the rest of the owners are unable to unanimously agree on a different slate, that number could be lower.

Sound familiar?  Same as some group getting 51% of Bitcoin's hash power.

But, since behavior of a slate of delegates is transparently visible to everybody, a "bad" slate would be immediately apparent.
Outraged wailing and gnashing of teeth would ensue.

Should that happen, someone would surely launch a competing clone by doing a sharedrop on only keys that did not continue to support the evil slate.

Now, the market and businesses in the ecosystem would have to choose
between the rogue fork and the fork with the rest of the stakeholders.

Presumably, if the behavior was sufficiently objectionable, the honest chain would win out.  Those "left behind" on the bad chain would have lost their whole attacking stake to the discipline of the marketplace and would have to start over with new capital for their next attack.  Those on the new fork would be compensated by having the shares left behind burned, with a corresponding increase in their percentage of the market cap.  We strongly encourage attackers to do this over and over again.  

With DPOS, crime doesn't pay.

Compare that to POW.  You could try to clone an honest fork, but all that rogue hash power remains untouched, and would follow you there.  

Welcome to the Hotel Hashifornia.
You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.

Of course, Stan, you are assuming 100% of the shareholders are voting which they are not.  Last time I checked, you had under 20% of shareholders voting.  Let us assume the following:

- There are 101 delegates
- The first delegate has 20% approval.
- The last delegate has 10% approval.

Now, "approval voting" is counter-intuitive to most people when they think of elections.  With "approval voting", you can vote for as many or as few delegates as you wish.  This allows strategic voters to unduly influence the outcome of the election.  Let us imagine there is a group of shareholders, who for obvious reasons, want to position their own business interests into delegate positions.  It is unknown to the general electorate that these specific businesses are really controlled, funded and backed by this "coalition of the wealthy".  Now, let us furthermore assume that this "coalition of the wealthy" controls 5% of all shares and is participating in the delegate elections.  I'm not a gambling man, but I'd wager that this so called "coalition of the wealthy" would probably control a good amount above 5% of all shares.

The spread between the first delegate and the last delegate is 10%.  We can furthermore assume that a brand new delegate candidate entering the elections will not solely be voted for by this "coalition of the wealthy", but instead will also receive some votes from the general electorate.  Regardless of the proven identities behind these new delegate candidates, it is impossible to know who really controls the so called business of the new delegate candidate.

The "coalition of the wealthy" can remove their 5% share vote from the last fifty delegates and vote them out of power.  In addition, if they can gather >5% support from the general electorate, they can replace the delegate positions with delegates of their own choosing.  Of course, no one really know which delegates are vested business interests of this "coalition of the wealthy".  With increasing profits derived from taxation imposed on the general shareholders, these businesses can further solidify their delegate positions through unrestricted campaigning.  They can also effectively smother out any of their competitors creating a monopoly because their taxation is offset by their collection of revenues from their delegate position.  If a delegate holds >1.01% of all shares, they can operate effectively tax free.

Stan would like for you to believe that this would be detected and stopped by the general shareholders because the delegates would start acting in bad faith.  That is utter nonsense.  This "coalition of the wealthy" and their delegates which they have vested interest wouldn't even conceive of destroying this newly found cash cow that they created and would do everything in their power to keep everything running smoothly to maintain their monopolistic position over the blockchain.

Does this sound like Corporatism to you?

[StanLarimer]

Bingo!

"They would do everything in their power to keep everything running smoothly."  That's all we ask!

With POW systems, you are guaranteed 100% "evil" misuse of the 10% inflation - they are going to waste it generating mining heat.

The DPOS worst case scenario is that a group of delegates get into power and "burn" all 6.3% (max) by spending it on themselves.

(Of course, this would be detected by the rank and file who would wonder why nothing was being accomplished.)

But even if nobody cared enough to form a lynch mob and overrule them, the net result would be a smoothly running system that wastes half of what POW systems waste.

And as for your coalition of the wealthy, everyone is free to form their own "strategic" coalitions.  So if a group of delegates propose a different strategic vision than what the current set is doing, they simply campaign to all the shareholders and find (in your example) 5% of them who will work together for their agenda.

We believe in freedom and everyone, even the "rich" who invested their funds to make it all possible, should have freedom of association.  

As for the rest of the world that did not decide to place their wealth at risk in the system, they don't care as long as the system runs smoothly and faithfully performs services they find useful.

The system works the way its owners want it to work.
(If not, they would not be owners.)
It is open source, so other competing chains can try other rules.
(and we are sure that many will be tried).
There is far more opportunity for owners to get their way than with POW systems where the owners have no say at all!
(The wealthy owners of mining enterprises have all the say and can not be overruled at all.)

Where is the coercion?  
Where is the monopoly?

[Daedelus]

I think you just hit a new low with that misquote Stan.

DE stated that would be their aim to keep themselves in power. You cherry picked it and spun it into business as usual. Then you seem to agree you wouldn't be against this freedom of association.

I know you don't do technical. Is Toast around to factcheck DEs post? I am pretty sure he has the common decency to respond to the points raised.

[StanLarimer]

Let me say it again as as succinctly as I can:

• Anything one group representing x% can do can be offset by forming another group of x%.
• Anybody owning stake has a natural right to vote that stake and collaborate with others who support the same position.
• If large groups alienate smaller groups, the smaller ones can start their own chain and compete for user acceptance.
• People who own BitShares want it that way.  People who don't want it that way don't own BitShares.
• Worst case hostile takeover attempts have remedies that discourage worst case hostile takeover attempts.
• If any of this ever gets to the point where the quality of products and services provided by BitShares are unsatisfactory to its intended customers, it results in an opportunity for someone to clone a competitor that serves those customers better.
• Over time, the fittest solution will be identified by market forces and thrive.
• Rather than complain, why not clone us, implement your preferred approach, and try to compete?

[Daedelus]

• Rather than complain, why not clone us, implement your preferred approach, and try to compete?

I don't think you have been following me, you haven't convinced me that BTS is secure (CfBs word carries mre weight than yours) so why would I contemplate cloning. The only users I have seen saying good things about BTS turn out to be delegates  Toast or tester (?) seemed to be more balanced in their views (though I think they are delegates too). Still, closer to a discussion than a marketing seminar when they are around. Did they not want to drop by?

[DecentralizeEconomics]

• Rather than complain, why not clone us, implement your preferred approach, and try to compete?

No, not now, not tomorrow, not ever!

Some us still believe in the original premise of crypto, that people come first and profits come second.  Regardless of who uses DPoS with approval voting, it will devolve into a situation where a "coalition of the wealthy" will be able to effectively rig the elections and control the crypto-economy via a monopoly.  It seems like free crypto is becoming a lost cause because it is being ever encroached on by corporatization, but to that I say, "I will defend free crypto to the end, because the only causes worth fighting for are lost causes."

[testz]

Who was with BitShares from beginning probably knows the history of DPoS, originaly devs plan to implement TaPOS but with TaPOS it's was impossible to have fast (2 sec) transactions, when they invented DPoS, today BitShares has 10 sec transaction confirmation but I participate in test network where was tested 2 second blocks and DPoS handle such kind of load.

Originaly in DPoS all delegates only get transactions fee, and not like in other crypto when block producer get all fees from transactions in produced block, delegates in DPoS share the fees and get same reward per block as other delegates, so no competition for transactions (fees).

Today DPoS brings inflation to BitShares by paing 100% delegates 50 BTS per block, it's give us ability to hire devs and for me it's an excellent idea.

Don't think that DPoS it's final BitShares consensus algorithm, if we invent something better or other community invent something better and BitShares community support it - we will use it.

If anybody knows consensus algorithm which can provide 1-5 seconds transactions confirmation let's me know. Don't try to convince me that transaction confirmation speed not important - after I use BitShares I know how it's nice and important. 

It's my personal opinion about DPoS 

TaPOS white paper:
https://github.com/super3/invictus.io/blob/master/assets/pdf/TransactionsAsProofOfStake10.pdf