Companies acting on technicalities such as "accelerating payments to cancel each other" makes it apparent that there is a huge conflict of interest.
The only way I see these issues getting resolved is getting fresh managers on board. Would usagi be willing to let us appoint different managers/CEOs to some or all of these funds/companies, if any suitable candidates come up? I'm asking both usagi and the shareholders.
Yes, totally.
I own about 1800 shares of CPA which are non-saleable "management fee" shares and these would be transfered to anyone who wanted to take over CPA.
As for NYAN, it's just a fund of GLBSE securities. If anyone wants to run it either temporarily or permanenty they can. I don't take management fees from NYAN but anyone who wanted to run it would be completely justified in taking 5% which I think is pretty standard.
If anyone is interested in this we can arrange for them to run it for 1, 2, 3 months, or even permanently. We don't even need to motion on it because the business operation and contracts would not change.
If you think you can do a better job you are more than welcome to try. CPA and NYAN have no assets which are not on the GLBSE right now so it would be extremely easy to hire a new manager or CEO.
Maybe that is what is required. Maybe I should step down. Let someone else run the company and do a better job.
I believe CPA and nyan should both be closed down - that's not JUST because usgai is running them. Here's why:
CPA: I don't believe the bitcoin market-place is developed enough (or regulated enough) to be place to run an insurance company. With the majority of busineses being incompetent, scams or run by individuals unable to do their job properly there's just no way to run the type of insurance company CPA set out to be profitably. The risks would be high - and there's pretty much nowhere that the funds can be invested safely enough (and with sufficient liquidity) to be able to make large payouts in a timely fashion AND offer reasonable rates. Depositing the funds in a non-BTC deposit-taker (such as a bank, buying treasury bills or whatever) isn't an alternative due to exchange-rate issues. Which leaves the only safe option as being to hold all (or nearly all) funds as liquid BTC.
There's also the issue of regulatory issues - insurance is one area that falls within the realm of "must be properly licensed/authorised regulated" to conduct in every developed country I can think of. If GLBSE becomes regulated by the FSA then there's absolutely no way it could continue to list an insurance company that didn't comply with the relevant regulations.
Nyan: This was badly structured from the start. Six things were wrong with it:
1. The minor issue of having the pretence of 3 funds while it's in reality 1 fund. This has caused confusion over valuations etc - which SHOULD be totally irrelevant (the only value that matters is what you get back when you sell at the end).
2. No settlement date. There should have been a date at which all nyans would be liquidated and paid out - then restarted (if desired).
3. No fixed amounts of each nyan. This meant that no informed investor could actually calculate the relative merits of each nyan choice - as that depends on the relative numbers of each type.
4. The CPA guarantee. This is no problem for nyan.a investors - but I can't see how it was ever in the interests of CPA shareholders to offer it. I must be missing the bit where they get a hefty payment in return for their exposure to it.
5. Although 4 isn't a problem for nyan.a investors it IS a problem for nyan.b - as every time a nyan.a unit is bought back it reduces their overflow from nyan.a without reducing the benefit they give to nyan.a (in fact it increases it on a per/unit basis - as their protection is spread over less units of nyan.a).
6. Investing in non-liquid assets. With the model used this was bad - as it couldn't withstand a spate of withdrawals. With a proper model (fixed expiry date) then all investments should be such as to be realisable at the expiry date.
In short it should have been:
Defined in size (# of each type or ration of each type),
Fixed expiry date,
Zero buy-backs before expiry (meaing no need for the CPA guarantee).
If CPA underwrote the offer then they should have got a small cut of the pie in return for taking up the slack on whatever units didn't sell (the role nyan parent was supposed to do - but didn't).
Right now, if nyan.b closes down then nyan.a pretty much HAS to close down as well. Without nyan.b (and with nyan.c essentially asset-less) there's zero reason why nyan.a investors should want any cut of their profits (if they make any) going to a nyan.c that contributes nothing in return (it has no assets to back them with any more). This situation is a direct result of the 3 points I just listed not being followed.
The MPEx similar offering is much better structured - though it IS completely hilarious that they invested in nyan.a. I nearly fell off my chair laughing when usagi pointed that out.
Incidentally, one of the biggest problems facing ANY offering on GLBSE is the completely irrational (to the pont of being delusional) expectations of investors here for a ridiculously high rate of return. The only things offering high rates are ponzis/scams, loans (which often default) and minng operations that devalue - making the real ROI way lower than it appears. There ARE ways to make high returns - but typically only on a tiny amount of capital. The mistake, of course, is trying to run something 'real' AND pay the same sort of rates - you're pretty much certain to fail on one of the other of the two objectives (or both, as is the case here).
